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Introduction 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: to present the first operational study of the 
August 1914 Ardennes campaign; to demonstrate that in two particular encounter 
battles the French had the opportunity to inflict a tactical, possibly operational defeat 
upon their opponents but in both cases failed to do so; and to explore the reasons for 
that French failure, by relating events on the battlefield to each side’s pre–war 
preparations.    
On 22 August 1914, on a battlefield one hundred kilometres wide, stretching 
from Luxembourg in the south–east to Dinant on the river Meuse in the north–west, two 
French and two German armies clashed in a series of encounters known collectively as 
the Battle of the Ardennes.  The battle came about as a result of an offensive ordered by 
General Joffre under the overall strategic umbrella of the French Plan XVII, an 
offensive designed to counter the developing German threat to the French left flank. The 
outcome was a clear tactical defeat for the French, whose armies retreated first to their 
start–line and then, in accordance with the general strategic situation, deep into the 
hinterland of France. By 23 August, the day on which the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) met the German First Army at Mons, the focus of the war had already shifted to 
the west bank of the Meuse and the broad open Belgian plain. 
On 22 August, about twenty–seven thousand French soldiers were killed and 
many more men wounded and missing in action.1 Overall German casualties have never 
been published, but individual regimental histories and eye–witness accounts give 
sufficient evidence to suggest that they were similarly high in the combatant units. 
However, the French retreated, defeated; the Germans advanced, victorious. French 
                                                 
1 H. Contamine, La Victoire de la Marne (Eds. Gallimard. Paris, 1970), p.120 
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losses for so little gain and the unanticipated failure of their offensive strategy had to be 
explained: over time the myth of the ‘Cult of the Offensive’ arose. Overlaid with the 
ensuing four years of savage and unheard–of casualties on the Western Front, the legend 
of gallant but suicidal French attacks gained credence amongst many historians.  In 
1930 Liddell Hart wrote: ‘The troops attacked blindly with the bayonet and were mown 
down by machine guns’2; and in 2005 Doughty could still write: ‘Tragically for France, 
many casualties suffered in the attacks from August 14 to 23 were unnecessary and 
came from foolish bayonet charges against an entrenched enemy’.3  
In fact the French Ardennes counter–offensive had had the strategic potential to 
change the course of the war, by cutting the lines of communication of the three 
powerful German right wing armies (Schwenkungsflügel)4 which were seeking to 
execute the ‘Schlieffen Plan’. Indeed the mission and role of the two German central 
armies in the Ardennes was to prevent just such a move. The French failure, following 
as it did their earlier defeats at Sarrebourg and Morhange on 20 August (which battles 
were the main French attack towards the German frontier in Alsace–Lorraine), 
surrendered the strategic initiative to the Germans and dictated the pattern of events 
leading to the Battle of the Marne, the ‘race to the sea’ and stalemate in the trenches.  
 
The first compelling reason for writing this thesis is that there has not yet been an 
operational study of the Battle of the Ardennes as a complete, unitary military 
campaign, in any language. Sewell Tyng’s excellent book The Campaign of the Marne 
devotes one chapter from forty–three to the French perspective of the offensive in the 
                                                 
2 B.H. Liddell Hart, first published as The Real War 1914-1918 in 1930, but this quotation taken from 
History of the First World War ( Cassell & Co Ltd., London, 1973), p.82 
 
3 R.A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory (Harvard University Press, 2005), p.75 
 
4 H.H. Herwig, The Marne, 1914 (Random House, New York, 2009), p.50: translated as ‘pivot wing’. 
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Ardennes;5 Terence Zuber’s The Battle of the Ardennes, 1914  only claims to be a 
tactical comparative study and even then focuses predominantly on German tactical 
performance in individual encounters, giving the French side much less attention.6 
Apart from Tyng’s and Zuber’s works, the battle has so far either been hastily 
summarised in general histories of the Great War, in which it necessarily takes but a 
small part in a general survey of the Battles of the Frontiers, or it has been treated 
piecemeal with individual encounters being analysed in detail. In the first instance, the 
general histories attempt to draw out the essence of the campaign, identify themes and 
find vignettes that succinctly exemplify the points to be made. As will be shown, the 
danger in this approach is that the diversity of the campaign defies such brief 
encapsulation. Conversely, the study of an individual encounter may do justice to the 
one event but will fail to capture the overall operational context.  
 
The second reason behind this study arises from the first, in that neither the general nor 
the encounter–specific approaches have properly identified and explored the important 
operational issue of the lost French opportunity for victory in the Ardennes. The French 
offensive on 22 August came as a complete operational surprise to the German High 
Command. Marching north from the river Semoy in a typically thick morning mist, the 
bulk of the French Fourth Army remained undiscovered by German reconnaissance for 
several vital hours as they advanced into the weak centre of their opponent’s defensive 
screen. When the fog lifted and aircraft were able to fly again, the extent of the French 
advance was revealed. Duke Albrecht von Württemberg, commanding the German 
                                                 
5 S. Tyng, The Campaign of the Marne (Longmans, Green & Co., 1935) 
 
6 T. Zuber, The Battle of the Ardennes, 1914 (Tempus, Stroud, Glos., 2007) . 
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Fourth Army, was himself in no doubt as to the effectiveness of the initial French 
moves:  
 
he received an air–reconnaissance report at about midday which blindingly 
illuminated to him the extremely dangerous situation into which Fourth Army 
had fallen...The short, but significant report showed that Fourth Army was 
facing an immediate and serious crisis: strong enemy forces were slipping past 
them in a northerly direction and in the very near future superior forces would 
also strike their centre. The fighting might even have already begun. The priority 
now for Fourth Army was to protect the left flank of Third Army. Only when 
this was guaranteed could Third Army cross the Maas [Meuse] in order to help 
the right wing armies deliver the decisive blow; otherwise a substantial part of 
Third Army might have to be diverted south. And for the time being Fourth 
Army only had its two central corps available to oppose the attack.7  
 
In contrast to this pessimistic near–contemporary German assessment, English–
speaking historians have typically dismissed the French Ardennes offensive as ‘an 
imaginary coup de grace’ 8 a ‘failure to anticipate the strength of the enemy’9 and ‘a 
multiple disaster’,10 if indeed they mention the battle at all. But the fact remains, as this 
thesis will show, that at two separate locations on that hundred–kilometre front and for 
the whole of the day’s fighting on 22 August, the French outnumbered their opponents 
                                                 
7 Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande, Erster Band (Weltkrieg 1) 
(Reichsarchiv, E.S.Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1925), p.316 
 
8 Liddell Hart, op. cit., p.82 
 
9 Doughty, op.cit., p.72 
 
10 D. Stevenson, 1914 –1918  (Allen Lane, London, 2004),  p.53 
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by odds of between four– and six–to–one in men, supported by an overwhelming 
superiority in artillery and machine guns.  
This thesis will demonstrate that the French had on the one hand a clear 
opportunity to turn the open right flank of the German Fourth Army and on the other an 
equally clear chance to break through the centre of that same army into the open and 
undefended hinterland. A strategically important railway junction and Duke Albrecht’s 
forward command–post, both at Libramont, within ten kilometres of the fighting, were 
two potentially early and easy prizes. But it will be shown that all of the above remained 
unknown to the French generals involved. Their ignorance of their own tactical situation 
and of opportunities for operational manoeuvre testifies to the poor quality of the 
French commanders involved. 
The magnitude of the French opportunity has not yet been brought to light. The 
German role in thwarting French strategic and operational ambitions in the Ardennes 
has similarly not been properly addressed in the history of the opening phase of the 
Great War, whilst certain misconceptions – for example about parity of numbers and 
equipment differences – will be reviewed and clarified in this study.  
 
Examination of the causes of and reasons for the French failure to grasp these fleeting 
opportunities and deliver tactical and possibly operational defeat of the Germans in the 
Ardennes forms the third major theme of this thesis. As will be shown, as a result of 
operational failures the Battle of the Ardennes became a series of loosely connected 
tactical encounters between individual corps, divisions, and on at least one occasion, 
brigades. Each had its own unique characteristics of terrain, timing and tactics, each 
presented individual opportunities and problems for the use of specific weapons and 
 9 
pieces of equipment and each gives us today a different example how both French and 
German pre–war doctrines worked out in practice and under pressure of battle.  
Much has been written about French pre–war military doctrine. Colonel de 
Grandmaison and his supposed championship and dissemination of the so–called 
doctrine of offensive à outrance and élan has been widely blamed for the early French 
defeats and the enormity of their losses. For example Doughty has written of ‘the notion 
of the offensive à outrance as articulated by Lieutenant Colonel Louis Loyseau de 
Grandmaison’, claiming that ‘had Michel remained chief of staff of the army, his 
reservations about Grandmaison and the offensive à outrance might have limited some 
of its pernicious effects’.11 But Contamine wrote that the French failure was one of 
execution rather than doctrine.12 This thesis will examine Grandmaison’s role, and test 
Contamine’s assertion, firstly by a thorough examination of the differences between the 
military doctrines of both sides and what actually happened on the battlefield, and 
secondly by an examination of pre–war training and preparation.  
 Although issues of doctrine and training have been cited by historians as key 
reasons for French failure in the Ardennes, issues concerning the type, number and 
quality of various items of equipment on each side have also been highlighted as 
possible causes. Questions arise for which fresh answers will be provided in this study. 
For example: what is the truth of Churchill’s and Liddell Hart’s assertion of French 
bayonets against German machine guns? 13 Were the German field howitzers really the 
decisive battlefield factor that several historians have claimed?14 Was the absence of 
                                                 
11 Doughty, op. cit., p.10 and p.26 
 
12 H. Contamine, La Revanche  1871-1914 (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1957), p.237 
 
13 W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis (Odhams, Watford, 1938),  pp.215-219; and Liddell Hart,  op. cit., 
p.82 
 
14 For example: H. Strachan, The First World War Volume 1: To Arms (Oxford University Press, 2001), 
p.229 
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French heavy artillery a pivotal mistake?15 Were the Germans waiting, entrenched, for 
the French to attack, as some have claimed?16 What role did aircraft on each side play in 
the battles? These questions and answers are central to this thesis, which will compare 
pre–war preparations with performance in the Battle of the Ardennes in order to throw 
new light on the reasons why the Germans defeated the French in all the opening battles 
until that of the Marne.  
 
The consequences not so much of the French defeat but of their failure to grasp two 
fleeting chances of victory were far–reaching. The French were the attackers, the 
Germans the defenders (in strategic and operational terms at least); the French had to 
win, the Germans had simply to avoid losing; this strategic difference is crucial to an 
understanding of the outcome of two encounters in particular, at Maissin–Anloy where 
the French failed to turn the German left flank, and at Neufchâteau where they 
conspicuously missed a potentially decisive opportunity to break through the German 
centre.  
Just as the Germans were under no illusions at the time as to the seriousness of 
the threat posed to them by the surprise French advance on the morning of 22 August, 
so they fully appreciated the importance of having avoided defeat:  
 
The serious crisis which had threatened not only the [Fourth] Army itself but the 
whole front of the German wheeling right wing was seen to have been favorably 
overcome thanks to the prudent and methodical leadership and heroic devotion 
                                                                                                                                               
 
15 Goya, op. cit., pp.155–162 
 
16 For example: P. Miquel, La Grande Guerre (Librarie Arthème Fayard, Paris, 1983) pp. 130, 132 
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of the troops… Somewhat later news came in from Third Army that it would 
assault across the Meuse on 23 August.17 
 
 It is no part of this thesis to speculate upon what might have happened in the event of a 
French victory. Nevertheless a successful German defence in the Ardennes  was 
evidently so crucial to the continued evolution of the German ‘Schlieffen Plan’ that a 
fresh interpretation of events in the Ardennes and analysis of the causes of French 
failure, as presented in this thesis, is needed to properly understand the outcome of the 
Battles of the Frontiers.  
 
The scope of the study includes the activity of the French Third and Fourth Armies and 
that of their opponents the German Fourth and Fifth Armies. For the purposes of the 
study, the role of the French Third Group of reserve divisions originally allocated to 
Ruffey’s Third Army will be touched upon, even though Joffre removed them from 
Third Army command on the eve of the battle.  These reserve divisions formed the core 
of Maunoury’s new Army of Lorraine, whose mission was to protect Verdun and the 
Meuse Heights against a German sally from Metz. They are included in the study, 
briefly, because of the issues raised by their unexpected absence from Ruffey’s battle–
line. 
The study specifically excludes the activity of the French Fifth Army and the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF). This has been extensively studied in both French 
and English–speaking historiographies, partly because it constituted the Allied reaction 
to the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ which has become the dominant feature of the opening phase of 
the War, partly because the British naturally concentrate on their own contribution 
                                                 
17 Weltkrieg 1, p.334 
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while the French prefer to discuss the victory on the Marne rather than the defeat in the 
Ardennes. It is useful to redress this balance with an in–depth analysis of the Ardennes 
campaign, the western boundary of which was the river Meuse.  
Also excluded on the French side are the twin battles of Sarrebourg and 
Morhange. These, the high–water marks of the main French offensive under Plan XVII, 
were very different in nature from the Ardennes battles, being firstly Joffre’s pre–
emptive attempt to gain the strategic initiative and secondly a set–piece offensive in 
relatively open (if constricted) terrain.18  The Battle of the Ardennes was by contrast a 
counter–offensive in reaction to German moves and a scrappy, uncoordinated, 
somewhat unexpected series of encounter–battles.  
On the German side, the activity of the German Schwenkungsflügel – their First, 
Second and Third Armies – has been excluded from the study, except insofar as the 
march across the Belgian Ardennes of Third Army, and its mission to cross the Meuse 
either side of Dinant, impacted upon the activity of Fourth Army, part of whose mission 
was to secure Third Army’s right flank from French attack.  
 
The key primary sources used for the operational and battle analysis in this thesis have 
been taken from (on the French side) the military archives at Vincennes (Service 
historique de l’armée de terre) and (on the German side) the military archives at 
Freiburg (Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv). Both archives contain a variety of source 
material, ranging from unit daily journals (journaux de marche et opérations or JMOs in 
French) to casualty returns, medical journals, intelligence reports and occasionally 
individual battlefield documents such as scribbled notes from officers’ pocket books 
                                                 
18 The Vosges mountains in the east and the fortified zone of Metz in the west contained the space 
available for the advance of the French First and Second Armies into a front only 140 kilometres wide, 
sub–divided into the ‘Sarrebourg’ and ‘Morhange’ sections by a swampy, flooded lake area known as Les 
Étangs. The terrain itself is open, forested, rolling hills, but there is limited space for deployment. 
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(where collected archive material has survived pruning and weeding). To supplement 
the rather sparse remaining records on the German side, the Imperial War Museum’s 
rich collection of German regimental histories, often written by former commanding 
officers and containing eye–witness testimony, has added valuable detail. On the French 
side, their Official History covering the period in question, Les armées françaises dans 
la grande guerre, premier tome, premier volume, contains over a thousand annexes  – 
orders, battle reports, intelligence reports and intelligence briefings  – many of which 
duplicate the originals in the archive and some of which represent surviving documents 
which have been weeded from the archive.  
Further French primary source material can be found in the published works of 
Commandant Grasset, works which are themselves important secondary sources.19  But 
not only did Grasset take part in one of the Ardennes encounters (at Ethe as a sub-
lieutenant in 7 DI) but after the war he became Commandant of the Service historique 
de l’armée de terre, responsible for collecting and codifying archive material. In this 
latter capacity, he had access to the recollections of very many eye–witnesses, whose 
testimony is woven into his text. His book on Neufchâteau also includes copies of 
relevant interrogation reports of German prisoners.20 Grasset’s own personal account of 
the encounter at Ethe, Vingt Jours de Guerre aux Temps Héroïques, contains valuable 
commentary on the process of mobilisation, concentration and of the period of 
couverture leading up to the battle.21 
                                                 
19 Commandant Grasset, La Guerre en Action (Berger–Levrault, Paris): Neufchâteau (1923), Virton 
(1925), Ethe (1925) 
 
20 Grasset, Neufchâteau, pp.104–107 
  
21 Commandant A. Grasset, Vingt Jours de Guerre aux Temps Héroïques (Berger–Levrault, Paris–Nancy, 
1918)   
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  Other eye–witnesses have published their own accounts of the encounter in 
which they took part. On the German side, for example, there is Herman Kaiser, who 
was an artillery subaltern at Bertrix, and who wrote an account which was translated 
into English and published in The Journal of the Royal Artillery in 1935.22 On the 
French side, Colonel (later General) Paloque was the senior officer commanding the 
French divisional artillery massacred at Bertrix and later published a pamphlet in 
defence of his own performance.23 The diary of Commandant Moreau, chief of staff of 
3 Colonial Infantry Division (DIC), has recently been found and published, giving a 
fascinating insight into the minds of the senior officers of that division, as well as a 
first–hand account of the battle at Rossignol.24  
In a wider context, contemporary accounts of the events of August 1914 are still 
available: three in particular have provided valuable background for this study: J. 
Simonin was Médecin–Inspecteur in the 7 DI which fought at Ethe, and wrote his 
account of the opening weeks of the war, de Verdun à Mannheim, in 1917;25 two 
priests, le Chanoine Jean Schmmitz and Dom Norbert Nieuwland, published their 
account of the invasion of Belgium, L’Invasion Allemande dans les provinces de Namur 
et de Luxembourg, in 1924. Volume VII deals specifically with the battle of 
Neufchâteau and of Maissin [sic] as seen from a civilian perspective;26 and Fernand 
Engerand, whose interest in the lost provinces of Alsace–Lorraine and the Briey iron–
                                                 
22 H. Kaiser, Deutsche und Französische Artillerie in der Schlacht bei Bertrix, 22 August 1914  
(Waisenhaus–Buchdruckerei, Hanau, 1937) 
 
23 General Paloque, Bertrix 1914 (Charles–Lavauzelle & Cie, Paris, 1932) 
 
24 J. Moreau, 22 août 1914, Journal du commandant Jean Moreau, chef d’état-major de la 3e division 
Coloniale,  (retranscribed and with commentary by Éric Labayle et Jean-Louis Philippart, Anvoi, Parçay-
sur-Vienne, 2002) 
 
25 J. Simonin, de Verdun à Mannheim: Ethe et Gomery (22, 23, 24 Août 1914) (Pierre Vitet, Paris, 1917) 
 
26 le Chanoine Jean Schmmitz and Dom Norbert Nieuwland, L’Invasion Allemande dans les provinces de 
Namur et de Luxembourg, Sixième Partie, Tome VII, La Bataille de Neufchâteau et de Maissin  (G. Van 
Oest & Cie., Librarie Nationale d’art et d’histoires, Bruxelles et Paris,1924) 
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ore deposits led him to become rapporteur at the Briey Commission of Enquiry in 1919, 
wrote a book, Le secret de la Frontière 1815–1871–1914, which contains a chapter on 
the offensive in the Ardennes, an interesting if biased interpretation of events.27 
 The official histories of the Great War, written by French and German appointed 
historians and archivists, are the base secondary source material for this study. The first 
volume of the French official history was published in 1922 and revised in 1936;28 the 
German official history was published in 1925.29 Both are essentially factual, 
descriptive accounts drawn from the vast array of then available primary sources. Of the 
two histories, the German contains slightly more analytical content. It says for example: 
 
Thanks to the excellent telephone links with all corps, the [Fifth] Army 
Command which had moved forward from its Headquarters at Diedenhofen to 
its Command Post at Esch, was constantly informed about the situation on the 
battlefront and whenever the situation required it could take energetic, balanced 
and supportive action; in particular it provided for fast exchange of news 
between the individual corps, thus ensuring co–ordination of actions.30  
 
The French history is very much more factual, giving so much detail, particularly of 
local geography, that the reader is pressed to distinguish the wood from the trees:  
 
                                                 
27 Fernand Engerand, Le Secret de la Frontière 1815–1871–1914, Charleroi (Éditions Bossard, Paris, 
1918) 
 
28 Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre, Tome premier, premier volume [AFGG I/1] (Ministère de 
la Guerre, État–major de l’armée, service historique, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1922 and 1936) 
 
29 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Die militärischen Operationen zu lande, Erster Band, Die 
Grenzschlachten im Westen [Weltkrieg 1], (E.S.Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1925)  
 
30 Weltkrieg 1, p.324 
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Only at about 14.30 did the (French) Fourth Army commander learn that the 
head of 2 CA had reached the vicinity of Tintigny, whilst the following division 
had clashed with the enemy at Meix–devant–Virton and Villers–La–Loue.  Still 
in ignorance of the fact that 2 CA had found itself embroiled with the enemy at 
Bellefontaine and that the other Corps were in their turn halted, General de 
Langle, as has been seen, had invited General Gérard to establish the bulk of 4 
DI as flank guard of the army in the region of Tintigny and to attack vigorously 
south of the woods at Meix whilst linking on its right with 4 CA of Third 
Army.31   
 
Overall, both official histories provide an authoritative high level account written close 
to the events they record by people who had access to first–hand witnesses and first– 
hand accounts.  
The first and still most authoritative account in English of the Ardennes 
campaign is that contained within Sewell Tyng’s The Campaign of the Marne, written 
in 1935.32 Drawing extensively on contemporary accounts in France, Germany and 
England, including (with reference to the Ardennes) Grasset, the sixteen pages devoted 
to the offensive in the Ardennes remain even today the best overview of events. Tyng’s 
incisive and insightful commentary demonstrates a depth of knowledge indicating 
extensive research: for example, Tyng acknowledges the temporary nature of German 
field entrenchments at Longwy, dug whilst the German infantry was ‘awaiting daylight 
                                                 
31 AFGG I/1 (1922),  p.405 
  
32 Tyng, op. cit., pp.75–91  
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before launching their attack’,33 a point which has been lost on many historians who 
have followed him. 
Tyng cites amongst his sources the first six volumes of General Palat’s , La 
Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental, probably the earliest detailed account of the 
war by a French historian, the first three volumes of which were written before the end 
of 1918.34 Palat’s first two volumes give an essential background to the opening phases 
of the war, while volume three provides the most detailed account so far of the Battle of 
the Ardennes as a whole, as seen from the French point of view. But he wrote too soon 
after events for any German material to be available to allow a truly balanced account.  
After Palat, Grasset is arguably the most influential French secondary source for 
the Battle of the Ardennes.  His books on the encounters at Ethe, Virton, Rossignol and 
Neufchâteau, serialised in the Revue Française Militaire, have been used as sources for 
several English–speaking historians’ accounts of the overall Ardennes offensive.35 The 
drawback is that the encounter battles which he did not cover (Maissin, Anloy, and 
particularly Roques’s 12 CA at Nevraumont) have received little or no attention as time 
goes by.  
Other important secondary sources include articles written during the 1920s and 
1930s for military journals and publications, notably the Revue Française Militaire and 
the British The Fighting Forces and the Journal of the Royal Artillery; the authors drew 
on archive material and eye–witness accounts which have not necessarily survived. Two 
of Grasset’s books – Ethe and Virton  – were used as the basis for articles written in 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.83 
 
34 General Palat, La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental (Librairie Chapelot, Paris,): I Les élements du 
conflit (1917), II Liége, Mulhouse, Sarrebourg, Morhange (1917), III Batailles des Ardennes et de la 
Sambre (1918) [Grande guerre III, Ardennes]   
 
35 For example the following authors  all quote Grasset in their bibliographies: Cyril Falls, The First 
World War (Longmans, London, 1960); Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (Ballantine, New York, 
1994); Hew Strachan, To Arms 
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English by Major A.H. Burne and published in The Fighting Forces journal during the 
1930s.36 The encounter battle at Bertrix has received particular attention, from Herman 
Kaiser, cited above, and an English article in response by an anonymous officer 
(A.G.M)37, as well as General Paloque’s apologia, cited above; perhaps this accounts 
for the fact that that the Bertrix encounter has been given a modern reappraisal by Bruce 
Gudmundsson.38 In France, Commandant Pugens published a long two–part article on 
Neufchâteau in Revue Française Militaire.39 Dr E. Bircher’s Die Schlacht bei Ethe–
Virton (1930) is a rare example of a German account of two of the Ardennes encounters, 
the more useful because Bircher took part in his capacity as commander of 12 Infantry 
Brigade.40 Similarly, Erhard Mutius, a captain in 7 Grenadier Regiment at the time, 
wrote Die Schlacht bei Longwy in 1919.41  
 
Material for the third part of the thesis has been derived almost exclusively from 
secondary sources; it is not intended to add new research in this area, merely to set the 
events in the Ardennes described in this study against existing interpretations of pre–
war preparation.  This approach should either confirm existing arguments regarding the 
reasons for French failure and German success, or provide a fresh interpretation which 
will enrich our understanding of these battles.  
                                                 
36 Major A.H. Burne, The Battle of Rossignol (The Fighting Forces, Vol. VIII, Nr 3, October 1931) and 
The Battle of Virton (The Fighting Forces, Vol. VIII, 1931) 
 
37 ‘AGM’, Bertrix 1914, seen from the German side (Journal of the Royal Artillery Vol. LXIV 1937–8) 
 
 
38 B. I. Gudmundsson, Unexpected encounter at Bertrix (in The Great War, ed. Robert Cowley, Pimlico, 
London, 2004) 
 
39  Commandant A. Pugens, The Genesis of Neufchâteau (Revue Militaire Française nr.97 July 1929) 
 
40 Dr E.Bircher, Die Schlacht bei Ethe–Virton am 22 August 1914 (Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, Berlin, 1930) 
 
41 E. Von Mutius, Die Schlacht bei Longwy (Volume three of a compilation Der grosse krieg in 
Einzeldarftstellungen , Verlag von Gerhard Stallung, Oldenburg, 1919) 
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 One exception to the proposed approach has been made during the course of 
writing. It seemed that existing writing on the subject of French doctrine failed to 
explain fully what happened in the Ardennes battles. Consequently, fresh primary 
research has been done into the writings of Colonel de Grandmaison, in order to 
illuminate his true role in the genesis of the so–called offensive à outrance.42 The 
conclusions of that research have subsequently been broadly confirmed by the findings 
of Dimitry Queloz in his new book, De la Manoeuvre Napoléonienne à l’offensive à  
outrance.43 
 On the subject of ‘Doctrine’, as well as Queloz’s detailed research, general 
studies such as Barry Posen’s The Sources of Military Doctrine44 and Azar Gat’s A 
History of Military Thought45 provide a thorough backdrop into which one can place 
performance in the Ardennes campaign. With regard to armaments, David Stevenson’s 
Armaments and the coming of War46 and David Herrmann’s The Arming of Europe47 
together provide a comprehensive and authoritative background to the whole question 
of why and how the comparative state of armament in August 1914 came about. The 
subject of training does not seem to have been addressed yet as a single issue in its own 
right, and an overall picture has been assembled from a variety of works, including 
                                                 
42 Colonel de Grandmaison, Deux Conférences faites aux officiers de l’ État-Major de l’Armée (février 
1911) (Berger-levrault, Paris, 1911); Colonel de Grandmaison, Dressage de l’Infanterie en vue du 
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(Cornell University Press, 1984) 
 
45 A. Gat, A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford University 
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46 D. Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war: Europe 1904–1914 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 
 
47 D. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton University 
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Joffre’s Mémoires,48 Douglas Porch’s The March to the Marne49 and Erich Dorn 
Brose’s The Kaiser’s Army.50  
 
Looking at the general histories of the war as a whole written since the 1920’s, one 
finds a number of attempts to encapsulate the Ardennes campaign into a few short 
paragraphs, sometimes sentences. The campaign defies such brief encapsulation, and 
most of the myths  – of French red trousers and German machine guns, for example  – 
and false interpretations of, say, the doctrine of offensive à outrance can be traced to 
these secondary sources. Winston Churchill published his first edition of The World 
Crisis in 1923.51 General Hofacker followed closely in 1928 with his Der Weltkrieg, 
and Liddell Hart published the first version of his history of the First World War in 
1930.These early writers share a common trait and a common objective: to endorse and 
justify their own nation’s role in the recent conflict, if necessary at the expense of the 
others. They also all pay scant attention to the Battle of the Ardennes, including it in 
their overall synopsis of the battles of the Frontiers in a few short, pithy sentences. 
Nevertheless they represent at a high level their nations’ general appreciation of the 
opening phase of the war. Churchill in particular has influenced generations of English–
speaking people with his image of the French army as a Napoleonic anachronism in 
colourful uniforms throwing itself blindly at entrenched Germans who massacred them 
                                                 
48 Joffre, Mémoires, Tome premier (1910–1917) (Librarie Plon, Paris, 1932)  
 
49 D. Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871–1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1981)  
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with massed machine guns.52 In short, the first generation of general histories were 
mostly short on detail and lacked objectivity. 
One thread that links the early English general histories with those of the next 
generation is the emergence of the myth of French offensive à outrance and the ‘cult of 
the offensive’. From Churchill and Liddell Hart (quoted above) there is a direct link to 
Cyril Falls who wrote in 1960: ‘Artillery support was hardly taken into account by this 
high–minded and selfless but crack–brained seer [Grandmaison]. It is impossible to 
calculate how many men were sent to their deaths through his agency’.53 And thence to 
modern scholars such as Professor Herwig, who wrote in 2009 of the encounter battle at 
Rossignol that ‘one furious frontal bayonet charge after another, accompanied by lusty 
cries of “En Avant!,” was mowed down by murderous artillery and machine gun fire’.54  
On a more general note, in the second–generation histories the interpretation 
moved on from regarding the Ardennes offensive as an ‘imaginary coup de grace’.55 
Falls was the first to acknowledge the serious strategic purpose behind the Ardennes 
operation: ‘Their mission was to strike the marching columns of the enemy in the flank, 
cut through them, and rout them’.56 He also referred to the closeness of the result: ‘Yet 
the Germans themselves acknowledge that they had been in a critical situation, 
threatening the whole of their wheeling wing’.57 But he curiously described the French 
defeat as ‘inevitable’, attributing their failure to poor intelligence and inferior cavalry, 
assertions which will be tested in this thesis.  
                                                 
52 Churchill, World Crisis (1923), pp. 263–266 and (1938),  pp.215–219 
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French analysis has developed in a similar way to that of the English–speaking 
historians. In 1957, Henry Contamine made an important revisionist step forward with 
his book La Revanche, examining French preparations and early performance with great 
objectivity and clarity.58 He asserts, for example, that French tactical weaknesses 
increased the chances of a German strategic success and that those tactical weaknesses 
were the overall decisive factor.59 
In 1980, Pierre Rocolle produced his work L’Hécatombe des Généraux, in 
which he examined the state of the French senior officer corps and highlighted 
individual instances of generals who failed the ultimate test under fire and who were 
removed from their posts.60 Rocolle’s work has made a valuable contribution to the 
study of the Battle of the Ardennes, particularly because many of the failed generals 
were in charge of units that took part in the Ardennes encounter–battles. But he also 
made at least one important factual mistake: Rocolle stated that the French 12 CA at 
Neufchâteau was faced by a brigade from the German 21 ID which fought additionally 
at Ochamps and Bertrix.61 In fact, as this thesis will show, the encounter between those 
two units did not take place until the morning of 23 August, and on 22 August the 
French 12 CA was faced with no more than part of a weak brigade of reservists from 21 
RAK. Rocolle’s mistake of fact has inadvertently helped to conceal until now the extent 
of the lost opportunity at Neufchâteau. 
In Professor Strachan’s first volume of his history of the Great War, the Battle of 
the Ardennes inevitably forms but a small part in the overall picture, just over two pages 
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of analysis. Professor Strachan’s thesis regarding the French offensive in the Ardennes 
is that the French High Command did not expect the Germans to join battle in the 
forests, ‘but would be found on the further side’.62 This suggests an issue over the 
gathering and use of French intelligence. He goes on to cite failings in French cavalry 
and reconnaissance and the absence of mobile field howitzers as major reasons for the 
French defeat. All these judgements will be tested in this thesis. The danger of using a 
single vignette in a concise summary of the Ardennes campaign is highlighted by 
Strachan’s use of the case of 87 Brigade of 2 CA to suggest that the French infantry 
were exhausted even before the battle began. Putting this case into its operational 
context shows that 2 CA had been asked to change its orientation and narrow its front in 
order to accommodate 4 CA of Third Army on its right and CAC on its left, when Joffre 
changed front from north–east to north and announced a northerly axis for his attack; 2 
CA thus suffered more than any other on 21 August from ‘marching, counter-marching, 
orders and counter-orders,’ although to be fair there was a high degree of poor staff 
work and control which exacerbated the situation.63  
The latest significant addition to French historiography is Michel Goya’s La 
chair et l’acier.64 In Chapter V (L’Épreuve du feu – baptism of fire) he uses the action 
of the French Fourth Army to exemplify the points which he wants to make. He drills 
down in great detail into a number of specific incidents. But even the five pages which 
he devotes to description and analysis of the encounters in the Ardennes are insufficient 
to cover the totality of events, merely a judiciously selected number of highlights. The 
result is a fair and balanced high–level assessment which correctly identifies the main 
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issues and demonstrates a grasp of detail and factual accuracy which is yet to be found 
in the British lexicon, whilst leaving scope for an overall detailed study of the 
campaign. But Goya dismisses the whole of the French Third Army’s role in a single 
sentence: ‘This vicious check is similar to that of Third Army, which had been given the 
same mission further east’.65 This statement is inadequate to describe the unique 
contribution of Ruffy’s men to the battle ; the specific and different role of Third Army 
will be exposed in the thesis.  
Of the most recent general works that include coverage of the offensive in the 
Ardennes, Robert Doughty’s Pyrrhic Victory adds significantly to our overall 
understanding of the operations of the French army.66 Regarding  Doughty’s short 
treatment of the Ardennes, his cited sources are Grasset, and certain GQG instructions 
and reports (compte rendu). But the five pages which Doughty devotes to the Ardennes  
are insufficient to allow him to get to the heart of the matter. For example, Doughty 
accepts the official account of Roques’s 12 CA action, concluding that that unit ‘was, as 
reported by Fourth Army, in a « good » situation at the end of the day’ and its 
withdrawal was a result of 5 Colonial Brigade uncovering its flank.67 This study will 
show how much more there was to that pivotal encounter. 
Below the operational level, Terence Zuber’s book, The Battle of the Frontiers : 
Ardennes 1914, published in 2007, is a comprehensive tactical study of the whole 
campaign, seen from the German perspective, which somehow misses its mark.68 One 
cannot fault Zuber’s research, and his conclusions are often eminently supportable. But 
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one is left with the impression that Zuber starts from the premis that the German army 
of 1914 was near–perfect,  that the facts have been selected to support that argument, 
and that the argument itself is over–sold. More comprehensive research on the French 
side, and a more objective approach, would have allowed Zuber to make a more 
balanced judgement. 
 With Sewell Tyng’s 1935 study remaining the best overall description of the 
offensive in the Ardennes, the subject is overdue for a fresh interpretation  which this 
study will provide. By returning to primary sources on both the French and German 
sides, and by setting events into a context of how the two armies prepared for war, this 
thesis will not only reinterpret events but also present new and challenging arguments as 
to why those events transpired as they did.  
 
The thesis is in three parts, each one dealing with one of the three objectives described 
above. The first part is the operational study: because of the diversity and complexity of 
what actually occurred, it will start with a high–level overview of the whole campaign, 
detailing the strategic intent of the two sides, the intelligence gathered and how it was 
used, the relevance of the terrain and the key issues at high–command level. Then the 
study descends to the detail of army command, taking each of the four armies in turn 
and examining the mission, objectives, plans and instructions of the four army 
commanders. To complete this analysis, the thesis studies battlefield operational 
command and control in action, to see how strategic and operational intent was 
executed, and how events deteriorated into a series of unconnected and uncoordinated 
encounter battles. 
The second part of the thesis examines the two encounter battles – Neufchâteau 
and Maissin–Anloy – in which it will be explained how the French lost their two 
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opportunities to beat the Germans at a tactical level and possibly achieve operational 
success. Two other better known encounters – Bertrix and Rossignol – are also 
examined in order to put the lost opportunities into the context of de Langle’s whole 
operation. Defeats at those two latter places overshadowed the lost opportunities both at 
the time and since. Those defeats will also be shown to have been major factors in 
denying de Langle his chance of operational success. Chance, guesswork and luck came 
into play on both sides; timing and (for the Germans) serendipity combined to ensure 
that the French defeats – one at least of which can be shown to have been a completely 
unnecessary, self–inflicted disaster – took precedence over the French opportunities. It 
will be shown how it could easily have been different, if with incalculable results.   
The third and final part steps back from the action and analyses the reasons for 
the outcomes described. In a series of chapters, the key issues of doctrine, training and 
armament are considered in the light of the outcomes analysed in the study. The 
intention here is not necessarily to conduct fresh research – although certain aspects of 
French doctrine have necessitated a certain amount of additional investigation – but to 
use existing scholarship to set a sufficiently firm context in which to frame the activity 
in the battles.  
 
In summary, this thesis will add a full operational study to the historiography of the 
opening phase of the Great War. It will identify for the first time the extent of the 
opportunity for tactical and operational victory foregone by the French on 22 August; 
and it will analyse through comparative study the reasons for the French failure and 
German success. This integrated analysis of operations, individual encounter–battles 
and the underlying causes which led to the outcomes of those battles, together produce a 
 27 
fresh interpretation of the Battle of the Ardennes, and explains why France missed vital 
opportunities to potentially reverse the outcome of the Battle of the Frontiers. 
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Chapter One : Operational Overview 
 
 
This chapter provides a broad, high–level sweep across the Ardennes campaign. It aims 
to examine the strategies employed and the operation of large units (armies and groups 
of armies) for the delivery of those strategies. Certain issues which arise and which 
demand more detailed analysis, will be taken up in later chapters, when the operational 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
War was declared between France and Germany on 3 August 1914, although both sides 
had already commenced mobilisation.1 The French held their forces at least ten 
kilometres back from their frontier, a purely political decision, in order not to appear 
provocative; their opponents were not so scrupulous and there were many border 
violations by German patrols. The first soldier killed in the Great War actually died in 
such a skirmish before the war officially started: on 2 August, Corporal Peugeot of 44 
régiment d’infanterie (RI) was killed by Leutenant Mayer, an officer of 5 Jäger–
regiments zu Pferde, leading a German cavalry patrol near Jonchery on the French side 
of the Alsace border.2 On the Ardennes front, German troops invaded the Duchy of 
Luxembourg on 2 August and French guns in the fortress at Longwy fired on German 
troops seen in nearby Aumetz.  
 
Each side had its war plan. That of Germany was the so–called ‘Schlieffen Plan’ in 
which the bulk of their forces on the Western Front, their First, Second and Third !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 AFGG I/1 (1936), p.114; and Weltkrieg 1, p.35 
 
2 P. Creuzinger, Königlich Preussischen Jaeger Regiment zu Pferde nr.5, pp.22–24 and Revue Historique 
de L’Armée (Vol 3, July-Sept 1950): Première Victoire de la Grande Guerre, Altkirch 7 août 1914, p.37 
 
 
! "$!
armies with over a million men in a Schwenkungsflügel were to cross the river Meuse 
between Liège and Dinant and march in a wide encircling movement across the Belgian 
plain towards Paris. In this plan, Sixth and Seventh armies were to defend the common 
Franco-??????? ??????? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?? ????
?????????????? ?? around Metz and Diedenhofen (Thionville), while Fourth and Fifth 
armies were to defend the ground between Metz and the Meuse at Dinant. The mission 
of the latter was to secure, at all costs, the link between the Schwenkungsflügel and the 
Moselstellung. 
The French Plan, Plan XVII, had been written in 1913 and implemented in the 
spring of 1914. It differed from its predecessor (Plan XVI, March 1909) in that it was 
more offensive in nature, recognising the greater threat from the north. However these 
principles had to a great degree been anticipated in the two variants to Plan XVI, issued 
in September 1911 and April 1913 respectively.3 Plan XVII was actually a plan for the 
mobilisation and concentration of the French armies, not a plan of campaign. The 
chosen concentration areas of the main French armies were of course based upon certain 
expected operations, but General Joffre reserved the right to alter his pre–conceived 
ideas to fit the circumstances at the time. His strategy, to launch his major offensive 
acr???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
details of that and of all French operations were contained in general and specific 
instructions issued from Joffre’s Grand Quartier Général (GQG). Under Plan XVII, 
Fifth and Third armies were deployed along the northern frontier from Sedan to Verdun, 
whilst First and Second armies assembled between Nancy and Belfort for the great 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????–le–
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.33–91 
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Duc, from where it could intervene either due east between Verdun and Nancy or due 
north, west of Verdun. 
 The Germans held pretty well to their original plan throughout the opening 
phase of the war, although the enormity of their defensive success in Alsace–Lorraine 
on 20 August did for a while offer the tempting illusion of a classic double–
envelopment. In the central Ardennes sector, the original mission for Fourth and Fifth 
Armies was executed unchanged at the strategic level.  
Joffre, however, started tinkering with his original dispositions from the very 
first days of the war. Surprisingly, given the common perception in early histories that 
his main offensive in Alsace–Lorraine was ‘wild and premature’,4 he started to move 
his troops around as early as 8 August, when he transferred 2 CA from Fifth to Fourth 
Army. He was even then building up Fourth Army into his prospective counter-attack 
force; and his very early change to the deployment area of that army – on 2 August, to a 
more northerly–facing front – indicates where, even then, he was contemplating using 
it.5 
On 16 August Fifth Army lost another corps – 11 CA – to Fourth Army but on 
18 August gained 18 CA from Second Army. Also on 18 August, Joffre gave Fourth 
Army its third additional corps – 9 CA – again from Second Army.6 So even before he 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
armies there by two corps, over 20% of their original strength. And in the Ardennes 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????wo 
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4 C.R.M.F. Crutwell, A History of the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford University Press, 1934), p.16 
 
5 AFGG I/1, Annex 33: GQG, Paris, 2 août, 19.30: IVe armée, variante à la concentration 
 
6 AFGG X/1: Order of Battle of Second Army (p.88), Fourth Army (p.204) and Fifth Army (p.266) in 
August 1914 
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days before he launched his counter–attack, he had doubled the size of Fourth Army 
from three to six regular corps so that his total left wing (Fourth and Fifth Armies 
together) was some 25% stronger than at the outset. These were not the actions of a 
commander–in–chief fixated inflexibly on a single offensive à outrance.  
 
The task of protecting the frontier during mobilisation lay with permanent, full–strength 
units of each regular army. The French called this force La Couverture, the Germans 
Grenzschutztruppen. During the mobilisation and concentration period no major attack 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????attaque brusquée:  a swift 
surprise attack by full–strength units of the standing frontier force. The French had for a 
long time feared an immediate pre–emptive German attack, directly across their 
common border between Metz and the Vosges mountains, against the fortress line of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
complete.7 And although in recent years this strategic option had been replaced as the 
primary threat by an expected attack in northern Belgium towards Sedan and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????8 So the French concentrated their forces 
further back behind their fortress zone. The Germans, on the other hand, relied upon an 
elastic defence between their heavily fortified places at Metz and Strasbourg, preferring 
to guard the Rhine and suck any French attack into a dangerous salient by temporarily 
ceding territory in Alsace and Lorraine. All the while their strategy never deviated from 
delivering their own main attack into central Belgium. 
On the Ardennes sector, the French cover for the concentration of Ruffey’s 
Third Army between Verdun and Metz was provided by 6 CA supported by 7 division !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Palat, La Grande Guerre, II, p.10 
 
8 G. Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the eve of the First World War (transl. Stephen 
Conn, Berg Publishers, Leamington Spa, 1984), pp.45-47 
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de cavalerie (DC); while for de Langle’s Fourth Army between Sedan and Verdun 
cover was provided by 4 DI of 2 CA and 9 DC. On the German side, the common 
border with France  either side of Metz was protected by 16 and 8 AK from their bases 
around Diedenhofen (Thionville to the French), whilst von Richtofen’s 1 
Kavaleriekorps (KK) and two mixed infantry brigades were deployed rapidly to the 
north on the Luxembourg and Belgian borders between Diedenhofen and the Eifel 
mountains.9 
 
In August 1914 Verdun was the cornerstone of the French frontier defence, as it was to 
be two years later. A strong bastion in the north–eastern corner of the country, it stood 
at the top of the eastern frontier, which ran down to the Swiss border and the French 
fortress of Belfort, and at the eastern end of the northern frontier, which ran west to the 
Belgian border and the fortress of Sedan. Frontier defence has nearly always been about 
rivers, and high ground; Verdun has both. The river Meuse flows almost due north from 
its source near the Vosges mountains and bends at Verdun to flow north–westwards up 
to Sedan and beyond. The Meuse heights east and north of Verdun are now legendary; 
in August 1914 they were that cornerstone of the frontier defence. North of Verdun, just 
a little more than the prescribed ten kilometres behind the actual border, the river 
Othain, which the French chose as their main defence line, runs north–west for forty 
kilometres before flowing into the river Chiers at Montmédy.  
The river Chiers also figures prominently in the Ardennes campaign, primarily 
because it flows through the fortress town of Longwy on its way down to Montmédy 
and thence on to join the Meuse at Sedan. And at Longuyon, some ten kilometres south  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of Longwy, the river Crusnes flows into the Chiers. The German High Command chose 
the line of the Crusnes–Chiers rivers as the limit for the advance of their Fifth Army on  
22 August, and it lay directly in the path of Ruffey’s advancing Third Army. From the 
Othain to the Crusnes valley is a mere fifteen kilometres.  
The French fortress at Longwy requires description, given its pivotal role in the 
campaign. It had been built by that great engineer, Vauban, for King Louis XIV in the 
seventeenth century, on the edge of the mighty cliffs above the town of Longwy, which 
nestled in the valley of the Chiers river below. For three hundred years it had dominated 
the route into France from the north–east, forcing an approaching enemy to swing west 
into the bad terrain of the Argonne forest or east towards the fortresses of Verdun and 
Metz. But it had not been updated to cope with modern weaponry after the 
technological advances of the late nineteenth century, and was in August 1914 very 
much a second–rate fortification. It had the additional disadvantage of being too close to 
the border for the French to use as part of their main line of defence. Nevertheless, with 
a wartime garrison of two battalions, six 155mm heavy guns and supplies for a month, 
it was an obstacle that the Germans needed to remove from their path.10  
Another river, the Alzette, was used by the central group of German armies for 
frontier protection in August 1914. It springs, coincidentally, from the same range of 
hills as the Crusnes, about five kilometres further north, and flows north rather than 
west. It became part of the German frontier barrier as it passed through Luxembourg 
city, from whence it flows some seventy kilometres due north, in the Duchy of 
Luxembourg but parallel to the German border, before emptying into the Sauer, a 
tributary of the Moselle, at Ettelbruck.  
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The river Alzette was a convenient defence line for the Germans. The high ground on 
the right bank gave good defensive positions along most if not all of its seventy–
kilometre length. It ran through the middle of the Duchy, so any French attack would 
take place on Luxembourg territory. It was sufficiently far back from the Meuse to be 
beyond the immediate concern of French intelligence, and yet it was only two days’ 
march from the central Ardennes and the open terrain around Neufchâteau. When, day 
after day, French flyers reported no enemy movement through the central Ardennes, it 
was because the Germans were waiting patiently behind the Alzette for the moment to 
advance. And at its southern reaches, south of Luxembourg, the Alzette linked 
seamlessly to the static defences of the Moselstellung.  
But the Alzette was a strictly east–west barrier, and the Germans were 
determined to take some pre–emptive actions in order to secure for themselves the 
Duchy of Luxembourg, which would require a south–facing defence. 16 Infanterie 
Division (ID) of 8 AK (one of the two Grenzschutztruppen units in the central sector) 
started moving in on 2 August.11 It had completely occupied the Duchy by 18.00 on 3 
August, only twelve hours after the war officially started. Luxembourg had been in the 
German sphere of economic influence for decades, and some might say it was a client 
state. Occupation would give Germany an extended defensive front in a westerly salient 
whose southern border conveniently faced Verdun. !
OHL also recognised that the town of Arlon in Belgium was an important 
strategic asset – it was a major railway hub and stood protectively at the eastern (upper) 
end of the ‘Étalle corridor’, an anticipated invasion route for the French up the valley of 
the river Semoy from Florenville and their major bases at Sedan and Charleville–
Mézières directly towards the Moselstellung. On 12 August a mixed detachment from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 AFGG I/ 1 (1936), p.114; and Weltkrieg 1, p.105 
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16 AK (the second of the two Grenzschutztruppen units) moved into and took 
possession of the town. From that moment the French effectively lost (or gave up) one 
of their strategic options. Their chosen defensive line was well back, along the river 
Othain. Consequently they lost control of Briey and the iron ore deposits in the 
surrounding region and lost the use of the fortress of Longwy as a point d’appui 
(strongpoint) for their defence. The French deployment also conceded to Germany the 
use of Arlon as their own point d’appui: as a result Ruffey’s Third Army had to be 
given the objective of capturing it when Joffre finally launched his offensive on 22 
August. 
 
Plan XVII envisioned that the mobilisation and concentration of the French armies 
would be completed at some time between midday on the eleventh day (14 August) and 
the evening of the thirteenth day (16 August) when the reserve divisions arrived in their 
zones; the regular divisions were expected to be in place by evening on the ninth or 
tenth day (12 or 13 August).12 The opening moves on the French side began on 7 
August with a foray into upper Alsace by elements of the couverture.13 This was 
followed by Joffre’s main attack into Lorraine on 14 August, which came to grief on 20 
August at the twin battles of Morhange and Sarrebourg, when a German counter–attack 
comprehensively defeated the French and threw them back beyond their starting line. 
But by that time, Joffre was already contemplating his next move, his own counter–
attack into the Ardennes. In the north, the Belgian fortress–zone of Liège had finally 
fallen completely into German hands on 16 August.14 So on that day, OHL issued 
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orders for its main offensive to commence on the morning of 18 August. In the 
Ardennes, Fourth and Fifth Armies started to move forward to cover the left flank of the 
main advance. It was time for Joffre to finalise his embryonic ideas for the deployment 
of his Third and Fourth Armies into a full–blown operational plan. But to do that, he 
needed firm intelligence as to the position, strength and intention of enemy forces in the 
central Ardennes. And to counter him, von Moltke needed to make his own strategic 
reconnaissance. The two opponents had very different approaches and consequently 
executed this important task in contrasting ways. 
 
Between 7 and 10 August, Germany launched her strategic reconnaissance missions, 
using both aerial and ground forces. In the air, Germany preferred to use her Zeppelin 
fleet for strategic missions. She had five such airships, all under OHL command, and all 
capable of long–range missions of several hundred kilometres.15 One such mission was 
recorded by a French soldier who observed a dirigible surveying the Verdun defences 
on 9 August.16 
On the ground, German doctrine prescribed that the advance of each major 
group of armies would be preceded by a strong advance guard of reinforced cavalry 
whose dual mission was both security and reconnaissance.17 There were two such units 
initially allocated to the Ardennes sector, von Richtofen’s 1 KK and von Hollen’s 4 KK, 
each of two cavalry divisions complete with horse artillery, mobile machine gun 
companies, light wireless sets, telephone and telegraphic units and their own integral 
Jaeger infantry battalions. Whilst operating in this strategic reconnaissance role, these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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16 J. Simonin, De Verdun à Mannheim (Pierre Vitet, Paris, 1917), p.12 
 
17 Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, [BA–MA], PH 3/641: Standing Orders for Army Staff Officers, 
sections B (Standing Orders for HKK) and C (Standing Orders for cavalry divisions)  
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cavalry corps were given independent status as Höhe Kavallerie Kommando or HKK, 
reporting direct to OHL.  
On 7 August, the two divisions of von Hollen’s 4 HKK, consisting of 3 
Kavalerie–Division (KD) and 6 KD, advanced south beyond Longwy to seek the 
French. Their mission included small long–distance reconnaissance patrols sent south 
towards Verdun and St Mihel (6 KD) and west towards Mézières and Sedan (3 KD).18 
But they were stopped short by the strong French defensive screen provided by 6 CA’s 
infantry and artillery and could make no further progress.19 On 10 August, 4 HKK was 
ordered to broaden the scope of its reconnaissance, seeking the flank of the French line, 
and went west to Longuyon, and thence towards the river Othain. Again they 
encountered firm French resistance. There was a major skirmish at Mangiennes, 
between the Othain and Loison rivers, on 10 August, after which 3 KD, having failed to 
break through the French protective screen but having assessed its strength, moved yet 
again, up to Arlon and the Étalle corridor, leaving 6 KD as security in front of the 
Crown Prince’s assembling Fifth Army. The main French defence had been clearly 
identified on the line of the Othain river, and it could not be forced by cavalry alone; the 
Germans settled in on this front to complete their own deployment and to await an 
expected French attack towards Metz.20 
Also on 10 August, OHL released von Richtofen’s 1 HKK (Garde and 5 KDs) 
from its assembly positions in north Luxembourg to perform long–range reconnaissance 
due west up to the river Meuse on a line Namur–Givet–Mézières. Scouting squadrons 
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preceded the general advance of 1 HKK. By 14 August von Richtofen’s main force had 
reached Dinant. Having established the presence there of two French cavalry divisions 
(1 and 6 DCs), Richtofen proceeded to try to seize the fortress at Dinant by a coup de 
main on 15 August, without success. However his troops did succeed in identifying the 
presence of major French forces on the left bank (1 and 2 CAs). The German 
reconnaissance had found the French Fifth Army. But with de Langle de Cary’s 
assembling Fourth Army remaining firmly on the defensive, well back to the south 
between Mézières and Sedan, von Richtofen’s cavalry missed it, and the intelligence 
gathered served to focus the German High Command on a possible French advance 
across the Meuse from west to east. This option – of throwing Fifth Army across the 
Meuse onto the right bank into the central Ardennes – was indeed being considered by 
Joffre at that time.21 The idea was only given up between 13 and 15 August when the 
strength of the German threat west of the Meuse was re–evaluated.22 It is worth bearing 
this fact in mind when considering the strategic surprise achieved by the French through 
the final decision to direct their attack on 22 August due north from the river Othain.  
The other important point to note about von Richtofen’s mission was that his 
deployment in front of both Third and Fourth Armies along the German frontier became 
necessarily focused on Third Army and Dinant, to the detriment of Fourth Army’s 
southern flank, as the frontage to be covered widened beyond 1 HKK’s capability to 
police it. So Duke Albrecht’s army was effectively the only major German operational 
unit without its own strong independent protective screen, another calculated risk and 
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22 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.452–458 and Annex 103: GQG, Vitry–le–François, 8 août, 07.00: Instruction 
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one that contributed greatly to de Langle’s achieving operational surprise on 22 August. 
From 15 August onwards, 1 HKK was concentrated around Dinant and focused on 
crossing the Meuse in support of Third Army. The outcome of the absence of a German 
strategic cavalry screen in the southern Ardennes was noted by French historian 
Commandant Pugens, who wrote in 1929 about the situation around Neufchâteau: ‘The 
German cavalry did not seem to have tried to get intelligence for the High Command 
whilst the French 4 and 9 cavalry divisions had despite everything obtained important 
results’.23  
France also used dirigibles for long–range strategic reconnaissance, deploying 
ten craft, divided into two types – croiseurs, of which there were six, and four 
éclaireurs.24 One such mission, by dirigible ‘Fleurus’ (the name of the captain of one of 
the croiseurs), flew over the railway yards at Trèves, Sierck and Luxembourg on the 
night of 10–11 August, reporting that there was very little activity on the lines.25  
 On the ground, Joffre issued orders at 19.00 on 5 August for his own strategic 
reconnaissance mission. Sordet’s independent cavalry corps (CC) of three divisions was 
launched into the Ardennes on 6 August from positions around Charleville.26 His 
mission was to establish the position of the enemy on the eastern border of Belgium, to 
‘note the size and importance of the gaps between different enemy groupings, to delay 
the enemy’s marching columns, to clear the region of enemy cavalry’ and ‘spread the 
rumour that the whole French army is following.’27 Had Sordet achieved his mission, 
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the campaign would have taken a totally different course. But the way in which he 
executed his orders, dictated in part by doctrine, in part by natural and cultural 
inclination, meant that he and his huge force achieved almost nothing of import. For ten 
days his three cavalry divisions roamed the countryside of the central Ardennes looking 
for signs of German activity in the very same region where, on 22 August, the battles 
were to take place.28 But because the German Fourth and Fifth Armies were still firmly 
dug in on the frontier behind the river Alzette awaiting the order to advance, Sordet 
achieved nothing except the exhaustion of his troops and especially their horses. The 
intelligence which he did gather – of unit designations and locations around Liège – 
helped GQG’s Deuxième Bureau (intelligence) to form a reasonably accurate picture of 
the German Second Army and part of Third Army (what French intelligence called the 
‘northern group’ of German forces), but thus had the unfortunate side effect of directing 
the eyes of Joffre’s staff to the north rather than to the east. The central Ardennes was 
empty of enemy troops, and when that reality changed, the perception lingered. Had 
Joffre instructed Sordet to set up a protective screen in the German style across the 
Ardennes from, say, Bastogne to Neufchâteau, much vital intelligence might have been 
gained when the Germans eventually commenced their advance. But such an action was 
not part of French strategic doctrine.29 The German opinion of Sordet’s activity has 
been scathing:  
 
The presence of this horde of horsemen of eighteen cavalry regiments with 
thirty–six guns in the area between the Semois, Ourthe and Maas (Meuse) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 AFGG I/1, Annex 99: GQG, 7 août, 09.55: Communication téléphonique d’Offagne (par Bouillon). 
Corps de cavalerie; and Annex 100: GQG, 7 août, 20.30: reçu du corps de cavalerie à 20.30; and Annex 
195: [Cavalry Corps] de Givet, 11 août, 15.00:  message téléphoné. Corps de cavalerie à commandant en 
chef. 
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[rivers] had no palpable result. It was a patrol ride by cavalry divisions. At one 
point, when the cannons thundered at Dinant, this 1st Cavalry Corps (sic) crossed 
the Maas instead of attempting to clarify the situation by an advance in force to 
reconnoitre the sector.30  
 
It is clear, but for different reasons, that the strategic cavalry reconnaissance on both 
sides failed to offer anything of substance regarding the Ardennes region. But there 
were other sources of intelligence, including information from spies and informers 
about German mobilisation movements, which informed Joffre in preparation for his 
offensive.  
 
By 9 August, GQG’s Intelligence Bureau believed that it had identified seventeen 
German corps in the west and four corps in the east, with five still to be identified.31 
The French were not counting reserve formations, only regular or aktiv ones, which was 
realistic at this time, given that the reserve corps could only mobilise in a second phase, 
after the regular army had relinquished use of the depots and trains. They posited five 
groupings: (i) An ‘Army of the Meuse’, grouped around Aachen and St Vith, made up 
of five or six corps; (ii) a group around Luxembourg made up of about four corps: the 
French believed that they had positively identified 8 and 18 AK here along with the 
Saxon 11 AK; (iii) a group at Metz, made up of four corps, including 16 AK; (iv) a 
group around Strasbourg, of about three corps; (v) finally at Freiburg, across the Rhine 
in south Germany, the French believed there was one corps. 
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As an initial count and location of the concentration of Germany’s twenty–six 
regular army corps, the French 9 August briefing was remarkably accurate. For 
example, two of the three regular corps of Fourth Army (8 AK and 18 AK) were 
correctly identified in their concentration areas. In the context of the Ardennes 
campaign, the important features of the 9 August briefing were these: firstly Joffre and 
his staff began to target the northern group (provisionally called in the report the ‘Army 
of the Meuse’) as a possible opportunity for counter–attack; and in this context the next 
group (Luxembourg) would have to be masked by Third Army to allow the counter–
attack to go ahead unhindered. Secondly, French intelligence was grouping these 
identified units according to their concentration areas rather than by knowledge of each 
German army’s order of battle. So there was no clear identification of the German Fifth 
Army at Diedenhofen as opposed to Fourth Army stretching north towards von 
Hausen’s Third Army, which was patently in the ‘northern grouping’. Overall at this 
stage there were five corps which remained undetected; one (6 AK) was to play a 
crucial part in the Ardennes battle. Having initially concentrated on the Eastern Front in 
Silesia, it was then moved by rail to the West and was not picked up by the French 
intelligence gatherers.32 It appeared unannounced on the battlefield on 22 August, 
augmenting the ‘Luxembourg’ group, which included elements of Fourth Army, and 
upsetting Joffre’s calculations with devastating effect. And lastly, by not counting 
reserve corps (which in any case were still largely in transit on 9 August), GQG 
fundamentally underestimated the numbers of troops in the Ardennes theatre.  
By 11 August, GQG had identified not five but nine regular corps in the 
northern grouping, five around Liège and four further south.33 Now the prime strategic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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focus of Joffre’s intelligence staff would remain firmly on what was happening between 
Liège and Namur. It is important to note, in the context of how GQG’s and Joffre’s 
writings have been subsequently interpreted, that compared to the build–up of this huge 
German force in the north, a grouping of two or three corps in the central Ardennes 
appeared relatively insignificant at the strategic level.  
Over the next two days (13–14 August) GQG’s strategic intelligence picture 
polarised. Around Liège the ‘northern grouping’ of German army corps continued to 
cause concern, whilst a report stated that in the south ‘important enemy forces have 
arrived in the Arlon region, pushing elements up to Virton and Longuyon’.34 But 
between those two regions, air reconnaissance reports indicated that the area around 
Recogne, Neufchâteau and Florenville – Fourth Army’s prospective zone of operations  
– were ‘absolutely empty’.35 This was true, because Duke Albrecht’s forces were still 
behind the Alzette and would be for four more days. But it becomes easier to 
understand how this polarisation between Liège and Arlon and the cumulative reports of 
an empty central zone between them could seduce French intelligence and operations 
staff officers into coming up with a plan to strike north. 
By 18 August, Joffre’s staff believed that they had enough intelligence to allow 
them to proceed with their plan. By their reckoning, there were about seven or eight 
corps in the ‘northern’ grouping (there were in fact eleven plus five reserve corps, 
making sixteen); between Bastogne and the Moselstellung at Diedenhofen, they 
estimated six or seven corps (when there were actually six plus five reserve corps, 
making eleven).36 
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What is interesting about this data is that, even by their own optimistic analysis 
(counting regular corps only), the French High Command intended to attack up to eight 
corps in the north with ten of their own (five in Fifth Army to fix and hold, five in 
Fourth Army to turn their flank); but in the south, Ruffey’s Third Army was expected to 
defend the flank of the attack with just three corps against what was thought to be six or 
seven. It was generally believed that the defender could resist odds of two–to–one for 
twenty–four hours (and indeed the Germans were to prove this point), so perhaps that 
was the logic behind the French plan, although there is little evidence on which to base 
any opinion as to GQG’s rationale. Perhaps, and this will be explored briefly below, 
Joffre was at this stage thinking of using his reserve divisions in a defensive role; but it 
is by no means clear. 
 
It is interesting to note that German intelligence was similarly flawed. After a break in 
flying due to bad weather, observers overflew the French lines between Sedan and 
Verdun on 18 and 19 August. Their report stated that the region Sedan–Montmédey (de 
Langle’s Fourth Army concentration zone) was ‘full of troops...estimated at two or three 
corps’ (in fact there were five). From Montmédey south to Verdun, the fliers reported a 
strong French presence as before, but were unable to come up with firm numbers. The 
official historian concluded: ‘No clear picture of enemy intentions could be gained from 
these reports’.37  
The weather was a very important factor in intelligence gathering, the more so 
because of the fragility and low engine–power of the early types of aircraft which would 
cause them to be grounded by conditions of wind and rain and fog that would be 
considered normal for improved machines only a year later. Duke Albrecht had hoped !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to use his aircraft on 21 August to help determine his enemy’s most likely axis of 
advance, north or east. At 09.00 on 21 August, a report indicated that three French 
columns, estimated at about two divisions, were concentrating between Stenay and 
Montmédy – but there was no clue as to their intentions. By 11.00 cloud cover had 
grounded his aircraft and no further information was forthcoming.38  
 
Joffre’s early and necessarily vague concept of a counter–attack through the southern 
Ardennes took shape and form as the intelligence picture developed and sharpened. 
Joffre’s hope and intention was to place Fourth Army on and behind the left flank of 
what his intelligence reports called ‘the northern group’ of German armies. Lanrezac’s 
Fifth Army and the BEF, operating against those German units which had crossed over 
to the west bank of the Meuse, were to fix and hold the German advance while Fourth 
army executed its flank attack. Fourth Army’s own right flank, vulnerable to a German 
counter–stroke out of the Moselstellung, would be masked and protected by Ruffey’s 
Third Army. Once the left flank of the German ‘northern group’ had been located and 
engaged (by de Langle’s own left–wing units), the centre and right of Fourth Army 
would sweep up and round the German flank and drive it back, trapping the bulk of the 
‘northern group’ between the Ourthe and Meuse rivers. The Germans would effectively 
have been cut off from their lines of communication with their backs to the major 
obstacle of the Meuse. 
If one looks at the French Plan but with actual German dispositions rather than 
those provided by French intelligence, a challenging scenario emerges: for his plan to 
work, Joffre had to ensure that de Langle’s army envelop the whole German right wing 
(First, Second and Third Armies) and push it away from its lines of communication. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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And he needed to ensure that Ruffey’s Third Army stopped all German forces coming 
from the east from attacking de Langle’s flank, which meant getting far enough north to 
intercept Fourth Army as well as Fifth Army. The errors in French analysis of 
intelligence, outlined above, meant that GQG did not appreciate how much greater was 
the task they were setting themselves. And it will be demonstrated how far short of this 
objective Ruffey and his troops fell.  
Having underestimated the strength of the German ‘northern group’, the 
operational execution of Joffre’s strategic plan was conceptually flawed and it would 
have been interesting to see how it might have worked out. In the event, due to the early 
intervention of the German Fourth Army from the east against the flank of de Langle’s 
army, an entirely different scenario unfolded, in the shape of a series of smaller–scale 
encounter battles, unexpected in time and place by both sides.  
To achieve the desired result, that of trapping the German ‘northern group’ 
against the Meuse, Joffre’s two army commanders had to ensure that each corps of both 
Third and Fourth armies achieved its assigned and very specific march objectives on 22 
August. The result would have been a strong line, anchored in the south on the modern 
fortress zone of Verdun and (to a lesser but nevertheless important extent) on the 
obsolete fort at Longwy, and stretching north–westwards to the mouth of the ‘Étalle 
corridor’ at Étalle itself. This line, held by Third Army, would have provided flank 
protection for Fourth Army from any counter–offensive out of the Moselstellung. 
Having achieved the first day’s march objectives, the line was to be extended by Fourth 
Army, through Neufchâteau further north–westwards to the village of Maissin. The 
remaining gap between Maissin and the Meuse, some twelve kilometres further west, 
was a band of rugged terrain which genuinely lived up to the name of the ‘impenetrable 
Ardennes’, and which could be covered by light forces. This was where de Langle 
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positioned his cavalry. To the rear, the river crossings over the Meuse and Semoy were 
strongly guarded by reserve formations.  
 
So the French operational orders required de Langle’s Fourth Army to march on the 
first day (22 August) unopposed, due north, through the bands of forest in front of them 
and occupy the open terrain beyond. On the second and subsequent days they would 
deploy and advance to find and engage the left wing of the enemy ‘northern group’. The 
supporting advance of Third Army, to achieve the defensive line described above, 
necessitated a northerly march also, albeit across less wooded and more open terrain 
and in closer proximity to the enemy. That at least was the plan. 
 
The strategic role of the German Fourth and Fifth armies, explained above, made their 
operational plan necessarily simple. Duke Albrecht’s army was to advance into the 
central Ardennes, keeping in touch on the one hand with Third Army in the north and 
on the other with Fifth Army in the south. The mission, though simple, was challenging, 
because the front to be protected grew wider the further west they marched and (as has 
been explained above) Fourth Army had no strategic cavalry reconnaissance or 
protective screen on their southern front. Crown Prince William’s Army was to lock 
itself onto the Moselstellung in the south–east while at the same time clinging to the left 
of Fourth Army further north–west. Despite the relatively short distances to be covered 
by Fifth Army, it too had a challenging mission, because Fourth Army was on the move 
westwards, the front was widening exponentially, and gaps threatened to appear. And 
the Crown Prince, expecting daily an attack out of Verdun by the strong French forces 
identified by his intelligence, was keen to improve his defensive position by moving 
forward onto ground more favourable for his artillery.  
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* * * 
On 17 August, OHL issued orders for the main German offensive to start on 18 August. 
The event went unnoticed by French intelligence. On the morning of 18 August Duke 
Albrecht released his army corps from their positions behind the Alzette and ordered 
them to cross the border from Luxembourg into Belgium. The narrowness of the front 
available to Fourth Army at the border (thirty–five kilometres) and the small number of 
decent roads led Duke Albrecht to put his three regular corps in front, with his two 
reserve corps following in a second line.39 This formation, when reported by French 
intelligence, played to the French preconception that reserve units would not fight in the 
front line. And when, soon after, the German formation changed, the French 
preconception did not.  
Crown Prince William set his army on a long, looping march around the 
Moselstellung from its concentration areas east and south–east of Metz, with his three 
regular corps also in front and the two reserve corps following in a second line. On 18 
August they arrived just north of Diedenhofen.40 
Also on 17 August, General Ruffey issued his secret and personal instruction for 
Third Army’s operations on 18 August.41 The army was given the mission of 
establishing a front facing north–east, from Jametz to Étain, ready to debouch in the 
general direction of Longwy. So on 18 August the troops closed up in preparation for an 
advance, occupying the right (north) bank of the Othain; but it would be four more days 
before they were launched into the attack.  
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On 19 August, the German Fifth Army began to swing westwards around the 
Moselstellung. 5 AK headed for Arlon with 13 AK close by on its left, whilst 16 AK  
stayed closer to the fixed defences of the Moselstellung. Reports, which reached the 
French of a German army entering the Arlon region from this day on, were not 
unfounded but were dismissed.42 Preparations were also put in hand by OHL and Fifth 
Army staff for the siege of the French outlying fortress of Longwy, which now lay in 
the path of a further German advance. A special detachment was set up under a Fifth 
Army general of pioneers, General Kaempffer, complete with heavy siege guns.43  
  Also on 19 August, Duke Albrecht’s Fourth Army columns reached a line 
between Bastogne and Attert, a thirty–three kilometre front. Attert was only nine 
kilometres north of Arlon where Fifth Army’s right wing lay, so liaison was assured.44 
Their front was still east of the line patrolled by French aircraft, which continued to 
report that the central Ardennes was empty of enemy troops. 
De Langle was ready on this day to launch his five corps into the central 
Ardennes and he wrote to Joffre to that effect.45 But GQG believed that the north–
westerly march of large German columns (actually mainly Third Army and the right 
wing of Fourth Army) observed by their aerial reconnaissance would send more enemy 
units into the trap on the Ourthe. So it held de Langle back. From this point on, GQG’s 
ignorance of the imminent arrival of the bulk of the German Fourth Army from the east 
clouded its judgement. Only Fourth Army’s own intelligence and operational staff could 
– or should – have balanced the local risks to the mission they were being asked to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 AFGG I/1, Annex 692: [transcript of an enciphered telegramme], 21 août, 0.10: Préfet Meuse à: 1° 
guerre, cabinet, Paris; 2° grand quartier général, armées de l’Est. 
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la IVe armée. 
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undertake. Ruffey’s Third Army remained in its defensive positions and engaged in 
localised patrolling.46  
On 20 August, Duke Albrecht’s army made only short marches, but it was 
provoked into a major skirmish. In the north, 8 AK marched only sixteen kilometres, 
sticking closely to the left flank of von Hausen’s Third Army and ending up on the 
upper reaches of the Ourthe river. Had it been the only German corps in the central 
Ardennes, Joffre’s plan would have been realistic. But it was not, and in the south, 6 
AK made a leisurely and uninterrupted march, still undetected by French intelligence, to 
the region east of Neufchâteau, around Léglise which was to be one of the key 
objectives of Ruffey’s Third Army only two days later.  
But French intelligence had managed to locate Duke Albrecht’s third regular 
corps in the centre of the line. 18 AK had by lunchtime completed its short march 
westwards to the region north of Neufchâteau, around Libramont, and was settling into 
its billets when its outposts came into contact with de Langle de Cary’s provisional 
cavalry corps (4 and 9 DC) which was reconnoitring in force.47 One of 18 AK’s two 
divisions deployed, the other stood on alert and even sent its artillery south in support.48 
The fighting escalated to involve all of the above and lasted until nightfall.49 Prisoners 
taken by the French gave valuable intelligence about their enemy’s dispositions.50  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 AFGG I/1, Annex 545: IIIe armée, 19 août, 18.00: Compte rendu de renseignements nr.31 (bis). 
 
47 On 18 August, Joffre combined de Langle’s two cavalry divisions into a provisional corps under the 
command of 4 DC’s General Abboneau, reinforced by a mixed detachment from 17 CA made up of a 
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Annex 426: Armée de Varennes [Fourth], 17 août, 20.00: Ordre particulier aux 4e et 9e divisions de 
cavalerie; and AFGG X/1, p.940 
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(Stallung, Oldenburg / Berlin, 1927), p.11 
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GQG at 23.59 on 20 August by Lieutenant–Colonel Brécard. 
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Both 5 AK and 13 AK of the German Fifth Army made short marches down to 
the upper reaches of the Semoy river near Étalle; 16 AK stood fast in its positions near 
the Moselstellung. The Crown Prince moved 6 RAK up into the widening gap in the 
centre of his line. He now had four of his five major units in the front line, with 5 RAK 
held slightly back around his headquarters’ town of Esch.51 Ruffey’s Third Army 
remained in its defensive positions on the Othain this day, gathering information in 
preparation for an advance.52 But in the evening of 20 August, Joffre issued orders to 
Ruffey to commence his advance ‘in the general direction of Arlon’ the next day.53  
 
At 06.00 on 21 August, Ruffey’s Third Army moved forward from the Othain towards 
the line of the Chiers–Crusnes rivers, closing up on its advance guards. The march was 
reported as having been uneventful.54 But it is now clear from individual unit JMOs that 
in the evening the leading elements of Brochin’s 5 CA encountered the enemy in 
trenches on the south–facing slopes west of Longwy.55 These defences were not part of 
the besiegers’ circumvallations, but were outposts of the main army (13 AK) protecting 
the besiegers, facing south and on the alert for a possible French advance.56 Brochin’s 
leading troops entered into a series of skirmishes which lasted most of the night, 
although these events did not impact upon Ruffey’s plans at all; indeed it is not clear !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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whether Brochin and his staff actually reported the contact. The bulk of the Crown 
Prince’s Fifth Army had rested in its billets all day, inadvertently thwarting French 
aerial reconnaissance and adding to the false sense of security pervading the French 
high command. The only significant activity on Fifth Army’s front was the investiture 
of Longwy by a brigade of infantry from Kaempffer’s detachment, the bringing up of 
the heavy artillery for the siege, and the placement by 13 AK of protective outposts, 
referred to above.57  
  Duke Albrecht’s troops likewise took advantage of a day of comparative rest. 
The French cavalry corps seemed to have disappeared from in front of their 18 AK, 
leaving them in the dark as to French intentions. They themselves shifted slightly north–
westwards (from Neufchâteau–Libramont to Libramont–Libin), making room for 18 
RAK to enter the front line at Neufchâteau. 
  De Langle used the night of 20–21 August to close his main force up onto their 
advance guards. But the northerly axis of the impending attack required that de Langle’s 
two right–wing corps – 2 CA and CAC – surrender part of their zone of operations to 
Third Army; this necessitated a lot of extra marching to free up roads and villages 
which they had occupied in the eastern part of their original zones. The mouvement was 
not organised at all efficiently and this is the activity described by General Cordonnier 
as ‘order, counter–order, disorder’.58 The troops of 2 CA seem to have been particularly 
fatigued by this necessary reorganisation, their march discipline was so poor that units 
got muddled up on the few crowded roads, and their tiredness and disorder had a 
significant effect on the action on the following day: the advance guard (7 Brigade) 
failed to reach its objective of securing the exits north of the forest of Virton and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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remained on the wrong side of the forest for the night.59 There was also another 
significant skirmish at Izel, on the edge of the Florenville clearing, between a regiment 
from General Roques’s 12 CA and strong elements of the German 3 KD which was still 
providing security in the Étalle corridor, in the gap between Fourth and Fifth Armies.60 
 
On 21 August Joffre issued his preliminary instructions for Fourth Army’s offensive 
into the Ardennes.61 At almost the same time, Crown Prince William ordered the 
advance of his Fifth Army from its positions on a rough line from Étalle to Diedenhofen 
down to the line of the Chiers–Crusnes rivers, in order to improve his defensive 
position.62 Because of the relatively short distance between the two sides, the scene was 
set for an imminent clash between the German Fifth and French Third Armies. Both 
sides had gathered enough intelligence to establish this fact; the Germans, interpreting 
their intelligence correctly, were on the alert; the French, ignoring small but crucial 
pieces of evidence, convinced themselves that Ruffey would not face significant 
opposition.  
In the centre, Duke Albrecht von Württemburg’s orders to his Fourth Army on 
21 August for execution on 22 August were for a continuation of his leisurely advance 
westwards through the Ardennes. He had no inkling of de Langle’s forthcoming attack, 
just a general awareness of such a possibility, leading him to order a generally 
heightened sense of alert.63 But during the night of 21–22 August came one of those 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘Clausewitzian’ moments of chance, which alter the course of history. The Crown 
Prince’s orders called for his army to march south, and this particularly affected his 
right–hand corps (5 AK), requiring it to make a long march down through the forests 
from its pivotal position around Arlon on the Semoy river into the next open clearing 
(the valley of the river Vire), from where it could protect the flank of the neighbouring 
13 AK in the Longwy region. The movement of 5 AK away from Arlon threatened to 
open a thirty–kilometre gap between Fourth and Fifth Armies and leave the ‘Étalle 
corridor’ unguarded. On receipt of his orders and appreciating the potential significance 
of the gap, the commanding general of V Korps sent one of his staff officers, 
Hauptmann Wachenfeld, to ask his nearest neighbour (25 Reserve Division of 18 
Reserve Korps, IV Army, at Anlier) to turn south in support. Driven in a fast motor car 
and with a spare car travelling behind (even if the spare car lost its way!), Wachenfeld 
arrived at 25 DIR’s headquarters at 00.30hrs on 22 August. But the commander of the 
reserve division felt unable to comply without orders from his own superiors. On his 
own initiative, Wachenfeld then drove on to VI AK’s headquarters at Léglise, arriving 
at 02.00hrs. General von Britzelwitz, VI AK’s commander, appreciated the seriousness 
of the situation (even though, it should be remembered, the German intelligence had at 
that stage no inkling of the impending French offensive) and phoned Fourth Army 
commander Duke Albrecht. Woken from sleep and despite the unorthodox request from 
another army’s subordinate unit, Duke Albrecht appreciated the risks in the Crown 
Prince’s new plan, and issued orders for VI AK to march south and close the gap.64 So 
within four hours the 12 Division was sent south on the road through the forest via Les 
Fosses to Rossignol and the 11 Division from Léglise to Tintigny.  
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Map 3: German move South, night of 21/22 August.  
(Source: Bircher, Die Schlacht bei Ethe-Virton, op. cit.) 
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The hectic German staff activity which led to Duke Albrecht ordering 6 AK to 
march southwards, contrasts with the lethargy and complacency shown by the French 
units opposite them. The leading division of 2 CA (4 DI) had received orders to traverse 
the forest in front of it and establish itself on the southern slopes of the Semoy valley 
before bivouacking for the night of 21–22 August. The orders were clear, and necessary 
to secure the Étalle corridor and de Langle’s right flank. But the commander of 4 DI 
decided – as a result of the additional marching occasioned by Joffre’s change of the 
axis of attack, described above – that his troops were too tired to execute their orders; he 
informed his corps commander that he was stopping south of the forest but would make 
up the time by an earlier start in the morning. This unilateral decision seems not to have 
been questioned, nor did anyone think to inform General Lefèvre, commanding CAC, 
whose flank would be uncovered if 4 DI was late arriving on the Semoy. Of course, in 
the morning, that was exactly what happened. When the main body of 4 DI eventually 
occupied the southern slopes of the Semoy valley, they found 6 AK in possession of the 
valley, the river crossings at Tintigny and, crucially, the high ground of the northern 
slopes, which afforded excellent observation for artillery down the whole of the valley. 
The consequences of this poor discipline and ineffective command and control were 
catastrophic for the French, as will be explained in the narrative of the individual 
encounters. But nothing could better contrast the general state of the French and 
German command structures and attitudes than the behaviour described above. 
 
 Thus it was, through a combination of chance and a markedly different approach to 
conducting war, that Ruffey’s left–hand corps (4 CA) met the German 5 AK at Virton 
and Ethe, rather than achieving an unopposed march north; and thus also de Langle’s 
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two right–wing corps (CAC and 2 CA) encountered their enemy (6 AK) in the Semoy 
valley rather than in the north around Neufchâteau. The sequence of events which drove 
the German units south and which precipitated the four encounter battles in the centre of 
the battlefield show clearly that the French perception – carried forward even today into 
several respected histories65 – that the Germans were lying in wait for them in ambush 
positions is pure myth; and shows instead that the Germans were not actively seeking 
battle, merely seeking to close gaps in their line and improve their defensive positions. 
De Langle himself contributed to obscuring the true course of events by seeking in his 
memoires to pass all responsibility onto Joffre. In these he wrongly claims that on 20 
August the Germans opposite him stopped, turned to face south–west, occupied the 
woods and localities, fortified them and prepared to receive an expected French 
attack.66  
 
The morning of 22 August was hot, humid and foggy. It had rained the day before, 
causing thick river mist to rise, covering the whole terrain. Air reconnaissance was 
impossible until the sun burned through the mist, which was at about 08.30 at the 
earliest. The fog and lack of aerial cover aided the French advance and contributed 
greatly to the surprise achieved against their opponents.  
The French set out early – most units were on the march by 05.00 – but many of 
them had a long approach march in front of them. On the French left, the main bodies of 
each column had a couple of hours march before they even crossed the river Semoy 
behind their advance guards, and the prospect of a further twenty kilometres or more to 
reach their day’s objective. The troops would be tired if and when they came into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!>=!For example: Doughty,  Pyrrhic Victory, pp.66–67; and Herwig, Marne, pp.147–8 
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action. The German troops generally had shorter marches in prospect and were 
consequently likely to be fresher when combat loomed.  
The longer approach marches of the French units on the left – the most westerly 
columns – meant that any contact with the enemy, who was approaching at a right–
angle from the east, would be during late morning. In the centre and on the French right 
– mainly on Third Army’s front where the Germans were either nearby or closing fast, 
there was the likelihood of early action.  
 
The German Crown Prince’s decision to send his army southwards towards more 
favourable terrain had coincided with Joffre’s decision to send Ruffey’s army into the 
attack. So the five corps of Fifth Army were committed to a manoeuvre which would 
put them directly in the path of the advance of Ruffey’s three corps. But, as has been 
mentioned above, Ruffey had been given the Third Group of reserve divisions as part of 
his command. These troops, equivalent to an additional one–and–a–half corps and with 
eighteen batteries of heavy artillery attached, had been ordered by Ruffey on 17 August 
to extend his refused right flank back to the Meuse Heights; 54 reserve infantry division 
(DR) in particular was to hold itself ready to take over flank protection for Third Army 
from Sarrail’s 6 CA.67 However, for reasons which are not entirely clear, Joffre 
removed the Third Group of reserve divisions from Ruffey’s command on the morning 
of 21 August, setting up an independent command under General Maunoury which was 
soon renamed the ‘Army of Lorraine’.68 Since Maunoury was given the Verdun 
garrison and additional reserve units, as well as responsibility for the defence of Verdun 
and Toul, this can be seen as a cautious, defensive move on Joffre’s part, perhaps !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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influenced by the aftermath of the defeats on 20 August at Morhange and Sarrebourg. 
But the effect on Ruffey, and on the counter–attack into the Ardennes, was entirely 
negative. Without the three reserve divisions under his command to counter the German 
four reserve divisions – and ignoring for the moment the question of the relative quality 
of each side’s reserve units – Ruffey found himself outnumbered. The timing of the 
removal of the reserve divisions from Ruffey’s command highlights the point: at 09.15 
on 21 August, Ruffey ordered 54 DR to take over flank guard duties from 40 DI of 
Sarrail’s corps, thus releasing the latter for the main offensive.69 Joffre issued his Order 
Nr 14, setting up Maunoury’s command, only an hour later, at about 10.30, which was 
received at Third Army headquarters at 15.00. As a result, only Ruffey’s three regular 
corps met all five of the Crown Prince’s regular and reserve corps in battle on 22 
August. 
 In the west, 5 AK met 4 CA at Virton and Ethe, and prevented the French from 
advancing from their overnight positions.70 In the centre, 13 AK met and 
comprehensively defeated 5 CA near the fortress of Longwy, while on the other side of 
the fortress 6 RAK supported by 5 RAK successfully held off a series of assaults by the 
elite 6 CA. In the east, advancing from its pivotal position near the Moselstellung, 16 
AK nearly succeeded in turning Ruffey’s flank, forcing the French into a fighting 
withdrawal.  
* * * 
It is clear from this brief summary of the action between the French Third and German 
Fifth Armies that from the opening moments of the engagement, Joffre’s strategic plan 
was compromised and Ruffey’s operational plan totally disrupted by the German !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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advance to the line of the Chiers–Crusnes rivers. Instead of marching twenty kilometres 
or more northwards to protect Fourth Army’s vulnerable right flank, Third Army was 
fighting for its life near its own start line. De Langle de Cary’s Fourth Army would be 
marching north on its own. 
 And indeed it was to prove worse than that. The two right–hand corps of Fourth 
Army (CAC and 2 CA) were also stopped well short of their objectives and isolated 
from the rest of the army by a thick band of forest. This was the result of the 
serendipitous decision by Duke Albrecht – mentioned above – to send 6 AK south 
during the night to cover the emerging gap in the German line in the Semoy valley. 
Instead of traversing the forest north of the Semoy and arriving at Neufchâteau on the 
flank of the main body of Fourth Army, CAC met the German 6 AK in the Semoy 
valley and suffered a catastrophic defeat at Rossignol; whilst 2 CA (when its lead 
division – 4 DI – eventually arrived) was forced to fight a defensive action alongside 
them at Tintigny. The action in the Semoy valley destroyed de Langle’s operational 
plan. When his right wing was fixed in place so early in the day, fighting the wrong 
battle in the wrong place, the rest of de Langle’s army marched on without it, north 
through the forests, their right flank exposed now to any German movement from the 
east. By 10.00 (if not before) de Langle’s tenuous command over his operation was 
already beyond his control.  
Only the two corps on the left of de Langle’s army (11 and 17 CAs) managed to 
get close to their objectives for 22 August, which were the occupation of three villages 
north of the tree–line: namely Maissin, Anloy and Ochamps. But even they met German 
opposition before they could emerge from the forest and deploy properly. They were, 
however, together with 12 CA in the centre, the group of French units that through their 
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unforeseen advance caught the Germans completely by surprise and caused them great 
concern.  
 
For Duke Albrecht did not have it all his own way; he had his own problems. His 
serendipitous decision to send 6 AK south to the Semoy may have paid off at Rossignol 
and Tintigny, but he still had nearly sixty kilometres of front to protect with only his 
four remaining corps. He had allocated the key role of protecting von Hausen’s Third 
Army’s flank in the north to 8 AK; it was too far away to be able to intervene in any 
action on 22 August. He had kept 8 RAK back at his headquarters at Bastogne, as his 
personal army reserve; it too was too far from the battle zone to play other than a last 
minute peripheral role. That left two corps, 18 AK and 18 RAK, both situated around 
Neufchâteau, to meet and resist the advance of de Langle’s centre and left. And to make 
matters worse for Duke Albrecht, the fog concealed the early morning advance of de 
Langle’s centre–left group, which managed to approach into contact without his 
knowing. Only at midday did reports reach him, revealing the danger he was in, and by 
that time his two central corps had been in action for over an hour.71  
It is a long–standing misinterpretation of the Battle of the Ardennes that the 
Germans were lying in wait for the French and ambushed them in the forests.72 Nothing 
could be further from the truth. On the morning of 22 August, both 18 AK and 18 RAK 
began by implementing Duke Albrecht’s orders of the night before for a continuation of 
their gradual westerly advance. Only short marches were envisaged, because 18 AK had 
to echelon back from 8 AK in the north and 18 RAK had to keep loosely in touch with 6 
AK in the south; together the two were to attempt to hold a broad line of more than fifty !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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kilometres through the central Ardennes. This explains why the rear half of 18 RAK (25 
Reserve infantry division –RID) did not move at all until the afternoon, and then only to 
join the fighting which had broken out. It explains why the other half of 18 RAK (21 
RID) was engaged in a leisurely route march in column when attacked by the French. 
And it explains why the southerly half of 18 AK (21 ID), having sent out its advance 
guard, did not move its main body until noon. Only the northern half of 18 AK (25 ID), 
with the furthest but still short distance to travel in order to keep in touch with the 
advancing 8 AK, sent its main body onto the roads during the early morning.73 
 But coincidentally, and unfortunately for the French, the advance guards of these 
German formations were heading for the same places as the French columns of de 
Langle’s centre–left grouping – the villages of Bertrix, Ochamps, Anloy and Maissin, 
and they were closer. Thus it came about that the advancing French units, expecting a 
peaceful day’s march through the forests, a deployment the following day and a 
subsequent advance upon the German ‘northern grouping’ on the river Ourthe, instead 
found themselves in contact with German Fourth Army units coming from the east, and 
engaged in fierce fighting in and on the northern edges of the forests. Thus also it 
happened that the German Fourth Army advance guard at Ochamps was facing west 
when a French column came out of the forest from the south;74 the German advance 
guard on the road to Maissin had to force–march in order to occupy that village and its 
commanding high ground before the recently located large French column came up;75 
the German reservists (advance guard of 18 RAK) marching out of Neufchâteau were 
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caught in column by French rifle fire;76 and the German advance guard which reached 
Anloy was caught by surprise by French rifle fire coming from the tree–line to the south 
when it sought to advance further.77  
These were not actions consistent with the suggestions of a well–laid German 
ambush. This myth (for such it was) had its roots in two factors: the multitude of small 
German cavalry patrols which had roamed across the central Ardennes over the 
previous days, giving rise to rumours passed on by civilians of masses of Germans in 
the forests;78 and the desire on the part of certain French commanders to explain away 
their failures at the tactical level. This will be examined in greater detail later in the 
thesis, when the individual encounter–battles are examined. There is even a suggestion 
that certain German commanders encouraged the propagation of the ‘ambush’ myth in 
order to enhance the reputation of German military excellence.79  
 
In the central Ardennes zone between Maissin and Neufchâteau, the French, despite 
faulty intelligence and disrupted operational plans, managed to outnumber their 
immediate opponents by more than two to one. At one specific point on the thirty–
kilometre front, the odds in favour of the French lengthened to more than six to one. 
Here, ironically and despite mistakes on both sides, was the opportunity for which 
Joffre had hoped and planned; a clean break in the German centre followed by an 
envelopment of the ‘northern grouping’ of German armies. It was not, as has been 
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shown, at all like the plan envisaged, neither in time nor place. Improvisation had 
become the order of the day, both on a tactical and operational level.  
On the left, Maissin was first occupied by French cavalry from 11 CA, only to 
be driven out by the superior firepower of German infantry. Thereafter, three German 
infantry regiments from 25 ID (18 AK) held off successive attacks by the eight infantry 
regiments of 11 CA. Only in the evening after more than six hours’ fighting did weight 
of French numbers and superior firepower succeed in driving the Germans from the 
field. Maissin was the first of two clear opportunities for de Langle to win an 
operational victory, not only because of his superiority of force but also because 18 
AK’s right flank lay open and vulnerable to envelopment without any support or 
reinforcement on hand. The reasons for the French failure to realise their opportunity 
will be examined in the second part of this thesis. 
South of  Maissin, the remaining regiment of 25 ID met and held off the whole 
of 34 DI at Anloy, primarily because of a decision by the French commander to keep his 
artillery back whilst sending his infantry forward into the forests. Consequently, 34 DI 
failed to support and protect 11 CA’s right flank and thus contributed to the missed 
opportunity. Without artillery, the French infantry failed to get forward and suffered 
heavily in turn from German shelling. At nightfall it was the French who retreated, after 
heavy casualties on both sides. 
The right–hand column of 17 CA, 33 DI, suffered the greatest disaster of the day 
because of a series of avoidable blunders by the French commanders. This encounter is 
described in detail later in this thesis, but in short, the French division marched without 
adequate security into the forest north of Bertrix and there was taken in the flank by 21 
ID, coming down from Libramont where it had been based. The result was disaster for 
the French; 17 CA was effectively destroyed and retreated in considerable disorder.  
! >?!
In the three encounters described above, at Maissin, Anloy and Ochamps–
Bertrix, Duke Albrecht’s 18 AK acquitted itself well, holding off three times its 
numbers and inflicting a bloody reverse on 17 CA. But further south, around 
Neufchâteau, 18 RAK had an even more difficult challenge. One of the corps’s two 
divisions was resting in reserve, holding a position some five kilometres east of the 
town, from where it could move south in support of 6 AK if needed. This left only one 
reserve division to face the might of the approaching 12 CA, which also had the 
reinforced 5 Colonial Brigade in support. So at Neufchâteau the odds against the 
Germans were initially more than two–and–a–half to one. Once the fighting had 
intensified and the situation clarified, the commander of 18 RAK ordered his reserve 
division (25 RID) to force–march to the rescue of its embattled sister unit. The 
reinforcements arrived successively during the afternoon, just in time to stop the elite 
French colonial infantry from capturing Neufchâteau town, which would have been a 
serious reverse for the Germans. But the real opportunity lay west of the town, where 
the twenty–four battalions and one–hundred–and–twenty guns of General Roques’s 12 
CA encountered six reserve battalions and eighteen guns from 18 RAK’s leading 
column.  
 The encounter between Roques’s corps and the German reservists west of 
Neufchâteau is central to the dominant theme of this thesis: that the French were 
afforded but failed to capitalise upon an opportunity to break through the centre of Duke 
Albrecht’s front into open and undefended territory beyond. This encounter is described 
and analysed in its own chapter later in the thesis. But in summary, the engagement 
went like this: fighting between the two advance guards started at about 10.00 and each 
side successively deployed more troops into their respective firing lines. Within two or 
three hours, Roques’s troops had driven their weak opponents back, inflicting severe 
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losses and pushing the German reservists to the limits of their endurance. But with 
victory within their grasp, the French failed to deliver the coup de grace; indeed 
Roques’s right wing actually retreated rather than advanced, a movement ordered to 
conform to the position of the Colonial brigade on their right. At nightfall, 12 CA was 
able to bivouac comfortably on the battlefield whilst the Germans licked their wounds 
and counted their blessings.  
To summarise de Langle de Cary’s Fourth Army operation: as with Ruffey’s 
plan, de Langle’s operational plan went wrong from the very beginning when his right 
wing was intercepted and held on the Semoy. The left and centre, however, continued to 
implement their part and achieved surprise against an inferior enemy. However despite 
two clear opportunities to inflict a significant defeat on their opponent, these French 
units failed to dominate and indeed, in the case of 17 CA at Bertrix, suffered themselves 
a devastating reversal.  
 
During the night of 22–23 August, all four army commanders were able to receive the 
latest reports and take stock of what had happened and decide what to do next. Initially 
de Langle de Cary felt that he could renew his attacks on his left with 11, 17 and 12 
CAs, bringing up fresh troops (9 CA and 60 DR) in support; all the while holding a 
defensive line ‘at all costs’ with CAC (supported now by his heavy artillery) and 2 CA 
on the left bank of the Semoy. He issued orders to that effect at 23.45 on 22 August.80 
But by 05.00 he had received sufficient information to reveal the stark reality: 17 CA 
had fled back to the Semoy in total disarray; casualties in all units had been high and 
time was needed to regroup. De Langle issued new, defensive orders reflecting that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 AFGG I/1, Annex 866: IVe armée, Stenay, 22 août, 23.45: Ordres du commandant de l’armée pour le 
23 août. 
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reality.81 But Joffre and GQG did not agree with this assessment, still clinging to the 
belief that Fourth Army was faced by no more than two or three German corps. De 
Langle was ordered to renew the attack as soon as possible.82 He dutifully obliged, 
issuing at 10.00 fresh orders for an attack which he knew his troops were incapable of 
executing.83  
But Duke Albrecht was in no position to follow up his defensive victories; the 
cost on 22 August had been too high. Men were tired, supplies were low, units 
disorganised, casualties severe. Even the victorious 18 AK took a morning of rest before 
moving out at noon.84 The losses suffered by the units which had fought at Maissin and 
Anloy were such that they had to be intermingled with fresh units from 8 RAK (which 
had force–marched to the battlefield arriving at dusk on 22 August). Impromptu 
divisional–sized detachments were formed under senior commanders in order to effect 
the follow–up.85 
Ruffey’s Third Army was in better shape, despite the debacle of 5 CA’s baptism 
of fire. A strong defensive line was formed on the Tellancourt plateau south of Longwy, 
linking north–west up to 2 CA of Fourth Army on the Semoy. On the right flank, 
Sarrail’s corps was even able to launch a fresh attack on the morning of 23 August, this 
time making full use of heavy artillery to prepare the way.86 And the three reserve !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 AFGG I/1, Annex 1102: [Fourth Army] Armée de Stenay, 23 août, 05.00: Ordre général nr.22 
 
82 AFGG I/1, Annex 1048: [GQG], 23 août, 08.30: communication téléphonique, général en chef à 
commandant armée Stenay. 
 
83 AFGG I/1, Annex 1107: [Third Army] Armée de Stenay, 23 août, 10.00: Ordre [sic]; and Annex 1108: 
[Third Army], 23 août, 10.00: Armée Stenay à général en chef, téléphoné général Maistre à lieutenant–
colonel Paquette. 
 
84 Weltkrieg 1, pp.336–339 
 
85 Weltkrieg 1, pp.333–336 
 
86 AFGG I/1, Annex 913: [6 CA] Arrancy, 22 août, 21.20: Général commandant 6e C.A. à général 
commandant la 12e division; and Annex 1080: IIIe armée QG de Verdun, 23 août, 0.30: Ordre général 
d’opérations nr.18 pour la journée du 23 août. 
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divisions of what had been the Third Group but which was now renamed the Army of 
Lorraine, were available to form a strong defensive front, linking with Third Army’s 
refused right wing and covering Verdun, the Meuse Heights and southwards towards the 
fortress at Toul.87  
Crown Prince William, despite his proclaimed success on 22 August, was only 
released from OHL’s stricture not to cross the Chiers–Crusnes line at 07.00 on 23 
August, and therefore had had no immediate opportunity for pursuit, only the prospect 
of preparing a series of fresh attacks to drive the French back.  
 
Joffre’s strategy to drive his reinforced Fourth Army north through the difficult terrain 
of the Ardennes, rather than use a more traditional axis north–eastwards using the river 
valleys, main roads and the ‘grain’ of the terrain, was not, as has been previously 
claimed, completely stupid. But it was complex to execute, and fraught with risk. The 
virtue of the strategy is demonstrated by the fact that, even with its faulty execution, it 
still managed to achieve the element of surprise and deliver strong, superior forces at 
the weakest point of the German defence. Success or failure then depended upon 
operational and tactical issues. 
  The German strategy, to defend the hundred–kilometre gap between the 
Moselstellung and their attacking Schwenkungsflügel with the bare minimum of forces, 
was arguably more of a calculated risk. In particular, the lack of a strong cavalry 
protective screen on the southern flank opposite Sedan, based as it was upon an 
assumption that the French would not march north, gave Joffre his opportunity to 
achieve surprise. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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  Ruffey’s part of the French plan seems with hindsight to have been wildly over–
optimistic, requiring as it did that 5 CA break through known enemy field fortifications 
of unknown strength and still achieve a challenging march northwards, in step with its 
neighbours, in order to reach a position from where it could help protect Fourth Army’s 
right flank. And the execution of the plan, especially by 4 CA on the left, whereby the 
northern exits from the forests were not secured before the main columns set out, seems 
foolhardy in the extreme.  
Crown Prince William and his Chief of Staff, having decided to turn southwards 
on the night of 21–22 August, deployed Fifth Army well, and the execution of their part 
of the German strategy was without major faults. The attempt to outflank Ruffey’s 
extended right flank was the catalyst for the withdrawal of the whole Third Army. They 
were aided by the absence from the battlefield of the French Third Group of reserve 
divisions, which put pressure on Sarrail’s 6 CA and allowed the Crown Prince to try to 
turn the French right flank. No wonder that Ruffey raised a strong post–war protest 
against Joffre’s decision to take those troops away from his command.88  
It has been shown above how de Langle de Cary’s army was split in two by 
German action and how his part of Joffre’s plan was consequently fatally compromised. 
There are questions about Fourth Army’s use of intelligence, indeed many questions 
underlying the army’s performance, which will be examined in detail in later chapters. 
Then there is the crucial issue, introduced above, of the two opportunities for units of de 
Langle’s army to break the German line. These two incidents lie at the heart of the 
second main theme of this thesis, and for that reason will receive detailed analysis in 
later chapters.  
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Duke Albrecht’s army fought an excellent battle, especially considering the 
initial shock of finding the bulk of de Langle’s army aimed directly at their weakest 
point. The decisions which appear on the surface to be driven by luck (such as the 
serendipitous despatch of 6 AK south to the Semoy) were also driven by sound military 
principles – in this case the OHL directive to keep the inside flanks of Fourth and Fifth 
Armies in close liaison. But, as will be shown in more detailed analysis later, it was 
German tactical competence which was tested, and passed the test.  
 
Overall, despite flaws in the strategic and operational planning, each side achieved a 
partial operational success: de Langle delivered the bulk of his army at the weakest 
point in the whole German front, and Crown Prince William stopped Ruffey’s army 
before it could advance to assist de Langle. Thereafter, the answers to success and 
failure in the Ardennes 1914 campaign seem to lie at the operational–tactical 
(battlefield) level. So it is there that the following chapters will start to unravel the detail 
of events. 
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Chapter 2 : Army Operations 
 
 
This chapter examines the way in which each of the four army commanders involved in the 
Battle of the Ardennes planned to execute his part in his commander’s strategic plan and 
how he then conducted his operation. It examines the comparative effectiveness of the four 
generals’ command, control and communication skills, and analyses the extent to which the 
army commanders contributed to the outcome of events on 22 August. Although the key 
role was arguably given to General de Langle de Cary, who was to lead France’s striking 
force into the attack on the enemy’s weakest point, this chapter commences with an 
examination of his opponent, Duke Albrecht of Württemburg, whose Fourth Army was to 
receive the main French attack. An understanding of Duke Albrecht’s role in thwarting 
French ambitions will illuminate the subsequent analysis of de Langle’s own performance.  
 
The operational overview (chapter one) has described at army level and above how Duke 
Albrecht’s Fourth Army advanced from the Alzette position on 18 August into the central 
Ardennes. It has shown how some excellent staff work and a good operational decision by 
Duke Albrecht on the night of 21–22 August brought 6 AK down into the Semoy valley to 
fill the gap left by Crown Prince William’s advance to the south. The overview has made 
clear the extent to which the fog and the timing and direction of the French attack caught 
Duke Albrecht and his army by surprise. And it has described at high level how, in four 
separate encounter battles – Maissin–Anloy, Bertrix, Neufchâteau and Rossignol –  three of 
Duke Albrecht’s five corps held (and in two cases defeated) de Langle de Cary’s five corps, 
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frustrating the French operational plan and forcing them to retreat. It now remains to 
examine the performance of Fourth Army in order to identify the critical factors behind its 
success, and possible weaknesses.  
When news of the advance of the French Fourth army reached Duke Albrecht at 
about noon on 22 August, he was visiting 6 AK’s headquarters at Rulles on his left flank. 
He had arrived at 09.00, almost certainly to see for himself why he had been woken in the 
night and asked to send 6 AK south.1 Unlike his French counterpart, who preferred to 
remain at his headquarters, Duke Albrecht had not only established a forward command–
post (CP) at Libramont, twenty kilometres in advance of his main headquarters at Bastogne, 
but he also preferred to travel and visit his corps commanders in the field. Such a command 
style differentiates him from his opponent and also pays tribute to the quality of his army’s 
communications systems which allowed him such freedom whilst preserving his ability to 
control his wide–spread army.  
Duke Albrecht was following the development of the fighting in the Semoy valley 
between 6 AK and CAC and 2 CA. The scale of the fighting, the fog and the lack of 
reconnaissance and intelligence raised in his mind the possibility that the French might 
have launched a major attack on Fourth Army, and at 10.30 he decided to take 
precautionary measures. He issued orders (transmitted from 6 AK’s communications 
centre) for the army to swing south and close up on 6 AK; 18 RAK at Neufchâteau was 
ordered to move down towards the Semoy in order to join 6 AK’s battle; 18 AK was to 
move from Libin–Libramont down to Bertrix–Orgéo; and (crucially as it turned out) 8 
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RAK was ordered to march from Bastogne down through St Hubert towards Villance.2 We 
now know that two of those units – 18 AK and 18 RAK & were already in action against 
French forces, so their orders were impossible to execute. But the speed and decisiveness of 
Duke Albrecht’s reaction to his early appreciation of the scenario is nevertheless 
impressive; and the decision to bring 8 RAK down from reserve at Bastogne was to pay 
dividends at the end of the day.! 
Having given these orders, Duke Albrecht went even closer to the action, driving to 
the Semoy valley and the heights at Marbehan with 6 AK’s commander General von 
Pritzelwitz, from where 11 ID’s artillery was bombarding the French and from where he 
could personally see the scale of the action, the fog having lifted. It was while he was there 
that reports from the first aerial reconnaissance of the day caught up with him. As he had 
feared, major French forces had come up hidden by the fog and were threatening his right 
and centre. The aeroplanes had taken off at about 09.00 as the fog was lifting, and the 
information they brought back was already several hours old, so the situation could already 
have deteriorated.3 Duke Albrecht’s surprise was total but his reaction was fast and 
positive. His immediate appreciation of the seriousness of his situation led him to return to 
his CP at Libramont at once (13.00). But he still made time to stop in Neufchâteau to give a 
personal briefing to General von Steuben, commander of 18 RAK.4  At the time that Duke 
Albrecht arrived in Neufchâteau  21 RID had been fighting desperately for more than three 
hours against two–and–a– half French divisions, and there was considerable doubt whether 
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they could hold. One can legitimately speculate that the steadfast and desperate resistance 
of that division, and the absolute refusal of both divisional and corps commanders to 
countenance retreat, was bolstered through Duke Albrecht’s personal appearance.  
Back at his CP at Libramont, Duke Albrecht took stock. At 14.00 he held a face&to&
face meeting with 18 AK’s commander, General von Schenk, whose headquarters was 
conveniently adjacent. The movement of that corps previously ordered at 10.30 had been 
made unworkable by enemy action. 25 ID was totally embroiled in the fighting at Maissin 
and Anloy; 21 ID was waiting around Libramont, although its advance guard had gone west 
to Ochamps. There followed a typically Prussian command situation: Albrecht wanted von 
Schenk to send some support to von Steuben’s hard&pressed reservists at Neufchâteau; von 
Schenk demurred; Albrecht insisted; he personally ordered at least part of 18 AK to go to 
help 18 RAK by moving on a line Orgéo–Bertrix.5 This would have taken part of 21 ID 
towards the French 12 CA at Saint Médard; Rocolle mistakenly believed that this had 
occurred.6 Such a move would have considerably weakened the advance of 21 ID on 
Bertrix, with incalculable consequences for the ensuing action with the French 33 DI. But 
in the end, von Schenk’s appreciation of his situation was that it was too deeply locked in 
its own combat for him to be able to comply with the order from Albrecht; a new report to 
that effect received Albrecht’s retrospective concurrence.7 Thanks to the pusillanimous 
performance of General Roques’s 12 CA, von Schenk’s decision to ignore his superior’s 
wishes bore fruit; but it was a close call. !
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At 15.00 Albrecht issued a consolidated general order to all his corps commanders, 
which confirmed the individual instructions previously given to each and which gave fresh 
instructions to 8 AK and 8 RAK. The latter was to push forward to Villance where it would 
form up in tightly closed ranks, whilst the former would prepare to send its left&hand 
division south in the morning, provided that there was no threat from the west (where the 
French Fifth Army stood on the Meuse).8 From 15.00 onwards, there was little for Duke 
Albrecht and his staff to do, except await the outcome of the day’s fighting, and plan for the 
morrow. A crucial decision made earlier, when calling the rest of his army to swing 
southwards to meet the threat, had been to keep 8 AK in the north on Third Army’s flank. 
This was a measure both of the importance given to guarding the progress of the main 
advance on the right wing and of the risks Duke Albrecht was prepared to take in order to 
fulfil that part of his mission. In then planning for one division of 8 AK to turn south on 23 
August – and indeed later adding one brigade of the remaining division to that move, 
leaving only one brigade to protect Third Army’s flank – Albrecht was implicitly 
acknowledging the seriousness of the French Fourth Army’s threat to his army.9 Who 
knows what might have developed had the French realized their lost opportunity at 
Maissin? The appearance of 9 CA and de Langle’s provisional CC on the line of the river 
Lesse to the north&west would have constituted a considerable threat to the security of 
Third Army’s flank. As it was, Albrecht’s decision taken at 10.30 to call 8 RAK up from 
reserve to support 25 ID at Maissin and at Villance was to prove of critical importance: any 
later and that unit could not have reached Villance before nightfall and the retreating 50 
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Brigade would have been without the vital support which bolstered the crumbling German 
line. !
The performance of Duke Albrecht and his staff was impressive; in full and 
immediate command and control of his five corps, he directed the action from his forward 
CP, only returning to his headquarters at Bastogne in the late evening, when the crisis was 
known to have passed.10 It should be noted, however, that even with this timely and hands&
on approach, the speed of events still outstripped the army commander’s ability to react; 
orders to his two centre corps could not be implemented because of enemy action. But at 
least Duke Albrecht was informed and able to take sensible command decisions, several of 
which proved effective. This was due in no small part to the effectiveness of Fourth Army 
communications. !
It is perhaps surprising to find such good and timely communications in Fourth 
Army, particularly given the apparent poor quality of those of First and Second Armies. 
Herwig has written of ‘the German army’s prewar neglect of communications and control’, 
stating that during the Battle of the Marne: ‘There were no electronic ties between First and 
Second Armies, or between them and their army corps and cavalry corps.’11 There is, 
however, contrary evidence that the German army overall did not neglect its 
communications infrastructure before the war; surviving standing orders for cavalry 
divisions include detailed regulations for setting up Field Signal detachments,12 and a 1912 
report on an exercise involving 13 AK and 18 AK offers constructive criticism of the 
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performance of the telephone detachments.13 Herwig’s example from First and Second 
Armies seems to be an extreme case in which the long distances involved stretched the 
limits of contemporary technology. In the case of Fourth Army, Duke Albrecht’s 
communications network seem to have gone way beyond just a link back to OHL; he seems 
to have been directly and constantly in touch with all of his corps commanders, whenever 
he wanted to communicate with them. How so? 
Amongst the few remaining records of August 1914 in the archives at Freiburg there 
is, fortuitously, the war diary of Fernsprech. Abtlg.VIII AK, the telecommunications group 
of Duke Albrecht’s 8 AK.14 It provides a detailed daily record of how this unit laid the 
telegraph and telephone connections which not only linked 8 AK headquarters with Duke 
Albrecht’s headquarters and thence to OHL, but also providing either telegraph or 
telephone service to both of the divisions of the corps, to ancillary outposts and to 
neighbouring units. This group of telephone engineers laid between twenty and fifty 
kilometers of wire every day from the start of the advance on 18 August until well after the 
battle on 22 August. On 19 August, for example, when 8 AK was centred upon Bastogne, 
they ran twenty&two kilometres of wire, setting up a star network with Bastogne as the hub 
and spokes going out (labeled on an accompanying diagram) to 15 ID and 16 ID. There 
were four ancillary spokes, one labeled as a Feldpost going south&eastwards and another, 
interestingly, linked to a second network stretching all the way to Libramont. It seems that 
8 AK had a direct telephone link to Duke Albrecht’s CP as well as to his main headquarters 
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at Bastogne. The unit’s target was to have the day’s network up and running by 12.00 each 
day, and judging by the performance on 22 August, when Albrecht was using 6 AK’s 
network at 10.30 to communicate with his CP, they were able to exceed that target for 
shorter routes. Such superb communications were a critical success factor for Duke 
Albrecht and Fourth Army.!!
!
De Langle de Cary’s command of the French Fourth Army provides a complete contrast at 
every level. He remained at his main headquarters at Stenay, sixty kilometres behind the 
line, for the whole day. Yet despite being constantly at the centre of his whole army’s 
communications network, he was singularly ill&informed. At 16.45 he was still under the 
mistaken impression that his left and centre were progressing well.15 And even before the 
operation had started at dawn on 22 August, there were some questionable decisions and 
some glaring lack of decisions by Fourth Army’s commander and his staff. Unlike Duke 
Albrecht, whose operational role merely required him to be alert and reactive, de Langle 
had a difficult offensive to plan. He had to meet Joffre’s strict requirement for secrecy and 
timing whilst at the same time getting his five corps safely across two bands of inhospitable 
forest and unforgiving terrain. Security – a concept central to French doctrine – and liaison 
between columns were prerequisites for success in the first phase of his operation.!
And yet, despite the importance and complexity of the proposed operation, there 
seems to have been very little specific and detailed planning to meet those two crucial 
criteria. De Langle simply sent his army north in multiple columns on 22 August, with 
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orders to occupy a number of specific features – towns, villages, high ground – on the 
northern side of the forests. Instructions were given to his cavalry corps to reconnoitre 
ahead of the army towards Recogne, Libin and Beauraing, which, had they been executed, 
might have been of inestimable value, given that Recogne and Libin were in the 
concentration area of 18 AK; but they were not implemented, for reasons which will be 
explored below along with a brief analysis of the operational role of Fourth Army’s cavalry. 
His operational order was factual, mechanical and lacked context.16 For example it says: 
‘Colonial Corps’s objective is Neufchâteau. Its zone of movement [will be] between the 
road from Orval farm via Pin, Jamoigne and Suxy to Neufchâteau and the road from Saint&
Vincent via Rossignol, Les Fossés, Offaing’. There was no mention of the previous fighting 
near Neufchâteau on 20 August or at Izel on 21 August and no sense of impending action. 
Surely this – or the commander’s personal and secret briefing examined below – was the 
place in which to remind the army of the close proximity of enemy forces, to reinforce 
instructions for security and to lay down contingency plans in the event of contact? De 
Langle’s personal briefing was not only issued on 20 August, two days before the start of 
the operation, and not (as far as can be determined from surviving records) subsequently 
updated, but it also gave a falsely optimistic impression whilst failing to mention any of the 
risks inherent in the operation. On the contrary, it strongly emphasised the need for secrecy, 
whilst giving the impression that the advanced detachments which had been, or would be, 
sent forward would be adequate to secure the army’s advance: !
The enemy seems at the moment to be making a flank march across our front which 
would result in him moving the central mass of his forces towards the north&north–
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 AFGG I/1, Annex 757: [Fourth Army] Armée de Stenay, 21 août, 18.00, Ordre général nr.20 concernant les 
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west, without making any important movements south of a general line Longwy–
Neufchâteau–Givet. The more the region between Arlon, Audun–le–Roman and 
Luxembourg is emptied [of enemy troops] when we launch our offensive, the better 
it will be for Fourth Army’s advance, supported on our right by Third Army.  
It is therefore of the utmost importance that we let the enemy flow past our front, 
towards the north&west, without attacking him prematurely. We must ensure that we 
do not fall into a trap which he may have laid in order to provoke us into launching 
our offensive too early by directing detachments towards our front.!
Consequently I formally command that the advanced detachments, whose advance 
to secure the Semoy river crossings and the Florenville clearing were laid down in 
general order nr.17, fulfil their mission by concealing themselves in the most 
effective manner. 
Precise and imperative instructions will be given to them this evening by their corps 
commanders emphasising that the most advanced outposts must even refrain from 
firing on groups of enemy soldiers slipping past their front towards the north&west.!
Under no circumstances whatsoever will the advanced detachments go onto the 
offensive.17 
This personal instruction goes on to specify what the advanced detachments should do if 
attacked, which was, in summary, to hold the Semoy river crossings and the Florenville 
clearing at all costs until reinforced, none of which was relevant to the situation two days 
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later, making the absence of a second secret and personal instruction to cover the planned 
advance on 22 August all the more surprising. Such a follow&up instruction could and 
should have referred to the identification of 18 AK at Neufchâteau, an important event 
which was taking place even as his original secret instruction was being written; it could 
and should have put the whole army onto a state of high alert, and it could and should have 
specified what steps were to be taken in the event of contact in the forest, while on the 
march.  
The extremely adverse effect of these deficiencies is demonstrated by the fact that 
within the lower echelons of CAC (divisional level and below) there was a widespread 
belief that 22 August was to be a day of uninterrupted peaceful marching, culminating in a 
warm billet at Neufchâteau: ‘Towards two o’clock in the morning we were woken. A 
preparatory movement order had arrived from corps. The division was to billet (cantonner) 
at Neufchâteau. Our advance guard would cross the bridge at Breuvannes at 06.30. No new 
intelligence about the enemy.’18 Whilst nothing can absolve lower echelon commanders 
from blame for failing to take basic local security measures as laid down in regulations, the 
lack of planning and leadership from de Langle and his staff is very apparent.  
The other notable absence from the operational order is the failure to co&ordinate 
the timing between columns. There were in any case many instances of delay and 
inefficiency in organising units to march, as will be amply demonstrated in the following 
chapters when individual battles are analysed. But Fourth Army staff set no timings for 
columns to achieve, no liaison points, no instructions to ensure a coordinated approach. 
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Admittedly there were a few general requirements for liaison included in individual unit 
instructions; in a specific order issued at 13.00 on 21 August, Gérard’s 2 CA was ordered to 
establish liaison with 4 CA (Third Army) on its right, and was informed that Boelle’s 
headquarters was at Velosnes.19 So poorly executed was this order that units of the former, 
attacking at Virton the next day, ran into units of the latter, also attacking, when each 
breasted a particular hill crest.20 In the same instruction, CAC was ordered to ensure that its 
advance guard set up liaison with 12 CA at Florenville and 2 CA at Bellefontaine. But as 
will be shown, 2 CA failed to get to Bellefontaine on time. And in any case, CAC’s liaison 
officer arrived there at least an hour after the head of 3e division d’infanterie colonial (3 
DIC)’s column had crossed the Semoy and marched off into the forests.21 If Fourth Army 
believed that its corps would automatically follow both instructions and regulations in a 
professional and timely manner, they were to be sadly disabused by the reality of the 
execution. The absence of a unifying central control, and the failure to inject any sense of 
urgency or criticality into an otherwise mundane set of manoeuvre instructions were major 
weaknesses on the part of Fourth Army’s staff.  
It was not a case that de Langle and his chief of staff simply underestimated the 
threat posed by the enemy; on the contrary, they had been engaged in some very worried 
and worrying correspondence with GQG and with their cavalry corps over the previous two 
days. The dichotomy is difficult to understand and impossible to explain. At 13.00 on 20 
August, even as 9 DC was about to clash with German outposts of 18 AK between 
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Neufchâteau and Libramont, de Langle wrote to General Abbonneau, commander of the 
provisional cavalry corps: ‘There is no change in your mission of exploration towards 
Bastogne and Saint–Hubert. The enemy appears to be slipping across our front in a flank&
march; if he turns towards my army, it is your task to find the right wing of the forces 
oriented towards me’.22 Fifteen minutes later (at 13.15), chief of staff General Maistre 
telephoned Joffre’s staff at GQG: 
You will have received reports indicating that several significant enemy columns 
are marching west–north–west and that their vanguards reached a line Neufchâteau–
Bastogne and further north at about 10.00. I cannot predict whether these masses 
will continue their flank–march tomorrow [21 August] or turn in whole or in part 
towards me. I must, in any case, envisage the possibility of this latter hypothesis. In 
the case that the enemy presents himself tomorrow on the front Bertrix, Saint-
Médard, Rossignol, Étalle and even in the direction of Arlon and Virton, I must ask 
what are the Commander–in–Chief’s  intentions with regard to the steps to be taken 
by my army? Should I await the arrival of the enemy on my existing front of 
Montmédy, Sedan? Or should I seek battle in the clearings of Florenville and 
Neufchâteau?23   
Thus the argument that de Langle and his Fourth Army were unaware of the threat posed to 
them by the German forces known to be in the Ardennes, and the very real possibility that 
those forces would turn and march through the forest towards the Semoy river, is 
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erroneous. This raises the almost unanswerable question as to how de Langle and Maistre 
subsequently thought that they could reach Neufchâteau unopposed and meet the enemy on 
the other side of the forest. Perhaps they convinced themselves that the German forces had 
marched away to the north&west, leaving them free passage, but that is hardly tenable. Even 
as Maistre was on the telephone to GQG, the cavalry corps was engaged in a sharp four–
hour skirmish with large elements of 18 AK just north of Neufchâteau.24 And 
reconnaissance reports from 4 DC received at Fourth Army headquarters early on 22 
August showed de Langle that those Germans were still in place.25 This highlights the 
delinquent behaviour of Fourth Army staff in not sharing their concerns with their corps 
commanders and not putting in place contingency plans in the event that Maistre’s fears 
were realised. And indeed history shows that the German masses identified by Maistre did 
indeed turn to confront de Langle’s army, on the very line which Maistre had predicted, just 
twenty&four hours later than he feared. In the meantime, de Langle sent his army north, 
allowing his troops to believe that the orders of the day where ‘for no more than a simple 
march to get through the forested zone.’26  
After the war, de Langle tried to blame Joffre for the lack of security, claiming that 
Joffre had prohibited proper reconnaissance for reasons of secrecy.27 On the contrary, 
Joffre’s response to Maistre’s call for guidance was to authorise de Langle to send strong, 
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mixed&arms advance guards from that evening [20 August] onwards up to ‘a general line 
Bièvre, Paliseul, Bertrix, Straimont, Tintigny in order to secure the advance of your army 
beyond the Semoy.’28 In fact, despite this authority to secure his advance, de Langle never 
secured Tintigny or the Étalle corridor, leading in part to the defeat at Rossignol; and 
although, as will be shown, he set up a very strong security screen at Saint-Médard between 
Bertrix and Straimont, he only did this at 05.00 on the morning of 22 August, about thirty&
six hours after he was encouraged by Joffre to do so.29 And, most interesting of all, each of 
the French Fourth Army columns which engaged the Germans on 22 August did so after 
they had reached and then marched beyond the cover of the protective detachments. This 
needs further analysis in search of an explanation. !
 
Many historians have noted the peculiar formation adopted by de Langle’s army for its 
advance, sometimes called the ‘stepped&echelon’ or ‘staircase’ formation in which each 
corps was to march to the right of and a little behind its neighbour, starting with 11 CA on 
the extreme left.30 This complex manoeuvre, which in itself reinforced both the need for 
and the absence of control at army level over timings and coordination, was dictated by the 
terrain. Firstly, the river Semoy winds significantly to the north&west from Tintigny to the 
Meuse, so de Langle’s left flank started at least twenty&five kilometres further north than 
his right wing; secondly, the lie of the land and the main road network had a broad north&
east to south&west orientation, so an advance due north cut across the grain. The protective 
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detachments were in positions at the head of zones which had been allocated on a north–
east facing front, before the axis of advance changed to due north. Thus the protective 
detachment of 17 CA at Saint&Médard was on 22 August in 12 CA’s new zone of 
operations, that of 11 CA in 17 CA’s new zone – and 11 CA had no protective detachment 
at all, only the advance guard which marched at the head of its main column.31 These 
advance detachments were effectively fixed in place, with orders to join the rear of their 
own column when relieved by the head of the column whose zone they were now in.32 
Ironically achieving the reverse of what has been assumed (that the unit on the right 
protected the flank of the unit on the left), these fixed flank guards from the unit on the left 
protected the advance of the unit on the right, at least until they were overtaken. The 
tactical problems experienced by the French came from poor individual column security 
after the strong but static mixed&arms screens had been left behind.  
Apart from specifying those protective detachments, de Langle de Cary allowed his 
corps commanders to make their own arrangements for the security of their own individual 
columns, neither adopting the new doctrine nor taking any steps of his own under the old 
doctrine to secure the passage of his army through that difficult terrain. The best that can be 
assumed of him and his staff is that they believed Fourth Army to be sufficiently well 
trained that all could be relied upon at least to protect themselves according to the 
principles of the 1895 regulations. The reality was to prove them either naively over&
optimistic or professionally negligent, or both. The proof, in retrospect, of the need for de 
Langle to have taken a firmer hand in guiding his army across the forest is shown in 
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particular by the lack of basic march precautions taken by 17 CA and CAC, whose travails 
are examined later in this thesis. But judging Fourth Army’s march discipline against the 
1895 Regulations, it was not uniformly bad: General Roques’s 12 CA  marched with a 
battalion&strength flank guard on its vulnerable right flank;33 on the far&left, Général 
Eydoux’s 11 CA pushed two battalions of infantry, a battery of field artillery and a half–
squadron of cavalry up to Porcheresse on its north&western flank, to guard against a 
German thrust from beyond the river Lesse.34 One is struck by the inconsistency that 
permeates French performance, and reasons for this must be sought.  
There remains the question of the role of the army’s provisional CC. It has been 
shown above that de Langle had expressed considerable concern about the danger of a 
sizeable German force turning south to confront him, and so had ordered General 
Abboneau’s cavalry to scout ahead of the army. In his general order for operations on 22 
August, de Langle ordered the cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy’s movements south of the 
Recogne–Libin–Beauraing road. It was to determine how far west had come the enemy 
columns which were heading south, delay the advance of the enemy forces threatening the 
left of the army and, if battle commenced, operate on the left wing of 11 CA.35 It is a matter 
of history that the cavalry corps did not do what de Langle had asked them to do, the 
question is why not?  
As usual, there is no one single reason for this failure, but multiple aspects. One of 
the two cavalry divisions – 9 DC – had been battered in the three–hour skirmish with 25 
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ID’s infantry and artillery on 20 August and now declared itself too tired to continue to 
operate.36 It remained virtually inactive in and around Bièvre on the left flank on both 21 
and 22 August. This “democratic” tendency, bordering on insubordination, for senior 
French officers to decide whether they could or would implement their orders can be 
noticed elsewhere;37 but in this case it meant that half de Langle’s strategic cavalry screen 
declared itself unable to take part in the most crucial part of the operation – and the 
decision was not queried or countermanded.  
That left the other division – 4 DC – to discharge the scouting mission. On 21 
August it was in the right place to do so. D’Urbal’s brigade of dragoons was deployed in 
front of the army, at the crossroads north of Bertrix, coincidentally at the spot where 33 DI 
was to be ambushed by 21 ID the next day. D’Urbal sent out squadron&strength patrols 
(250 horsemen), to watch the Germans at Libramont and at Libin. But the patrols were 
withdrawn at 15.00 and the brigade packed up at 16.00 – as if on manoeuvres – so they 
could ride to their billets twenty&five kilometres away at Graide on the left flank.38 They 
left the vital crossroads unguarded and according to d’Urbal they regarded their security 
mission as over.39 It is worth noting two points: that despite this inauspicious beginning, 
General d’Urbal rose rapidly in the following months to division, corps and eventually 
army command; he evidently had qualities of energetic resilience and, perhaps, an ability to 
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learn rapidly from experience. Secondly General Abonneau chose to reinterpret his orders 
in a way that deprived the army of its reconnaissance screen: ‘The cavalry corps’s mission 
(in addition to its scouting mission already defined) is to operate on the left wing of 11 CA 
and to delay the advance of enemy forces which will threaten the left of the army.’40 From 
the left wing, the cavalry could not reconnoitre around Recogne, from where 18 AK would 
set out to defeat the French at Bertrix, nor could it delay, for example, the German columns 
which won the race into Maissin village. It was an important difference in interpretation 
and one which left the advancing columns of Fourth Army far more vulnerable than de 
Langle had intended.  
To compound his delinquent behavior, Abonneau then failed to discharge even the 
mission he had chosen. On 22 August, d’Urbal records that his brigade covered the 
concentration of the division into columns preparatory to advancing north towards 
Vonêche. This town was at the northern edge of the zone allocated by Fourth Army for 
scouting, so it looks as if Abonneau intended to commence his mission. Had he done so, his 
cavalry would have been behind 18 AK’s right flank, between it and 8 AK. Conditions 
would inadvertently have been set up to reveal the operational opportunity to turn 18 AK’s 
right flank in coordination with the tactical opportunity at Maissin described in Chapter 
Four. But Abonneau seems to have been put off by the activity of small columns of German 
infantry filtering through the woods, and instead withdrew to the south.41 D’Urbal says that 
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shortly afterwards Abonneau was diagnosed with stress and became unable to command;42 
he was replaced by General de Buyer on 13 October 1914.43 Ironically, there was no 
serious German threat in that area, as testified by 8 [German] Cuirassiers, the divisional 
cavalry of 15 ID (8 AK). On 22 August that regiment stood for hours in the hot sun near the 
village of Sohier, just six kilometres west of Abonneau’s intended target, Vonêche. They 
watched, they took shelter from enemy artillery and they deduced that they were faced by 
an enemy cavalry division; but they were not attacked, nor did they themselves advance. In 
the evening they received orders along with the rest of 15 ID to march south on 23 August, 
which they did, reaching Porcheresse unopposed.44 Porcheresse was where the flank guard 
of the French 22 DI had stood idle for the whole of 22 August.  
The unwillingness of these large bodies of French cavalry to take on and force the 
German protective screen prevented them from performing a valid reconnaissance role. The 
right questions were asked by Fourth Army staff, but the execution was neither performed 
nor supervised properly. As a result, de Langle’s powerful cavalry corps failed in its 
mission to scout in front of Fourth Army during the advance through the forest and in 
particular failed in the specific task of finding and reporting on the approaching German 
columns.  
 
On the day of the battle the inherent weaknesses within the whole of Fourth Army revealed 
themselves. Without good communications there can be no command or control, and Fourth 
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Army’s communications proved to be appalling. There was a technical aspect and there was 
a human aspect. Taking the latter first, it is clear that all units within Fourth Army had 
extremely poor discipline when it came to reporting up to headquarters to keep them 
informed. On the far left, General Eydoux reported at about 10.00 that his troops had 
occupied Maissin and that he was consolidating his position.45 He failed to report again 
until after 16.45, by which time he had lost Maissin and was coming to the end of a five–
hour battle to retake it. In the centre, General  Roques was reporting good progress by 12 
CA (as well he might, given the weak opposition he was facing) but in his ignorance of 
both his tactical and operational opportunities, he failed to give his army commander any 
useful intelligence about the weakness of the enemy or the gap in the enemy defence 
between Saint Médard and Bertrix. On the right, General Lefèvre also was unaware of the 
true situation of his CAC at Rossignol. There was no chance for de Langle to take 
command or control since he did not know what was going on:!
At this moment [16.45] General de Langle had the impression that the centre and 
left of his army were continuing their march without incident. 12 CA had just 
reached Saint–Médard where the enemy was giving way, and the three columns of 
17 CA had debouched at 11.00 north of Bertrix, Acremont and Offagne. The 
commander of Fourth Army could furthermore still have the impression that the 
German columns were continuing their march to the north–west, because he had 
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received reports that two brigades, having left Neufchâteau that morning were 
heading via Recogne towards Libin.46  
The events described above were more than five hours old; 11 CA had failed to report, the 
others were slow, out&of–date and ill–informed. All of this was primarily due to the senior 
French commanders simply failing to report properly. But they were not helped by the 
technical side of French communications systems.  
In preparation for the offensive, de Langle set up two new forward telegraph offices, 
one at Bouillon and one at Florenville.47 From there, it seems to have been a case of using 
couriers or the Belgian public telephone network from local Post Offices in order to 
communicate with the front. The crucial order from de Langle to Lefèvre, authorising the 
release of 2 DIC from reserve, was sent to Florenville for onward transmission – apparently 
by courier – to CAC headquarters at Jamoigne: ‘let the colonial corps Jamoigne [sic] know 
that he can, if necessary, use his second division’.48 This was not an isolated instance; it has 
already been shown that General Abonneau’s last vital message took eight–and–a– half 
hours to get through to de Langle’s headquarters.  
The one area where de Langle did attempt to assert some control over the conduct of 
the day’s fighting was on his extreme right, where his 2 CA was supposedly in liaison with 
Boelle’s 4 CA of Third Army in the vicinity of Virton. Following the very early reversal 
suffered by 5 CA west of Longwy, General Ruffey asked de Langle for the support from 
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Gérard’s 2 CA to help him regroup. De Langle responded positively, ordering Gérard to use 
his 3 DI to help Boelle at Virton, instead of supporting the fighting in the Semoy valley. 
Communications between the two army headquarters were clearly better than between 
Fourth Army and its own corps. Because of his ignorance of his own state of affairs, de 
Langle was influenced to help Ruffey rather than himself.  
De Langle’s failures in command, control and communication during the fighting on 
22 August had been preceded by failures in the communication of relevant intelligence. The 
data was available, he and Maistre had a clear appreciation of the operational situation, but 
they did not prepare their subordinates in anything like a proper professional manner. The 
result was to place the individual corps of Fourth Army in a variety of tactical situations 
which ranged from fortuitously good (12 CA at Neufchâteau) to the unexpectedly bad 
(CAC at Rossignol), with shades of difficulty in between. During the tactical encounters, 
small–unit training within Fourth Army would be tested to breaking point.  
 
The operational overview has shown how the concentration and deployment of the German 
Fifth Army went smoothly according to OHL’s strategic plan. Mobilising and concentrating 
between 2 and 16 August at various railheads behind the powerful protection of the 
Moselstellung, and with the additional security afforded by the permanent frontier force of 
16 AK in front of the fortress zone, the two remaining regular and two additional reserve 
corps then waited patiently for the order from OHL for the offensive to begin. That order 
having been given on 17 August for implementation on 18 August, it was actually on the 
morning of 19 August that Fifth Army began to move out from the protection of the 
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Moselstellung:49 they had the shortest distance to go in order to discharge their mission and 
had to give time for the other armies to get ahead.  
 The strategic overview showed how the early invasion of Luxembourg established a 
south–facing defensive line using units from the Grenzschutztruppen, with Arlon as a point 
d’appui on the right flank at the head of the Étalle corridor. On 19 August, Crown Prince 
William moved the main body of his army to occupy that line in strength. This entailed a 
long, westerly loop around the Moselstellung, a movement which contributed greatly to 
French intelligence’s mistaken assessment that the primary German manoeuvre in the 
Ardennes was towards the north-west. Fifth Army was also required to keep closely in 
touch with Fourth Army on its right. 
 Once Luxembourg had been secured, and Arlon occupied, William’s plan envisaged 
the capture, if possible, of the ancient French fortress of Longwy. It was important to get 
the earliest assessment of French intentions, so the German cavalry screen would advance 
into contact and establish the positions of the French screen and their main defensive line. 
Then a special siege detachment, complete with the heavy guns necessary for the reduction 
of fixed fortifications, would be brought into position. William’s initial advance was 
protected by 4 HKK, which had been operating in front of the Moselstellung, under the 
direct control of OHL, since the start of the war.  
 
By 10 August, following a strong probe and major skirmish at Mangiennes, 4 HKK had 
established beyond doubt that the French had set up their main defence behind the line of 
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the river Othain, twenty&eight kilometres south of Longwy. 3 KD was therefore sent west 
to determine the extent of the French defences, reaching Arlon on 11 August and Étalle on 
14 August. In the following days it skirmished with the French 4 DC in the Étalle corridor, 
pushing that unit back down the Semoy valley to the vicinity of Tintigny.50 Meanwhile 6 
KD remained as a security screen in front of Fifth Army in anticipation of a French attack 
out of Verdun.  
There was a period of eight days (from 10 to 18 August) during which Fifth Army 
watched and waited for signs of that attack. On 19 August, as outlined above, 5 AK and 13 
AK marched into Luxembourg to occupy the terrain around Arlon in strength. Then on 20 
August, the siege of Longwy was initiated. A special detachment was formed under the 
command of one of Fifth Army’s specialist staff officers, Lieutenant-General Kaempffer. It 
consisted of 52 Infantry Brigade, taken from 13 AK; 23 reserve Infantry Brigade from 6 
RAK; one 210mm mortar regiment, two 155mm heavy field&howitzer battalions and 20 
Pioneer Regiment.51 On 20 August, the Detachment’s heavy artillery marched to and took 
up positions around Differdange, some five or six kilometres from Longwy, while the 
infantry took up investing positions on the heights at Rodingen [Rodange]. The Longwy 
fortress which Kaempfler was to attack had been built by Vauban in the seventeenth 
century, and had hardly changed since that time. Star&shaped bastions, ditch and 
escarpment, low, deep earthen walls buttressed with stone testified to the then state–of–the–
art military architecture which had been Vauban’s signature; but it was hardly a match for 
early–twentieth century high explosive. Furthermore, German General Staff efficiency had 
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ensured that, through a long term programme of spying and intelligence gathering, up–to–
date records of every single detail of the fortifications and garrison had been gathered by 
intelligence for decades, updated regularly and held for the moment when they might be 
needed.52  Nevertheless, even an obsolete fortress like Longwy was to prove a hard nut to 
crack, as will be shown below, begging the question whether Joffre might have made better 
use of its defensive capabilities.  
The decision to start the siege of Longwy must be seen in a wider operational 
context. The likelihood was that it would provoke a French response, and until Crown 
Prince William moved his main force forwards, Kaempffer’s detachment would be in an 
exposed position. Although nowhere explicitly stated, there is an implication that the siege 
was part of Fifth Army’s overall intent to move down into the line of the Chiers–Crusnes 
rivers, as they were to do two days later.  
The strategic role of Fifth Army may have been one of absolute defence, but that did 
not mean that Crown Prince William could not exercise the freedom traditionally claimed 
by Prussian army commanders to choose independently his operational and tactical plans. 
William’s power and independent authority were of course bolstered by his position as heir 
to the throne. Of the two major operational decisions taken by Fifth Army during the 
campaign and battle, the first – the operational plan to send the army south on the morning 
of 22 August – was central to the ensuing action. 
After several days of waiting impatiently for signs of the expected French offensive, 
William decided to act. Intelligence had shown the build–up of major French forces on his 
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front; the French would undoubtedly attack in the very near future. William decided to 
attack first.53 In order to persuade OHL to allow him ‘off the leash’, he and his Chief of 
Staff,  Lieutenant–General von Knobelsdorf, developed the argument that Fifth Army 
needed to find better defensive positions than those currently occupied.54 The line from 
Arlon east to Luxembourg was studded with woods and forests, hills and gorges, small 
villages and streams, terrain which was unfavourable to defensive artillery, whereas only 
ten kilometres south, on the plateaux stretching either side of Longwy and (particularly on 
the eastern side) overlooking the plains stretching down to Verdun, the line of the Crusnes 
and Chiers rivers offered the perfect battlefield, especially for the Crown prince’s artillery. 
On the morning of 21 August, just as the French were making final preparations for their 
attack, the Crown Prince and his staff obtained grudging permission from OHL to advance, 
but with strict caveats not to go beyond the Crusnes–Chiers river line.55  
The plans drawn up on the evening of 21 August to implement the advance required 
5 AK, on the right wing of Fifth Army, to march due south from around Arlon and achieve 
defensive positions on the southern edge of the forested belt above Ethe and Virton. This 
effectively left the Semoy valley and the route up the ‘Étalle corridor’ into Arlon devoid of 
protection (an issue which will be dealt with elsewhere) and moved the right flank of Fifth 
Army down to the next river valley, that of the Vire. There the village of Roblemont, only 
two kilometres or so north and west of Virton, was situated on a narrow promontory jutting 
out into the valleys; forests to the north gave the promontory the shape and status of an 
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observation platform, an ideal defensive node upon which to anchor the right wing of the 
army. Its occupation and defence was part of the mission of 10 ID of 5 AK. 
But Fifth Army’s change of direction from south&west to due south seems to have 
been taken without consultation with its neighbouring Fourth Army, creating a twenty–
kilometre gap which Fourth Army had to fill. This was a drawback of the German tendency 
for OHL to allow its senior commanders a degree of latitude in determining the extent of 
their operational freedom. It was a consultative process which allowed the strongest will (in 
this case the Crown Prince) to override and ‘persuade’ the weaker (in this case von Moltke 
and his staff). The result, as has been shown in the examination of the neighbouring 
German Fourth Army, was that a dangerous twenty–kilometre gap opened up between Fifth 
Army and Duke Albrecht’s nearest forces. But the command decisions arising from Fifth 
Army’s swing south and the resultant gap became a defining moment in the Battle of the 
Ardennes, coincidently working very much in Germany’s favour. Duke Albrecht’s 
impromptu response to the reports of the gap between him and his neighbour resulted in his 
left wing (6 AK) arriving at Tintigny, Bellefontaine and Rossignol, in the right place and at 
the right time to stymie the advance of de Langle’s right wing (2 CA). This was not a 
considered battle&decision based on Duke Albrecht’s operational plan, nor was it based on 
any sound intelligence aimed at thwarting a specific French attack; on the contrary, at this 
stage Duke Albrecht was largely ignorant of French intentions. But whatever the intention, 
the outcome was the same, a series of encounter battles in which the German forces were 
placed in better positions than perhaps they had a right to expect and in which tactical 
superiority would decide victor and vanquished.  
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Once Fifth Army had committed 5 AK and 13 AK to the move southwards on the 
right wing, and once contact had been made by those two corps with significant enemy 
forces, there was little that Crown Prince William and his staff could do except await the 
outcome of the fighting. Similarly, in the centre, 5 RAK and 6 RAK were committed to 
march southwards past Longwy towards the Crusnes valley and, once confronted by 
Sarrail’s 6 CA, simply had to fight their own tactical battles. The clashes with the French 
had commenced while the fog still lay thick over the ground, and several hours passed 
before a clear picture of the developing action could be gained. But the Crown Prince had 
one more card to play. He had held back 16 AK (the permanent frontier force) in front of 
the Moselstellung in case the French launched a direct attack out of Verdun. There were 
five French reserve divisions on the Meuse Heights and in German military understanding 
there was no reason for the French not to use them in an offensive role. However, 
reconnaissance and intelligence on the morning of 22 August showed that those French 
forces were too far away to intervene before nightfall, so eventually William felt secure 
enough to release 16 AK and order it to execute an enveloping move around Sarrail’s right 
flank. During the course of the afternoon, this operational decision proved its effectiveness, 
and Sarrail was forced to order his right&hand division to withdraw to avoid being 
outflanked. The rest of 6 CA had to conform to this move.!!
Finally in terms of Fifth Army’s operational command and control, there was the 
confident, timely and firm way in which the Crown Prince’s staff handled the Kaempffer 
Detachment. This powerful force of infantry and artillery had been drawn largely from 
operational divisions (mainly from 13 AK) and had consequently weakened them. During 
22 August, Fifth Army temporarily returned both infantry and artillery to their original 
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commands in order to confront the French attack. At the end of the day, they were returned 
to General Kaempfer to continue the siege. So too, the heavy artillery allocated to the siege 
detachment was used on 22 August to counter the French assault, and was particularly 
effective with its long–range fire in pursuing the routed infantry of 9 DI over the 
Tellancourt plateau.56 Such instant decision&making, and such immediate execution points 
to a command and control system within Fifth Army that was very much fit for purpose. !
 
Opposite Crown Prince William’s front lay Ruffey’s Third Army. Ruffey was the first army 
commander to be relieved of his command by Joffre in the cull of senior officers during 
August 1914. He lost his job on 30 August, just a week after the battle described in this 
chapter.57  One might think that he was therefore the worst of the five initial army generals 
and that the performance of his Third Army and his staff was so poor that it demanded his 
removal. But Barbara Tuchman has put forward a suggestion that it was Ruffey’s own 
criticisms of Joffre and GQG which led to his dismissal.58 It will be argued below that 
Ruffey’s performance stands up well compared to that of his colleague de Langle de Cary, 
who went on to command a group of armies. After the war, Ruffey certainly felt himself to 
have been made a scapegoat for the endemic failures during the Battles of the Frontiers.59  
Joffre’s strategic plan required that Third Army protect the right flank of Fourth 
Army’s advance, and to do that it was to orientate itself in the general direction of Arlon. 
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This town, it will be recalled, was situated at the top (north&eastern) end of the Semoy river 
valley, a classic invasion route into and out of France. Units of the German 
Grenzschutzentruppen had occupied Arlon as early as 12 August as part of their defensive 
line. But Joffre’s plan called for Ruffey to approach it from due south, not the south&west. 
This in turn would open Ruffey’s own right flank to a sally from the Moselstellung, which 
had to be guarded against. It was to be a long approach march into enemy territory; from 
the start line on the Othain to the river Chiers was approximately twenty&seven kilometres 
(nearly seven hours’ standard march, planned for 21 August) and from the Chiers to Arlon 
another twenty&six kilometers (planned for 22 August). To accomplish his task, Ruffey had 
three corps, but one (6 CA) contained three well&trained divisions of the couverture, with 
six battalions of élite chasseurs à pied (BCP) and five groups of heavy artillery attached.60  
Ruffey was also given the Third Group of reserve divisions, initially three divisions, to be 
used for the defence of Verdun, the Meuse Heights and, potentially, Ruffey’s extending 
flank.  
Ruffey’s plan seems to have been similar in structure and process to that of de 
Langle: a set of daily operational orders of a logistical nature (destination and route for 
each unit) issued to execute GQG’s instruction in stages. And as with de Langle, there 
seems to have been an inexplicable gap between the sum of the intelligence gathered and 
the analysis and briefing which emanated from Third Army headquarters. Aerial 
reconnaissance was used extensively but was actually quite misleading: a report sent to 
GQG at 11.10 on 20 August said that the region Virton, Arlon, Longwy was absolutely 
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empty of enemy forces.61 It was incorporated into the evening compte rendu nr. 32: 
‘nothing to report up to 15.00. Agents report a battalion of Landwehr still at Joeuf…the 
general impression from the inhabitants of frontier villages is that the Germans are retiring 
to the north to reinforce their troops in Belgium.’62 The report paints an overall picture of 
security and lack of concern. Yet within hours the German heavy artillery would start to 
bombard Longwy, and Kaempffer’s detached infantry would advance to commence 
investing the fortress. German sources show that infantry of their 23 Brigade was actually 
assembling at Rodange, seven kilometers away from Longwy at the time of the French 
aerial reconnaissance.63 So Ruffey’s staff received, accepted and passed down an inaccurate 
and over&optimistic picture of what was in front of them.  
But unlike de Langle, Ruffey’s secret and personal briefing to his corps 
commanders was issued alongside the order to attack and was both timely and relevant. It 
laid out in clear terms the mission of the army, and that of each corps, and thus 
complemented the more formal instructions for the advance and gave his commanders an 
understanding of the ‘why’ as well as the ‘what’. This was the sixth personal briefing note 
which Ruffey had sent out, whereas de Langle’s (unnumbered) personal briefing to Fourth 
army on 20 August seems to have been the only one he issued during the planning of the 
campaign. It is noteworthy that Ruffey made clear to his senior commanders that the heavy 
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artillery accompanying 6 CA was to be used to help mask the German heavy artillery 
position at Differdange.64! 
!
In order to plan properly for the successful outcome of his mission, Ruffey and his staff had 
three operational issues to address. On his left, his troops had to cross a thick band of forest 
extending from the valley of the river Vire at Virton up to the valley of the river Semoy at 
Étalle; in the centre there was the problem of the German forces beginning the investment 
of Longwy; and on the right there was the risk of a German thrust out of the Moselstellung. !
On the left, Boelle’s 4 CA had the first problem – one of securing an uncontested 
march through an extensive thick forest in order to occupy the head of the Semoy river 
valley near Étalle. The plan was to concentrate on 21 August in the valley of the small twin 
rivers, the Vire and the Ton, around the rivers’ confluence at Virton (8 DI) and two 
kilometres east at Ethe (7 DI) and then march north. A different main road ran through each 
of the two villages – one for each divisional column – and then!through the forests. Boelle’s 
two divisions, having safely navigated the forests, would then be in a position to fortify the 
upper reaches of the Semoy, capture Étalle, mask the German forces known to be at Arlon, 
and prepare to continue an aggressive defence in liaison with de Langle’s right wing at 
Neufchâteau.  
In the centre, Brochin’s 5 CA was deployed west of the upper Chiers valley on the 
Tellancourt plateau, with Longwy at its head and Longuyon lower down at the confluence 
of the Chiers and the Crusnes. Its mission was to march past Longwy on the western side 
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and head north to link up with the flank of Boelle’s corps near the little village of Bleid, 
some two kilometres east of, and on a line with 7 DI at Ethe. It would then go on to hold 
the centre of the long defensive line planned to stretch down from Arlon to Verdun. But 
there was a problem at Longwy, a bottleneck on the route north. At 06.00 on 21 August the 
heavy German siege guns of Kaempffler’s detachment had started to bombard the 
fortress,65 and supporting infantry had marched up to and west around the walls, some to 
commence the investiture, some to provide protection against a possible French move from 
the south.66 The French outposts could see, and reported to 5 CA headquarters, the trenches 
of the protection force on the slopes opposite the Tellancourt plateau, blocking their route.67  
5 CA would have to attack and break through known German defences of unknown 
strength in order to continue their march north. Brochin’s main force would have an 
approach march of more than ten kilometres, followed by an attack across a three–
kilometre valley and up the slopes beyond. Only then could his troops begin the final 
seven–kilometre march to achieve their assigned objective. It was a tall order; in fact it is 
difficult with hindsight to see how 5 CA could ever have been expected to keep up with 4 
CA, given that the latter had planned for an uninterrupted march, whereas the former was 
planning an attack on those trenches.  
The problem on the right flank, of a potential German counter–attack out of the 
Moselstellung towards Verdun, was the one which preoccupied Third Army's staff and 
GQG the most. As Third Army moved northwards across the face of the powerful German 
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defences, it opened up an ever&widening gap between itself and Verdun. Admittedly it had 
cavalry (7 DC) to warn of any German movement, and Verdun had its own resident 
garrison division (72 DR), but the gap needed to the held by a field&infantry force. Ruffey 
planned to use the Third Group of reserve divisions (54, 55 and 56 DRs) for this purpose.68 
He also planned to echelon his three regular divisions back from left to right, with the 
extreme right&hand division of 6 CA (40 DI) acting as the immediate flank guard on the 
march.  The ground which 40 DI was to occupy was amongst the most favourable defensive 
terrain in the region. The high ground at Mercy–le–Haut overlooked the Crusnes valley and 
provided good observation for artillery. Ruffey had planned well for the protection of his 
flank.  
But the same cannot be said of the other two operational issues. On the left, Boelle’s 
4 CA closed up on the southern entrance to the forests and spent the night of 21–22 August 
firmly ensconsed in the village of Virton, with a vanguard out in front and outposts on the 
forest edge.69 But Ruffey did not order any operational security – a strong mixed–arms 
detachment was required by regulations to traverse the forest and secure in advance the 
exits from the northern side – nor did Boelle think of using his initiative. The consequence 
was that, on the morning of 22 August, when the first French patrol rode past their outposts 
in the thick fog, it came into contact almost at once with the advance guard of 9 ID which 
Crown Prince William had sent south during the night from the Étalle region. The Germans 
had stolen a march from the French through their early departure and were able to stop 
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Boelle’s left–hand division in its tracks. The battle was fought at Virton, south of the forest, 
and not at Étalle in the north on the Semoy as Ruffey had planned.  
In the centre, the lack of planning was more than just a failure to secure the advance 
through an inhospitable forest. Brochin’s 5 CA received no special instructions from Ruffey 
for dealing with the entrenched German forces in his path. Indeed in the absence of specific 
evidence, it is not clear whether Third Army headquarters had been informed of their 
existence by the staff of 5 CA. But the general problem posed by the German siege of 
Longwy was acknowledged in Ruffey’s planning; two divisions of 6 CA were tasked with 
advancing and masking the German heavy artillery position known to be at Differdange. 
But the German infantry force (Kaempffer’s detachment) on the west side of the fortress 
received no attention from Third Army’s planners.70  
It was left to General Brochin to plan for what seems with hindsight to have been a 
formidable task. He set his two divisions in line, side–by–side, with 9 DI on the left and 10 
DI on the right.71 The troops had had two days of rest on 19 and 20 August in their 
positions south of Longuyon. On 21 August the columns set out at 05.00 for a long march 
up over the Tellancourt plateau to close with their outposts. At the end of that march the 
leading units of 9 DI encountered the enemy and launched into an immediate and 
apparently unplanned and unauthorised assault which continued as darkness fell. After a 
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forty–kilometre march and an impromptu skirmish, the division apparently missed the 
chance to get its rations.72 It was not the best start to the operation.  
9 DI’s divisional orders and preparations leave no doubt that a formal attack was 
planned and with artillery support too.73 This makes it all the more inexplicable that the 
high–level operation called for a seven&kilometre march after the assault. It is irrelevant 
that in the event the fog made the artillery impotent – that applied to both sides; from an 
operational perspective it is clear that 5 CA's advance would at best be delayed for several 
hours whilst German resistance was crushed, or at worst might not break through. That this 
was not reflected in the planning by Third Army is inexplicable. To make matters worse, 
General Ruffey had the reputation of being a proponent of artillery firepower.74 He had put 
under Brochin’s command his best group of heavy artillery, three batteries of Rimailho 
155m howitzers. These guns were arguably better than the German 150mm of which so 
much is written, and they were just ten kilometres behind the front.75 But there were no 
plans for their use, and on the day they were left ten kilometres behind the front – just out 
of range. There is a doctrinal issue here; mainstream French military thinkers did not see a 
role for slow heavy guns in fast manoeuvre warfare. But Ruffey was supposed to be a 
proponent of heavy artillery.76 He if not Brochin could have insisted on a methodical attack 
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using those heavy guns on the Germans known to be west of Longwy, and he alone could 
have coordinated the movements of the other two corps to fit in to 5 DI’s progress. It is 
possible that Third Army headquarters did not know what 5 CA knew about the German 
trenches – the archives at Vincennes are silent on the point – in which case Ruffey is 
absolved of a command error but Third Army’s control of its communications was then at 
fault.  So too, only Ruffey could have postponed the start when it was clear that the fog 
ruled out artillery support. Such staff liaison and activity would become second nature to 
the French army before the year was out; that it did not happen in August 1914 reflects 
poorly on French pre&war training and preparation. Looked at from an overall Third Army 
perspective, Ruffey’s planning and preparation were seriously flawed. Only the possibility 
of a counter&strike out of the Moselstellung was catered for, and the failure to anticipate the 
problems faced by 5 CA was reprehensible. What then of Ruffey’s command and control 
during the battle?! 
!
Communications were all&important, as the analyses of de Langle de Cary’s and Duke 
Albrecht’s armies have shown, in differing ways. The limitations of technology in August 
1914 meant that even the best commander with the best communications (arguably Duke 
Albrecht) could not keep pace with the development of the action. Nevertheless Ruffey 
made several good and timely command decisions, which argue in favour of his 
communication and control capability. He also managed to work from a forward 
command–post at Marville, forty kilometres closer to the front, leaving his deputy chief&
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of&staff to manage the main army headquarters at Verdun.77 This suggests a relatively 
competent communications system within Third Army. And the surviving record of 
Ruffey’s communications during the battle shows a real–time grasp of the action and an 
active participation in guiding his units.  
During the approach march on the morning of 22 August, 10 DI, the right–hand 
column of 5 CA, encountered the enemy west of Longwy at about 09.00 and deployed from 
column to line. This inhibited the forward march of 12 DI on the left flank of 6 CA, and 
there was for a while a danger that units would get entangled and chaos might ensue. 
Ruffey’s staff made a timely intervention and smoothed the situation out.78 When it became 
clear at about 14.45 that 5 CA’s attacks had failed, Ruffey asked Sarrail’s 6 CA to support 5 
CA with its artillery in order to stop the retreat turning into a rout.79 This event has been 
recorded by Barbara Tuchman in graphic terms, although she incorrectly attributes it to the 
battle at Virton, more than twenty&six kilometres away:  
At Virton the French VIth Corps under General Sarrail took a German corps 
in the flank with fire from its 75s. “the battlefield afterwards was an 
unbelievable spectacle,” reported a French officer dazed with horror. 
“thousands of dead  were still standing, supported as if by a flying buttress 
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made of bodies lying in rows on top of each other in an ascending arc from 
the horizontal to an angle of 60°”.80 
Ruffey also informed de Langle de Cary of the reverse at Longwy and called for support 
from Fourth Army’s 2 CA to take some pressure off his left wing.81 He informed Boelle (4 
CA) at the same time, and ordered him to support Brochin.82 These are the actions of a 
general fully in command of his army, adjusting to adverse circumstances and laying 
alternative plans. Furthermore, as the outcome of 5 CA’s defeat appeared ever more 
disastrous and troops were streaming back in disarray across the Tellancourt plateau, 
Ruffey sent his chief&of&staff to the spot, where he was able to take charge and set up a 
fresh line of resistance.83 !
On the left, where Boelle’s 4 CA  and especially 7 DI at Ethe were in a precarious 
position, Ruffey had in place his own liaison officer, Captain Pellegrin, who from 09.10 
onwards gave lengthy, timely and accurate situation reports back to Third Army 
headquarters, including at least one telephone call to Ruffey’s  forward CP at Marville.84  
On the right wing, a strange command situation had arisen. On the eve of the 
offensive, at about 10.30 on 21 August, Joffre took Ruffey’s three reserve divisions away 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Tuchman, op. cit., p.284, quoting: Fernand Engerand, La Bataille de la frontier, aôut 1914 (Brossard, Paris, 
1920),   pp.499–504. Tuchman’s cameo (and error) have been repeated by other authors. See for example: 
Anthony Clayton, Paths of Glory (Cassell, London, 2003), p.28 
 
81 AFGG I/1, Annex 851: [Third Army] Télégramme pour Montmédy, Stenay, de Marville, dépôt le 22 août à 
15.00: Général commandant armée Verdun à commandant armée Stenay et à général commandant corps 
Montmédy. 
 
82 AFGG I/1, Annex 852: [Third Army] Marville, 22 août, 15.00: Général commandant IIIe armée à général 
commandant 4e corps. 
 
83 AFGG I/1 (1936), p.376; and Rocolle, op. cit., pp.120–121 
 
84 AFGG I/1, Annexes 897 and 898, op. cit.  
 
! ++#!
from him and gave them to General Maunoury, commanding the newly–formed Army of 
Lorraine.85  Ruffey had had General Paul Durand’s Third Group of reserve divisions under 
his command from the outset. This group, with support from much of the heavy artillery 
allocated to Third Army, had been allocated the task in the base documentation of Plan 
XVII of protecting the Meuse heights, which released the regular forces of Third Army for 
offensive action.86 Having been given his orders by Joffre to advance on 21 August, 
Ruffey’s own orders that day included instructions to Durand for 54 DR to relieve 40 DI of 
flank guard duties around Conflans and Briey.87 Joffre’s major alteration of command 
arrangements at such a time seems with hindsight bizarre and likely to cause confusion. 
One might speculate that GQG was hedging its bets by ensuring that, whatever the outcome 
of the forthcoming offensive, there would be a strong defensive force at Verdun and on the 
Meuse Heights. The change certainly ensured that Ruffey would not put the needs of his 
offensive ahead of the need for the defence of the gap between Second and Third Armies, 
but at what cost to the chances of a successful attack?  
Ruffey nevertheless worked to make the best of the circumstances. His order to 54 
DR to relieve 40 DI (at 02.00 on 21 August)88  and another at 08.00 for 72 DR to advance 
and occupy ‘centres of resistance’ around Hennemont and Pintheville,89 became at 06.45 on 
22 August a request to General Maunoury to move a mixed–arms detachment as soon as 
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possible up to Spincourt.90 In the event, an outflanking move by the German 16 AK forced 
Sarrail’s 6 CA to retreat to defensive positions, and 54 DR was late in arriving on their 
flank. But this seems more to do with the sloth of the divisional general than the change of 
command. Contrary to what Rocolle has written – that Ruffey’s orders were 
countermanded91 – Maunoury’s first order, at 13.30, confirmed the dispositions which 
Ruffey had previously made, for 54 DR to advance the five kilometres from Spincourt to a 
position at Ollières–Domprix, to stop all attacks on the right flank of 6 CA.92 There was a 
potential problem of delay inherent in the new command structure, but General Durand, 
still in command of Third Group  under Maunoury, had attempted to minimize this by 
directly ordering the commander of 54 DR at  08.15 on 22 August to close up his left onto 
the edge of the Ollières plateau, given Third Army’s advance to the north&east.93 So the 
onus rested firmly on the commander of 54 DR himself. It should be noted in passing that 
Durand responded relatively swiftly to Ruffey’s request despite the change of command 
structure – probably because they were both headquartered at Verdun – and that Zuber’s 
conclusion that ‘they didn’t talk to each other…It would be hard to find a worse example of 
high–level staff work’ seems unduly harsh.94  At 16.25, Ruffey’s staff were enquiring about 
the whereabouts of the 54 DR;95  at 18.30, Durand replied that the division reported that it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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could only reach Spincourt – not the allocated defensive plateau – by nightfall and then 
with only one brigade.96 Given the evidence, the failure of Maunoury’s reserve divisions to 
support Ruffey would have happened without the change of command. Nevertheless, the 
failure of the reserve divisions, particularly 54 DR, to support Sarrail’s (6 CA) right&rear 
gave the Germans an opportunity which they ruthlessly exploited.  
 
The analysis above finds weaknesses in Third Army’s operational planning process with 
regard to Fourth and Fifth CAs, although the planning to secure its right flank was sound 
and only failed in the execution. Ruffey’s command and control performance was positive 
and hands–on during 22 August and his contribution as army commander to the events of 
the day was considerable. This therefore raises the question whether he deserved to be 
relieved of his post or was the victim of some internal French military politics, an issue 
which is outside the scope of this study but deserves further investigation. But in the final 
analysis, as this operational overview has shown, the initiative was entirely taken from 
Ruffey by the actions of the German Crown Prince opposite him, something which could 
have been predicted but which poor French intelligence failed to analyse correctly.  
 
This chapter has examined the performance of the four army commanders and their 
respective staff organizations, analyzing each individual contribution to the outcome of 
events in terms of command, control and communications. It has found that French 
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96 AFGG I/1, Annex 977: Armée de Lorraine, au GQ à Verdun, 22 août, 18.30: Le général P. Durand, 
commandant le 3e groupe de divisions de reserve, à M. Le général commandant la IIIe armée. Compte 
rendu. 
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operational planning, as we know it today, was almost non&existent in both Fourth and 
Fifth Armies and that specific problems, such as overcoming the German defences west of 
Longwy and the need to secure the northern side of the forested belt through which many 
columns had to pass, were inadequately thought through and prepared for. There can be no 
comparison with the two German commanders on this issue, because their operational role 
was essentially defensive and reactive.  
On the issue of communications, both German commanders were well served by an 
efficient telephone and telegraph organization, whereas the French Fourth Army’s 
communications were very poor, and contributed significantly to the uncoordinated and 
ineffective tactical performance of de Langle’s units. Ruffey’s Third Army seems to have 
had at least adequate communications infrastructure, which further emphasises the 
weakness within the Fourth Army, which Joffre had chosen as his strike force.!
The quality of communications influenced the quality of command and control; 
without frequent and timely reports from the fighting line, no army commander could hope 
to control his battle, and so it proved in the case of de Langle. Both Ruffey and Crown 
Prince William were, by dint of better information, able to exert some influence over the 
outcome of their battles, albeit within the constraints of the technology of the period. But 
Duke Albrecht has been shown to have been the best commander of the four, with a 
proactive, personal style and strong leadership. His firm handling of his Fourth Army 
compares most favourably to that of his opponent, and can be seen to have made a 
significant contribution to the German avoidance of defeat in the Ardennes on 22 August.  
 
! ++"!
Following this operational analysis, it is now appropriate to examine at a tactical level the 
key individual encounter–battles between de Langle’s attacking columns and Duke 
Albrecht’s defensive formations. In the next chapter, the question of the French lost 
opportunities during those encounters will be explored in full. 
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Part Two : The French Lost Opportunities 
Chapter 3 : Neufchâteau 
 
The operational study has shown that a great opportunity was afforded to Roques’s 12 CA 
to achieve an unexpected victory over its opponents; that the overall odds in favour of the 
French were more than two–to–one, and higher in specific places on the front; and that only 
the timidity of Roques’s troops prevented the forcing and exploitation of a significant 
German retreat. Detail now needs to be added to that overview, to examine the extent of the 
missed opportunity, and to explain why it was missed.  
 
In the twenty–square–kilometre zone between Libramont and Neufchâteau, Duke Albrecht 
had two army corps, 18 AK and 18 RAK. French intelligence had positively identified the 
position of the former on 20 August when it fought the French cavalry corps, but lost track 
of its movements on the evening of 21 August.1 Evidence of the presence of the reserve 
army corps at Neufchâteau had been gathered but had been overlooked by staff analysts and 
operations planners alike.2 But with the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that 18 RAK 
at Neufchâteau would find itself in the eye of the approaching storm.  
Several historians, particularly from France as one might expect, have identified 
that there was some sort of opportunity for the French at Neufchâteau on 22 August, but 
none have so far come close to explaining how great that opportunity was. One – Pierre 
                                                     
1 AFGG I/1, Annex 694: GQG, 21 août, 17.00: Compte rendu de renseignements nr.52 
 
2 AFGG I/1, Annex 748: [Fourth Army] Stenay, 21 août,10.15: Commandant A.Stenay à commandant armée 
Vitry [telegramme from Fourth Army to GQG]; and Grasset, Neufchâteau, p.3 
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Rocolle – has even managed to blur the truth through a significant factual mistake in his 
account.  
Rocolle wrote that Roques’s corps was faced by a brigade from the German 21 ID, 
reinforcing his assertion with a sketch.3 The individual regimental histories of 21 ID, 
however, show that that division fought in its entirety on 22 August against the French 33 
DI at Bertrix.4 It only turned southwards, on the course delineated by Rocolle, on the 
following day, 23 August.5  
Henry Contamine has produced a reasonably accurate but very short account of the 
lost opportunity but still without any supporting detail.6 In 1970 he wrote: ‘Finding itself 
opposite a hole in the enemy line, it [12 CA] hardly engaged at all on 22 August. If it had 
thrown one of its divisions to the right and one to the left, it might have achieved two 
notable successes, at Neufchâteau and at Bertrix’.  
English–speaking historians, who in the main have lacked access to un–translated 
French and German primary sources and rely on translations of mainly secondary sources 
or the official history, are only now beginning to assess the impact of the lost opportunities. 
In Pyrrhic Victory Doughty merely says: ‘XII Corps was, as reported by Fourth Army, in a 
                                                     
3 Rocolle, Hécatombe, p.143 and Rocolle’s Note 46. See also sketch on p.136 
 
4 (i) Das Königlich Preussische Füsilier Regt, Nr 80 im Weltkriege 1914-18, Teil 1 [IR 80] (Oldenburg, 
Berlin, 1925), pp. 27–35; (ii) Das Königlich Preussische Infanterie  Regt., Nr 81 im Weltkriege 1914-8 [IR 
81] (Oldenburg, Berlin, 1932), pp. 26–32; (iii) Walter Rogge Das Königlich Preussische 2 Nassauische 
Infanterie  Regt., Nr 88 im Weltkriege 1914-18 [IR 88] (Bernard und Graefe, Berlin, 1936), pp. 69–74    
5 Weltkrieg 1, pp.338–339 
 
6 Contamine, Marne, p.122 
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“good” situation at the end of the day.’7 Terence Zuber, who purports to have made a 
tactical study of the whole Battle of the Ardennes, devotes only six short paragraphs to the 
French perspective, summing up 12 CA’s performance thus: ‘In spite of the fact that the 
corps was at most opposed by two German reserve regiments, one of which had no 
machine–guns or artillery support, the corps stopped 5km short of its objectives. Sixteen of 
the corps’s twenty–four battalions had been engaged. One of the principal reasons for the 
French defeat in the Ardennes was the inertia of the XII CA’.8 Zuber adds some detail 
about the German side but his is still not a balanced assessment, lacking as it does detail on 
the French side. 
None of the above examined the action at Neufchâteau in sufficient detail to prove 
how overwhelming was Roques’s superiority and how great the opportunity afforded him, 
or most importantly why he failed to grasp it. The two central issues are the relative size of 
the forces engaged and the use that was made of them. The first key issue, then, is to 
establish exactly how much resource, in men and firepower, was available to each side.  
 
The two divisions of the German 18 RAK opposed two–and–a–half French divisions – two 
from 12 CA plus the independent 5 Colonial Brigade. But the way in which the two forces 
collided – the French coming from the south, the Germans from the east – meant that there 
was an uneven distribution of forces across the battlefield. The Germans were weakest in 
the west, where their advance guard was out in front, whilst the French were weakest in the 
                                                     
7 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p.67 
 
8 Zuber, Ardennes, p.141 
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east where the 5 Colonial Brigade appeared on its own in front of Neufchâteau. The 
distribution of weakness versus strength made a significant contribution to the opportunity 
for French victory.  
The French advanced in three columns from the south.9 Each column fought more 
or less independently from the others and the action thus divides conveniently into three 
segments for descriptive purposes. On their right was 5 Colonial Brigade; in the centre was 
23 DI and on the left was 24 DI, both of 12 CA. The corps troops (artillery and reserve 
infantry) marched behind the left–hand column, which was led by the corps commander, 
making the French left by far the strongest against the weakest German component.  
The two German divisions were roughly ten kilometres apart, a two–and–a–half 
hour march at normal road speed. 21 RID spent the night of 21–22 August camped in and 
around Neufchâteau. 25 RID was further east, under orders to await further instructions 
near Léglise, still ten kilometres from Neufchâteau, The German high command was 
undecided whether to send 25 RID south to support its 6 AK in the Semoy valley, or to let 
it carry on west behind 21 RID; so it stayed where it was on the morning of 22 August, 
awaiting events.10 
21 RID was under orders to continue marching westwards, towards Bertrix, on 22 
August. In the morning the advance guard marched westwards out of Neufchâteau on the 
main road towards Bertrix, fifteen kilometres away. It had reached the village of Petitvoir, 
some five kilometres out of town, when it encountered the advance guard of 24 DI.  The 
three kilometres of ground immediately west of Petitvoir, in which 21 ID’s advance guard 
                                                     
9 AFGG I/1 (1923), pp.391–394 
 
10 Weltkrieg 1, pp.311–312 
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engaged 24 DI, constitutes the first segment of the battlefield. In the five kilometres 
between Petitvoir and Neufchâteau, 23 DI engaged the head of the main German column of 
21 RID, whilst in Neufchâteau itself, the remainder of 21 RID fought against 5 Colonial 
Brigade.  
 
In Neufchâteau, the German 41 Reserve Brigade (6000 riflemen), was assembled waiting 
for the road to clear in front of it before moving out. Three batteries of artillery (18 guns) 
were with this group. The town was directly in the path of 5 Colonial Brigade – two 
regiments of infantry (about 6000 riflemen), 12 machine guns, 12 field guns and 25 young 
reservist cavalrymen. The odds here were about even at the start of the battle.   
In the centre, between Neufchâteau and Petitvoir, following the advance guard and leading 
the main body of the German 21 RID’s column was 88 RIR, some 3000 riflemen with two 
batteries of artillery (12 guns).  Their opponents on 22 August were to be 23 DI, 
approximately 12,000 riflemen, 24 machine guns, 36 field guns and 250 cavalry.11  The 
odds in favour of the French were four–to–one in men and six–to–one in guns.  
On the western segment of the battlefield, the opposing forces were as follows: the 
German advance guard consisted of 81 RIR, supported by a squadron of 7 Dragoons, a 
battery from 21 Reserve Artillery Regiment (21 RAR) and a company of pioneers. There 
were no machine–guns; the German programme for equipping all units had not yet covered 
all reserve regiments, and 81 RIR was one that was still waiting for its machine–guns when 
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war broke out.12  The total complement was some 3000 riflemen, 250 pioneers and 250 
cavalry men with six 77mm field guns. Opposing them would be the whole of the French 
24 DI which, when fully deployed, had a complement of about 12,000 riflemen, 24 
machine–guns, 36 75mm field guns and 250 cavalry.13 The divisional column was 
accompanied by the corps cavalry regiment (1000 horsemen), the corps artillery (48 guns) 
and the corps’s two regiments of reserve infantry (about 6200 riflemen).14 The odds in 
favour of the French on this segment were five–to–one in infantry and six–to–one in guns. 
And the corps cavalry regiment – 21e Chasseurs à cheval – was deployed forward and 
available for scouting and reconnaissance work, where the Germans had but a squadron of 
reserve horsemen.  
 
It is central to an understanding of the French lost opportunity to appreciate that the 
fighting west of Petitvoir was limited to three kilometres between Petitvoir itself and the 
village of Nevraumont; beyond lay a seven–kilometre gap between Nevraumont and 
Bertrix. Between dawn and 14.00 on 22 August there were no other German troops within 
twenty kilometres of the gap. The nearest other unit was the small flank guard of two 
companies from 21 ID which was fighting at Bertrix. This is what Contamine meant when 
he wrote that if it had thrown one of its divisions to the left, it might have achieved notable 
                                                     
12 Generalmajor a D von Jordon, Das Reserve Infanterie Regiment Nr 81 im Weltkrieg [RIR 81] (Hans 
Druner, Osnabruck, 1933), p.7 
 
13 AFGG X/2, pp.193–5 
 
14 AFGG X/1, pp.723–5 
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success at Bertrix.15 It is no part of this thesis to speculate on what might have happened, 
merely to highlight the military potential arising from a French advance into the seven–
kilometre gap onto the flank of 21 ID, and to seek to establish why the French failed to 
realise that potential. The odds in favour of the French in that area were four–to–one in men 
and six–to–one in guns. Furthermore, the corps cavalry regiment, 21 Chasseurs, was 
deployed to the left once the main action had started and was perfectly positioned to push 
out strong patrols to discover the gap. It did not do so of its own initiative, nor was it 
ordered to do so by Roques. The second opportunity suggested by Contamine was for 12 
CA to throw one of its divisions to the right and achieve a notable success at Neufchâteau. 
Following the exposition of forces, terrain and orientation above, it becomes clear that 
Contamine was referring to the opportunity for the central French column (23 DI) to break 
the fragile German defence between the town and Petitvoir and encircle the town from the 
open west side while the remaining German forces (the eastern segment) were fixed in 
place by the frontal attack of 5 Colonial Brigade. !
 
Starting this review of the action with the units on the French right flank, the fighting was 
between 5 Colonial Brigade and the German 41 Reserve Brigade reinforced later by 25 
RID. 5 Colonial Brigade was an ad–hoc, independent mixed–arms formation attached to 
CAC and under the command of General Goullet. It was made up of unbrigaded units left 
over after CAC had taken its official complement: two surplus regiments of colonial 
infantry, supported by one surplus field artillery group (three 4–gun batteries) and a platoon 
                                                     
15 See Note 8 , above: Contamine, Marne, p.122 
 125 
of reserve cavalry.16 Apart from the cavalry, it was, like all the colonials, made up of 
experienced officers and soldiers – white colonials not non–European troops such as the 
famous Moroccan Division – many of whom had seen action abroad. It was considered an 
elite formation. When the main column of CAC, led by 3 DIC, was brought to action in the 
Rossignol forest, 12 kilometres south of Neufchâteau, 5 Colonial Brigade, marching on a 
parallel track through the forest, reached Neufchâteau unopposed and proceeded to assault 
the town. While never under the control of Roques’s 12 CA, it nevertheless fought 
alongside them. 
On the German side, the main body of 21 RID, 41 Reserve Brigade was initially 
spread out across the town in column, waiting for the road ahead to clear so they could 
march westwards behind their advance guard. When the action began, the brigade deployed 
onto the slopes facing south towards the oncoming enemy. The German corps commander, 
General von Steuben, had placed his second division, 25 RID, about ten kilometres away to 
the south–east. Given the general movement of the whole army to the west, it meant that 
this division was coincidentally in a good position to intervene on the flank of the French 
attack. It was scattered in its overnight positions in Léglise and the surrounding villages. 
The nearest battalion was at Assenois, seven kilometres by road to Neufchâteau but only 
two kilometres away from the battlefield if approaching directly from the right rear via the 
village of Le Sart; the main body at Léglise was ten kilometres south–east of Neufchâteau. 
When called upon, the division could and would deploy piecemeal, depending on each 
unit’s starting distance from the battlefield.  
                                                     
16 In fact, the brigade was initially loaned half a squadron of the elite Chasseurs d’Afrique, part of the cavalry 
regiment supporting CAC. But on the day before the offensive, the Chasseurs were reunited with their 
regiment and replaced by a third–rate unit, a troop (25 men) from 6 (Reserve) Squadron of 6 Dragoons...see 
AAT 24N3009/34/4b: miscellaneous papers of 5 Colonial Brigade 
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5 Colonial Brigade set out at 07.00. After an approach march disturbed only by 
irritating but small German cavalry patrols, the advance guard – two battalions of 23 RIC – 
came into action at 11.30.17 The opening of the engagement between the colonials and the 
German reservists gives the strongest evidence of how great was the element of surprise 
achieved by the French in the Ardennes that day. The French ‘point’ unit, a company from 
23 RIC, reaching the final crest before Neufchâteau, observed a German supply column 
(wagons escorted by cavalry) resting on the road leading westwards out of Neufchâteau, 
directly in front of his advance, and opened fire at a range of 800 metres.18 It was the 
combat train of the German 42 Brigade guarded by a squadron of 4 Dragoons; the cavalry 
was decimated, the supply train disabled, and the surprised infantry either side hastened to 
deploy into makeshift firing–lines.  
After an hour’s hard fighting, the colonial infantry had advanced up to the western 
outskirts of Neufchâteau while their flank guard on their vulnerable right fought for the 
tactically important Bois d’Ospot. During the next three hours, they continued their 
aggressive assault on the town, taking casualties but making progress. This was the time of 
greatest danger for the Germans:  
The 41st Reserve Brigade, fighting on the left wing had to put in its last few men in 
order to hold the heights south west of Neufchâteau.  The batteries west of that 
                                                     
17 AAT 24N3009/34/4b: Miscellaneous notes of 5 Colonial Brigade, a handwritten ink note Rapport 
sommaire sur le combat de la 5° Brigade devant Neufchâteau, dated 22 August 1914; and Grasset, 
Neufchâteau, p.16 
     
18 Grasset, Neufchâteau, p.16 
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place [the town] came to dire straits because of enemy fire which had stalked them 
in the many hollows and depressions of that terrain.19  
 
Towards 16.00 the crisis peaked; two batteries of 21st Reserve Division, positioned 
on the slopes west of Neufchâteau, called for immediate infantry support. They 
were on the point of being captured by the assaults of the French colonial infantry. 
But 21st Reserve Division had not a single infantryman to spare. Von Steuben sent 
one of his staff officers in haste to find the last regiment of 25th Reserve Division 
with orders to bring it immediately to Neufchâteau to support the centre... General 
Rampacher [21 RID commander] remained stoically just a few hundred metres from 
the nearest French skirmishers under a hail of fire which mowed down his liaison 
officers.20  
But the Colonial Brigade was simply not strong enough on its own to deliver the final 
decisive blow and force its way up and into the town. This is where de Langle’s operational 
plan demonstrably broke down as a result of German action: the main Colonial column, 3 
DIC, had been stopped at Rossignol by 6 AK and was sixteen kilometres short of 5 
Colonial Brigade, whose right flank was now hanging in the air. The growing threat on its 
right flank was draining resources, and casualties had been heavy. It had however fixed and 
held a force equal to its own, denying the German divisional commander the ability to 
reinforce his centre. Despite there not being a coordinated plan between 12 CA and 5 
Colonial Brigade – for lack of a unified chain of command – the colonials had  
                                                     
19 Weltkrieg 1, p.337 
 
20 Pugens, Neufchâteau, pp.367–369 
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serendipitously bought time for 12 CA to act decisively against the weak forces opposed to 
it. But the tide gradually turned against the colonials. As soon as he realised the enormity of 
the threat faced by 21 RID, von Steuben had sent orders to 25 RID, received at 13.00, to 
march to its support.21 The nearest battalion had only a two–kilometre march and at 13.30 
the first troops arrived at the village of Le Sart, more than one kilometre south of the Bois 
d’Ospot, advancing from a south–easterly direction into the rear of the French colonial 
position. Although well–sited French machine–guns and artillery held off this threat, it 
certainly put paid to any chance of the Colonial Brigade itself capturing Neufchâteau. 
Further German attacks developed towards the Bois d’Ospot from Hamipré as the more 
distant units of 25 RID arrived on the battlefield. These battalions and guns had been 
directed further north, a longer march but one which placed them in direct support of the 
failing German line in the town. Gradually from 15.30 onwards, the leading brigade of 25 
RID deployed its battalions and its artillery consecutively in front and on the flank of the 
Colonial firing–line, which was forced back step–by–step in a fighting withdrawal.22  
It is impossible to say what might have developed on the French side had 5 Colonial 
Brigade been under direct command of 12 CA. General Goullet had asked for assistance 
from 23 DI, and as a result three battalions were approaching from the west to strengthen 
the colonials’ line. The overwhelmingly powerful corps artillery of 12 CA was also moving 
into positions of support.23 A withdrawal in a westerly direction towards the supporting 
strength of 23 DI was the obvious military solution.  But 5 Colonial Brigade was part of 
                                                     
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Ibid.; and Grasset, Neufchâteau, pp.57–69 
23 AAT 26N136/1: JMO of 12 CA, Entries for 22 August; and AFGG I/1 (1936), p.404 
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CAC, even if their corps commander had not communicated with them at all since their 
orders arrived at 06.30 that morning.24 So at 17.00 a staff officer was sent back south to 
find General Lefèvre, supposedly at Les Bulles on the Semoy. General Goullet started 
organising a fall–back position around his command post at Montplainchamps from 15.50 
onwards, complete with shallow trenches dug by the engineers. The order to retreat upon it 
was given at about 17.00. At 18.00 the first retreating company of infantry moved into the 
trenches, and immediately the German pressure eased. Stragglers continued to find their 
way back until about 19.00. At 20.00, having still not heard from corps command, Goullet 
decided to withdraw upon Suxy, about seven kilometres back on their original route, 
southwards towards his corps commander rather than westwards towards the strength of 
Roques’s 12 CA. 
 It was the end of a day of very hard fighting, and General Goullet had learned that 
23 DI on his left was itself retreating: ‘The General judged that his decision to retreat could 
not be put off even for a minute, once he had been informed of the retreat of 12 CA which 
up until then had been covering his left’.25 At 21.00 ‘in the most profound silence, the 
column set out. It arrived at Suxy at 22.00’.26  There had been no pursuit by the Germans 
when the colonials disengaged.27 It is clear that the reason why they were able to disengage 
and withdraw without interference was because the resistance of the elite colonial troops 
had left 25 RID in no position to pose any further threat to anyone that day: ‘Towards 19.00 
                                                     
24 Grasset, Neufchâteau, p.72 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 AAT 24N3009/34/4b: Miscellaneous notes of 5 Colonial Brigade, op. cit., a handwritten ink note: Rapport 
sommaire sur le combat de la 5e brigade devant Neufchâteau, dated 22 August.  
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the retreat of all isolated troops seemed over. Held back by their respect of our guns, whose 
fire never ceased, and by the fire from Montpleinchamps, the enemy did not intervene. The 
German regiments, exhausted, gathered near the bridge where they still suffered from our 
artillery fire’.28 
Casualties in 5 Colonial Brigade were high – at roll–call on 24 August, only 2156 
officers and men of an original complement of over 6500 were fit for duty, a 67% casualty 
rate.29 But their opponents had suffered badly too. According to French Medical Orderly 
Tramini, who remained behind to tend the wounded and who remained on the battlefield 
for four days before going into captivity, the Germans lost 1300 dead and 3000 wounded in 
front of Neufchâteau. He claimed to have seen eleven 77mm German guns destroyed, 
together with caissons and horses.30  
The important contribution of 5 Colonial Brigade on 22 August was that, despite 
being isolated from the rest of its corps and despite being gradually outnumbered during the 
course of the day, it had through its fierce fighting and its stubborn resistance created the 
conditions whereby 12 CA was faced by a mere brigade of reserve infantry and thus given 
the opportunity to obtain a victory. This narrative now moves on to examine how 12 CA 
made use of that advantage.  
On the central sector of the battlefield, the German 42 Brigade, with 88 RIR in the main 
column, was marching west out of Neufchateau towards Bertrix. 
                                                     
28 Grasset, Neufchâteau, p.71  
  
29 AAT 24N3009/34/4b: miscellaneous papers of 5 Colonial brigade,  compte rendu, 24 août. 
 
30 Grasset, Neufchâteau, p.101: Annex 9, Report of Medical Orderly Tramini of 23 RIC, returned from 
captivity in July 1915. 
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On the French side, the mission of General Leblond’s 23 DI was to advance and occupy the 
important railway town of Libramont. Its route, as the right–hand column of 12 CA, would 
take it north between Neufchâteau and Petitvoir. Unknown to them, the German 88 RIR lay 
right in their path. But the Germans were equally ignorant of the whereabouts of the French 
and were initially spread out along five kilometres of road in their marching column.  
23 DI marched north in a single column to Straimont, where the column divided.31  
 
The advance guard continued due north on the Harfontaine road which would then bisect 
the main Neufchâteau–Petitvoir road some two kilometres outside the town. Behind the 
advance guard, 138 RI was sent off on the right flank towards Grapfontaine and the 
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colonials. But Leblond was clearly not coordinating his march with Garreau’s 24 DI on his 
left or with that of 5 Colonial Brigade on his right, because his advance guard only came 
into action at about 13.30, by which time the units either side had already been fighting for 
two hours; precious time had been wasted. 
 
 Nevertheless, in its own time, Leblond’s advance guard – 107 RI, astride the Harfontaine 
road – struck at the very thin extended German firing–line. Within an hour [circa 14.30] the 
Germans were forced back and Leblond informed Roques that he would push forward and 
cross the Petitvoir–Neufchâteau road.32 This would cut the fragile German line in two, 
                                                     
32 Ibid., and AAT 22N817/30/3: orders and notes of 12 CA. 
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virtually guarantee the annihilation of the forces west of Petitvoir and allow the 
encirclement of Neufchâteau town.  
Leblond organised a formal attack, bringing up 63 RI on the left of 107 RI and 
setting up all three groups of divisional artillery – 36 guns en batterie – on the high ground 
behind the infantry.33 But organising this took time and an hour or more elapsed before 
Leblond actually issued his order to advance, at 15.50, adding that the enemy seemed to be 
giving way and the French artillery seemed to have a marked superiority.34  
Despite the delay, it still looked as if the fate of the Germans at Neufchâteau was 
about to be sealed. With hindsight, and full knowledge of what 5 Colonial Brigade was 
achieving alongside them during this time frame, it is now clear that a timely and vigorous 
drive by Leblond’s battalions, supported by his massed artillery, would have fractured the 
Germans’ thin line and broken its resistance. Indeed General von Steuben had decided to 
pull back and concentrate the meagre forces of his 21 RID on the heights west and south–
west of Neufchâteau but east of the Neufchâteau–Straimont road.35  This was the movement 
noticed by the French at about 15.30, and Leblond gave the order to advance north across 
the main road after the retreating Germans.36 The German retirement to the north and east 
of the Straimont road would leave the more westerly route – the Harfontaine road astride 
which Leblond’s attacking force was assembling – clear for the French to advance virtually 
unopposed.  
                                                     
33 AAT 26N307/1: JMO of 23 DI, entry for 22 August 
 
34 AAT 22N817/30/3: miscellaneous orders and notes of 12 CA, ordre général nr.14. 
 
35 Weltkrieg 1, p.335 
  
36 JMO of 23 DI, op. cit.  
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But something occurred during those inactive hours before the French advance was 
due to be implemented that caused General Leblond to order a retreat. The official 
contemporary record suggests that Leblond ordered a withdrawal because of the retreat of 5 
Colonial Brigade which uncovered his right flank.37 Leblond seems to have first been made 
aware of the difficulties encountered by the colonials on his flank at about the time he was 
reporting his initial success to Roques, around 14.30. At 14.45 he sent a note to General 
Goullet that he was sending a battalion to help him via Grapfontaine.38 So Leblond’s 
attention and concern was directed to the possible vulnerability of his flank almost from the 
outset of his battle. This was reinforced just as he was giving the order to cross the 
Neufchâteau road. His divisional JMO stated that just as he gave the order to advance 
across the main road, CAC reported that strong forces were opposing it. So he sent two 
battalions of 78 RI and one of 138 RI under Colonel Arbalasse to its support.39 The time 
was about 16.00 and the battle hung in the balance, with the colonial attack on the town 
threatening to shatter the fragile German defence but with their defensive flank under 
increasing threat from the east. The lack of a unified command structure across the front 
meant that 23 DI’s support for the colonials was difficult to coordinate and control.  
Meanwhile another issue was arguably starting to influence the conduct of 23 DI’s 
own battle – that of the state of mind of its divisional commander. His JMO records that 23 
DI had only three battalions left in reserve, two of which were reservists. One battalion of 
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reservists from 300 RI had even been put in the firing line.40 One senses a touch of anxiety 
in the use of the word ‘only’. Having to divert most of his remaining reserve to prop up the 
colonials and protect his own right flank must have increased Leblond’s growing anxiety.  
But there was more to it than that.  
 
Sometime between 14.00 and 17.00, some of the troops in Leblond’s attack force 
panicked and gave way under a German artillery bombardment. A pencilled battlefield note 
written at 18.20 to Leblond by the colonel of 46 Brigade stated that the moment of panic, 
caused by the abandonment of a battery, lasted only five minutes, but that then several 
companies of infantry in the front line became demoralised and had to be rallied by their 
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officers. The colonel himself had to take matters in hand, leading a charge, flags flying, 
music playing, which ‘recaptured’ the original positions.41  
The divisional JMO confirms but underplays the incident, stating only that under an 
accurate, rapid and violent bombardment by German artillery, some troops gave way for a 
moment but, under the energetic leadership of their officers, all calmed down; the infantry 
went forward bäionette au canon and a few gunners, who had momentarily abandoned their 
posts, returned to their guns.42  
However, the fact that a brigade commander was required to restore discipline and 
morale points to the seriousness of the incident. Furthermore it would have taken a 
considerable time to rally the disrupted troops, organise them and re–launch the assault 
referred to. The records do not give the time at which the incident commenced, only that 
the brigadier felt able to take the time to write a note at 18.20 after it was over.  
 But there is one further note on file which illuminates the timing of the incident as 
well as Leblond’s possible reaction to it. Leblond scribbled a note to General Goullet at 
14.45 to inform him that 23 DI was occupying the heights 500m north of Menguette (2km 
south west of Grapfontaine) and asking to be kept informed of the Colonial brigade’s 
situation. That note then contains a semi–illegible phrase which seems to refer to a group of 
artillery and several infantry units fleeing, which suggests that Leblond had heard of the 
panic within his 46 Brigade as early as 14.45 and was already considering the possibility 
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that he might have to fall back.43 The delay between informing Roques that he planned to 
cross the main road and issuing the order for the advance coincides with the time slot in 
which Leblond was made aware of the panic in the ranks of his troops. It is certainly 
credible that as his fear and uncertainty increased, compounded by anxiety over his right 
flank, Leblond would seize upon an excuse to stop and consolidate his line, even withdraw. 
That excuse was provided by the situation in which 5 Colonial Brigade found itself. 
Leblond sent a note to 12 CA headquarters that he was withdrawing about 1000m because 
the 5 Colonial brigade’s retreat had uncovered his right flank. He called for 
reinforcements.44  
Once again, the note does not indicate the time it was sent, but Roques’s reply 
(‘Received your news of today on the subject of [your] 1000m withdrawal and your general 
order nr.15. Remain where you are.’) was timed at 19.30, far too late to reverse the action, 
but suggesting, given average times for messages to move up and down the chain of 
command, that Leblond finally gave way to his inner fears at about 17.30, roughly when 
news of Goullet’s retreat to his fall–back position might have reached him but before he 
had heard from the colonel of his 46 Brigade that the panic of his men had been stopped.  
* * * 
                                                     
43  AAT 24N3009/34/4b: Miscellaneous notes of 5 Colonial Brigade. The relevant portion of the note seems 
to read ‘J’eut mettre pouce de disposer dans la fuite d’un Gr [groupe] d’ Artie [artillerie] et de quelques 
éléments d’infanterie’ The French phrase mettre les pouces is old–fashioned slang for ‘giving way after 
resistance’ (see: Nouvelle Petit Larousse, (Librarie Larousse, Paris, 1970), p.808): and the final phrase clearly 
refers to a group of artillery and several infantry units ‘fleeing’. 
 
44 Miscellaneous notes of 12 CA, op. cit. 
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 It is as well to be reminded at this stage that before ordering the retreat and calling for 
reinforcements, Leblond had placed six battalions astride the Harfontaine road, supported 
by twenty–four of the thirty–six divisional guns, and that he had sent a further five 
battalions towards Grapfontaine on his right. The three German battalions opposed to him 
had been ordered to retreat away from the Harfontaine road and indeed had been observed 
withdrawing to the north. To put Leblond’s cautious approach into further perspective, one 
only has to look at his division’s casualties. According to the corps’s casualty return, 107 
RI lost 11 men killed (no officers) and 66 men wounded (2%); 63 RI seems to have 
suffered no casualties at all; 78 RI lost 1 man killed and 18 wounded (0.6%); 138 DI lost 1 
officer killed, another wounded, with 3 men killed and 25 wounded (0.1%). The artillery 
regiment, whose gunners fled under the German shelling, recorded only four wounded 
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men.45 These trivial numbers speak for themselves and evidence the total lack of élan, 
leadership and drive, which in turn explain the failure of 23 DI to break its weaker 
opponent. Before midnight Roques removed him from command, with no official reason 
recorded. He was replaced on the spot by one of his subordinates, Colonel Bapst.46  
The failure of 23 DI to press forward at 14.30 across the Neufchâteau–Petitvoir road 
was a pivotal moment in the battle. With the panic and dislocation of some of his troops, 
the opportunity for Leblond to force his way through the centre of the German line faded 
away. And the decision, at around 17.30, actually to retreat ended any possibility of 
breaking the German line.  
 
Turning to the action between 24 DI and 81 RIR on the French left, the role which one 
single German reserve regiment played in denying France her best opportunity for a victory 
in the Battle of the Frontiers was so important that its precise composition, location and 
movement need to established beyond all doubt. The commander of 81 RIR wrote that his 
regiment was supported in the advance guard by a squadron from Dragoon Regiment 7, a 
battery of Artillery Regiment 21 and a company of pioneers.47 The regiment marched five 
kilometres down the Bertrix road out of Neufchâteau until it reached the high ground at 
Petitvoir, and the village of that name nestling in the valley below. There von Jordon 
received orders to capture the heights north–east of Rossart up to the heights north–east of 
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Nevraumont and to halt there. One company, 6/81 RIR, was sent to the heights north–west 
of Grandvoir as protection for the right flank. The regiment was to set up a strong defence. 
Shortly after this, the first French prisoner, a chasseur whose horse had been shot, was 
brought in.48  
Two important points emerge from this narrative. Firstly, the defensive line which 
81 RIR was ordered to occupy faced west, not south. The German command was even at 
that late stage unaware of the true axis of the French advance. The proposed defence line 
straddled the main road from Neufchâteau to Bertrix some two kilometres further forward 
from Petitvoir. 
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The main road was in a valley and on either side the ground sloped up to the Nevraumont  
plateau, extending both north and south, on which were situated the two villages which 
became central to the fighting, Rossart in the north and Nevraumont in the south. It is not 
clear from the regimental history how far the deployment to the defensive line had 
progressed when the fighting started. However the possibility exists that some elements of 
the leading battalion (I/81 RIR) had reached the vicinity of Rossart, in response to their 
orders, when the first shots were fired. Secondly, it is important to track the approximate 
location of the twelve companies of infantry which made up the German regiment. It will 
be shown that French sources claim at various points to have been confronted with strong 
German forces. Already it is clear that few, if any, of the troops of 81 RIR were likely to 
have progressed west of the designated defensive line. It must also be noted that one 
company (6/81 RIR) was ordered off to the north–east at Grandvoir, away from the 
impending encounter. The four companies of III/81 RIR and the pioneer company were 
retained at Petitvoir as regimental reserve.49 The seven remaining companies formed the 
initial German firing–line which confronted the French.  
The French advance guard had arrived at Saint–Médard at about 10.00, from where 
it had a clear view of Nevraumont on the ridge in front, two–and–a–half kilometres away 
across a valley. The leading infantry unit was the first battalion, 108 RI (I/108), supported 
by a group of artillery (12 guns) and a company of engineers.50  In front of them, during the 
scouting and skirmishing phase, Nevraumont had been occupied by 3 squadron of 21 
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Chasseurs, who reported at 10.30 that a group of German infantry was approaching from 
the east.51 The first skirmishing shots were fired at about 10.20.52  
The leading companies of the German I/81 RIR on the right advanced over open 
fields towards Nevraumont, despite receiving fire from its open right flank. and on its left 
II/81 RIR went forward through the woods known as the Bois du Ban. The first casualties 
were taken; thick swarms of troops strengthened the thinning forward line...[the infantry] 
advanced slowly but surely, springing forward in groups’53 – an informative comment on 
contemporary German infantry tactics. The skirmishing had developed into a full fire–fight 
by about 11.30.54 
The six German field guns of their supporting battery deployed on the Petitvoir 
promontory and were able to observe and use direct fire west towards Nevraumont, but not 
due south, where higher ground obscured their line of sight.55  The fire–fight developed 
over the next two hours, by which time, about 13.30, the firing–lines were only 300–400 
metres apart. French machine–guns were much in evidence, causing the German infantry 
some difficulty. The lack of machine–guns on the German side was keenly felt.56  
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On the French side, the cavalry occupying Nevraumont seems to have retreated in 
the face of the advancing German skirmishers because at 11.15, I/108 formed up and 
advanced to take the village, to be met by a few shots.57 This initial attack was made 
without artillery support, but nevertheless made rapid progress. Behind it, III/108 formed 
up in a double column and, as enemy fire grew brisker, deployed into line on the right. The 
last battalion, II/108, then moved up to the far right, and by 12.00, about the time when the 
field guns with the French advance guard opened fire, all three battalions (twelve 
companies) faced the increasing rifle–fire coming from the German infantry (seven 
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companies) approaching from the north–east.58 The French infantry, now supported by the 
artillery of the advance guard, still only made slow progress, using the guns to bombard the 
edges of the little woods which served as enemy strong–points.59  
The second regiment of 47 Brigade (50 RI) marched up and deployed, one battalion 
to the east of Nevraumont, another to the west of the village and the third in reserve.60 It 
would have been difficult for the regimental commander to retain command and control 
over his three widely dispersed battalions. 
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60 AAT 26N640/1: JMO of 50 RI 
 
 147 
But (as will be shown below) the commander of 47 Brigade, Colonel Descoings, 
seems to have taken direct control at around this time, leading from the front.  The two 
remaining groups of the divisional artillery regiment (34 RAC) came up and positioned 
themselves in support of Descoings’ brigade.61 Around this time also, a battalion of 126 RI 
was brought up to strengthen the French line, and after a heavy bombardment of the woods 
the Germans who had occupied them fell back.62  
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The French now had twenty companies in their first line, eight more in a support 
line, and thirty–six guns in action; the Germans still only seven companies in one thin line, 
with six guns. 
It was at this time, according to the French official history, that major German 
forces debouched from the woods to the north and disputed possession of the village.63 The 
diarist of 47 Brigade also recorded that the woods west of Nevraumont seemed to be very 
strongly occupied.64  But it has been demonstrated above that no units other than those of 
81 RIR were in that area, so that the only German troops likely to have been in the north at 
that time, coming from the general direction of Rossart, were those elements of I/R81 
which had been ordered to the northern ridge around Rossart as part of the original westerly 
deployment onto the defensive line ordered for R81. The exact number is unlikely ever to 
be established; however arguably the smallest German tactical unit to be ordered to march 
to defend a regimental flank, would have been a company. The natural conclusion is that 
the major German forces debouching from the woods north of Nevraumont observed by the 
French were no more than a flanking company of I/81 RIR hastening to the sound of 
gunfire. Whatever the number, the few German riflemen west of Nevraumont appear to 
have been sufficiently aggressive to have convinced many French officers that they were 
faced by much stronger forces. The Germans also seem to have made sufficient use of the 
cover afforded by the many copses and small woods that only artillery could dislodge them. 
But there seems to have been a lack of urgency and an almost drill–like approach by the 
French gunners. Their JMO recorded that the batteries took up their positions just like on 
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the practice ground, with the battery captain’s observation post alongside each battery; each 
battery had been given a specific mission and in a short time regular fire was laid down. 
The guns crushed the copses under their salvos, after which the infantry was able to 
advance.65 
By 14.00, casualties, enemy numbers and weight of fire were beginning to tell on 
the weak German line. Von Jordon decided to bring forward his third battalion and the 
attached company of engineers to strengthen his line. But his orders were overruled by his 
brigade commander, who ordered the whole brigade to pull back and defend the heights 
east of Petitvoir.66 The higher German command was by now particularly aware of the 
possibility that 23 DI might cut the German advance guard off from their main body. But 
the operational significance was that a retreat by von Jordon’s men at 14.00 would have 
opened up in front of Garreau’s 24 DI a free passage through Rossart to the north, with five 
or six hours of daylight left. Fortunately for the Germans, not only did 23 DI fail to follow 
up on its initial threat to cut their line in two, but von Jordon felt confident enough about 
his local situation to be reluctant to withdraw and twice sent messengers to Brigade HQ to 
query his orders:  
 
Oberst von Jordon, who clearly appreciated the situation of his two leading 
battalions, recalled the lessons learned in training, that “Retreat leads to 
Annihilation”, and refused to carry out the order, sending first the Regimental 
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Adjutant then the Adjutant of II/R81, (Oberleutentant d. l. kav. Röhrig), to brigade 
commander Lieutenant–General v Diotmann to ask again for the support of III/R81. 
In vain!67  
 
This was the time when the French perceived their enemy to be defending the ground foot–
by–foot.68 The French command had noticed the slackening of German resistance. Colonel 
Descoings scribbled a note for his divisional commander at 13.50 at his position at a 
crossroads north of the woods situated north of Nevraumont; he reported that after a series 
of bayonet attacks by 108 RI and I/50 RI, the enemy was retreating, pursued by 50 RI. He 
had ordered the pursuit to continue towards Rossart and the woods between Rossart and 
Petitvoir.69  
It would seem at this stage, with von Jordon ordered to retreat and Descoings 
ordering a pursuit, that a French breakthrough was possible. But shortly after 14.00 
Descoings’s ‘pursuit’ became a formal assault on the village of Rossart, culminating at 
19.00 with a bayonet charge in which all the regiments of the division took part.70 Five 
hours elapsed, during which the opportunity for 24 DI to turn its initial success into 
comprehensive victory before nightfall drained away. Part of the reason lies in von Jordon’s 
reluctance to withdraw and his troops’ continued resistance, but this in turn was only made 
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possible by French caution and reluctance to use their massive superiority in men and guns 
to advance à outrance.  
In addition, two events are recorded on the French side, which most probably 
contributed to Descoings’s ‘pursuit’ becoming a formal assault. At some time during the 
afternoon (the exact time is not recorded) Colonel Descoings was wounded, shot through 
the right arm.71 And at 15.50 corps commander Roques sent a note to General Leblond to 
tell him that 24 DI was on the point of reaching Grandvoir, well in advance of 23 DI. 
Roques tersely requested that Leblond should avoid firing on his own side, as had already 
happened while 24 DI was at Hill 403, 1500 metres east of Nevraumont.72  
The French unit on the right flank at Hill 403 was 108 RI; this regiment suffered 
1292 casualties on 22 August, a 40% loss rate, which was nearly ten times higher than any 
other regiment of 24 DI that day.73   
It is probable that Descoings had to leave the field to have his wound dressed, and at 
roughly the same time, the leading regiment, 108 RI, was hit by friendly fire from their 
neighbouring division, which caused significant casualties including up to twelve officers, 
amongst whom were four company commanders.74 This latter event would not be one that 
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Roques would want to see written into the official accounts of his battle. The two events 
together, it is argued, would have been enough to drain the impetus from the French attack.  
 
Descoings was a relatively young, competent brigade commander with potential: in 
five months’ time, on 5 January 1915, he would be appointed to command 12 CA in place 
of Roques, having been given command of 24 DI immediately after this battle.75 He was an 
important figure, and critical to 24 DI’s success thus far. His departure from the front for 
the dressing station just after ordering the pursuit would have left command and control of 
the battle in the hands of the two remaining senior officers, Generals Garreau and Sorin, 
                                                     
75 AFGG X/1, p.723 and X/2, p.193 
 
 153 
commanders respectively of 24 DI and 48 Brigade. It is an interesting fact that not a single 
message from either of them, up or down the chain of command, remains in the archives.  
The formal attack on Rossart involved all the regiments of the division.76 The 
divisional artillery (34 RAC) also moved forward to take up a new position north of the 
village of Nevraumont. Led by Descoings’s 47 Brigade, this formal assault on the village 
succeeded.77  
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The move of five fresh battalions and eight batteries of field guns about three 
kilometres forward would normally take well over an hour.78 The change of command, the 
re–establishment of control and the preparation for a formal assault would also take time. 
The apparent inactivity on the French side between 14.00 and 17.00 could finally be 
explained by this hypothesis. Confirmation is provided by the JMO of the final regiment to 
deploy, 100 RI, which reported that it was ordered to assemble at 15.00 and to march in 
combat formation, starting at 17.30, the four kilometres to join the ‘capture’ of Rossart. It 
suffered from German artillery fire as it crossed the plateau.79 The march would take about 
an hour at regulation speed, indicating that there was little or no resistance to the ‘capture’ 
of Rossart at bayonet point at 18.00. Furthermore, the regimental casualty return shows that 
this regiment suffered not a single fatality on 22 August, just 57 wounded, probably from 
the shell–fire mentioned in its diary.80  
At 16.00 von Jordon had finally given his own order to retire in the general 
direction of Grandvoir and Tournay, deploying all his reserves (which were units of 7/R81) 
to protect the retirement.81 That he was able to remain so long in the field against such 
superior numbers indicates that the German line was not under particular pressure from the 
French; furthermore, during the retirement (which produced additional casualties from 
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French fire) the enemy did not follow up and merely sent out patrols into the area around 
Petitvoir.82  
Roques had reported to Fourth Army headquarters at 16.20 (in a formal compte 
rendu) that ‘24 DI, having taken Nevraumont, has pushed up to a crest one kilometre north, 
with two regiments and five batteries engaged. It is bringing up its last two regiments from 
reserve.’83 Given that this is precisely the position from which Descoings had ordered the 
pursuit more than two hours earlier, it would seem that Roques and his staff had only a 
poor appreciation of what 24 DI was doing.  
It is difficult to find evidence of any German defence of Rossart. As has been shown 
above, von Jordon had ordered his withdrawal towards Petitvoir, away from Rossart and 
east instead of north. Undoubtedly some stragglers from the few German companies which 
had attacked the western side of Nevraumont earlier in the day might have found their way 
back to Rossart, but without artillery or machine–guns; and no other German units were in 
the vicinity. The nearest, 21 ID at Bertrix, did however send out some scouting and security 
forces from its integral cavalry (6 Uhlans). ‘From the left at Rossart came reports from 
Assistant Guard Commander (Vizewachtmeister) Busse of the approach of very strong 
enemy cavalry.84 It was very unlikely that in the current tactical situation the enemy cavalry 
would breakthrough. In any case they could hardly be considered a serious threat given that 
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the terrain beyond the road was unsuitable for horses.’85  Nevertheless the German cavalry 
commander took no chances: 
 
Sergeant Glenneberg of the 1st Squadron would be deployed with a strong patrol 
towards Rossart for security and defence with their firearms... but Sergeant 
Glenneberg encountered no French riders. Instead there were scattered enemy 
infantry everywhere, who to some extent and completely irresponsibly let off their 
bullets whilst running. He made seventeen prisoners. Sergeant Welz even managed 
to capture a Frenchman and his horse and brought him back with him to the 
squadron.86  
 
There was one final mission for 6 Uhlans; General von Schenk, commander of 21 ID, 
wanted to make contact with his neighbour (21 RID) at Neufchâteau, and at midday 
ordered a patrol. Oberleutenant Buek of 3rd Squadron, 6 Uhlans, set out with six troopers. 
He wrote in his daybook:  
 
Through beautiful deciduous forest our path took us to Rossart. There were enemy 
infantry in the town and I sent one rider back to report. Shots were fired at us. We 
rode further on. We saw enemy riflemen crawl forward on the heights. From a 
                                                     
85 Herman Freiherr Hillier von Gaertringen, Geschichte des Thüringischen Ulanen Regiments Nr 6 von 1813 
bis 1919 [6 Uhlans] (Wilhelm Rolf, Berlin, 1930), p.51 
 
86 Ibid. 
 
 157 
wooded crest I made a sketch of the whole situation. Here the enemy even fired at 
our small patrol with their artillery. We disappeared into the woods. A messenger 
took our report back. It was sunset and the shelling slackened off. We rode back.87 
 
These reports from 6 Uhlans demonstrate conclusively that Rossart was not heavily 
defended and did not merit a full–scale assault by two brigades supported by thirty-six 
guns. It suggests a degree of French disorganisation, with infantry running around firing 
their rifles or crawling over empty hills and with artillery firing at a handful of cavalrymen. 
And it supports the speculative hypothesis that a vigorous ‘pursuit’, started at 14.00 as 
ordered by Colonel Descoings, would have brushed aside the final German resistance and 
gained Rossart, and the open ground between that village and Grandvoir in the east, with 
several hours of daylight left.  
General Garreau must be criticised for the excessive caution with which he directed 
his division, or by default allowed his division to proceed, against minimal opposition. 
Through his inadequate leadership he allowed a significant opportunity for French tactical 
success to slip away. The casualties sustained during the battle support the case. Apart from 
108 RI which, as has been shown above, sustained 40% losses, including those from 
friendly fire, the other regiments of 24 DI had relatively small numbers of casualties. 50 RI 
suffered no more than 150 killed, wounded and missing out of about 3200 over a three day 
period from 22 to 24 August, which is roughly 5%. Even if all the casualties had been 
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incurred on 22 August, it seems hardly offensive à outrance, by any standard.88 100 RI 
suffered 57 men wounded and 14 missing on 22–23 August (2%);89 126  RI suffered 15 
killed and 48 wounded in front of Nevraumont on 22 August, out of 3393, less than 2%.90 
These statistics do not support the 48 Brigade JMO’s assertion of ‘considerable casualties’ 
within the brigade as a whole. Nor do they give evidence of any truly aggressive action by 
the infantry of 24 DI. 
By comparison, German leadership was much more positive. Early in the day Major 
Seeleman called out to the regimental commander: ‘We are giving the enemy too much 
honour. It is doubtless only dismounted cavalry!’91 Major Seeleman commanded I/81 RIR, 
opposite the 50 and 108 RIs, and that day his battalion lost 244 men dead or missing 
(wounded are not mentioned but would considerably increase the total) out of a total of 
approximately 1000, in other words a mortality rate of nearly 25%. Projected to include an 
average number of wounded for such a number of dead, the overall losses of this one 
battalion would most likely have exceeded 60%. Judging from the evidence from the 
French side, the majority of those casualties would have come from French artillery fire. 
The morale of these German reserve soldiers is exemplified by the words of one wounded 
corporal: ‘Today things did not go at all well, Herr Oberst, but when we come back from 
hospital, we will give it to those Frenchmen properly’.92 Corporal Fröhlich of 5/81 RIR 
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actually buried the regimental colours rather than let them fall into French hands, and was 
able to retrieve them the next day.93 
The contrast between the performance of the officers and men of the German 81 
RIR and those of the French 24 DI could not be more starkly illustrated at every level. 
German morale was very high, as was their ability to take severe casualties and still stay on 
the field; French morale was low, particularly when they lost their officers, and they 
showed little appetite for attack until their artillery had completely destroyed all opposition. 
Even then, their progress was very slow. This was not offensive à outrance, indeed the 
degree of caution went beyond even the dictates of the 1895 doctrine, an issue which will 
be discussed later in this thesis.  German regimental and battalion command was resolute 
and professional, demonstrating an aggressive unwillingness to concede ground; the French 
command was cautious, even hesitant, with a total inability to assess the fighting correctly, 
appreciate the opportunity before them, and drive their men forward. One exception was 
Lieutenant Hérier of 10/108 who was wounded by a bullet in the face and who nevertheless 
insisted on reporting to his brigade commander, calling out en avant, pour La France 
[‘forward, for France’]. His behaviour is cited in the regimental JMO as one of supreme 
courage and heroic conduct when it might equally have been an impassioned call for 
leadership based on an appreciation of the opportunity unfolding at the front.94  Apart from 
Colonel Descoings, the French senior commanders were at best laborious, at worst weak; 
the German brigade and divisional commanders showed an astute and accurate assessment 
of the battle as it developed around them. The German reserve regiment continued to 
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function as a coherent fighting unit despite losing fourteen of its officers killed, including 
two company commanders, and an unknown number wounded. On the French side, officer 
casualties in the regiments of 24 DI were almost as high, but the resulting inertia caused by 
lack of leadership was out of proportion. 108 RI lost 3 captains killed, 1 wounded and 4 
lieutenants killed, five wounded; 100 NCOs were killed or wounded.  50 RI lost 21 officers 
(42%) over three days, starting on 22 August. These two regiments bore the brunt of the 
early fighting at Nevraumont, and were the force Descoings expected to pursue the 
retreating enemy. In those days, officers believed it right to expose themselves to fire in 
order to encourage their men, but it seems that the French officer corps often took this to an 
absurd degree: sub–Lieutenant Fayolle of 50 RI graduated from Saint Cyr during the 
mobilisation period, put on his plumed St Cyrian cap and his white gloves before the 
assault. He was mortally wounded by a bullet through the forehead.95 The “white gloves” 
stereotype was made popular by Tuchman in the 1960s: ‘Officers from St. Cyr went into 
battle wearing white–plumed shakos and white gloves; it was considered “chic” to die in 
white gloves.’96 But it is clear from the case of sub–Lieutenant Fayolle, and other instances, 
that it was founded on a real attitude of naive pride, ignorant of the reality of modern war, 
prevalent in the French army at the time.   
After the action had finished, there was no overt criticism of the performance of 24 
DI, by Roques or anyone else in the French army, then or since. Nevertheless General 
Garreau was quietly removed from command of 24 DI that same night, without any record 
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of explanation.97 The JMOs of both division and corps are not overtly untruthful, except 
arguably for the hyperbole of ‘major German forces’ west of Neuvramont to describe the 
opposition from at most the remnants of a few companies of German reserve infantry and 
some dismounted cavalry patrols. But the JMOs simply fail to record events during the 
pivotal period of the battle between 14.00 and 19.00, and so a detailed explanation of what 
happened and why has had to be constructed from disparate lower–level source material. 
The inference drawn from this is that the action of 24 DI was written up in the 
divisional and corps JMOs to present an inadequate performance in the best possible light. 
Given that General Roques quietly removed General Garreau from his post within hours, 
and given that the inactivity of 21 Chasseurs on the open left flank and the deployment of 
the powerful corps artillery and reserve infantry was the responsibility of the corps 
operational staff, the inference is that an attempt was made to conceal the extent of this lost 
opportunity in order to preserve the reputation of General Pierre Roques. As will be shown 
later, Roques was a political general, more familiar with activity in the Ministry of War 
than in the front line. And he was an old comrade of General Joffre, whose own early 
career in the colonial army his had closely mirrored.98  His operational control of his corps 
must be called into question. 
* * * 
                                                     
97 AFGG X/2, p.193: Garreau was removed from command on 22 August, replaced temporarily by Colonel 
Deffontaines and four days later by Colonel Descoings, who presumably was by then recovered from the 
wounds he received on 22 and 23 August.  
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Evidently 24 DI and 21 Chasseurs between them had a significant opportunity to brush 
aside the weak if energetic opposition of von Jordon’s regiment within three hours of the 
start of the fight. Had they done so, then reaching a line from Rossart to Grandvoir was 
within their grasp during the afternoon, with hours of daylight left. And a road from Rossart 
which leads directly north would have placed them, after an hour’s march, on the left rear 
flank of the German 21 ID fighting in the Forest of Luchy north–east of Bertrix. A second 
open road, from Grandvoir northwards to Libramont, led directly to Duke Albrecht von 
Württemburg’s CP – a prime target for a regiment of aggressively–led French light cavalry.  
But neither Roques nor his staff seem to have had the slightest appreciation of what 
lay before them. In the firing–line, companies and company commanders were intent on 
what was immediately in front of them and not on the task of finding their enemy’s flank. 
Little information seems to have found its way back to corps headquarters; the absence of 
any evidence other than Descoings’s messages in the files supports this point, as does the 
fact that 24 DI spent hours organising a formal assault, using the techniques set out in the 
1895 regulations, on a position at Rossart defended by less than a battalion of exhausted 
German reservists.  On the flank, 21 Chasseurs were content with a passive role, not even 
sending out aggressive scouting patrols. Again, the absence of positive evidence, together 
with the testimony from the German 6 Uhlans opposite them, supports the point. Over and 
above the lost opportunity for tactical battlefield victory, an appreciation of the prospects 
for exploitation (even if Roques and his staff were incapable of appreciating them) 
following a vigorous tactical success at Rossart and Grandvoir, leads one to conclude that 
the opportunity lost by 24 DI had potential operational and strategic significance.  
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Each individual action, incident and event described above about the battle at Neufchâteau 
contributes to a composite picture of the overall behaviour and performance of the two 
combatants, and illuminates a generic conclusion as to the contributing factors to success, 
and failure.  
On the French side, it is clear that there was a marked difference between the 
performance of the colonial and metropolitan troops. The Colonials, like their German 
opponents, showed a level of tactical proficiency, discipline and morale which was lacking 
in the metropolitan soldiers. They showed a willingness to take heavy casualties and still 
remain in the firing–line, absorbing pressure and continuing to fight against increasing 
odds. The metropolitan troops demonstrated a tendency to panic under fire, especially 
under artillery bombardment, losing cohesion, discipline and morale. This was particularly 
the case with the infantry and artillerymen in the firing–line of 48 Brigade of 23 DI, but 
was also evident (perhaps more understandably) within 108 RI.  The lack of impetus shown 
by virtually every regiment of 12 CA in this action signals a tendency to ‘go to ground’ 
when deprived of clear leadership. In all cases, it required senior officers to rally and 
regroup their units into battalion and regimental formations, using traditional methods of 
dense formations, music, flags and drums to re–establish command and control. These 
factors point to issues of training within the metropolitan army which require further 
analysis. 
The German soldiers demonstrated much the same characteristics of high morale 
and ability to absorb casualties whilst remaining in the firing line as the French colonials. 
This is the more surprising in that they were all reservists of the older classes. The 
youngest, most recently trained reservists went to regular units to bring them up to war 
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strength; reserve formations like 21 RID and 25 RID took the next tranche of conscripts.99 
There is clearly an issue regarding the relative quality of French and German reserve 
soldiers, which once again points towards pre–war training.  
Junior French officers (of the rank of captain and below) demonstrated an almost 
foolhardy courage and old–fashioned belief in leading from the front. Too many officer 
casualties reinforced any tendency for leaderless troops to ‘go to ground’. A real–life (and 
death) example of the “white gloves” stereotype has been quoted from amongst the officer 
fatalities of 50 RI. It is not the only instance to be found in archive material pertaining to 
the Battle of the Frontiers. The French learned the hard way and at the cost of a large part 
of their pre–war officer cadre that such behaviour could not survive the test of modern 
firepower. And German officer casualties were equally heavy, as has been shown above. 
The difference was that French junior–officer casualties seem to have made a major 
contribution to failures in unit cohesion, morale and discipline, whereas on the German side 
their strong NCO cadre and the inherent self–discipline and self–motivation of individual 
soldiers seems to have held units together and kept them in action longer.100  
Perhaps surprisingly, the tactics by both 23 and 24 DI showed nothing of the élan or 
furia francese which one might expect of an army supposedly indoctrinated by the cult of 
offensive à outrance. On the contrary, insofar as any doctrine can be seen to have been put 
into practice within 12 CA, it was that of the old 1895 Regulations, in which artillery 
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pp.115–142 and pp.222–227 passim; and D.Stone, Fighting for the Fatherland (Conway, London, 2006), 
p.231; and Zuber, Ardennes, pp.12–79 passim. 
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prepared the way for the infantry attack.101 But if what happened within 12 CA was a 
deliberate application of the 1895 doctrine, it seems to have been taken to excess, in that the 
French infantry demonstrably failed to move forward until the enemy was blasted out of 
their improvised strong–points or (in the case of 24 DI) until the  enemy himself withdrew. 
Finally, one cannot but help being struck by the similarity between the final attack on 
Rossart by all the regiments of infantry and artillery of 24 DI and the traditional massed 
charge with which the French ended their annual autumn manoeuvres.  
German doctrine as applied by 81 RIR adheres closely to the 1906 field regulations, 
with swarms of skirmishers reinforced into thickening lines which went forward bound–by–
bound. Use of copses and other natural features shows an attention to field–craft which 
must have compensated for the lack of firepower due to weak numbers of guns and the 
absence of machine–guns. Strong individual and small–unit self–discipline was 
demonstrated in the execution of a fighting withdrawal. Again one has to draw a parallel 
conclusion about the French colonial infantry.  
French artillery had overwhelming superiority in numbers, so it is unsurprising that 
they eventually gained fire–superiority. But there is evidence of a slow, methodical, almost 
text–book application of deployment and fire movements. Time, according to Napoleon, 
was the most precious commodity on the battlefield: a French artillery unit in column could 
accelerate its advance to at least six or seven kilometres an hour when needed;102 but there 
is no evidence that the urgency existed on the French side during this battle to bring their 
artillery into action earlier than the prescribed routine speed of march and deployment. On 
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102 Handbook of the French Army 1914 (War Office, 1914, IWM collection), p.403 
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the contrary, the first attack on Nevraumont by I/108 went ahead without waiting for 
artillery support, although this may also be evidence of the unofficial ‘cult of the offensive’ 
which drove junior officers to impetuous early attacks. When it did come into action, the 
tenor of 34 RAC’s JMO for 22 August hints at pride in a routine performance. The French 
organisational system provided for a very strong corps artillery unit – four groups 
compared to the three groups allocated to each division. In theory this allowed the corps 
commander to have under his hand a powerful reserve to apply to the decisive point. In 
practice, the battle at Neufchâteau highlighted the flaw in the theoretical logic; Roques 
positioned his corps artillery in its entirety behind his left–hand column, only to find that it 
was needed to support his extreme right flank. It took several wasted hours to move the 
guns to where they were needed, and that was after the time taken for requests and orders to 
pass up and down the chain of command across a confused and chaotic battlefield. More 
than one–third of the total firepower of 12 CA remained unused whilst these movements 
took place. On the positive side, the French guns seemed to have been very effective once 
they were deployed, as judged by the witness statements of batteries of German field guns 
destroyed. There is also a slight suggestion (one of only two which can be found in archive 
material regarding the Battle of the Ardennes) that the French did perhaps use the capability 
of their 75mm field guns to fire shells in a howitzer–like trajectory103: ‘The batteries west 
of that place [Neufchâteau] came to dire straits because of enemy fire which had stalked 
them in the many hollows and depressions of that terrain’.104 But the overriding impression 
left by the French artillery supporting 12 CA was the ‘friendly fire’ incident when 23 DI’s 
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guns fired upon 24 DI’s infantry. Not even the supposed high visibility of the red-trousered 
poilu stopped an elementary error in identification, and the ramifications upon the outcome 
of the battle were significant.  
The Germans of 18 RAK were weak in artillery. Reserve divisions in the German 
army had one regiment of field artillery instead of two. This meant that (since the light 
field–howitzer group was invariably in the second regiment of a regular division) it was 
most unlikely that 18 RAK possessed howitzers. There is certainly no mention of their use. 
Nor did 18 RAK have any heavy artillery.105 But what they lacked in numbers, the German 
guns seem to have made up for in effectiveness. The sudden, accurate counter–
bombardment onto 23 DI’s batteries had a disproportionate effect on the outcome of the 
battle, temporarily dislocating several artillery and infantry units, causing panic and, 
arguably, influencing General Leblond to call off their potentially decisive attack into the 
weak German centre.  
The French also had an overwhelming superiority in cavalry, and a golden 
opportunity to use that strength opposite the seven–kilometre gap on the German right 
flank. Admittedly, one German assessment at the time judged the terrain to be unsuitable 
for mounted action and consequently dismissed the threat. But French cavalry doctrine was 
here found wanting. Firstly they did not use the twelve– or six–man patrol system practised 
by the Germans to scout forward and provide accurate battlefield intelligence. Secondly, 
they did not engage in dismounted fighting, despite the adverse terrain. 21 Chasseurs seem 
to have adopted a purely defensive, protection and security role on the flank of a major 
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French offensive operation. Apart from the doctrine which was arguably proven not to be 
fit for purpose, the performance of 21 Chasseurs also shows signs of passive caution rather 
than aggressive intent. Their presence on the left flank of 24 DI is recorded by both French 
and German sources, but there is no record of any activity on their part.106  Whether this 
was due to failures in corps command, to lack of regimental officer initiative or to lack of 
training in combined–arms manoeuvres is difficult to judge. Whatever the reason, the 
failure of such a powerful force of cavalry to find and report upon, let alone exploit the 
magnificent opportunity to turn the flank of the German 21 RID was a key factor in this 
French lost opportunity.  
Whether it be regarding infantry, artillery or cavalry or – viewed from a different 
perspective – at rank and file, NCO, junior officer or senior officer level, it is impossible to 
avoid concentrating on major French weaknesses and comparing their performance 
unfavourably to that of the Germans. All of the issues specific to the battle at Neufchâteau 
can be found in other encounter battles across the Ardennes operation. Together they will 
be examined in the third part of this thesis in order to draw generic conclusions as to the 
relative significance of the factors which contributed to German success and French failure 
in the Ardennes.  
 
The reasonable conclusion from a detailed examination of the battle at Neufchâteau is that 
the French 12 CA could and should have broken the German 21 RID in two places. 
Moreover they could have done so sufficiently early in the day to have sufficient time for 
follow–up manoeuvre and exploitation. Better feedback from the firing–line would have 
                                                     
106 AAT 25N593: JMO of 21 Chasseurs: no papers whatsoever for 22 August 1914. 
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given Garreau and Roques information to plan from, as would reports from scouts of 21 
Chasseurs, had they been posted. A more positive (and in the event more realistic) 
assessment by Leblond and Roques of the ability of 5 Colonial Brigade to hold firm long 
enough for 12 CA to complete its attacks would have led to greater success; but such an 
assessment would have required better battlefield intelligence and better communication 
between the command structures of two different corps. And, in truth, it would have 
required a more aggressive and confident leadership from the three senior French 
commanders – Generals Roques, Garreau and Leblond – than they proved capable of 
delivering.  
On the left General Garreau’s caution and inertia, together with his lack of tactical 
appreciation of the battle in front of him, prevented 24 DI from pursuing a beaten enemy 
(albeit one who, Foch–like, did not know he was beaten), driving through to a line between 
Rossart and Grandvoir and thereafter breaking through into open country. Garreau thereby 
missed the opportunity to place a strong force on the vulnerable flank of the German 21 ID 
at a time when that unit was locked in battle with the French 33 DI in the Forest of Luchy. 
Had he done so, the whole outcome of de Langle de Cary’s operation would have arguably 
swung in favour of France. As well as his own caution, inertia and lack of professional 
insight, Garreau’s failure turned on the misuse of the French cavalry, the loss of key 
officers (particularly Colonel Descoings) at critical times, and the impact of a friendly–fire 
incident upon troops whose morale and training were insufficient to stand the test of their 
first live combat. Garreau applied the tactics of laborious formal assault, using massed 
artillery and massed battalions of infantry to a situation which required – dare one say it? – 
élan and offensive à outrance.  
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The evidence from 23 DI’s action provides a compelling argument that General 
Leblond lost his nerve when on the point of victory. It was not necessarily his fault that 
some of his front–line troops panicked and ran under German artillery fire, yet a more 
dynamic leader with more dynamic subordinates might have pressed on despite such a set–
back and used his superiority in both men and guns to force his way through the weak 
German line in front of him. Leblond’s fixation on the potential (or merely possible) threat 
to his own right flank rather than on his own ability to threaten the German defence 
demonstrates the very traits which Colonel Grandmaison had identified in his two speeches 
in 1911 as generic French command weaknesses: deploying on a wide (and therefore thin) 
front in order to avoid being outflanked by an enemy whose whereabouts were uncertain; 
displaying a negative and defensive mentality fostered by a preoccupation with protection 
and security;  adopting a mentally reactive mode, seeking to find out (or guess) what the 
enemy was about to do and working to protect against that move. Grandmaison argued that 
this mindset was atrophying French performance;107 Leblond’s performance certainly fits 
that description. In allowing himself to be dominated by the fear of being outflanked, 
Leblond missed the opportunity to break the German 21 RID in two, isolating the German 
advance guard and leaving it at the mercy of 24 DI west of Petitvoir. Leblond also missed 
the opportunity to drive his troops north across the Neufchâteau–Petitvoir road, swinging 
east around and into Neufchâteau itself and rolling up the rest of 21 RID. It can be 
legitimately argued that such a manoeuvre would have taken the pressure off 5 Colonial 
Brigade more successfully than simply sending it reinforcements. There is also a case to be 
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made that this might have altered the German commanders’ actions. It has been shown that 
the situation in Neufchâteau was so critical that the final regiment of 25 RID was diverted 
from the flank attack against the French colonials in order to march to the defence of that 
town.108 Had Leblond actually started to roll up the German flank in the town, there exists 
the possibility that more German units would have been diverted to oppose him, changing 
the whole dynamic of the action. But Leblond’s negative and reactive behaviour allowed 
the German corps and divisional commanders to grasp and retain the initiative.  
General Roques failed to impose any central command or control over the action of 
his corps. The cavalry regiment was under his direct control, therefore responsibility for the 
failure to find and turn the German western flank falls ultimately upon him. So too, the 
decisions which led to the powerful corps artillery being so ineffective lie at his door. His 
decisions appear with hindsight to be reactive and defensive, like those of his two 
divisional commanders. There is no sign that he possessed the vision to identify the 
opportunity in front of him or the leadership to drive his subordinates forward in an 
energetic and positive manner. But he was a good political general, as his career up to the 
moment he led 12 CA into battle shows.  
Pierre Roques was a career soldier, an engineer whose appointments before the war 
had eerily mirrored those of Joffre himself.109 Roques had spent half of his service as an 
engineer in the French colonies, half in the bureaucratic environment of the Engineering 
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Directorate in the War Ministry, where he rose to the position of Director. Whilst he was at 
the Ministry, he took a particular interest in the growth of the fledgling French air force, 
managing to win the internal political battle against the Artillery Branch for control and 
ownership.110 His management of the unit which built the French air arm was the crowning 
achievement of his pre–war career. During this period in the War Ministry, he rose from 
Lieutenant–Colonel to General, a senior rank warranting a senior field post, hence his 
appointment as commander of 12 CA. During Roques’s time in the War Ministry he 
walked the corridors of power and he undoubtedly made influential friends and allies. His 
success in that environment, especially his winning the control of the air force for the 
Engineering branch, is testament to his political skill and his understanding of the internal 
politics of that vast bureaucracy, the French army. And his reward when he left the 
Ministry on 9 April 1912 was a field command, 7 DI, followed rapidly by command of 12 
CA;111 prior to that, his largest field command had been twenty–five engineers in 
Madagascar in 1900. He had no true command experience, he had not attended the École 
supérieure de guerre, he had no experience of handling infantry and artillery in combined–
arms operations, nor of handling large bodies of troops. Contamine wrote of him: ‘This 
engineer with little presence, short, with a goatee beard and strawberry birthmark, was a 
friend of his old comrade in arms Joffre, as well as a man of valour who would rise to great 
heights’, 112 while Rocolle, quoting Pichot-Duclos, wrote that: ‘his ability to command fell 
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far short of his unfettered intelligence’.113 His was an unfortunately typical appointment of 
the French pre–war army; in part patronage, in part reward for long service, facilitated by 
political not military skills and an ability to fit in with the social and bureaucratic manners 
of the day. His prompt action in dismissing both his divisional commanders on the very 
night after the battle shows astute political judgement, as does the way in which the high–
level accounts of the action (corps and divisional JMOs) manage to omit the unsavoury 
whilst accentuating small positives. One outcome from Roques’s ability to present himself 
in the best possible light was the positive way in which his personal performance was 
eventually recorded in the official history: 
 
On first receipt of the news of combat on the left at Nevraumont, the GOC 12 CA 
moved to Saint-Médard.  From there, he hastened the entry of the artillery into the 
line and when after the enemy’s retreat, his left–hand column resumed its march and 
was close to taking Grandvoir, he pushed for movement by his right–hand column 
which was still very much lagging behind…When at the end of the day he learned 
that the left–hand column of CAC had been forced to retreat as well as the right–
hand column of 17 CA, he ordered into place fighting outposts, holding the front 
Nevraumont–Warmifontaine. 114  
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Preserving his reputation after his poor combat debut, Roques also furthered his career, 
rising to army command in January 1915 and to be Minister of War in 1916.  
 
The opportunity given to General Roques’s 12 CA to achieve a significant success over a 
weak and over–stretched enemy has been outlined. The reasons for the French failure to 
grasp that opportunity, and win a battlefield victory which might have developed into 
operational, even strategic success, have been explored. Many generic deficiencies of the 
French metropolitan army have been shown to have contributed to this French failure. At 
Neufchâteau, the French conceded operational initiative to the Germans, and were not to 
regain it until September on the Marne.  
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Chapter 4: Maissin–Anloy 
The Second Lost Opportunity 
 
 
The operational study demonstrated that at Maissin, 11 CA (General Eydoux) 
encountered three regiments of 25 ID in a battle for the extreme north–western corner of 
the Ardennes front. Outnumbering his opponent by more than three–to–one, Eydoux 
also had the opportunity to turn the right flank of the whole German Fourth Army, but 
failed to achieve anything more than the occupation of Maissin village at nightfall. 
Alongside him, 34 DI (17 CA), which was supposed to protect his flank, failed to do so 
and additionally failed to make any progress at Anloy with its four infantry regiments 
against a single German infantry regiment. This chapter examines the conjoined 
encounters at Maissin and Anloy in order to establish why this second French 
opportunity was missed.  
 
On the morning of 22 August, starting at about 05.00, General Eydoux’s 11 CA set out 
from the Semoy river bridgeheads in two columns: on the right 22 DI and on the left, 21 
DI with the corps artillery. Eydoux marched with 21 DI.1 On his right, and echeloned 
slightly behind him, General Poline had organised his 17 CA into three brigade–
columns.2 Each corps was preceded by its own reconnaissance cavalry. As was the case 
all across the Ardennes that morning, thick fog lay across the land, prohibiting aerial 
reconnaissance until the sun burned through at about 08.30–09.00. The French columns 
all had long approach marches in front of them. The heads of each column were 
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expected to march at least twenty kilometres (five hours at regulation speed) in the heat 
of an August day before reaching their planned destinations; those at the rear even 
further and longer. They would be tired and there was the prospect of delay. Because of 
the overall failure of French intelligence, they were not necessarily expecting to fight at 
the end of it. 
North of Neufchâteau on the night of 21–22 August, Duke Albrecht’s 18 AK 
was camped around the towns of Libramont (21 ID) and Libin (25 ID). French 
intelligence had lost track of the movements of these two divisions after the skirmish 
near Longlier on 20 August, but believed them to have marched north–westwards. In 
fact, 25 ID had marched the ten kilometres from Libramont to Libin, which was indeed 
to the north–west, even if the short distance still left it within striking distance of the 
advancing French. The other division, 21 ID, remained in the vicinity of Libramont, 
from where its activity on 22 August would have a profound effect on the overall 
French operation, although that is beyond the scope of this chapter. French cavalry 
patrols had, until the afternoon of 21 August when they were withdrawn, monitored the 
position of these German units, but that intelligence had not been properly used. 
Duke Albrecht’s orders for 18 AK on 22 August were for a continuation of its 
cautious westerly advance on the flank of Third Army. It was planned to be a relatively 
easy day, with marches of no more than five to ten kilometres for each division. For 25 
ID this specifically meant a leisurely march through the forests and over the hills to the 
region around Jehonville, coincidentally right into the path of the oncoming French 
columns.3 Major–General Rühne, commanding 25 ID, organised his division into two 
brigade–columns, each with a supporting artillery regiment. 50 Brigade on the right was 
sent towards Jehonville via Maissin and 49 Brigade on the left was to go via Anloy. 
                                                 
3 Grossherzogliches Artilleriekorps, 1 Grossherzoglich Hessisches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr 25 im 
Weltkrieg 1914–1918 [FAR 25] (verlag Rolf & co., Berlin, 1935), p.22 
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After breakfast the two columns set out from their billets around Libin at 07.00. 
Although at this stage the German commanders at all levels from Fourth Army 
headquarters down to individual regiments had no idea that the French had launched 
their offensive, the shorter marches planned for 25 ID gave them an opportunistic 
advantage. At Anloy, 49 Brigade’s column arrived in good time to rest, to set up its 
artillery and to reconnoitre its position – this was standard doctrine not a response to an 
impending attack – before the French arrived. 50 Brigade, with a slightly longer 
approach march, took a rest break at about 08.30, during which its commanders 
received and absorbed the latest cavalry reconnaissance reports, before setting off again 
towards Maissin.4  
Maissin was also the objective of Eydoux’s 11 CA, and Anloy that of 34 DI 
(General Alby), part of 17 CA. Alby’s left–hand column, (68 Brigade) was supposed to 
cover 11 CA’s right flank.5 In the context of de Langle’s operational plan, the 
occupation of these two villages was a very important preliminary step towards 
fulfilling Joffre’s strategic intention, because of their location and the terrain. They both 
lie north and east of the great forested belt through which de Langle’s army had to pass 
in order to gain the open region of the central Ardennes, the region north of 
Neufchâteau. They both also lie on the river Lesse behind which, as has been shown, 
French intelligence had identified a strong German defensive screen.6  Maissin 
anchored the north–west corner of the impending battle zone, there being only ten 
kilometres of impassible forest between it and the river Meuse; the heights around 
Anloy gave excellent observation and fire–positions over the open land to the east. On 
                                                 
4 FAR 25, op. cit., p.22 
 
5 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.390–392 
 
6  Ibid., Annex 512: GQG, 19 août, 06.00: Compte rendu de renseignements nr.47; and Annex 749 : 
[FourthArmy] Armée de Stenay, 21 août, [c.13.45] : Bulletin de renseignements nr.7. 
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the right, the rest of Poline’s 17 CA was supposed to come out of the woods between 
Anloy and Ochamps (north of Bertrix), while in the distance, Roques’s 12 CA would (in 
theory) push past Neufchâteau onto the open land near Libramont, forming the end of a 
huge arc of troops from the latter place back to Maissin.  
 
The village of Maissin lies on the north–eastern edge of the narrow band of hilly, 
forested terrain north of the river Semoy and east of the river Meuse; a region which 
justly typifies the classic description of the impassable Ardennes. At Maissin, although 
the village itself lies in a clearing on some south–facing slopes, the land to the south and 
west – through which the French were to advance – is covered with bands of forest. A 
pastoral valley lay between the village on its south-facing slopes and the plateau on 
which the French infantry were to appear. The plateau, heavily forested but with 
scattered clearings, and stretching back almost to Paliseul, fell away sharply on its 
eastern side. The main column of 22 DI would march up onto the plateau; on its left, 
down in the valley of the river Our, was 21 DI; and 68 Brigade was supposed to be 
below in the valley of the Lesse on their right, protecting their flank. The river Lesse 
flows north–westwards around Anloy and Maissin from its source five kilometres away 
at Ochamps on its way to the Meuse at Dinant.  
It was important for the French to secure Maissin and Anloy, to anchor their 
platform for attack. But it was equally important to the Germans. As has been shown, 
Duke Albrecht’s expanding front was too large for the forces allocated to him. There 
were necessarily huge gaps in his line and he was balancing one risk against another. 
Having decided to keep 8 AK in the north in touch with Third Army’s left wing, and 
having retained 8 RAK as his army reserve near Bastogne, there was no other major 
unit near enough to support 18 AK if it got into trouble. Once the importance of the 
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major French offensive was realised on 22 August, the German Fourth Army command 
knew that it was facing just such a crisis situation. 18 RAK at Neufchâteau had 
significant problems of its own. What was needed was a strong defensive position, and 
the high ground around Anloy and Maissin, combined with the unfavourable terrain 
further west, was the ideal place to make a stand. But even so, there were so few 
German troops available that, were the Maissin position to be turned and outflanked, 
there was nothing to plug the gap. 
 
The German attempt to seize and hold the Maissin–Anloy position fell to 
Major–General Rühne’s two brigade–columns, each supported by one of his two 
artillery regiments. The corps heavy artillery was not available to him, having been 
allocated in its entirety to 21 ID further south. The right–hand column (50 Brigade) was 
made up of 117 and 118 IR supported by 25 FAR. Its destination was Maissin, coming 
in from the north road. The left–hand column (49 Brigade) contained 115 and 116 IR 
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supported by 61 FAR. It marched on Anloy, from the north–east. Together the two 
columns had an approximate strength of 12000 rifles, 72 guns (18 of them light 
howitzers) and 24 machine guns.  
Opposing them were three French divisions with a total strength of 
approximately 39,000 rifles, 156 guns and 72 machine guns, an overall superiority of at 
least three to one. But as elsewhere on the overall front, notably at Neufchâteau, the 
distribution of forces was uneven: three German regiments (50 Brigade plus 115 IR of 
49 Brigade) would fight two divisions (seven regiments) of 11 CA for possession of 
Maissin, while one regiment (116 IR of 49 Brigade) was faced with the whole of 34 DI 
(four regiments) at Anloy. 
The failures of intelligence on both sides meant that neither was expecting a 
major battle. At the beginning of the day, the French were only vaguely aware of the 
German dispositions (‘digging in behind the Lesse’7), and were at divisional level and 
below very much focused simply on a march through the forests. The Germans of 25 ID 
were similarly barely aware of any possibility of combat when they started out on the 
morning of 22 August.8 The combination of secrecy and fog had shrouded the French 
advance, and it was only when local cavalry patrols revealed the imminent arrival of 
significant French infantry units that a true idea of what was unfolding formed in the 
minds of the German commanders. The original daily orders on each side had to be 
significantly modified as and when intelligence was received.  
 
At 07.00 French and German cavalry patrols encountered each other about 3 kilometres 
south of Maissin. The 2nd squadron of 2 Chasseurs à cheval, the corps cavalry of 11 CA, 
                                                 
7 AFGGI/ 1, Annex 580: GQG 2e Bureau, Compte rendu de renseignements, nr.49, du 20 août, 06.00. 
  
8 A. Hiss Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2 Grossherzoglich Hessisches) nr.116 [FAR 61] 
(Oldenburg, Stalling, 1924), chapter 2. 
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met a German cavalry patrol from 6 Dragoons, 25 ID’s integral divisional cavalry on 
the plateau about three kilometres south of Maissin, at a place called Bellevue farm. The 
Germans were outnumbered and retreated into Maissin, pursued by the French. By 
09.30 they had evacuated Maissin, and the French cavalry regiment started to organise 
its defence, setting up two squadrons and a machine–gun detachment at the northern 
exits of the village, as well as sending out patrols in all directions.  To the north, 
towards the heights at Transinne (on the right bank of river Lesse), it seemed that the 
Germans were gathering in force.9 The French cavalry patrols were observing the 
approach of the main columns of the 50 Brigade of 25 ID.  
It would seem at this stage that the French had seized the initiative, with their 
corps cavalry regiment fortifying their objective (Maissin), the advance guard of 22 DI 
coming up behind followed by the main column, and with the whole day in which to 
consolidate and develop their operation. Indeed, Eydoux informed de Langle’s Fourth 
Army headquarters at 10.10 (from his command post at the northern end of the village 
of Paliseul), that his cavalry had taken Maissin and that he intended to occupy it and 
then march east onto the heights at Anloy to link up with 17 CA.10  But already small 
but important things had started to go wrong.  
The advance guard of 22 DI, (19 RI of 44 Brigade) had started out at 04.50 but 
almost immediately got entangled with the wagons and supporting infantry of the corps 
artillery at Les Hayons, an important crossroads just two kilometres north of the start 
line on the river Semoy. They lost an hour untangling the chaos and, despite speeding 
up their march, only reached Paliseul by 09.30. Next in line in the column, the 
divisional artillery regiment (35 RAC) took the wrong road out of Les Hayons and then 
                                                 
9 Bujac, op. cit., p.65 
 
10 AFGG I/1, Annex 927: [11 CA, 22 August, 10.10]: Général commandant 11e corps à commandant 
armée Stenay 
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instead of cutting across on a minor road to rejoin the column, chose to retrace its steps 
to its correct starting position. Third in line, 118 RI was also late; Colonel François 
decided to delay his regiment’s departure because their night’s rest had been disturbed 
by a German aircraft. This in turn held up the entire 43 Brigade which only reached 
Paliseul (still 8 kilometres short of Maissin) at 14.30.11  
The consequences of this poor French staff work, slack discipline and weak 
command were devastating for their chances of achieving an operational victory. Firstly 
the lost hour cost 19 RI the race to the village. They arrived on the southern slopes 
above Maissin at 11.30, just as their cavalry was withdrawing and German infantry (the 
leading battalion of 118 IR) entering the village from the other side. So they had to 
mount an assault to recapture the village. Secondly, because their artillery had lost its 
way, 19 RI delivered its initial assault on the village without artillery support.12 Thirdly, 
118 RI and the rest of the column came up so late that the tactical situation had changed, 
the initiative had passed to the (outnumbered) Germans, and 22 DI was forced to fight a 
defensive battle, leaving its advance guard isolated in Maissin village. To cap a very 
poor staff performance, General Eydoux failed to report this dramatic reversal of 
fortune to his army commander until 16.45, leaving de Langle completely in the dark as 
to what was happening on his left wing.13 
The French failure to consolidate their early hold on Maissin was the first 
element of this lost opportunity, because the fighting, which then lasted all day, centred 
thereafter around a bitter struggle to occupy the houses, which formed natural strong 
                                                 
11 Bujac, op. cit., p.69 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 AFGG I/1, Annex 929: [11 CA] Poste de Stenay, reçu de Paliseul le 22/8/14 à 16.45 par telephone: 
Général commandant 11e corps à commandant armée Stenay; and Annex 930: 11e corps d’armée, écrit à 
17.30. 
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points. The narrowness of the margin by which I/118 IR beat 19 RI in the race to 
occupy the village suggests that a stout defence by the 1000 French cavalrymen – if 
dismounted and supported by their machine–gun company – might have held the 
Germans up long enough for 19 RI to reinforce them. It also highlights the crucial 
absence of French artillery, which could have halted the German advance. But the 
artillery was late and 2 Chasseurs, like their sister regiment at nearby Nevraumont, did 
not take on the German infantry14: ‘At 12.00 I/118 took fire from Maissin...Initially the 
French fire was ineffective. The battalion advanced in long bounds, crossed the “rather 
wide and deep” Lesse stream and by 12.30 had reached the east side of Maissin. I/118 
entered Maissin without encountering significant resistance.’15  At this very time, 
Colonel Chapès, commanding 19 RI, was deploying his three battalions for an assault 
on the village.16  
The time taken for 19 RI’s deployment was time used by the Germans on the 
other side to pour into the village. At 12.15 German artillery opened fire on the 
advancing French infantry; by this time the machine–gun company of 118 IR was 
hastening to the front of the main column to support the action.17 The Germans were 
rapidly consolidating their hold on the village, but the attacking French firing–line was 
deployed at ever shortening range and advancing in short rushes up the slopes south–
east of the village, supported by their own machine–guns on the flanks of their 
advancing riflemen.18 By about 13.30, the French infantry were in the centre of the 
                                                 
14 Bujac, op. cit., p.70; and FAR 25, op. cit., p.23 
 
15 Zuber, Ardennes 1914, p.153, quoting: H. Freund, Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Prinz Karl 
(4.Grossh. Hess) Nr 118 im Weltkrieg [IR 118] (Gross-Gerau, 1930), pp.29–28 
 
16 Bujac, op. cit., p.71 
 
17 Hiss,  IR 116, p.29 and Zuber, op. cit., pp.152–153, quoting: Freud, IR 118, pp.29–38 
 
18 Bujac, op. cit., p.72 
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village, disputing possession house–by–house, but impeded by German machine–guns 
firing down the streets and enfilading the crossroads.19  
In theory, 19 RI should have been reinforced by the next regiment in the column 
as well as by the artillery. The French firing–line should have thickened and widened so 
that their superior numbers could envelop the thin German line. But the late arrival of 
118 RI left a gap in both time and space, and allowed the Germans to seize the tactical 
initiative. As a result, the fight for the village became an equal struggle between one 
French and one German regiment, despite the large numbers of French infantry in 
column stretching back to Paliseul. Furthermore, the main battle then developed on the 
plateau, some two or three kilometres short of the village, for reasons which will be 
given below. 
Because of the delayed arrival of the French 118 RI, the second and third 
battalions of the German 118 IR were given the time and opportunity to deploy to the 
right of the village and, using fire–and–movement tactics, infiltrate around the flank of 
the denser French line, forcing the fighting back up onto the plateau: 
 
The whole region north of Maissin was swarming with German troops 
infiltrating through the woods...in the west came a vigorous push; elements of 
this group reached a large copse southwards between Maissin and Bellevue 
Farm. The group of 35e Artillery, against which the German guns had ground 
away, received severe losses in a very short time.20 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p.73 
 
20 Bujac, op. cit., p.74 
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This German attacking movement was made that much easier by the late arrival of 
General Eydoux’s other division (21 DI) which was supposed to appear on the 
Germans’ right flank – delays which will be examined in detail below. So when the 
second regiment of the German 50 Brigade (117 IR) arrived in its turn, it had time and 
space in which to manoeuvre. Two battalions deployed on the left and linked up with 49 
Brigade; the other, for the time being, remained in reserve.21 The brigade’s artillery (25 
FAR) occupied commanding positions on the heights east of Maissin and, as will be 
shown below, was very proactive in its support.  
 
 
While 50 Brigade came down from the north and occupied Maissin, 49 Brigade came in 
from the east. The axis of its advance took it up the slopes of the plateau towards the 
                                                 
21 Zuber, op. cit., pp.153–154, quoting: K. Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments 
Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 [IR 117] (Oldenburg i.O.1931), pp.29–40 
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open right flank of 22 DI’s column. Its two regiments were in line, with 115 IR on the 
right and 116 IR on the left, both deploying out of Anloy. Because of the delay to the 
French artillery, 115 IR was able to cross the three or four kilometres of open pasture 
between Anloy and Maissin unimpeded by enemy shellfire and scale the steep wooded 
slopes (in places a near–vertical incline) up to the plateau without opposition from 
enemy rifle fire. There, in the vicinity of Bellevue farm, they were able to attack 118 RI 
in the flank, disrupt the French artillery, and force the remainder of 22 DI to fight a 
defensive battle rather than reinforce 19 RI in Maissin: ‘Elements of 5 and 8 Companies 
[of 116 IR] supported 4 and 6 Companies of 115 IR in storming an enemy battery which 
they captured after a hard struggle and held despite several ferocious counter–attacks.’22 
The effectiveness of the German attack was evident: 
  
Parmentier’s battery risked being captured by skirmishers arriving within rifle 
range on the nearby crest. Lieutenant Granchi ran towards some infantry passing 
nearby calling for help since his own support (I/118) was too far to the left. The 
leader of this troop (a battalion from 17 CA which was separated from its main 
body) replied that his men were exhausted, that he had lost nearly half his men 
and that they could not continue in action. He marched off, abandoning the 
artillery.23 
 
The attitude of that junior French officer, citing exhaustion and casualties as an excuse 
to stop fighting, points to serious morale problems within the unit. And that errant 
battalion from 17 CA, turning up during the afternoon amongst the battalions and 
                                                 
22 IR 116, op. cit., p.26 
 
23 Bujac, op. cit., p.75 
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batteries on the right flank of 22 DI, points to another aspect of French failure. As stated 
above, the left–hand column of 17 CA (68 Brigade of 34 DI) was supposed to be 
protecting the right flank of 11 CA from just such an attack as has been described 
above. But its advance had not been coordinated with that of the unit it was supposed to 
be protecting, and it arrived too late. Although the need for each French corps to protect 
the open right flank of the one in front and to its left was an operational imperative, 
there is no evidence in the JMOs of 34 DI and its subordinate units that there were any 
tactical instructions designed to implement such action or any intent on the part of their 
commanders to fulfil such a mission. On the contrary, one regiment of General Alby’s 
34 DI (83 RI) recorded that at 12.00, after a prolonged halt at Jehonville, the regiment 
received orders at 13.50 to march from Jehonville in the direction of Anloy.24 Nearly 
two hours were wasted, during which a march on the Anloy heights might have been 
accomplished, to greater operational effect. This diary entry, like many others, hints at a 
total lack of urgency on the French side, even though the fighting at Maissin was 
already entering its third hour. General Alby’s left–hand column (68 Brigade) was 
powerful; two regiments, two groups of divisional artillery and two groups of corps 
artillery, led by Alby himself.25 But the leading regiment (59 RI) was at 12.00 still 
marching from Jehonville to Sart, six kilometres short of a proper screening position on 
11 CA’s open flank.26 To compound the problems arising within 34 DI, General Alby 
left all his artillery at Sart, on the 400m–high knoll north–east of that village.27 
Although technically just within range of Anloy which was about five kilometres away, 
                                                 
24 AAT 26N665: JMO of 83 RI, entry for 22 August 1914 
 
25 AAT 26N326/1: JMO of 34 DI, entry for 22 August 1914 
 
26 AAT 16N889/1: JMO of 9 Chasseurs à cheval [9 Chasseurs], entry for 22 August 1914 
 
27 JMO of 34 DI, op. cit. 
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the thick screen of woods prevented it from supporting its infantry.28 The French 
artillery men seemed to have difficulty finding firing positions further forward. So the 
infantry of 59 RI went forward unsupported. This decision to separate infantry from its 
supporting artillery was so far outside French doctrine as to be inexplicable, particularly 
when the divisional commander (Alby) had received information which suggested 
imminent contact. The orders added that if Jehonville and Sart were held by the enemy, 
the advance guard was to attack immediately.29 17 CA’s intelligence staff had learned 
that a German infantry company previously at Jehonville had withdrawn, and 17 CA’s 
corps cavalry patrols were reporting multiple contacts. But the French cavalry failed to 
provide any useful intelligence: a squadron of 9 Chasseurs had encountered German 
cavalry south of Anloy at Sart but had found it impossible to determine their strength.30  
A noticeable feature of the French Ardennes campaign was the frequency with 
which their cavalry reported that it could not penetrate a German defensive screen to 
establish the strength of what lay behind. In part this seems to have been due to the 
French habit of using squadron–sized patrol units (250 mounted men), or even (as 
above) marching a whole cavalry regiment from one location to another. These tactical 
units were too large to slip through gaps like the small German 6– and 12–man patrols, 
but too small to force through opposition. And the French reluctance to fight 
dismounted seems to have encouraged an even greater tendency not to try to force a 
screen.  
* * * 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 JMO of 9 Chasseurs, op. cit. 
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The significance of the late start of the French 118 RI with the consequent delay to 22 
DI’s main column, combined with the separate slow arrival of 68 Brigade on its right 
flank, becomes fully apparent. The fight for Maissin village became an independent 
action by the French advance guard (19 RI), while the main column led now by 118 RI 
fought a second action on the plateau. This second action was shaped by the aggressive 
initiative of two battalions of 118 IR in the north and west, by the equally aggressive 
attacks by 115 IR from the east and by the strong defensive action of 116 IR, facing 
south and holding back the bulk of 34 DI. The inferior German forces had seized the 
tactical initiative and 22 DI, despite its numbers, was fighting a defensive action. Of the 
flanking movement by 21 DI on the left there was still no sign at this stage. But the 
eventual arrival of 34 DI on the right initiated the fighting around Anloy.  
 
When at about 15.00 59 RI came out of the woods they encountered and were stopped 
by 116 IR. The German 49 Brigade artillery (61 FAR) had excellent fire–support 
positions on the heights east of Anloy; the French artillery back at Sart was powerless to 
intervene. The French infantry were pinned to the forest edge despite repeated gallant 
attempts to get forward without artillery support, in which they suffered heavy 
casualties. 59 RI lost its colonel and two of three battalion commanders, with about 
60% officer casualties and 30% casualties in other ranks.31 The remnants of the 
regiment merged with 88 RI when it came up and retreated with it at about 18.00 in 
response to orders from 68 Brigade headquarters.32 
Alongside, on their right, marched the column of 67 Brigade (83 RI and 14 RI). 
14 RI, which was heading directly for Anloy village, was leading. At about 14.00 when 
                                                 
31 AAT 26N650/1: JMO of 59 RI, 2 août–21 décembre 1914 
 
32 Ibid. 
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it debouched from the northern edge of the woods and occupied the crest of Hill 453, 
about one kilometre south of Anloy, it surprised a German battalion in march formation 
coming from the east via Hill 416 and stretching back to the slopes south of Anloy. The 
leading company and the machine–guns opened fire and inflicted heavy losses, forcing 
the German battalion, supported by its company of machine–guns, to defend the slopes 
south of the village. The French regimental JMO records that the German position was 
solidly fortified by trenches and by wire 30–40 metres in depth; bearing in mind that the 
German battalion had been caught by surprise whilst on the march, these German field 
fortifications must have been temporary, constructed for that specific fire–fight.33 
Within half–an–hour, two more French companies were fed into the line, but were 
subjected to heavy fire from a German artillery battery and two machine–guns set up on 
the north edge of the woods about 900 metres north-east of Hill 453.The French now 
started to take heavy casualties, and their commander reported that he could not advance 
without artillery preparation.34 The importance of combined arms cooperation to 
achieve fire superiority was being dramatically illustrated, and the French, despite far 
superior numbers, could not get forward, having left their artillery behind. The French 
version of events here at Anloy is confirmed by their opponents:  
 
Hardly had the first waves of II & III/116 reached the heights south–west of 
Anloy at about 14.00 when they were hit at a range of barely 400 metres by 
brisk infantry and machine–gun fire. And yet the enemy could not be seen. In 
the cornfields and on the edge of the woods they found themselves pressed by 
superior forces so that no reliable fire could be returned. But the enemy showed 
                                                 
33 For a discussion of comparative use of, and attitudes to field fortification, see Chapter Ten. 
 
34 AAT 26N586/2: JMO of 14 RI, 2 août  1914–31 janvier 1915 (microfiche) 
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no sign of that furious impulse to press forward which had become second 
nature to our infantrymen. Despite the strong fire and despite being hampered by 
the wire fencing in the fields, they [the German infantry] after repeated assaults 
began to clear the cornfields completely of the enemy and to reach the nearest 
coppices.35 
 
What is interesting in comparing the two sides’ versions of this event is not only the 
corroboration of the main facts but also the contradictions shown in interpretation. Both 
agree that the Germans were ambushed by French infantry, reinforcing the point that 
Joffre’s strategic and operational surprise was also occasionally achieved at the tactical 
level. But despite this, the Germans see fence wire bordering the cultivated fields where 
the French see wire set up as part of field fortifications. The French also give the 
impression (which is explicitly stated elsewhere36) that the German trenches were part 
of a pre–prepared defensive system, which was not at all the case. The German 
observation about the lack of French élan compared to their own aggressive behaviour 
resonates with the speculation over French morale raised earlier, and with evidence 
cited in the discussion of the battle at Neufchâteau. But the absence of French artillery 
support can be cited in defence of the performance their infantry; in trying to get 
forward 14 RI suffered 25% casualties in officers and 12% casualties in men.37 The 
German infantry of 116 IR at least had the backing of the guns of 61 FAR, which set up 
in a semi–open position offering the batteries a dominating view south–westwards from 
the crest of the hill. Although observation was hindered by hedges and forests, there 
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36 Bujac, op. cit., p.72 
 
37 JMO of 14 RI, op. cit. 
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could be seen, half–exposed above the hedges, the red–blue figures of French infantry, 
so the regiment opened fire at a range of 1600 metres.38  
The upshot of the fighting at Anloy was that, despite a superiority in infantry of 
more than four–to–one, 33 DI was unable to get forward for lack of artillery support. If 
they were adhering to their doctrine, they should not have attempted to go forward 
without it. But go forward they did, attempting many times to gain ground; the 
outnumbered Germans were able to hold their position thanks mainly to their artillery 
support, and inflict heavy casualties on their opponent. It should be recognised that this 
was not an issue of reckless French élan, nor an issue of a faulty doctrine of offensive à 
outrance being used on an open, planned battlefield. It was a matter of deficient 
command – sending columns of infantry to march unprotected through thick forest 
without their field guns. It was an issue of lack of combined–arms expertise and of lack 
of reconnaissance for suitable artillery positions before committing the infantry. It was 
also an issue of inadequate scouting ahead of the main column. Despite these failings, 
one French column managed to surprise their German opponents but could not 
capitalise upon this without their artillery. The failure of 34 DI to get forward at Anloy 
early enough to secure the high ground for their artillery was a major contributing factor 
to the overall missed opportunity at Maissin–Anloy.  
 
Meanwhile on the plateau, all three of 22 DI’s artillery groups had set up, two groups to 
the right of the road and the other to the left, some 300–400m forward in a slight fold in 
the ground. They received considerable counter–battery fire almost immediately, whose 
effectiveness can be judged by the fact that Captain Gallate’s battery was very soon 
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virtually wiped out and Gallate killed.39 The leading battalion of 118 RI had halted in 
response to the German initiative and was at this time protecting the guns around 
Bellevue Farm; the other two battalions were deployed as impromptu flank guards, 
defending against the German infantry working forward on both flanks.40 At this time – 
it was about 14.00 – 43 Brigade (22 DI) with 116 RI and 62 RI in column, was still back 
at Paliseul.41 The achievement of numerical superiority by 22 DI was a slow and painful 
process.  
 
If 22 DI was making slow progress, then 21 DI was arguably worse. Earlier in the day, 
this division, commanded by General Radiguet, was actually half–an–hour in front of 
General Pambert’s 22 DI, reaching Paliseul first (on a parallel road) at 09.00. General 
Eydoux had just reported to Fourth Army that his cavalry held Maissin. Based on this 
news and the developing tactical situation, he decided to commit 22 DI to a frontal 
attack whilst sending 21 DI onto the western flank of the enemy.42 This plan was of the 
classic ‘fix and hold’ type, often attributed to German doctrine but equally lauded by 
French military teachers like Foch and Grandmaison. Had it been executed with speed 
and skill, 21 DI would have found itself in a position to outflank the German 50 Brigade 
north of Maissin, and with plenty of time to execute further operational manoeuvres. 
Behind 50 Brigade was nothing but empty space for eighteen kilometres to the north 
(where 8 AK stood) and eighteen kilometres or more to the east (where 8 RAK was 
force–marching towards the danger zone). The opportunity was there for General 
                                                 
39 Bujac, op. cit., pp.73–75 
40 Ibid. p.73 
 
41 Ibid. p.74 
 
42 Ibid., p.66 
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Radiguet to force the German 25 ID back from the dominating high ground north of 
Maissin using an outflanking movement, thereby delivering one of Fourth Army’s key 
operational objectives. But it did not happen.  
The distance from Paliseul to Maissin via the western route – the valley of the 
river Our – was just over twelve kilometres, which should take a column about three 
hours at French army regulation speed, or less if a forced–march was initiated. In 
theory, Radiguet’s advance guard could or should have been threatening the German 
flank a little after 12.00, with the main body about half–an–hour behind it. In fact, the 
head of the column (93 RI) only reached the village of Our at about 13.00, still four 
kilometres (one hour) short of Maissin and with an extremely tough final climb in front 
of it out of the valley up to the plateau on which Maissin stood. Even General Eydoux 
himself realised that the slow arrival of 21 DI was stripping his planned flanking 
movement of its effectiveness.43 He ordered General Radiguet to intensify his attack, no 
longer to flank the enemy but to relieve pressure against the left of 22 DI which he 
considered to be threatened by the German infiltration.44And when this flank attack did 
go in, just after 14.00, 93 RI attacked in consecutive battalion waves without waiting for 
artillery support and from a distance of well over 1000m. The regiment suffered heavy 
casualties and was driven to ground.45 Yet this was not the stuff of official French 
doctrine or offensive à outrance, but rather the product of the unofficial cult, described 
later in the chapter on Doctrine, which infected all too many of the young French junior 
officer class: ‘Colonel Hétet placed in the front line his 2nd Battalion, under 
                                                 
43 Bujac, op.cit., p.77 
 
44 AFGG I/1, Annex 928: [11 CA, 22 August,14.00]: A Monsieur le général commandant la 21e division. 
 
45 AFGG I/1, pp.399–401; and Bujac, op. cit., pp.78–80 
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Commandant Lafouge who, without waiting for the support of the artillery and without 
liaison with 22 DI on his right, launched his attack. It was nailed to the spot.’46  
Apart from the undisciplined furia francese of the French junior officers and 
men, one of the reasons why the flank attack failed was that the German command was 
given plenty of time to reorganise to face the new front. The two remaining battalions of 
117 IR, so far held back in reserve, were deployed to face west, just inside the tree line; 
their rifle–fire, together with their machine–guns and with artillery support from I/25 
FAR, was sufficiently powerful to stop the injudicious French assault. A second assault, 
organised this time with full artillery support and with regiments of both 41 and 42 
Brigades in line, was launched at about 16.00 and was progressively more successful: 
‘From the moment our batteries opened fire they surprised and disrupted the enemy. 
Until dusk they [the German guns] directed their fire upon those batteries which they 
had been able to locate, but with little effect.’47 The relentless pressure on the Germans 
west and north of Maissin took its toll. At 17.00, 50 Brigade was formally ordered to 
retire,48 which it did in good order to start with, using a battery of field guns right in the 
front line to break up the threatening French infantry attacks and even launching three 
limited counter–attacks of its own.49 To the north, 117 IR melted away into the woods. 
In the village 118 IR finally gave up its resistance. 50 Brigade retreated behind the river 
Lesse, towards Villance.50 The exhausted troops were close to breaking and only the 
energetic efforts of their senior officers managed to stop the backward movement at 
                                                 
46 Bujac, op. cit., p.79 
 
47 Bujac, op. cit., pp. 79–80 
 
48 Weltkrieg 1, op. cit., p.329 
 
49 See Bujac, op. cit., p.81; and FAR 25, op. cit., p.28  
 
50 Weltkrieg 1, p.329 
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Villance and form an impromptu firing–line to protect the guns.51 But its strong defence 
over six or seven hours had left General Eydoux no time to exploit this even limited 
success before nightfall.  
  
The retreat of 50 Brigade had a knock–on effect on 49 Brigade and the fighting at 
Anloy. But the position of 49 Brigade was stronger, and the artillery–less French 
situation weaker, so it was able to hold until nightfall. Here, it was the French who 
retreated, albeit in a somewhat haphazard fashion. The retreat of 34 DI has been 
described as something of a rout brought on by the debacle suffered by 33 DI in the 
Forest of Luchy: 
 
But due to the destruction of 33 DI in the Forêt de Luchy, 34 DI was ordered to 
retreat, front to the east towards the German 21 ID, which was pushing into its 
rear area. This, on top of the pounding that the division had taken from 25 ID, 
caused a panic. The division collapsed, with only two battalions and two groups 
of artillery turning to face 21 ID. The rest traversed the woods and retreated as 
far as Florenville.52 
 
 In fact, the overriding characteristic of the retreat of 34 DI was command chaos rather 
than panic. Certain units did not receive the order to fall back and remained in position 
all through the night and into the next morning, thus confirming that the Germans were 
in no position to exploit the situation. III/59 RI received the order to retreat at about 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
  
52 Zuber, op. cit., p.157, paraphrasing AFGG I/1 (1936), p.408, but omitting a key point; that the Germans 
failed to pursue the retreating French, so that one unit of 68 Brigade, which did not receive the order to 
retreat, remained unmolested on the edge of the Bois Piret all night. 
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18.00, and it was then passed slowly to the rest of the regiment. But many units 
remained on the battlefield all night, including 6 and 8 companies of II/59, 11 company 
and some elements of 9 company of III/59; there remained also a battalion of 88 RI.53 
Others withdrew in good order to their designated fall–back position only to find no 
staff officer to direct them, so they continued to march to the rear. 83 RI’s JMO reported 
that the retreat was conducted in an orderly manner protected by two companies of 59 
RI. It left its third battalion at Jehonville to cover any threat from Ochamps, and that 
unit remained undisturbed until about 19.00. But, having received no further 
instructions and feeling increasingly isolated, it withdrew spontaneously via Acremont–
Assenois where it joined the rest of the regiment. At 21.00 the regiment, more or less 
regrouped, escorted three groups of artillery back via Offagne, Fays and Dohan and 
Muno, to Hessincourt, which it reached on 23 August.54  
Similarly, the JMO of 14 RI reported that it was ordered to withdraw at 21.00. 
Having arrived [at Jehonville] at 22.00 it left again at 23.00 to march through the night 
to Dohun. But at Dohun they found the village virtually abandoned and the barns and 
granaries locked. Because the troops were excessively cold and could not sleep they 
soon continued their march to Muno, which they reached at 15.30 on 23 August. The 
troops were exhausted, having marched seventy kilometres in thirty–eight hours and 
fought a six–hour combat. But they were in no way demoralised and they set up camp in 
very good order.55  
The threat of an intervention from Ochamps, mentioned in 83 RI’s JMO refers 
to von der Esch’s detachment of 21 ID, which was fighting nearby in the Bertrix 
                                                 
53 JMO of 59 RI, op. cit. 
 
54 AAT 26N665, JMO of 83 RI, entry for 22 August 1914 
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encounter battle.56 But the threat did not materialise, judging by these accounts of 34 
DI’s withdrawal. Moreover the German 49 Brigade at Anloy was in no position to 
exploit the French withdrawal at all, hence its failure to locate and destroy the small 
French detachments left behind in the firing–line. The German troops went back into 
night quarters and regrouped and consolidated their defensive position: 
 
At last nightfall brought the fighting to an end. Completely exhausted, the 
battalions gathered on the heights near Anloy. Through the lack of security for 
the whole position –  the right wing of the division had had to evacuate Maissin 
at 17.00 because of the threat of encirclement – the heights and the outskirts of 
the town were ordered to be fortified...the troops remained near Anloy until the 
afternoon of 23 August.57  
 
By nightfall the German situation had markedly improved. Reinforcements in the shape 
of both divisions of 8 RAK had arrived, 15 RID at Maissin and 16 RID at Anloy. Most 
importantly, additional artillery had arrived with these columns, the presence of which 
particularly helped to bolster the deteriorating morale of 50 Brigade, whose heavy 
casualties and long exposure to superior fire–power had weakened them almost to 
breaking point: 
 
During this perilous moment of the flood of retreating men of 50 Brigade, the 
forward elements of 8 RAK arrived on the battlefield behind 18 AK, after an 
average forty–five kilometre forced march, accomplished through the difficult 
                                                 
56 ‘AGM’, Bertrix 1914, seen from the German side (Journal of the Royal Artillery Vol. LXIV 1937–8), 
pp.245–252 
 
57  IR 116, op. cit., p.27 and p.28 
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hilly country of the Ardennes and under the burning rays of an August sun 
without regard for those who fell out...15 RID was directed to continue its march 
through Libin towards Villance. A group (Abteilung) of field artillery and half a 
group of heavy field howitzers were brought into position at 18.45 east of 
Villance. The whole artillery was soon brought into operation. If this help came 
too late to turn around the outcome of the battle at Maissin, the protective fire of 
8 RAK did stop the enemy’s exploitation of his partial success.58 
 
The German perspective of 50 Brigade’s low combat capability at the end of the day 
simply underlines how much the French delays and slow deployment cost them. The 
wasted hours were hours during which the French window of opportunity closed, hours 
in which Duke Albrecht managed to shore up this particular gap in his line. 8 RAK, the 
designated Fourth Army reserve, had started the day around Bastogne. As early as 
10.30, Duke Albrecht had decided to call his reserve south as a precautionary measure. 
By the time the situation had clarified, and 8 RAK was ordered to go to Villance to 
support 25 ID, it was already marching to the front. The soldiers of 8 RAK, reservists of 
the older categories, force–marched doggedly in the intense heat for hour after hour, 
covering nearly forty kilometres before arriving at the Villance, just five kilometres 
short of both Maissin and Anloy, at about 18.00. There the staff of 25 ID was busy 
rallying the remains of 50 Brigade. The reinforcements, exhausted as they were, 
improved morale and re–established a strong defensive line. The artillery was especially 
welcome. At this stage and at this local level, the Germans had every reason to expect a 
fresh French assault in the morning; the events elsewhere which caused the French 
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Fourth Army to retreat would only become clear during the evening as reports came in 
and a consolidated picture was communicated to them.  
 
So ended the encounter battle at Maissin–Anloy. Despite their early occupation of 
Maissin village, the French forfeited that advantage and failed to capitalise upon their 
superiority in numbers and fire–power. The open right flank of the German 25 ID and 
the large empty space behind them was not even sought, let alone found, by the French 
commanders. And yet General Eydoux believed that he had won a notable victory, 
while the retreat of 34 DI was blamed on the disaster of 33 DI at Bertrix. But in fact 
Maissin–Anloy was, if a tactical stalemate, a German operational victory; they only had 
to avoid losing until their reinforcements arrived, and in that they achieved total 
success.  
 
There are several prominent features of the battle which explain why it ended in a 
favourable outcome for Germany. At the operational level, General Eydoux’s failure to 
keep de Langle informed of the significant change in the situation when Maissin village 
was lost – there was a six–and–a–half hour gap between his reports – meant that Fourth 
Army staff had no opportunity to influence events or make revised plans – even if they 
had wanted to. De Langle had the extra resources to make an operational manoeuvre: as 
the operational study has shown, there were two French cavalry divisions (4 and 9 
DCs), one infantry corps (9 CA) and one reserve infantry division (52 DIR) all within 
striking distance of Maissin on that open westerly flank. This not inconsiderable force 
would have been more than sufficient to turn a tactical envelopment of 25 ID’s right 
flank into an operational manoeuvre of some significance. But even if the vital 
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intelligence had been passed to Fourth Army headquarters, de Langle would have to 
have reacted faster and got his units to move faster than had hitherto been the case.  
On the German side, communications between 18 AK and Duke Albrecht’s 
headquarters were much more efficient and effective, even though the Duke was at his 
forward battle command–post rather than his main headquarters at Bastogne. By 15.00 
Duke Albrecht and General von Schenk had discussed and agreed what to do to counter 
the French attack. Part of that was the order to rush 8 RAK to the right part of the front. 
Of course the reality of war was such that the fighting at Maissin had already been 
underway for three hours or more when the senior commanders debated the issue.  
In order to exploit the opportunity to turn the German right flank, the French 
would first of all have had to scout and find the open end of the German firing–line. 
Here one looks first for what use Eydoux made of 11 CA’s integral cavalry regiment, 2 
Chasseurs à cheval. Just as with 12 CA’s 21 Chasseurs and the missed opportunity at 
Neufchâteau, this powerful reconnaissance unit, having fulfilled its first mission of 
scouting ahead of the corps and occupying Maissin, disappears off the tactical scene; 
despite being deployed on the left of the corps, it played no further part in the battle. 
Had it been ordered or had it used its initiative to probe round the north side of the 
battlefield, beyond the short firing line of 117 IR, the gap would have been found. This 
did not happen. 
A second more local opportunity to turn the flank of 117 IR was ignored by 
General Radiguet (21 DI). Even though the cumbersome execution of his flank march 
allowed 50 Brigade time to turn and face him, he still had numbers enough to extend his 
firing–line and infiltrate round the northern–end of his opponents’ shorter line. French 
doctrine had long established that frontal attacks against unbroken defence were costly 
and most likely to fail and that an attack against a flank was to be preferred. Foch wrote 
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that ‘one can no longer...come to grips with an unbroken opponent’;59 Grandmaison 
wrote that ‘normally in open terrain a frontal attack by infantry under fire is 
impossible’;60 and the new October 1913 Regulations stated that the commander–in–
chief should ‘combine direct attacks, pushed straight out in front of armies, with wide 
enveloping movements directed against the enemy’s lines of communications’.61 But 
Radiguet made no attempt to overlap his enemy’s flanks, opting instead for a frontal 
attack on an unbroken enemy. So the manner of Radiguet’s execution of Eydoux’s plan 
for 21 DI was not a doctrinal issue but one of his and Eydoux’s poor command and 
control of their units in the field.  
 
At the tactical level, the analysis of this battle has shown stark disparities between 
French and German performance in all arms. The use (or otherwise) of cavalry has 
already been examined in the analysis of the battle at Neufchâteau. But there is an 
additional point which comes from a regimental history which highlights the close 
cooperation of cavalry and artillery in the German army and the level of alert and 
preparedness they routinely undertook. The diarist of 61 Field Artillery Regiment 
described how his commander sent out numerous patrols as soon as there was any 
possibility of  going into action, scouting the whole wide–ranging forested terrain in 
order to find the best routes in the direction of the advance. He also pushed forward 
artillery officer patrols alongside the divisional cavalry.62   
                                                 
59 Commandant Grasset, Précepts et Jugements du Maréchal Foch (Berger–Levrault, Paris, 1919), p.79, 
citing De la Conduite de la Guerre,  pp.482–483 
 
60 Colonel de Grandmaison, Dressage de l’Infanterie en vue du Combat Offensif  (Berger–Levrault, Paris, 
1912), p.8 
 
61 The Operations of Large Units, (translated from the Field Service Regulations of the French Army, 
dated 28 October, 1913, HMSO, London, 1914), p.32, Article 64 
 
62 FAR 61, op. cit., p.11 
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No instance has yet been uncovered of French artillery officers scouting daily for 
positions ahead of the advance alongside normal cavalry reconnaissance, as a precaution 
against only the possibility of contact. As for the infantry, key points are clear. One 
battalion of 17 CA wandering, disorientated and demoralised, into the zone of 11 CA’s 
action was asked to help defend some guns, and declined to intervene. Albert Hiss’s 
contemporary account of the action at Anloy opines that the French lacked the élan 
typical of the German soldier.63 German infiltration tactics exercised by 117, 118 and 
115 IRs proved most effective whereas the French 93 RI resorted to an unauthorised 
massed frontal attack without waiting for the readily available artillery support.  
 
Regarding the use of artillery, it has been shown how General Alby (34 DI) actually 
decided to leave his guns behind, and how 22 DI deployed all 36 guns in battery in open 
spaces on the plateau and suffered heavy counter–battery fire as well as rifle–fire from 
infiltrating infantry. In both cases, French handling of their artillery was inept. On the 
other hand the role of the German field artillery was crucial to German success at 
Maissin and Anloy. 
Of 25 ID’s two field artillery regiments, 61 FAR was with 49 Brigade at Anloy, 
and 25 FAR marched in the 50 Brigade column towards Maissin. When the first cavalry 
patrols came in and reported the presence of the enemy, 25 FAR immediately deployed 
to the nearest high ground, so that it was in good firing positions even before the first 
enemy was sighted.64 When 118 RI was ordered to seize Maissin, the artillery supported 
the attack, only receiving French counter-battery fire after two hours. Observing two 
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French batteries standing very close to each other in a clearing near Bellevue, they were 
able to suppress their fire. And when called upon to support the infantry more closely, 
they sent a group (abteilung) forward to closer positions, firing at a range of 600m–
800m and causing the French infantry to retreat.65 Such a performance sits in direct 
contrast with that of its opponent, 35 RAC which, quite apart from getting lost and 
causing 1! hours delay, seems to have marched at regulation speed in column until it 
reached the plateau and the clearing at Bellevue where, as recorded by the Germans, 
two of their batteries were spotted, bunched together. The much–vaunted 
manoeuvrability of the 75mm field gun seems not to have been matched by a similar 
agility of mind when the French commanders put doctrine into practice. But there is one 
element of similarity: the guns of 5/25 FAR opened fire forty–five minutes after the 
infantry went forward. They were clearly supporting not preparing the attack, throwing 
an interesting light on the debate about similar French doctrine enshrined in their new 
1913 Regulations.   
There was a further instance of the German tactic of using their guns proactively 
to meet the needs of the moment. A single battery (1/25 FAR) was ordered by divisional 
staff to support 117 IR in its resistance against 21 DI. It actually entered the firing line 
and engaged the French infantry at a range of 700m. There was no French counter–
battery fire as the guns broke up the French attacks.66  
61 FAR performed equally valuable work with 49 Brigade at Anloy.  I Abteilung 
deployed south–east of Anloy in a semi–open position on a crest offering the batteries a 
dominating view to the south–west, from which it observed the red–blue figures of 
French infantry, half–exposed above the hedges. The guns opened fire at a range of 
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1600m on the French infantry before switching to a new target – French artillery 
coming into range in an exposed position.67  The second group of 61 FAR (II Abteilung) 
II had the division’s 105mm light howitzers, but from the dominating heights above 
Anloy, their high–trajectory fire was hardly distinguishable from that of the 77mm field 
guns. There was however at least one instance where a combination of German 
adaptability and a high–trajectory weapon made a difference. 116 IR was faced with the 
consecutive arrival of the four French regiments of 34 DI, and found itself in danger of 
being outflanked on its left. At the moment of crisis, three junior infantry officers 
commandeered a howitzer and had it dragged into the firing line, from where it 
bombarded the tree line from which the French were about to assault. Its fire enabled 
the German infantry to push forward again.68 It is noteworthy that here, as in many 
other places in the Ardennes on 22 August, the German infantry were attacking at the 
tactical level even though their strategic and operational stance was defensive. Nor was 
the ad–hoc use of individual artillery pieces the only recorded instance at Anloy that 
day. At a second crisis point within 116 IR, two guns were brought forward to beat back 
a French assault. The absence of any French artillery to prevent such moves was crucial. 
The two guns tore huge holes in the overlapping enemy ranks.69  
It is instructive that in both of the instances above, junior German infantry 
officers used their initiative to get the guns forward in order to save the situation and, 
conversely, junior artillery officers used their initiative to allow it to happen. It is 
difficult to conceive of a similar circumstance in the French army.  
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One last lesson can be drawn from the analysis of the battle at Maissin. General 
Eydoux, like several of his peers in other battles in the Ardennes, genuinely believed 
that the Germans had been waiting for the French in ambush positions from pre–
prepared trenches with wire and machine guns:  
 
19 RI progressed slowly. To the south–west, trenches stopped the left of the 
attack. These defences revealed the ingenuity of the enemy. Prepared over the 
previous few days, they consisted of barbed wire entanglements, shelters (abatis), 
false trenches adorned with cabbage–heads, stalks in the air to simulate a line of 
helmets, and flanking machine–guns.70 
 
It has been made clear in the operational study that, apart from cavalry patrols, no 
German forces had reached as far west as Maissin before 22 August. This fact is 
corroborated by all the regimental histories of the German units involved. These sources 
show in fact that the Germans were as surprised by the French advance as the French 
were to find opposition. Furthermore, even given the very unlikely possibility that 
German cavalry had prepared the trenches earlier, they were facing in the wrong 
direction:  it has been shown that the German high command expected any future threat 
to come from the west across the Meuse, and not from the south through the forests. 
However, there is one excellent example elsewhere in the history of the Battles of 
the Frontiers which shows exactly how quickly and efficiently German infantry built 
field fortifications, even for the briefest encounter. At Landrecies, as is well known, the 
British Guards under General Haig’s command were surprised at night by a violent 
skirmish with a German advance guard following them in pursuit during the retreat 
                                                 
70 Bujac, op. cit., p.72 
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from Mons. There Captain O’Rorke, Chaplain to the 4th Field Ambulance Unit attached 
to the British 2nd Division, volunteered to stay behind to look after the wounded. In the 
morning he walked up the road from the village to view the scene of the previous 
night’s fighting. He found German trenches lining the sides of the roads and a garden 
wall with firing embrasures knocked through it. It was impossible for those trenches to 
have been pre-prepared: 
 
Just beyond the houses was a pile of German field-gun cartridges [sic], and 
some German spades very long and narrow in the blade. The German trenches 
were littered with bottles; apparently the German soldier had had a couple of 
bottles of wine to keep up his spirits in the trench. The red brick wall about 100 
yards from the top of the road had been loop-holed, and they had even put in 
rough seats behind. The work obviously took some time, and the Germans must 
have been at it all the time of the false alarm of the day before.71  
 
There is very good evidence that German infantry were trained to dig temporary field 
entrenchments during a fire–fight and even when they were going forwards. Their pre–
war doctrine on the subject shows both how relatively sophisticated such works could 
be and how quickly they could be dug.72 So contrary was this to French practice that 
they could not believe any other explanation than that the trenches had been prepared in 
advance. For lack of comparative evidence from the German side, the French 
explanation has until now passed as fact.  
 
                                                 
71 B.G.O’Rorke, Chaplain to the Forces, In the Hands of the Enemy  (Longman, Green & Co, London 
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72 See Chapter Ten, ‘Equipment’, for detail of German doctrine with regard to digging temporary field 
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To sum up the twin battles of Maissin and Anloy, it has been shown that the French 
were tactically inferior to the Germans in all arms. The reasons for that inferiority will 
be examined in detail in the third part of this thesis, but the evidence above points to 
superior German artillery tactics, superior combined–arms cooperation and superior 
speed and efficiency in execution. The French inferiority in these respects cost Joffre 
and the French army its second opportunity to inflict a significant defeat upon the 
Germans in the Battle of the Ardennes.  
Operationally, the French weaknesses in command, control and communication, 
and their inability to conceive of an effective reconnaissance role for their cavalry, 
robbed them of the chance even to find and recognise the opportunity to turn the 
German flank, let alone attempt to pull it off. In the third part of this study, an 
examination of French doctrine and officer training will seek to establish the reasons 
why the French didn’t even know what an opportunity they had missed. 
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Chapter 5 : The Other Battles 
 
 
Despite the inefficiencies, delays and poor tactical performance which denied the French 
their two opportunities to achieve a decisive result on 22 August, they nevertheless were in 
relatively strong positions at both Neufchâteau and at Maissin from which to launch further 
offensive action on 23 August. 
 At Neufchâteau, 12 CA had encamped on its battlefield and, with relatively low 
casualties, was in good shape to continue on the morrow. At Maissin, 11 CA similarly 
ended the day in possession of the ground and the village. Despite heavier casualties, they 
had the advantage of strong reinforcement from 9 CA, the provisional cavalry corps and 52 
DIR in the immediate vicinity. At first sight, Fourth Army was well positioned to continue 
the attack on 23 August, and de Langle initially issued orders to develop his attack on his 
left.1 But an hour later, at about 19.00, news started to reach Fourth Army headquarters of 
the other encounters. By 05.00 on 23 August, de Langle had accepted the reality of the 
overall adverse situation across his front. He ordered a general withdrawal of his left and 
centre, hinged on the continued defence by CAC of the south bank of the Semoy.2  
Joffre and GQG thought otherwise. When de Langle signalled that he intended to 
retreat and regroup, Joffre replied: ‘All our Intelligence shows that you have only about 
three enemy corps in front of you. Therefore you must return to the offensive as soon as 
                                                     
1 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.415–6; and Annex 862: [Fourth Army] Armée de Stenay, 22 août, porté à 18.40 par 
l’officier de liaison: Ordre particulier au 9e corps; and Annex 863: Armée de Stenay, 22 août, 18.00,Ordre 
particulier au 9e corps faisant suite à l’ordre particulier nr257/3. 
 
2 AFGG I/1, Annex 1102: Armée de Stenay, 23 août, 05.00: Ordre général nr.22 
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possible.’3 Joffre and his 2e Bureau were technically correct: Fourth Army had fought 
against 18, 18 Reserve and 6 AKs. But GQG had not yet picked up on the late arrival of 8 
RAK in the Maissin–Anloy area and was not yet fully aware of the general state of Fourth 
Army’s troops. De Langle sought to comply with Joffre’s command – it would have been 
career–limiting to do otherwise – although reading between the lines he was less than 
convinced, merely repeating Joffre’s words almost verbatim as his rationale for continuing 
the offensive. He ordered his left wing (11 and 12 CAs but including this time 9 CA, 52 
DIR and 60 DIR and excluding 17 CA) to attack northwards again.4 But, as the official 
history succinctly put it: ‘Whilst de Langle attempted despite everything to order a renewal 
of the offensive, his troops were forced by enemy pressure to accelerate their rearward 
movement.’5 On 23 August, the French Fourth Army was not under the control of de 
Langle or his staff; it had its own momentum of retreat, driven by events, and it took de 
Langle a day to regain control.6  
 
Of all the other encounter battles which took place on 22 August, two in particular stand 
out. At Bertrix and at Rossignol the French were comprehensively beaten.7 By nightfall, 
Duke Albrecht’s and de Langle’s units had each won two tactical victories. But Duke 
Albrecht’s were both decisive, de Langle’s marginal. The delays and inefficiencies on the 
                                                     
3 AFGG I/1, Annex 1048: communcation téléphonique, 23 août, 08.30: général en chef à commandant armée 
Stenay [Fourth Army] 
 
4 AFGG I/1, Annex 1107: Armée de Stenay, 23 août, 10.00: Ordre. 
 
5 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.423–424 
 
6 AFGG I/1 (1936), pp.423–427 
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French side meant that they had failed to achieve the sort of decisive battlefield advantage 
which could have been theirs; by simply holding on until nightfall, the Germans diminished 
the significance of the two French successes, which could and should have been much 
greater. That was the first measure of their lost opportunity. But in terms of the operation as 
a whole, a second measure of loss must be taken into account. When news of the magnitude 
of defeat at Bertrix and Rossignol reached de Langle, it was clear that he could not stand 
overnight and in the morning attempt to capitalize upon his advantage at Maissin–Anloy 
and Neufchâteau. Operational advantage passed to the Germans, without de Langle or 
anyone else truly realizing what they had missed. This was the real significance of Bertrix 
and Rossignol, and one should therefore ask whether those defeats might have been 
prevented and why they were not. Because they were not, the events at Bertrix and 
Rossignol became the defining encounters of the day.  
 
The battle at Bertrix has been relatively well covered by historians over the years.8 Most 
recently, Bruce Gudmundsson has written a comprehensive account from the French 
perspective, whilst Terence Zuber devoted a chapter to it from the German perspective in 
his book on the Ardennes battle.9 In essence, 33 DI marched into the Forest of Luchy, north 
of Bertrix, was stopped by a detachment of 21 ID at Ochamps on the northern edge of the 
forest and was then hit by the rest of that German division in its right flank whilst still in 
column in the trees. The whole of the French divisional artillery was wiped out as well as 
                                                     
8 In particular see: Palat, Grande Guerre: Batailles des Ardennes & de La Sambre III (Librarie Chapelot, 
Paris, 1918), pp. 142-151; Lieutenant–Colonel A.H. Burne, The French Guns at Bertrix 1914, Journal of 
Military History, LXIII, 1936–37; and ‘A.G.M’, Bertrix; and Kaiser, Bertrix. 
 
9 Gudmundsson, Bertrix, pp.25–36; and Zuber, Ardennes 1914, pp.144–151 
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their 66 Brigade, and they retreated in considerable disorder to the west. 
 However, none of the studies have sought to place the events at Bertrix into the 
context of the whole operation. Consequently there are three key elements of the disaster at 
Bertrix which have not yet been adequately explained: the strange role of the French 
divisional flank guard; the complex command situation which led to the French artillery 
being trapped and annihilated in the forest; and the impromptu but once again highly 
effective role played by the German artillery.  
 
 General Poline (17 CA) organised the strongest flank guard of the whole Fourth 
Army, a complete brigade (65 Brigade) supported by a group of artillery (12 guns) and the 
corps cavalry regiment. Early on the morning of 22 August at about 05.00, it set itself up in 
the fog in a strong defensive position on the heights just a short distance south-east of 
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Bertrix, between Orgéo and Saint–Médard.  That latter place was to become the command 
post of General Roques (12 CA) when he came up later in the day; Poline’s 65 Brigade had 
to remain in place until relieved by the vanguard of 12 CA.10 Not only was 65 Brigade a 
particularly powerful flank guard in a particularly strong defensive position, but it was 
commanded by 33 DI’s commander, General Villeméjane, accompanied by his divisional 
staff, including the divisional artillery commander, Colonel Paloque.11 Facing north–east 
towards Neufchâteau and Libramont – the very area where the major skirmish between the 
provisional cavalry corps and 18 AK had taken place on 20 August – it was ideally placed 
to guard the advance of 17 CA from any German foray from that direction.  
 All this suggests that the French command was, after all, alert to the possibility of 
the German units swinging south towards them and was taking steps to guard against 17 
CA being attacked. So it is all the more surprising that, having gone to such lengths to 
secure his most vulnerable flank during the first part of the march, General Poline (or his 
subordinates) then let his right–hand column (66 Brigade and the remaining two groups of 
artillery from 33 DI but no scouting cavalry) march past the static flank guard, up into 
Bertrix, down into the Forest of Luchy and on towards Ochamps without further 
precautions. That column, commanded by a brigadier (General Fraisse), was neither 
preceded by scouts nor protected on its right by any security.12 This behaviour was directly 
contrary to French doctrine – both the 1895 FSR and the newly published December 1913 
FSR – and can only be explained by individual or collective incompetence among the 
                                                     
10 AFGG I/1 (1936), p.405 
 
11 Paloque, Bertrix, p.12  
 
12 Goya, La chair et l’acier, p.177 
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senior officers of 17 CA. The lack of security set up by the officers of 33 DI after they had 
passed through Bertrix into the hinterland beyond was a serious tactical mistake. But the 
stark contrast between the setting up of the strong static flank guard and the subsequent 
slack attention to basic march procedure points to a randomly inconsistent level of 
competence within the French officer corps. 
 
 The destruction of the French artillery in the forest has been ascribed by 
Gudmundsson to a disagreement between the divisional general and his brigade 
commander, the latter having ordered the guns into the forest whilst the former 
countermanded him and ordered them to turn and go back;13 Rocolle, on the other hand, 
writes that the entry of the artillery into the forest was simply as a result of a mistaken 
                                                     
13 Gudmundsson, op. cit., p.32 
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order.14 The issue is central to the scale of the disaster and requires further clarification. It 
has already been mentioned that both the divisional commander, General Villeméjane, and 
his divisional artillery commander, Colonel Paloque, were with the static flank guard. The 
main column was therefore under the command of 66 Brigade’s commanding officer, 
General Fraisse, who was supported by the commander of 18 RAC, Lieutenant–Colonel 
Picheral. These four senior officers were the key players in the drama which was to unfold. 
 Paloque in particular is an interesting character: former professor at the École 
supérieure de guerre and author of a 1912 book on artillery tactics, he was also former 
commander of 18 RAC – 33 DI's artillery regiment – before his promotion to divisional 
artillery commander. After the war Paloque, by then a general, felt it necessary to publish 
his own version of events at Bertrix in order to explain the destruction of his beloved 
regiment.15 
 According to Paloque, there were two distinct commands for calling forward the 
artillery: one called for officers to go forward without the guns in order to assess the 
situation, the other called both officers and guns immediately forward. Paloque claims that 
General Fraisse issued an imprecise order direct to the commanders of the two groups of 
artillery via a junior artillery officer (Sub–lieutenant Legueu), by–passing Lieutenant–
colonel Picheral, which had the effect of inadvertently calling the guns forward into the 
forest. According to Paloque, Legueu called the officers for a reconnaissance, which 
according to artillery regulations (Fraisse was an infantryman) had a specific and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 Rocolle, Hécatombe, p.138 
 
15 Paloque, Bertrix, p.10, ‘It is not for me to pass judgement on those whose mistakes led to the destruction of  
my superb regiment, whose officers, non–commissioned officers and gunners were ready to follow me to the 
ends of the earth, except that an event has provoked  a corps commander to expose all those responsible.’ 
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immutable meaning: ‘According to the rules, which are still [in 1932] in place, when the 
command “reconnaissance” is not accompanied by an indication as to where the guns 
should wait (l'indication d'une position d'attente), the group commanders must organise 
their batteries to follow them.’16 This seems today to be a narrow distinction, and with 
hindsight points to a tendency towards blind obedience to rules as against common sense – 
the guns were about to plunge into a vast forest along a narrow forest track. Lest this 
judgement seem somewhat harsh, it must be pointed out that, prior to Legueu’s unfortunate 
contribution to the confusion, the two artillery–group commanders had been clearly ordered 
to remain outside the forest: at about 14.00, Picheral had sent an officer with an earlier set 
of orders, whom Paloque had also met and interrogated: ‘I am charged (said reserve Sub–
lieutenant Portrait) by Lieutenant–colonel Picheral to tell the artillery to come forward to 
the southern entrance to the Forest of Luchy.’17 In this case, combined–arms protocol had 
been followed. General Fraisse (the general officer) had given a written order to Picheral 
(the artillery commander) at 13.30 which specifically included the phrase: ‘Do not commit 
your artillery to enter the woods until such a move is possible’.18 It is an interesting 
observation on core French military ethos – orders are to be obeyed and not necessarily 
understood – compared to that of the Germans – the mission is to be understood – that 
Picheral did not deem it necessary to pass on to his two subordinates the rationale for 
remaining outside the forest: that the vanguard was in action against the enemy and firing 
positions were being sought. When the third order came direct from Fraisse via Sub–
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
16 Ibid., p.15, note (1) 
 
17 Ibid., p.14 
 
18 Ibid., p.17 
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lieutenant Legueu and by–passing Picherel, it overrode the earlier ones. Paloque was 
undoubtedly arguing the finer points of the law (or rather regulations) to excuse himself and 
his beloved regiment from blame and there is undoubtedly logic in his argument. In the 
confusion of war, such mistakes are common, and a scapegoat has retrospectively to be 
found. But the case illuminates many small points: General Fraisse clearly intended to keep 
the guns out of the forest and call the officers alone up for reconnaissance, but the use of 
junior officers to relay messages (à la Captain Nolan, perhaps) distorted the outcome. 
Combined–arms co–operation was not good enough to bridge the technical language gap 
between two arms. The two artillery–group commanders obeyed the last order to be 
received despite the evident caution implicit in their previous instructions and despite the 
sound of heavy firing coming from the east; nor did they uncover their pieces until 
specifically ordered to. The two most senior divisional officers (Villeméjane and Paloque) 
were absent – taking hot drinks from the townsfolk of Bertrix at the time19 – and Fraisse 
and Picheral were of a rank less experienced in combined–arms co–operation when called 
on to deal with such a complex command situation. 
 Paloque himself comes across as a stickler for the rules, and undoubtedly trained 
his beloved regiment according to his own standards. His 1912 book on artillery tactics 
contains some illuminating passages. Chapter Two (‘How the artillery marches to battle’) 
contains forty–five pages – forty–six individual Articles – on the minutiae of marching; the 
professor in Paloque shines through.20 On the subject of the afore–mentioned rules which 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 Ibid., p.14 
 
20 Colonel J. Paloque,  L’Artillerie dans la bataille (O. Doin et Fils, Paris, 1912), pp.169–171 
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caused the disaster at Bertrix, Paloque the writer and professor had laid out his guidance: 
 
Article 166 – What orders should the commander of the artillery send to his group 
commanders, whom we envisage being on the march at the tail of the advance 
guard? The orders are extremely simple in the artillery; they are generally verbal; 
each level of authority entitled to receive orders receives communication from 
superior authority entitled to give him orders through the agency of a Liaison 
Officer. The commander of the artillery, addressing one of his Liaison Officers, tells 
him: ‘Order to the group commanders: “Reconnaissance!”’ This order will be often 
completed by: ‘Batteries to go at such and such a speed, according to such itinerary, 
to take such formation at such position’. 
Article 168 – reconnaissance by group commanders: ... such reconnaissance should 
never take place until the group commander has called his battery commanders up 
for reconnaissance according to the same principles and with the group in waiting 
position (en position d’attente) [italics from Paloque’s text] behind the spot chosen 
by the commander of artillery.21  
 
Paloque adds in a footnote that the phrase ‘en position d’attente’ was ‘a useful phrase 
which deserves being included in the Rules, so familiar is it to gunners; its clarity and 
neatness of phrase is such that it will lead to less confusion.’22 It looks as if Paloque himself 
was the initiator, if not the author of the rules, which he regarded as so simple as to avoid 
                                                     
21 Ibid., pp.170–171 
 
22 Ibid., p.171, footnote 1 
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confusion, and yet which ironically led to the destruction of his very own regiment. And, to 
rub salt into Paloque’s wounded pride, it would seem that his two group commanders were 
technically in breach of Paloque’s Article 168! 
Whatever the explanation, the bare facts are that two groups of 75mm field guns (24 
pieces) were ordered forward, limbered and with caissons, horses and harness, onto a 
narrow forest track in which they did not have the space to turn or even deploy. To 
compound the insouciant lack of security evident in the column, evidenced through the 
absence of flank guards and scouts, the artillery were equally unconcerned and unprepared: 
 
These reports [that the woods north of Bertrix were full of Germans who had 
organised and concealed positions over several days] were taken to be so 
exaggerated that the leading group (2e) had removed neither tampions nor breech 
covers, and the colonel [Paloque] had to admonish the commander of this group as 
he passed, saying: ‘Are you going to wait until you are under fire before you 
prepare for combat?’ There was even as he spoke the sound of firing from the 
north–east [Neufchâteau].23 
 
It is difficult to reconcile this behaviour by 18 RAC with Paloque’s claim that they were a 
superb regiment, unless one accepts that peace–time attributes like smartness and obedience 
to orders were more of a requirement than military awareness and readiness for real war. 
The poor state of French pre–war preparation and in particular combined arms liaison is 
once again brought into focus. 
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 The performance of the artillery of 21 ID, which made the major contribution to the 
destruction of 33 DI, actually demonstrates most of the qualities that the French lacked. 
Marching in the middle of the divisional column (but with the corps heavy artillery at the 
back), the two regiments of field artillery entered a terrain which was characterised by tall 
gorse (or broom) on either side of the paved road, obscuring vision and hindering 
deployment. Admittedly the road was better and wider than that which the French were 
using, and the gorse was slightly less constrictive than the trees, but there are similarities of 
circumstance. The German divisional commander, General von Oven, professed himself to 
have been as much surprised by the time and place of the contact as his opponents were;24 
and the artillery was limbered, with caissons and horses and harness, on the road when the 
firing started. The guns were on low ground, overlooked by the high ground north of 
Bertrix; it was fortunate for them that the French artillery had not remained on those 
commanding heights where they had halted only an hour earlier and from where they might 
have annihilated the German artillery. 
 When contact was made and the German infantry of the advance guard deployed 
and moved forward either side of the road, the artillery was left in column. But the 
divisional artillery commander, General Scherbening, was in the column and was able to 
gallop up and take control. Despite the absence of proper firing positions, he ordered the 
guns to deploy and set up as best they could, to left and right of the road, in the gaps in the 
gorse.25 Even the heavy howitzers were then brought up and similarly deployed in order to 
increase the weight of firepower. The guns opened fire in the general direction of the 
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enemy. Furthermore, in a fashion similar to the Germans’ behaviour at Anloy, a battery was 
taken forward by the infantry and deployed right in the front line, from where it destroyed 
much of the French 1st group of artillery at the rear of the column, blocking the French 
retreat back to Bertrix.26  
 
The German artillerymen proved adept at improvisation both in the swift ad–hoc 
deployment of large numbers of guns onto unfavourable terrain, and in the non–standard 
use of individual batteries or guns to meet infantry requests in support of a local tactical 
situation. The swift establishment of fire superiority, by weight of shell and by whatever 
means, was the priority of the German command.  
The three events described above help our growing understanding of the French 
disaster at Bertrix. While the immediate cause of the French failure was the lack of security 
on their open right flank in the Forest of Luchy and the failure to scout ahead and to the 
sides of a vulnerable marching column, the conundrum of the use of the strong static flank 
guard for the first half of the march indicates an inconsistent approach to war within the 
French units and a lack of consistent operational planning by the French command. The 
rigidity of the French artillery command and control system compares unfavourably with 
the flexibility and willingness to innovate shown by their opponents. It all points to serious 
underlying inconsistencies in French preparation. And yet the individual French soldiers, 
infantry and gunners alike, fought bravely and with great self–sacrifice. The performance of 
33 DI was not wholly bad, it was randomly bad and good. This leads on to the need to 
explore how French pre–war arrangements were organised, which is the subject of a later 
                                                     
26 A.G.M., op. cit., pp.245–247 
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chapter. From the German perspective, one sees again their ability to react swiftly to 
unforseen circumstances and to improvise, especially in their use of artillery. The massed 
fire from ninety guns, most of which could not see a specific target and all of which were 
deployed on low–lying flat and gorse–covered terrain, bears witness to the less–than–
scientific German approach to achieving fire superiority. In the German case at Bertrix, it 
may not have been strictly according to doctrine, but it worked.  
 
Rossignol was an encounter battle of an entirely different character. For a start, the French 
forces involved were the elite 3 DIC whose professional officers and experienced soldiers 
had for the most part engaged in combat overseas. That they were comprehensively 
defeated by their German opponents and suffered crippling casualties as a result of their 
refusal (and inability) to retreat was a severe blow to overall French morale. 
 The operational study has shown how Duke Albrecht sent his 6 AK south at 
extremely short notice on the night of 21–22 August in order to plug the gap between 
Fourth and Fifth German Armies. Two divisional columns, 12 ID on the right and 11 ID on 
the left, plunged into the Forest of Neufchâteau on parallel roads. By 07.00 both columns 
were close to the southern edge of the forest and the valley of the Semoy river, the whole 
terrain wreathed in fog. The right–hand column met the French colonial vanguard in the 
forest between one and two kilometres north of Rossignol, and commenced the action 
which will be described below. If all had gone according to plan on the French side, the 
left–hand German column (11 ID) would have debouched from the forest into the valley to 
be met by the infantry of 4 DI occupying Tintigny and the bridge over the river, with its 
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artillery dominating the scene from the heights at Bellefontaine. But once again French 
delays and inefficiencies conspired to give the tactical advantage to their opponents.  
General Rabier of 4 DI had been ordered to establish his advance guard at 
Bellefontaine, on the southern heights overlooking the Semoy valley, on the evening of 21 
August.27 It will be recalled that the river valley – dubbed the Étalle corridor – was a key 
tactical location which had been fought over by cavalry divisions since the beginning of 
hostilities; indeed the German 3 KD was still operating in that area.28 It was imperative for 
French security that they should prevent any German incursion down the valley. Had 
General Rabier fulfilled his orders, his artillery (at least the group accompanying the 
vanguard) would have been fortuitously in the perfect position to shell 11 ID’s columns as 
they debouched from the woods opposite. But Rabier decided that his men were too tired 
and his units too disorganised to reach the Semoy that night, so he informed his corps 
commander, Gérard (2 CA), who in turn informed de Langle de Cary, that 4 DI would 
camp south of the forest lying between them and the Semoy.29 Rabier undertook to make an 
early start and catch up with the timetable in the morning of 22 August, promising to be 
ready to debouch from Bellefontaine at 06.00 as ordered and occupy the bridge over the 
Semoy at Tintigny. He specifically ordered, firstly, his cavalry to occupy Tintigny and then 
scout ahead into the forest, and secondly 87 Brigade with a group of artillery to dominate 
                                                     
27 AFGG I/1, Annex 756: Armée de Stenay,21 août, 13.00: Ordre particulier au 2e corps, corps colonial et 
12e corps; and Annex 766: 2e corps d’armée, Montmédy, 21 août, 20.00: Ordre préparatoire pour la 4e DI, 
Villers–la–Loue. 
 
28 Weltkrieg 1, p.317 
 
29  AFGG I/1, Annex 767: [2 CA] Compte rendu du général Gérard apporté par agent liaison, 22.00, 21 août.  
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the valley from the heights at Bellefontaine.30 Had his troops even then managed to catch 
up with the overall timetable, had they executed their own commander’s orders, they would 
have been, if unintentionally, in ideal positions to thwart 11 ID.  The reconnaissance 
squadron of their cavalry (19 Chasseurs) would undoubtedly have met the German advance 
guard in the forest on the road to Rulles. But almost inevitably further inefficiencies on the 
part of 4 DI meant that they failed to redeem their promise. When the advance guard of 11 
ID debouched from the forest at 08.30 into the Semoy valley, there was only a single 
French regiment (without artillery) in Bellefontaine; and that regiment was not even the AG 
of 4 DI but part of the main body under General Cordonnier who had taken the initiative to 
push ahead.31 
 So the infantry of the German 10 Grenadier regiment marched unopposed through 
the village of Tintigny and across the Semoy by the town bridge.32 During the rest of the 
day, the whole of 11 ID was deployed and was able not only to attack and contain 4 DI in 
Bellefontaine but to spread westwards down the south bank of the river, completing the 
encirclement of the French 3 DIC at Rossignol. Zuber fulsomely describes this as ‘the last 
in VI AK’s series of brilliant tactical decisions’33; in fact it was the only and obvious thing 
to do and it was only made possible by the late arrival of 4 DI and the dire inefficiency of 
the French deployment. 
 More important to the tactical situation, and equally simple to implement given the 
                                                     
30 AFGG I/1, Annex 802: Corps G., Division Rabier, 21 août, 23.30: Ordre général d’opérations nr.13 
 
31 Cordonnier, Une Brigade au feu, pp.239–249 
 
32 Weltkrieg 1, p.315 
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lack of French opposition, the artillery of 11 ID was able to set up openly and unopposed 
on the high ground north of Tintigny. From those excellent positions it was able to 
dominate not only Bellefontaine but also the whole river valley downstream to Rossignol, 
limited only by the range of the guns. Starting at 09.15, when I/6 FAR set up 500m 
southwest of Harinsart and opened fire on the stationary main column of 3 DIC, the fire 
from these guns intensified until the bridge across the Semoy at Breuvanne was made 
impassable then destroyed, preventing reinforcements reaching 3 DIC’s beleaguered 
advance guard.34 
 The free passage of 11 ID into the Semoy valley on the right flank of the CAC was 
the defining operational feature of the battle at Rossignol. What happened at Rossignol 
itself was a second and consequential action, primarily tactical but nevertheless important 
because of the devastating outcome. 
 
When the infantry of 12 ID deployed to meet the colonials in the woods north of Rossignol, 
a separate battle broke out, one which, initially, either side might win. The two artillery 
regiments of 12 ID were stuck in column on a narrow forest track, just like the French guns 
at Bertrix, and were vulnerable to a successful infantry attack. The advance guards of each 
side were initially evenly matched. That battle became a matter of infantry tactics, doctrine 
and training. Doughty has described it thus: 
 
After French cavalry discovered enemy soldiers in a forest north of the small 
village, 3rd Division sent six battalions, one after the other, on a narrow front against 
                                                     
34 Palat, La Grande Guerre III, p.143  
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solidly entrenched German troops and suffered more than 5,000 casualties. The 
Germans responded by going around 3rd Division’s flank and destroying all its 
cannon, caissons, and vehicles.35 
 
There are some errors of detail in Doughty’s description – five French battalions were 
committed, not six and the Germans were not solidly entrenched.36 It is clear that this was a 
genuine encounter battle, and any German entrenchments were dug during the fighting; 12 
ID’s advance guard marched into contact with 3 DIC at about 08.30.37  
 The fight in the forest north of Rossignol was not the classic example of French 
offensive à outrance. which is its popular image.38 As Zuber has pointed out, ‘it is difficult 
to envisage an offensive à outrance in the thick undergrowth of this forest: bayonet charges 
would have been physically impossible.’39 Furthermore German accounts of the battle 
describe a close–range and very costly firefight in which the Germans themselves used fire 
and movement to drive themselves forward and the Frenchmen back.40 Casualty figures 
support this view; the French 1 RIC suffered 2,800 casualties (killed, wounded, missing 
                                                     
35 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p.67 
 
36 Doughty’s source is given as Commandant Grasset’s Rossignol, op. cit., and his error is understandable. 
Divisional commander General Raffenel did indeed order two regiments (six battalions) forward. But when 
the personal diary of 3 DIC’s Chief of Staff, Commandant Moreau, was rediscovered and republished in 
2002, Moreau revealed that brigade commander General Rondonay held back the third battalion of the second 
regiment from the slaughter in the forest: see note 49, below. 
 
37 Weltkrieg 1, pp.314–315 
 
38 Liddell Hart, First World War, p.82; and Clayton, Paths of Glory, pp.28–29 
 
39 Zuber, op. cit., p.113 
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and captured) out of about 3,200 (88%) compared to the German 157 IR which lost 931 
(29%) killed, wounded and missing.41 But it must be taken into account that the French 
were surrounded and in the end had a simple choice between death and captivity; there is 
no clear evidence as to how many of the French soldiers listed as casualties were in fact 
prisoners of war. The German casualty rate of 29% is itself very high, and would be notable 
if it were not for the awesome extent of the colonial soldiers’ sacrifice.  
Two issues stand out as having given the Germans victory in the forest: firstly they 
began to dig themselves in as soon as the firing started and sought fire superiority from 
behind temporary field emplacements before attempting to get forward; whereas the French 
– whose doctrine neither precluded digging nor required it and who had not been trained to 
dig whilst on the attack – sought to gain ground by fire and movement only, against an 
unbroken enemy. Secondly, the tactical error by General Raffenel, which sent two extra 
battalions into a narrow and already crowded firing line simply multiplied the number of 
targets available to German fire. And yet the myth of offensive à outrance persists. Michel 
Goya writes of the French ‘charging furiously’ at an enemy ‘going immediately onto the 
defensive and taking advantage of the favourable terrain.’42 And Professor Herwig, in his 
recent book on the Marne 1914, describes Rossignol with almost Churchillian rhetoric:  
 
In short order it [3DIC] sent five battalions of pantalon rouges in waves against the 
Germans on a front roughly six hundred meters wide. One furious frontal bayonet 
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charge after another, accompanied by lusty cries of “En avant”, was mowed down 
by murderous artillery and machine gun fire.43 
 
Herwig is wrong on several points: colonial troops did not wear red trousers, they had their 
own distinct blue uniform;44 there was no German artillery fire because the guns could not 
deploy off the road into the dense mass of trees; and it was more a question of fire and 
movement than bayonet charge. Since it has been shown that the long–standing cliché is 
invalid, why then did the French 3 DIC – considered an elite unit – commit itself to an 
attritional firefight on a narrow front while allowing itself to be outflanked on each side? 
Recently an important source has resurfaced which illuminates the inner working of 3 DIC 
on 22 August – the journal of its chief of staff, Commandant Moreau, written whilst he was 
dying in captivity in Switzerland and including testimony from many fellow prisoners. It 
provides a fascinating insight into the command, control and communication status of one 
of France’s avowedly elite formations, and raises questions about the fitness of General 
Raffenel for divisional command.45 
 In the first phase of the encounter, each side committed its lead regiment (three 
battalions) to the firing–line. The Germans then sent their second regiment (with a battery 
of field guns) out on an outflanking movement to their right, marching through the forest to 
the southern edge and out into the open, eventually reaching the village of Termes on the 
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river and the high ground nearby.46 The French were in danger of being cut off from the 
west. General Raffenel also had his second regiment (2 RIC) to hand and had to decide how 
to use it. Up–to–date information was available to him from the firing–line; Lieutenant–
colonel Vitart, of 1 RIC, had been wounded in both hands and was coming back for 
treatment when he met chief of staff Moreau. He said: ‘This won't do. We are enmeshed in 
a trap and we have fallen under well prepared infantry and machine–gun fire from enemy 
positions prepared in advance in the woods.’47 Vitart was not the only officer who mistook 
the German infantryman’s ability to dig temporary field fortifications for more permanent 
ambush positions.48 Vitart compared the situation to an ambush experienced in Tonkin and 
he and Moreau concluded that the tactical situation required a withdrawal from the trap and 
a fresh manoeuvre. As chief of staff, Moreau recommended to Raffenel that 2 RIC should 
not be sent forward to reinforce the firing–line; their front was too narrow and the exact 
position of the enemy’s front uncertain. But Raffenel insisted on committing three more 
battalions to the existing firing–line, using language which betrays a somewhat cavalier 
approach:  
 
The general replied in a humorous way ‘you bore me (baillez) with your talk of 
fronts.’ Then, turning to the group of officers, said ‘Let's go! Take the order to 2 
RIC to engage; one battalion on the track parallel to and three hundred metres west 
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of the road, one on the east of the road and the third battalion on the road itself.’49  
 
 In the event, this order was not fully obeyed. Worried that there was no sign of the main 
column appearing behind the advance guard, the brigade commander, General Rondony, 
took it upon himself to hold back the third battalion in the village, thereby saving it from 
the slaughter, at least for a while.50  
 
The kindest interpretation of Raffenel’s decision is that he still believed he could force his 
way through weak opposition and continue his march on Neufchâteau, despite the evidence 
of an experienced senior regimental commander who had seen the action developing first–
hand, and against the advice of his chief of staff. But, taken with other evidence from 
Moreau, it now seems more likely that Raffenel had reached the point where, under the 
strain of combat, he was proving to have been over–promoted and incapable of handling 
the situation. 
 General Raffenel was still ranked as a brigade general, having only been promoted 
to command of 3 DIC in June 1914 and not yet confirmed at the higher rank. He had been a 
brigadier for less than four years and a regimental colonel before that for only four years.51 
With such rapid promotions compared to many, he was considered a rising star. But 
Moreau’s early impression was of an officer lacking the command attributes required at 
divisional level; one who interfered with detailed staff work rather than devolving 
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responsibility: 
 
Furthermore, what was his concept of a divisional general staff? Everything pointed 
to a belief that we were a sort of honour guard provided to trot behind the chief. As 
to his role and his activity, as to his effectiveness as part of the command structure, 
he had no idea. He was the leader of a very big battalion; he more or less thought 
that he had at his disposal several adjutants of whom I was the oldest. It was perhaps 
because of his consideration for my age and with a benevolent intent that he avoided 
giving me anything to do. Indeed, the very idea of what I could and should be doing 
was of no importance to him.52 
 
There is in Moreau’s journal a catalogue of minor events from mobilisation to the eve of 
battle which build up to and give evidence in support of this conclusion.53 With the onset of 
battle, Raffenel’s weaknesses (in Moreau’s eyes) were tested beyond breaking point. The 
decision to send his second regiment up into the confines of the forest was a serious tactical 
mistake. There were other instances which will be enumerated below. He took to walking 
about, his staff trailing after him, as a substitute for getting to grips with the situation. 
Finally, he seems to have mentally fallen apart: 
 
At one stage the general looked me in the eye for a long time without speaking. His 
face was convulsed. Is this an illusion [sic] or indeed did my own nervous tension 
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give me the ability to understand his silence? But I believe I could read in his eyes 
what he was thinking. The unfortunate man had had revealed to him his incapacity 
[for command] and at the same time the irredeemable disaster [facing his division]. 
He looked questioningly at me, waiting for me to make another suggestion, but I too 
thought that all was lost.54 
 
The quotation above refers to the situation at 12.30; a long and bloody afternoon and 
evening lay before them. General Montignault (1 Colonial Brigade) had also reached the 
limit of his physical and moral strength in the fighting in the forest. His brigade was 
shattered, decimated; he had ‘abandoned the contest while General Rondony took his place, 
and remained hidden in the woods, stretched out in a ditch totally incapable of moving.’55  
He was later captured by the advancing Germans. General Rondony (3 Colonial Brigade) 
took command of the defence of the village and died fighting, towards the end of the day. 
Raffenel continued to walk about, without purpose. Finally at about 15.30, Raffenel 
wandered off again. Moreau followed but, struck in the right thigh by shrapnel, had to stop: 
with the words ‘well then, sit down here, I’ll just go and have a look in this direction [west] 
and I will pick you up when I return’, Raffenel disappeared for the last time.56 His body 
was later found just a few metres south of the river Semoy. Rocolle writes that it was 
believed that he may have committed suicide.57 
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The situation of 3 DIC’s advance guard north of the river Semoy became critical. On its 
right, 11 ID had crossed to the south bank of the river via the bridge at Tintigny and was 
threatening envelopment. Only on the left could 3 DIC’s commanders have set up an 
improvised escape plan. There was one obvious point d’appui, which dominated the terrain. 
Between Rossignol and Termes, the next village downstream, the river Semoy forms a 
large ox-bow loop, in the centre of which lies Hill 363. It was to become central to the 
fighting later in the day and crucial to 3 DIC’s communications both with corps 
headquarters and with 2 DIC at Jamoigne once German artillery fire interdicted the bridge 
at Breuvanne.  
Yet Raffenel had made no proper attempt to secure it. The actions which he did 
initiate to secure his left were half–hearted and not followed through properly. At 08.00, 
just as the first shots from the vanguard were heard by the main body, Raffenel ordered the 
Chasseurs d'Afrique (Colonel Costet) to reconnoitre firing positions for the artillery both 
east and west of the road.58 At 09.30 the artillery was ordered to take up the positions 
which were to have been found by the cavalry.59 In between, at 8.45, staff captain Laurans 
had delivered a second order to Colonel Costet, ordering him to act as support for the guns. 
Raffenel had decided to commit all his available infantry to his frontal attack and had none 
to spare for security duties. But Costet on his own initiative abandoned the west flank even 
though he had seen the commander of 1 group of artillery seeking a position there for his 
batteries.60 Costet apparently told General Rondony (3 Brigade) what he was doing, but 
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never thought to report formally to divisional headquarters; the information never got 
through. As a result, the artillery in the west could not sustain an unsupported position on 
Hill 363 once German infantry arrived at the forest edge, and the regimental commander, 
Colonel Montguers, ordered it to withdraw to a less exposed position. He too failed to 
inform divisional headquarters until, meeting up with General Raffenel at 10.10, he was 
asked the direct question ‘have you placed a battery in position west of the village?’ to 
which he perforce answered that it was withdrawn. Raffenel angrily ordered it back into 
position, without infantry or cavalry protection.61 But they were too late. The infantry of 63 
IR, supported by a group of artillery – II/57 FAR – which had been sent out on the German 
right to find and turn the French left, arrived at the edge of the woods opposite Termes at 
about 11.00 and was able to move a battery of guns unopposed onto Hill 363.62 The 
German guns were subsequently driven off from what was an exposed position by French 
artillery fire, but that is not the point. Raffenel had failed to secure this vital position with 
infantry and consequently contributed to the eventual encirclement of his division. 
 
To cap an already very poor performance, Raffenel and his officers also failed in the area of 
communications. Those failures within 3 DIC and between that unit and its corps 
headquarters compounded the problems with which it found itself confronted. Starting with 
the outcome: at 10.45 CAC headquarters reported to Fourth Army regarding the 08.00 
situation (fighting had started over three–and–a–half hours before this report was sent), 
saying that no enemy had been encountered that morning; at 11.45 it reported that enemy 
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artillery, firing from the east, had been suppressed, when in fact by that time 3 DIC was 
unable to cross the Semoy (in either direction) via the bridge at Breuvanne because of the 
overwhelming intensity of German shelling. At 12.15, CAC headquarters ordered 3 DIC to 
turn to face east in order to support 4 DI which was being attacked at Bellefontaine; the 
degree to which corps headquarters was out of touch is dramatically highlighted by the 
contemporaneous entry in Moreau's journal; this was the very time of which he 
subsequently wrote: ‘I also thought that all was lost; all we could do was put on a brave 
face in order to show the image and illusion of command to all those brave men who 
observed us and who would soon die.’63   
It is clear that, despite being less than five kilometres away from 3 DIC's 
headquarters, CAC’s staff were singularly ill–informed. Partly this was because there seem 
to have been no corps liaison officers up front with the division, partly because 3 DIC was 
not sending any reports.  Commandant Moreau’s journal confirms that the first (and last) 
attempt by 3 DIC’s staff to update CAC took place at 11.30 – after four–and–a–half  hours’ 
fighting, and it was Moreau, not his commanding officer, who decided to send the report. 
But Captain Scheidhauser, who was charged with delivering the message, was unable to get 
across the river and finally destroyed the message shortly before he was captured that 
evening.64 So it would seem likely that not a single report from 3 DIC reached CAC 
headqurters to inform them on one of the most critical engagements of 22 August. Certainly 
there are none remaining on file in the annexes of the official history, and research for this 
thesis has failed to uncover any in the archives at Vincennes, so Moreau’s testimony seems 
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to be corroborated. 
 Communications within the division were equally poor. General Montignault, 
leading the vanguard, wrote a report at 08.30 for his divisional commander which stated 
that they were powerless to advance. Bizarrely, Montignault’s staff officer, Captain 
Javouhey, who had just joined his commander, decided that the report was too 
pessimistically premature and went to see for himself. He was killed in the firing line, the 
message still stuffed in his pocket.65 Consequently a further hour passed, during which the 
vanguard continued to lose men, before Vitart arrived at the divisional headquarters with 
the same assessment. It is not clear why Montignault allowed this to happen. 
 
The picture painted by Commandant Moreau of a dysfunctional staff led by an incompetent 
general provides a credible explanation for the frontal attacks which decimated 3 DIC’s 
vanguard. Given that (like the regular British battalions brought back from overseas to form 
27 and 28  Divisions and which initially performed badly when committed in France in 
January 1915) the French colonial regiments were not permanently encadred before the 
war, but were formed into brigades and divisions for use at pre–war manoeuvres and then 
for the opening battles, the apparent dichotomy between elite regiments and a dysfunctional 
division is partially explained; inherent generic weaknesses in the French general officer 
and staff establishment – which will be explored in the final part of this thesis – would 
seem to be evident in the performance of Raffenel and his subordinates.  
 
The final chapter of this sorry French saga concerns the attempt by the corps commander, 
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General Lefèvre, to mount a rescue of his beleaguered 3rd Division. His headquarters and 
that of  2 DIC (General Leblois) were at Jamoignes, less than seven kilometres from 
Rossignol, but the route via the village of Termes was dominated by Hill 363. If Raffenel 
had occupied that position, keeping open a route westwards, and if 2 DIC could have 
reached the hill, there might have been some hope of relieving the troops trapped in 
Rossignol.  
But on the one hand Raffenel did not have it in him to take command decisions of 
that magnitude, and on the other there were more command and communication difficulties 
at CAC level. De Langle had taken 2 DIC as his strategic army reserve and it could only be 
released on his personal authority. General Lefèvre had first asked for it at 11.35 but 
without any sense of urgency. Indeed, his report includes the phrase ‘the Colonial corps 
continues its attack’.66 This is now explained by 3 DIC’s failure to report what was 
happening. Vital hours passed before Fourth Army received a second message from 
Lefèvre, sent at 14.00 but arriving at 15.30, which laid out in more graphic terms the 
increasingly difficult situation of 3 DIC:  ‘3rd division marching on Rossignol has been 
violently attacked on its right flank and from the northern edges of the forest since 07.00.’67 
De Langle finally agreed to this second request at 16.45 but, in a further adverse 
commentary on the state of Fourth Army communications, seems to have sent his reply to 
12 CA at the telegraph station at Florenville: ‘Let the colonial corps at Jamoigne know that 
                                                     
66 AFGG I/1, Annex 967: [CAC] Général commandant le C.A.C.[Lefèvre] à général commandant l’armée de 
Stenay, 22 août, 11.35, 500 mètres N. de Bellefontaine. 
 
67 AFGG I/1, Annex 969: Stenay de Breux à 15.30; official extreme urgence operations priorité; Corps L. 
[Lefèvre] à armée de Stenay. Poste de Jamoigne, 14 heures. 
 
 238 
it can if necessary make use of its second division.’68 This was too late to have been of any 
use but, surprisingly, the division was already on the march, its commander, Leblois, 
having taken the initiative to march to the sound of the guns – a rare enough instance in the 
French army on that day.69 
 As a result, the first two battalions of the Colonial 6 Brigade (2 DIC) counter–
attacked the German 63 IR and its accompanying artillery during the early afternoon in a 
bid to break through to Rossignol and link up with 3 DIC.  They captured Termes which 
was only four kilometres away, and only two battalions of Germans on Hill 363 stood 
between them and the remnants of Raffenel’s division;70 but it was too late to change the 
outcome of the battle. Moreover, for reasons which are not entirely clear, the attempt was 
called off at 17.00 and 2 DIC ordered onto the defensive.71 The official history states that it 
was an appreciation of the overall situation, at Rossignol and Saint–Vincent, compounded 
by the retreat of 5 Colonial Brigade from Neufchâteau, which caused General Lefèvre to 
take up a defensive posture.72 One might speculate that it was caution, fear of the unknown 
and lack of offensive spirit on the part of corps commander Lefèvre that stopped the 
counter–attack. Rocolle quotes an assessment of both Lefèvre and Leblois by de Langle de 
Cary, made in January 1915. Lefèvre was apparently brave, vigorous, possessing sound 
judgement, but lacking authority and very much influenced by Leblois’s more dominant 
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personality; Leblois was however lacking in offensive spirit, sowing discouragement 
amongst the men. He was ‘defensive, in the worst sense of the word.’73  A continuation of 
the counter–attack by Leblois would not have saved Raffenel’s division, but certainly 
hindsight and information from German sources suggests that it might have broken through 
before nightfall, and saved the remnants of 3 DIC from captivity.74 That this was not 
attempted provides further evidence of the poor senior command performance of the 
supposedly elite CAC.  
 
The magnitude of the disaster at Rossignol is encapsulated in 3 DIC’s casualty figures: 
10,520 officers and men lost out of a total of little more than 12,000. The two events which 
might have prevented the disaster, or at least mitigated the situation to manageable 
proportions, were (firstly and obviously) if 4 DI had carried out its orders and been where it 
was supposed to be at the right time. Secondly, if communications within CAC had been 
better, then 2 DIC could arguably have been released by de Langle earlier and linked up 
with Raffenel via the western route (the bridge at Termes from Jamoigne). That neither of 
these two events happened, and that ultimately 3 DIC suffered  a defeat of such magnitude 
that it has come to symbolise overall French performance in Joffre’s offensive, has been 
shown to have been less about doctrinal weaknesses and more about training and efficiency 
in staff and general command. 
 
The four encounter battles analysed in detail, in this and the two previous chapters, 
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illustrate the second argument of this thesis, that de Langle had two opportunities to break 
through Duke Albrecht’s weak and extended front, at Maissin and at Neufchâteau. Because 
of the extremely poor communications within Fourth Army de Langle was never aware of 
the magnitude of the operational opportunities which might have arisen from better tactical 
competence on those battlefields. His battlefield commanders not only failed to keep him 
properly informed but also failed to use their superior strength and their superior tactical 
situation – including the advantage afforded them by the achievement of operational 
surprise – to press home their attacks in a way that might have delivered to de Langle two 
swift and decisive tactical victories which he might then have attempted to convert into 
successful operational manoeuvre. Duke Albrecht’s commanders on the other hand 
delivered two crushing tactical defeats to their opponents at Bertrix and Rossignol, aided in 
no small part by French errors. The differences in performance revealed in this examination 
of the four key encounters demonstrate that the Germans possessed an overall superiority at 
both operational and tactical levels. The third part of this thesis goes on to examine the 
underlying reasons for this evident German superiority. 
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Part Three : Analysis 
 
Chapter 6 : Doctrine 
 
 
 
Even today, some historians continue to describe the military doctrines with which 
France and Germany entered the war in terms of the Churchillian myth of French 
offensive à outrance, red trousers and bayonets, against German trenches, wire and 
machine guns. Doctrine is a complex subject, requiring greater analysis than that, and 
its diverse yet interrelated strands are gradually being identified and subjected to greater 
scrutiny.  
This chapter will examine French and German military doctrines in the light of 
the performance in battle revealed in the first two parts of this thesis, in order to 
determine the extent to which they were responsible for the outcomes of the battles. It 
will start with an overview of what has been written about doctrine in general, and then 
continue by examining doctrine against performance in the Ardennes at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels. 
 
B.R. Posen defines military doctrine as setting, within grand strategy, priorities among 
various military forces and prescribing how those forces should be structured and 
employed to achieve the ends in view.1 He classifies doctrine into offensive, defensive 
and deterrent categories, examining each against a series of parameters such as 
‘Political–Military Integration’, ‘Innovation’ and ‘Environmental Uncertainty’, using 
Organisation Theory and Balance of Power Theory to test his hypothesis on chosen case 
studies. Given the way in which terms such as ‘offensive strategy’, ‘strategic offensive / 
tactical defensive’ and offensive à outrance are generally discussed in the context of 
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both Joffre’s and Moltke’s opening moves in August 1914, Posen’s research and 
conclusions provide a useful context within which to examine the doctrines used in the 
Ardennes campaign.  
 Azar Gat, in his study of the history of military thought, examines the 
development of both French and German doctrine as expressed by key and influential 
people – soldiers, thinkers, teachers, writers – over nearly four hundred years.2 His 
research into ‘The Cult of the Offensive’ is of particular relevance to this study, since 
the French doctrine of 1914 has been indelibly associated with that term. 
There is also the question of which level of a military organisation one is 
discussing. In his analysis of the theory of war Clausewitz divided the conduct of war 
into two levels, ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’, defining the former as ‘the use of engagements 
for the object of the war’ and the latter as ‘the use of armed forces in the engagement’.3 
But it is now common to add an ‘operational’ level to the conduct of war. Given that 
this thesis seeks as one key objective to present an operational study of the Ardennes 
campaign, the current status of the term ‘operational’ must be established.  
The words ‘operation’ or ‘operations’ have been used in the context of war as far 
back as the time of Frederick the Great, perhaps earlier. Sir Michael Howard has 
described ‘operational art’ as ‘the grey area between strategy and tactics’, going on to 
make the clear distinction that ‘strategy is about thinking and planning. Operations are 
about doing’.4 Gat, in his detailed examination of Clausewitz’s ideas on the purpose and 
means in war, wrote that: ‘he [Clausewitz] now gives an equal status to a variety of war 
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aims and operational objectives, or, to use the terminology of 1804, purposes of war and 
purposes in war.’5 Claus Telp, in his work on ‘The Evolution of Operational Art: From 
Frederick the Great to Napoleon’ develops a persuasive argument as to how the concept 
started to evolve in the late 18th century to the point where it required a classification of 
its own. Briefly, Telp identifies as a key evolutionary step the decision by Prince Henry 
(Frederick the Great’s brother) to create mixed–arm divisions of his army. The 
individual deployment of divisional or even corps columns directly from march into 
combat blurred the distinction between Clausewitz’s ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’, and gave 
the need for definition of ‘operations’ that much more prominence. Telp’s argument 
gains more credence when measured against the increasing size and complexity of 
modern armies and the widening of fronts.6 Martin van Creveld has called Napoleon’s 
way of war ‘the Dawn of Operational Warfare’7, whilst Dennis Showalter has written 
persuasively of ‘Prussian–German Operational Art, 1740–1943’.8 
Jehuda Wallach, on the other hand, writes that ‘it is widely assumed that 
Schlieffen was the creator of the level of the operative art between strategy and 
tactics’.9 Wallach’s assertion arises in the context of a discussion of Schlieffen’s 
preferred method of using his forces: always in offensive mode (‘Schlieffen rejected 
every thought, even in case of tremendous inferiority, of exchanging offense for defense 
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[sic]’)10 and always by envelopment of a flank or flanks (‘Schlieffen rejected frontal 
attacks; time and again he criticised them in his final discussions of exercises, war 
games, and staff rides by emphasising that, at best, an ordinary victory might be 
achieved’).11 Wallach’s argument might well be challenged on the basis that he is 
describing ‘manoeuvre warfare’ rather than ‘operational art’. Wallach describes 
Schlieffen’s views on generalship: ‘Owing to the concept of attack in front, flanks, and, 
if possible, in the rear, it is the duty of the higher commanders to make the necessary 
arrangements for shortening the unavoidable interval between the clash in front and the 
arrival of the enveloping forces in flanks and rear.’12 Schlieffen’s operational teaching, 
which as described by Wallach might be termed ‘operational science’ today, is evident 
on the battlefields of the Ardennes.  
Between them, Howard, Olsen, Creveld (and their contributors), Telp and 
Wallach provide an appreciation of pre–war operational art, such that a study of the 
activity by which the French and German commanders in the Ardennes in August 1914 
sought to use engagement(s) to further their strategic objectives can be taken as a valid 
proposition.  
 
Goya, in ‘La Chair et l’Acier’ also divides the art of war into three levels – strategic, 
operational and tactical – each with its own characteristics and level of doctrine 
constituting ‘the sum of the notions which allow the most effective use of the available 
means’.13 He examines just the operational and tactical levels, tracing the development 
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of French doctrines at those levels from about 1870 up to the start of the war. All the 
major powers produced and published Field Service Regulations (FSR); in France they 
were known as règlements de service en campagne (RSC). For Goya, these were 
‘operational’ documents setting out operational doctrine, although they were not 
necessarily recognised as such at the time. A reading of the 1895 FSR generally 
supports Goya’s thesis, in that it was primarily concerned with the activity preceding 
the actual encounter, although it does include a high–level section on ‘combat’. 
Extending Goya’s argument, the German FSR of 1900 and 1908 constitute the 
equivalent German operational doctrine, and again a reading of those two documents 
confirms their ‘operational’ intent.14 
At the tactical level, Goya identifies the various instructions issued to each 
branch of the armed forces, for example the règlements de manoeuvre d’infanterie 
(RMI), as the instruments which laid down doctrine for each arm during the encounter 
itself, the tactical level. The German 1906 Exerzier–Reglement für die Infanterie (ERI) 
and similar instructions for the other arms similarly form the corpus of German tactical 
doctrine. 
A key issue raised by Goya is his contention that French doctrine as a whole 
was, in the key period leading up to the war, full of confusion.15 This confusion 
stemmed from two principal causes: firstly the fact that the distinction between 
operational and tactical doctrine was not properly understood by the French officer 
corps; secondly the French failure to keep all their different regulations updated 
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regularly and in step with each other, particularly ensuring that a consistent set of ideas 
flowed down from the ‘operational’ FSR to the ‘tactical’ RMI.16 On Goya’s second 
point, the French conceded at the time their difficulty in keeping the various texts in 
step with the overall RSC, as noted in the minutes of the 22 March 1905 session of the 
CSG.17  
Dimitry Queloz, examining the development of French doctrine from 
Napoleon’s time to the start of the war, concurs with Goya’s conclusion that at the heart 
of the French army in the immediate pre–war period there was doctrinal confusion, 
emphasising a well–argued point that during the crucial period from 1900 to 1913 the 
ESG lost its key dual role in ensuring unity of doctrine and in disseminating that unified 
doctrine across the whole officer corps.18 Central to this argument is the fact that, while 
tactical regulations were amended and changed regularly, the higher level FSR of 1895 
remained unaltered until October 1913. The debate about whether and how to update the 
1895 FSR continued during the crucial decade between the Russo–Japanese War of 
1904–5 and the outbreak of war; it grew relatively heated and contentious after Colonel 
de Grandmaison’s two lectures of February 1911 and, finally, the changes were 
officially made when (with hindsight) it was too late for them to be properly absorbed 
and implemented before the war started. 
As if by way of explanation, Posen has written that ‘changing doctrines takes 
time; it disorients a military organisation. A war during such a period of transition can 
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be very dangerous.’19 His analysis and argument states that ‘innovation in military 
doctrine should be rare. It will only occasionally be sponsored by the military 
organisation itself.’ It is rare because it increases uncertainty: ‘While innovation is in 
progress, the organisation’s SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and programs [sic] 
will be in turmoil. Should a war come during the transition, the organisation will find 
itself between doctrines. Under combat conditions, even a bad doctrine may be better 
than no doctrine’.20 Posen has described almost exactly the state of French doctrine in 
August 1914, with the three new regulations of October and December 1913 and April 
1914 in place but not fully implemented nor practiced. No such confusion is evident on 
the German side, where continuity and gradual evolution of doctrine seems to have 
prevailed, and where continuous and more or less seamless teaching and practice had 
been the norm for decades. The powerful link between the Kriegsakademie and the 
Great General Staff, and between the army inspectorates and the trainers on the ground, 
meant that the confusion and dislocation experienced by the French during the vital pre–
war period was largely avoided in the German army.   
The argument presented by both Goya and Queloz that French doctrinal 
confusion extended to a general misunderstanding about doctrine at different levels is 
exemplified by an incident during the preparation for the Ardennes attack. Joffre sent de 
Langle an instruction on the eve of the offensive which concluded with the words ‘the 
enemy will be attacked wherever he is found’.21 It has been used to point to the 
supposedly flawed nature of the French doctrine of offensive à outrance. On the 
contrary, it is in fact a clear example of the confusion existing in the minds of French 
                                                 
19 Posen, op. cit., p.30 
 
20 Posen, op. cit., p.55 
 
21 AFGG I/1, Annex 696: [GQG, 21 August, 07.25]: Le commandant en chef au commandant de l’armée 
de Stenay.  ‘L’ennemi sera attaqué partout où on le recontrera.’ 
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officers at all levels about the nature of doctrine. A strategic doctrine which requires an 
army to ‘attack the enemy wherever he is found’ conveys an entirely different intention 
from a tactical doctrine of the same wording.22 Sir John French used similar words in 
his Operational Order Nr.36 on 15 October 1914, and he has not yet been accused of 
championing the cult of the offensive within the BEF.23 The point is that an acceptable 
strategic imperative can become an unacceptable tactical order; the problem with 
Joffre’s exhortation to take the fight to the enemy was that it was repeated verbatim 
down the whole French chain of command. De Langle’s operational order nr.20 for 22 
August started by copying Joffre’s words: ‘Tomorrow, 22, Fourth Army will commence 
its offensive movement to the north supported by Third Army in echelon back on our 
right. The enemy will be attacked wherever he is encountered’.24  And the lowly 9 
régiment de chasseurs à cheval (9 Chasseurs), corps cavalry for 17 CA, noted that when 
it received its orders for 22 August the Colonel then told his men ‘17 Corps must attack 
the enemy wherever he is encountered’.25 Between Joffre and the commander of a 
cavalry regiment, only the two words ‘will be’ (sera) had been changed to ‘must be’ 
(doit), and that is a tactical change for the worse.  
This incident speaks as much to the poor quality of French command as it does 
to the issue of doctrine, but a lack of understanding of the distinction between levels of 
doctrine is clearly exemplified. French regulations stated: ‘The intentions and orders 
                                                 
22 It is worthy of note that no such confusion seems to have existed in German minds. It has been 
highlighted elsewhere in this thesis that the strategic instruction for the German 4 Army was to adopt s 
defensive posture, yet that did not inhibit almost universal tactical offensive behaviour on the battlefield. 
 
23 Nikolas Gardner, Trial by Fire (Praeger, London, 2003), p.125: quoting GHQ Operational Order Nr.36, 
issued at 23.40 on 15 October 1914; ‘...attacking the enemy wherever met’. 
 
24 AFGG I/1, Annex 757: [Fourth Army]: Armée de Stenay, 21 août, 18.00: Ordre général nr.20 
concernant les operations du 22 août: ‘l’ennemi sera attaqué partout où on le rencontrera’. 
 
25 AAT 26N889/1: JMO of 9 Chasseurs, entry for 22 August: ‘Le 17 CA doit attaquer l’ennemi partout où 
on le rencontrera’. 
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received by the various grades of the military hierarchy are put into new instructions 
and orders, or into new orders only, for the use of immediate subordinates. Every effort 
must be made to diminish the time taken in the issue of these new orders.’26 It would 
seem that in practice, insofar as any French officer understood and sought to execute 
that instruction, the final exhortation for speed of transmission outweighed any other 
aspect of the regulation. In contrast, the equivalent German regulation stated: ‘Only in 
very exceptional cases should the orders of a subordinate leader be merely a copy of 
those of his superior with his own additions tacked on. It will be clearer and serve the 
purposes of the superior better, if he writes an independent order containing whatever is 
necessary’.27 The German staff officers also received specific training in the art of 
writing orders: ‘Once the military technical vocabulary had been mastered, orders were 
to be clear, precise, complete, and brief...Brevity implied that orders should never 
contain one word the omission of which would not immediately affect their meaning... 
Training in the art of issuing orders was one goal of war games’.28 It is clear that on the 
French side, none of the officers in the chain of command sought to distinguish between 
strategic and tactical doctrine, but were more concerned with executing a mindless but 
swift mechanical process.  
 
Before moving on from this consideration of overall military doctrine, the issue of the 
French offensive à outrance or ‘cult of the offensive’ must be addressed. Historians in 
the immediate post–war period wrote of it as an official doctrine that was some sort of 
                                                 
26 The Operations of Large Formations (conduite des grandes unités): (translated from the Field Service 
Regulations of the French Army, dated 28th October, 1913, by the General Staff, War Office and 
published by HMSO, London, 1914), hereafter ‘Operations of Large Formations, 1913’, p.29, Article 47 
 
27 German FSR 1900, p.15, Article 55 
 
28 Bucholz, Moltke, pp.192–3 
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aberration, driving  the French army to costly defeats in the opening battles, a view 
which remained common into the 1960s: ‘a disastrous doctrine had, however, been 
spread among them’.29 But modern research has demonstrated that there was a finely 
nuanced difference between an official offensively–minded but basically sound doctrine 
and certain unofficial tenets that seem to have seized the imagination of many in the 
junior ranks of the French officer corps. The difference can be ascribed in great part to 
the influence of a group of ‘Young Turks’ on the French General Staff, and they in turn 
were especially influenced by the two notorious lectures of Colonel de Grandmaison in 
February 1911.30 Grandmaison’s name has been indelibly associated with the supposed 
aberrations of French tactical behaviour in August 1914.31 One might hypothesise that 
there was a clear if subtle difference between official French doctrine and an unofficial 
cult of the offensive. 
 Gat however traces the evolution of what he calls the cult of the offensive from 
its roots, and places it firmly on the main line of French doctrinal development: 
 
When, after 1911, the national revival again changed the political setting, forces 
and ideas which had matured in the previous half–decade suggested themselves 
as possible solutions to the army’s problems. Young middle–ranking officers in 
the general staff advanced the notions of superior morale and out-and-out 
offensive as the answer both to the problems of modern firearms and to German 
material superiority. In this they were expressing, and in turn were supported by, 
                                                 
29 C. Falls, The First World War (Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1960), p.16 
 
30 Colonel de Grandmaison, Deux Conférences faites aux officiers de l’état–major de l’armée (Berger–
Levrault, Paris, 1911) 
 
31 For example: Falls, op. cit., p.16, Porch, op. cit., p.213, A. Clayton, Paths of Glory Cassel, London, 
2003) pp.36–37, I. Ousby, The Road to Verdun (Jonathan Cape, London, 2002) p.28, Doughty, op. cit., 
pp.26,28. 
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the quest for moral regeneration and by the vitalistic philosophies engulfing 
French culture and society. Newly appointed to high command, Joffre perceived 
the ideas of the ‘Young Turks’ as an excellent means to revitalize the army, 
boost its morale, and provide it with a unifying doctrine. The official adoption of 
the doctrine of the offensive and Plan 17 were the result.32  
 
Queloz too pays particular attention to the French army’s doctrine on the eve of 
the war.33 He, like Gat, gives the name offensive à outrance specifically to the doctrine 
enshrined in the totality of the three new French regulations of 1913–1914, rather than 
to a general ethos within the French army.34 But he makes a nice distinction between the 
teachings of Grandmaison and the doctrine codified in the new regulations, arguing that 
whilst they cannot be disassociated from each other, nor can they be regarded as 
identical. He points out (as did Contamine before him35) that many historians (like the 
soldiers at the time) have had difficulty in identifying whether the concept of offensive à 
outrance concerned the strategic level, the tactical level, or both. But he concludes that 
the new regulations were much more balanced and intelligent than is generally thought, 
that while they were characterised by a strong spirit of the offensive, they were 
nevertheless clear, consistent, less schematic and more realistic, embracing modernity 
(aircraft and modern communications); and – perhaps most surprising of all – whilst 
balancing fire and movement in attack, gave an important place to the defensive at the 
tactical level.36  
                                                 
32 Gat, op. cit., pp.402–440 
 
33 Queloz,  op. cit., pp.367–469 
 
34 Ibid., p.371 
 
35 Contamine, Marne, p.124  
 
36 Queloz, op. cit., p.469 
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One is drawn to the conclusion that confusion between tactical and operational 
levels of doctrine seems to lie at the heart of the debate about the nature of offensive à 
outrance. In identifying that fire and movement defined the attack and that the tactical 
defensive had an important part to play, Queloz has finally demolished the old 
Churchillian assertion that ‘the doctrine of the offensive raised to the height of a 
religious frenzy animated all ranks, and in no rank was restricted by the foreknowledge 
of the modern rifle and machine gun.’37 In fact, the new rules advocated taking sensible 
security precautions to avoid unnecessary losses before launching the final decisive 
bayonet attack. The concept of security or protection was central to both French and 
German operational doctrine throughout the period. 
As with the official regulations, Grandmaison’s text is permeated both by the 
offensive spirit and by the advocacy of sûreté.38 Contrary to some impressions, he did 
not advocate the total abandonment of protection of individual columns in his haste to 
advance into contact: ‘Because ultimately [a brigade column] needs to know exactly 
where to strike and to guard against a local surprise attack on its flanks, it will attack 
behind an advance guard and it will reconnoitre its flanks’.39 His earlier work on 
infantry tactics during offensive operations, republished in 1912 and therefore 
concurrent with his operational treatise, makes it clear that he believed that enemy 
defensive fire would pin down any attacking force until fire superiority was obtained to 
allow the assault to go in.40 Nor did he advocate the abandonment of operational sûreté 
                                                                                                                                               
 
37 Churchill, World Crisis 1938, p.218 
 
38 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.17 
 
39 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.34 
 
40 Grandmaison, Dressage de l’infanterie en vue du combat offensif (Berger–Levrault, Paris, 1912) p.5 
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during the offensive. The task of providing protection for the army (mission de 
couverture) was given to the first line security screen: 
 
We will take precautions; we will take them in advance bearing in mind our 
predetermined goals. Having decided to attack as soon as we know where the 
enemy is, we must not risk making contact prematurely on unfavourable 
terrain...We will also cover our flanks as required, and send out mixed arms 
detachments when necessary.41  
 
But Grandmaison also believed, and taught, (at the operational level) that a swift and 
violent advance into contact would fix the enemy on his front, paralyse the enemy 
command and render him incapable of counter–manoeuvre.42 He wrote: 
 
During the offensive, the sûreté of a unit should above all be found from within, 
in its ability to attack, that is to say in the dispositions taken to attack swiftly and 
violently. An adversary attacked brusquely and at many points at once will try to 
parry the blows; he will no longer manoeuvre and will rapidly become incapable 
of all serious offensive action. It is the speed of our engagement which will 
guarantee us surprise and the violence of our attack which will protect us against 
a manoeuvre by our enemy.’43 
 
Grandmaison put forward a balanced argument between traditional protection of 
tactical columns and the additional operational security gained from paralysing one’s 
                                                 
41 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.45 
 
42 Ibid., pp.7,18, 32 
 
43 Ibid., p.25 
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opponent’s ability to manoeuvre. The arguments laid out in his two speeches are 
technical and complex as befitted his professional audience, and cannot be covered 
adequately in this thesis.44 But at the heart of his teaching lies his belief that senior 
French commanders were demonstrating a total atrophy in offensive thought, which 
would lead once again to the sort of command paralysis which had led in turn to the loss 
of the war in 1870–71.45 And he was not alone in this view; the German Military 
Attaché at the French 1908 manoeuvres wrote: ‘overall this year the high command 
showed excessive caution and little enterprise.’ In 1910, the German report concluded: 
‘So the manoeuvre took a slow course and went on all day without decision, over the 
same terrain. The leadership failed to show any appetite for responsibility, the troops 
showed little interest.’46 Grandmaison’s purpose was to inject some much needed 
energy and spirit into the French army within the framework of existing doctrine, 
certainly within the bounds of sensible military technique. But in the end, all that is 
usually remembered of his closely argued theory is his peroration: 
 
Our conclusion will be that we must prepare ourselves and others [for the 
coming war] by cultivating with passion, with exaggeration and down to minute 
details of instruction, all that bears the mark, however small, of the offensive 
spirit. Let us go as far as excess and that will perhaps not be far enough.47  
 
                                                 
 
44 For a longer dissertation on this subject see: Simon J. House, The Scapegoat: Colonel de Grandmaison: 
Deux conférences faites aux officiers de l’état-major de l’armée (Février 1911 ) presented to the 
International Conference of First World War Studies, September 2009 and published on–line at 
www.firstworldwarstudies.org/?m=200907)  
 
45 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.22 
 
46 BA–MA PH 3/655: Reports on French Manoeuvres. 
 
47 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.69  
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Grandmaison’s two speeches fall into the category of an unofficial doctrine, a personal 
set of tenets, albeit delivered from an official platform; on the one hand his influence on 
Joffre’s operational doctrine of 1913–14 is beyond doubt,48 and on the other hand his 
unintended influence on the attitudes and actions of junior officers is equally clear. Even 
a young Charles de Gaulle, who was otherwise a protégé of Pétain, advocate of a 
doctrine based on firepower, fell under the influence of this desire for change: 
 
One must have the offensive spirit. This means that one must in all places and at 
all times have one single idea, that of advancing. As soon as the fighting begins 
everybody in the French army, the commanding general, the chiefs and the 
soldiers have only one idea left – advancing, advancing to the attack, reaching 
the Germans so as to spit them or make them run away.’49  
 
Grandmaison’s unwitting yet pivotal role in spreading an emotionally aggressive ethos 
amongst the younger French officers has become apparent. But his tenure of high office 
was short; he was not, as some historians have assumed, Chief of the Operations Bureau 
during Joffre’s period in command:50 only months after delivering his lectures and 
immediately after the arrival of Joffre as commander–in–chief designate he was sent to 
command 153 RI within 20 CA, where he proved himself to be an excellent field 
officer, rising rapidly to command a group of reserve divisions before being killed in 
action in January 1915. It is ironic that Joffre himself, who ‘admired the young [turks] 
                                                 
48 For example see: Queloz, op. cit., p.440; Contamine, Revanche, p.167; Goya, op. cit., pp.106–109. 
 
49 Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890–1944 (trans. Patrick O’Brian, Collins Harvill, 
London,1990), p.23: quoting from de Gaulle’s personal papers. 
 
50 Porch, op. cit., p.219: ‘Colonel de Grandmaison, chief of the 3rd bureau, was responsible for drawing up 
the controversial 1913 infantry regulations’. And: D. Stevenson, Cataclysm, p.41: ‘Probably influenced 
by advocates of the tactical and strategic offensive such as ... Grandmaison, chief of the operations bureau 
in the E.M.A., he [Joffre] wanted an immediate attack’.  
 
 256 
group for its energy and promise’, also ‘regarded it as one of his primary missions to rid 
the army of its confusion and lack of confidence by providing it with a clear, unified, 
and inspiring doctrine.’51 But he was not granted enough time to implement his new 
regulations properly before the war came; the confusion was, if anything, increased. 
Joffre wrote that his new offensive doctrine was codified into the single new regulation 
‘on the conduct of large units’ (October 1913) and that it was an operational rather than 
tactical doctrine.52 Unfortunately for him, and for the French army, the doctrinal 
confusion within the officer corps and their general failure to distinguish between 
strategic inspiration and tactical movement meant that, whilst most senior officers 
remained unmoved – as evidenced by the number of French generals removed from post 
by 30 August 191453 – a small body of junior officers sought to effect change where 
they could. We must now recognise a clear distinction between the offensive doctrine 
promulgated by Joffre and that occasionally adopted, unofficially, at the tactical level by 
frustrated young officers. 
 
This short examination of doctrinal theory and development has set a context for the 
analysis of the actual performance of both sides in battle at strategic, operational and 
tactical levels. In particular it has identified on the French side a crucial weakness not 
present on the German side, namely doctrinal confusion. This confusion originated in a 
failure to update their 1895 FSR in the light of developments such as the Russo–
Japanese War and a consequent lack of alignment between the higher and lower level 
regulations. Furthermore, the doctrinal debate raged as in Germany but without formal 
resolution until the autumn of 1913, too late to allow improvement, merely adding to 
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the confusion. Arising from this confusion was not only the conflict between the official 
doctrine under which all French soldiers had been trained and the new official doctrine 
only recently promulgated but also a second level of conflict between official and 
unofficial teachings regarding the cult of the offensive, particularly as to which level – 
operations or tactics – it might be applied. It remains to be seen whether there is 
evidence of such confusion on the French side in the engagements analysed in this 
thesis, and whether the Germans demonstrated a more rational application of their own 
doctrine at each level. 
 
Strategic Doctrine 
At the strategic level, military doctrine is an expression of how grand strategy will be 
implemented through war. Grand strategy  – ‘that collection of military, economic, and 
political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security’54– requires 
analysis of likely threats and the formulation of political, military or other remedies for 
those threats.55 The prioritisation of means and the establishment of a preferred 
structure and organisation for the employment of military forces to respond to 
recognised threats and opportunities arguably constitute the basis of a strategic doctrine. 
According to Posen it ‘includes the preferred mode of a group of services, a single 
service, or a subservice for fighting wars. It reflects the judgements of professional 
military officers, and to a lesser but important extent civilian leaders, about what is and 
is not militarily possible and necessary’.56  
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Following Posen’s analysis, it is clear that both France and Germany adopted 
offensive strategies, albeit for different reasons. Snyder’s conclusion is that neither side 
based its choice on ‘a rational strategic calculus’, but on many irrational factors such as 
‘military bias’ and perceived changed in the military balance of power.57 One may 
justifiably add that the French army’s rational strategic calculus of military need had led 
Joffre to advocate an immediate advance into Belgium, only for French politicians to 
deny him that option for reasons of grand strategy. Conversely it has been argued that 
the failure on the German army’s part to integrate their war planning with foreign policy 
led to undue military bias in the decision to commit their main attack through Belgium. 
 Most of the complex arguments put forward by Posen, Wallach, Snyder and 
others do not bear directly upon the issue of why the Battle of the Ardennes turned out 
as it did. But it is interesting to note where the Ardennes operation falls in the spectrum 
of analysis of strategic doctrine. On the one hand, the evidence from the battle chapters 
shows clearly that the Germans adopted an unusual ‘strategic defensive/tactical 
offensive’ doctrine in the Ardennes, although this has not yet been fully recognised by 
historians. Duke Albrecht’s 4 Army’s operational mission was to defend the gap 
between the Metz fortified region and the left flank of the Schwenkungsflügel; yet in 
every tactical engagement his troops advanced into contact. The Crown Prince’s 5 
Army was instructed not to advance beyond the defensive potential of the Chiers and 
Crusnes rivers, but during the advance each of his corps attacked their opponents 
wherever they encountered them. On the other hand, the French strategy was clearly 
that of counter–offensive, a direct response to the German manoeuvre into central 
Belgium, rather than an outright offensive à outrance, as some have claimed.58 What is 
                                                 
57 J. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision making and the disasters of 1914 (Cornell 
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58 For example: Gat, op. cit., p.436; Tyng, op. cit., p.75 
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more, Joffre envisaged an envelopment strategy, not a frontal attack. The operational 
study has shown that from the first day of the war Joffre was altering the dispositions 
laid out in Plan XVII in order to put greater focus on his left wing; the timing of the 
launch of his counter–strike was geared to an appreciation of German movements.  
One other issue is often cited as a key flaw in French strategic doctrine: the 
failure to use reserve units in the front line. Regarding Germany’s use of reserve corps, 
the study of the battles in the second part of this thesis has confirmed what a vital role 
was played by 18 RAK at Neufchâteau and by 5 RAK and 6 RAK at Longwy. The 
failure of French intelligence correctly to predict such use, despite evidence to the 
contrary, was clearly a significant error on the part of the French high command. But 
Gat argues that the issue of the reserves was not as crucial to the events of 1914 as has 
been claimed in retrospect. He points out that ‘the French high command fed its 
available reserve–units [sic] into battle very quickly, even before the German practice 
was fully recognised’.59 In support of Gat’s assertion, this study has noted the attempted 
use by Ruffey of divisions from 3 Reserve Group to extend his defensive flank on 22 
August – an attempt frustrated not by doctrine but by slow deployment. Furthermore it 
is often forgotten that each French corps had an integral brigade of reserve troops, and 
this study has shown that in one encounter at least – that of 12 CA at Neufchâteau – the 
two reserve regiments were committed into action on that very first day. On de Langle’s 
left flank, 60 DIR, initially employed to protect the Meuse and Semoy crossings in 4 
Army’s rear, was instructed on 21 August to cover the left flank of 11 CA during the 
attack.60 And orders for 23 August placed both 60 and 52 DIRs in the front line.61 The 
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evidence shows that the issue of the French reluctance to use reserve formations in the 
front line is by no means as clear cut as has hitherto been assumed. 
In short, at the level of strategic doctrine, what the two sides had in common was 
the strategic intent to gain and keep the initiative through offensive action, with the 
object of bringing about – on their own terms – the big decisive battle that would bring 
a swift end to the war.62 In this sense it is argued that both sides implemented in the 
broadest sense a strategic doctrine of offensive à outrance and, if anything, Germany’s 
was less flexible than that of France.  
 
Operational Doctrine 
Turning to the operational level, it is difficult to discern a specific written doctrine for 
operations as opposed to tactics, on either side. The issues of size and scale and the need 
for operational manoeuvre melding into combat were being increasingly recognised, 
and the word ‘operation’ was being used with increasing frequency in articles and 
books;63 but there were not yet any specific operational regulations. There was, and is 
even today, further doctrinal confusion between definition of higher level ‘operational 
art’ and what has been called ‘grand tactics’. The debate still has some way to run. 
 As has been briefly mentioned above, the FSRs on each side are now being called 
‘operational’ regulations but were not necessarily recognised as such at the time. One 
can appreciate how difficult it is to apply our modern concept of ‘operations’ to French 
and German pre–war FSRs, and how the intellectual debate about the difference 
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between ‘operational art’ and ‘grand tactics’ has not yet fully played out, by the fact that 
both French and German FSRs contain articles which clearly overlap into the tactical 
domain, that is to say the encounter. The French 1895 RSC contains a detailed section 
on ‘combat’ and the German 1908 FSR includes a new section on ‘fire effect’64, both of 
which will be examined below as part of the discussion of tactics. 
  Before the war, only Grandmaison attempted to differentiate between 
operational rules for large units (armies) and regulations for tactical units (corps and 
below).65 Even then, his primary objective was to suggest a way in which Germany 
might be beaten in the coming war;66 the differentiation between operational and 
tactical doctrine was a by–product of his thinking, arising from his belief that it was the 
conduct of large units by senior commanders that was deficient and needed greater 
definition and clarity.67 The result of his influence was the splitting of the 1895 FSR 
into two new regulations in 1913, one for operational, the other for tactical units. But, 
notable as that development was in the theory of doctrine, it must not be forgotten that 
the French army had been trained under the old 1895 regulations. So a comparison of 
the way in which the French RSR of 1895 and the German FSRs of 1900 and 1908 were 
put into practice will help determine the influence of doctrine on events at the 
operational level.  
The most striking difference between the two sides’ FSRs is one of style; the 
German conveys a sense of guidance and advice: ‘the best reconnaissance is useless if 
its results become known to the commanding general too late’68 – whereas the French is 
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somewhat more directive, or prescriptive: ‘the purpose of reconnaissance is to give the 
commander general information’.69  In this respect they very much reflect the prevailing 
military ethos of their respective armies.  
FSRs laid down rules (articles) covering the management of military units in the 
field, but they did not generally differentiate between a regiment, division, corps or 
army. Only occasionally and in a specific context did certain articles start to 
acknowledge this question of scale, for example the German FSR of 1900 (article 142) 
makes a point of differentiating between the sûreté of an army as opposed to individual 
columns.70 French regulations did not make this difference until 1913. Leaving to one 
side for the moment the sections on ‘combat’ and ‘fire power’, which are arguably 
tactical issues, the key issues of the FSR concerned intelligence and security during 
manoeuvre.  
 
The operational study has demonstrated that both sides experienced failings in the 
gathering and use of intelligence, but that those on the French side led to the greater 
misfortune. One can point particularly to the lack of urgency with which de Langle’s 
corps commanders reported back to him about what was happening on the battlefields, 
leaving him powerless to exert any effective operational control. The conduct of 
General Eydoux at Maissin was a most striking example, allowing de Langle to believe 
mistakenly for over seven hours that the village was in French hands. On the German 
side, the failing was one of resource. The long–range cavalry patrols performed by the 
HKK earlier in the campaign were, in the lead up to the battle, directed west towards 
Dinant rather than south towards Sedan; only the short–range patrols of the divisional 
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cavalry squadrons prevented tactical as well as operational surprise. On both sides, 
doctrine regarding intelligence gathering failed to be applied effectively, if for different 
reasons. 
Regarding security, the German failure on the southern flank in the Ardennes, 
seldom recognised by historians in the past, stemmed from that same lack of resource. 
In front of von Hausen’s 3 Army von Richtofen’s cavalry corps with its jaeger infantry, 
its horse artillery and its machine gun companies provided, as per doctrine, a strong 
security screen to good effect in front of Dinant.71  The absence of a similar force on the 
southern flank was keenly felt. German march security was somewhat better than the 
French, overall good with some random weaknesses. On the good side, 25 ID advancing 
on Maissin and Anloy in two columns, halted when the divisional cavalry patrols 
reported in whilst their commander took stock. He sent his field artillery routinely to 
occupy good defensive firing positions on nearby heights without even knowing the full 
extent of the opposition. Artillery officers accompanied cavalry patrols in order to find 
fresh firing positions for the artillery to leapfrog into. But despite these precautions, one 
infantry battalion of that very division marched in column within range of French 
infantry lining the edge of some woods south of Anloy, and suffered casualties before 
deploying and going to ground. And at Neufchâteau, French colonial riflemen were able 
to surprise a supply column of 21 RID with flanking rifle fire, for lack of proper 
German flanking protection. In contrast, in a proper application of doctrine, at nearby 
Bertrix the commander of 21 ID sent a classic flank guard of two infantry companies 
down the railway line that delineated his vulnerable left flank.  
The French situation is complex, because of the confusion about doctrines. 
According to the 1895 FSR, each column was responsible for its own protection, 
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requiring advance, flank and rear guards with corps cavalry out in front to provide 
longer range security. In practice it was randomly different in every case. Eydoux of 11 
CA, who failed the intelligence and communication test, nevertheless applied the old 
security doctrine well. His cavalry regiment, well out in front of his advance guard, met 
the enemy patrols early, chased them back, occupied Maissin and reported back – 
allowing Eydoux to tell de Langle (erroneously as it turned out) that Maissin was in 
French hands. Eydoux also sent an infantry battalion with a battery of guns and a 
squadron of cavalry out on his forward left flank at Porcheresse, to guard against any 
surprise from that direction. But General Boelle, of 4 CA (3 Army), in an example not 
elaborated in this study, failed to send his corps cavalry north through the forest to 
reconnoitre or a mixed arms detachment to cover his infantry advance and as a result 
wrecked Ruffey’s operational plan. General Poline (17 CA) operated a strange system, 
setting a strong fixed flank guard at de Langle’s direction but then allowing his infantry 
columns to advance beyond it into contact without even the flank protection prescribed 
by the 1895 rules. In short, the French performance regarding operational security 
varied from clear incompetence to proper execution of the 1895 rules, with variations in 
between. 
Overall there is little evidence of a consistently competent application of the 
1895 FSR by the French commanders, whereas the Germans showed much greater 
consistency in applying their own doctrinal rules of 1908. However, due to the 
confusion of doctrine evident on the French side, their performance should also be 
measured against both Grandmaison’s teachings and the new rules of October 1913, to 
see if there is evidence of the application of those doctrines. 
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The question whether Grandmaison’s personal doctrine was applied in August 1914 is 
easily answered – it was not. Grandmaison’s two lectures laid out a clear plan for a new 
method of defeating Germany in the coming war. It proposed to take advantage of a 
perceived weakness on the German side; Grandmaison had observed, or thought he had 
observed at the German manoeuvres he had attended, a tendency for the German 
commanders to take their time planning and preparing, before they launched their 
violent and rapid attack.72 
  He proposed to take advantage of that perceived German delay by launching his 
own pre–emptive strike. Advancing at speed behind a corps–strength advance guard 
(sûreté de première ligne73) that would fix and hold the enemy along his whole front, 
the French army commander would use intelligence delivered to him on the march to 
choose the decisive point at which to concentrate his main force and, without stopping 
or hesitating, deliver the decisive assault.74 Grandmaison himself admitted at the time 
that the French army would have to improve considerably before attempting his 
proposed methods.75 So it is hardly surprising to note that neither de Langle de Cary nor 
Ruffey attempted to advance behind a sûreté de première ligne, nor throw their armies 
precipitously forward.76 
Queloz concurs with the conclusion that the new regulation of 28 October 1913 
on the operation of large formations is recognisably taken from Grandmaison’s 
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teachings, but is not identical. The difference is evident in the preamble written by the 
committee of the CSC that produced the document for the War Minister’s approval, 
which fails to make a clear choice in favour of the key tenets of Grandmaison’s 
operational theory: 
 
So far as regards the conception of the plan of battle, the Committee has been 
confronted by two different theories. The first, which would extend to an army 
the principles contained in Section XIV [on combat] of the Field Service 
Regulations (1895), bases the battle on successive actions (preparatory 
engagements lasting sometimes several days – decisive attack launched when 
the preparation is considered sufficient). The second theory is based on the 
synchronization of efforts in the battle (secondary actions holding the enemy on 
the whole or part of his line – principle action against a wing). After 
examination, the Committee considered that there was no need to choose 
between the two systems, each of which has its value, and the application of 
which is above all a question of circumstances. It has been decided to leave to 
the commander, who is alone capable of appreciating all the factors which affect 
his decision, the absolute right of making his choice in complete freedom.77   
 
By avoiding a decision between two conflicting operational doctrines, the CSG was in 
one sense opting out (and increasing confusion) but in another sense leaning towards the 
German model where individual senior commanders were expected to use their 
experience and judgement to do the right thing within a loose framework of oral and 
written teaching. By letting French army commanders in August 1914 choose between 
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two operational doctrines, the French War Minister was to inadvertently highlight the 
qualitative differences between the one hundred–year–old embedded German system 
(Kriegsakademie, General Staff rides, war games, map exercises, inspections) which 
gave their generals the skills to exercise sound judgement in the field, and that of 
France, whose systems and processes, especially in the period of ‘republicanisation’ 
between 1900 and 1911, failed to develop the required standard of military proficiency 
in their future field commanders. The deficiencies in French senior command 
performance noticed by Grandmaison, Joffre and others during the autumn manoeuvres 
from at least 1908 onwards were not properly addressed before the war and therefore 
had to be eradicated as the war progressed. 
 There remains then to see whether any attempts were made to put the new 
October 1913 regulations into practice in August 1914. With regard to army security, 
the new rules said:  
 
The decree of 28 May 1895, concerning the Field Service Regulations, does not 
touch upon the operations of formations larger than the army corps...The 
Committee considers that [for the operation of large formations] the cavalry 
corps is not sufficiently strong to carry out the many tasks which are given it and 
that the duty of strategical protection, as indicated by the decree of 28 May 1895 
leads to a dispersion of force.78 
 
Instead, the new regulation advocated ‘the employment of detachments of all arms 
(protective detachments) [which] will permit him to gain the necessary time and space 
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for the development of his manoeuvre’.79 The operational study has shown how Joffre 
authorised de Langle on 20 August to send mixed–arms detachments forward to protect 
the advance of his army; this certainly seems to be in line with the new regulation. The 
execution, however, was imperfect on two counts: firstly de Langle did not put the 
detachments in place until the late evening of 21 and early morning of 22 August, 
thereby failing to use them to gather useful intelligence for the final stage before 
contact; secondly due in part to the ‘stepped–echelon’ formation and in part to poor 
performance, they failed in their primary mission of protecting the main columns. One 
concludes that there is no evidence of the application of the ‘Grandmaison’ model, 
instead an imperfect application of part–1895, part–1913 doctrine at the operational 
level.  
 
Turning to the higher operational level, that unregulated grey area called operational art, 
the battles generally demonstrate on the German side the very conditions described by 
Wallach as having been taught by Schlieffen. 5 AK at Virton and Ethe (not described in 
detail in this thesis) operated in two separate divisional actions, but in each action the 
divisional commander sought to fix his enemy in front and envelop either one or both 
flanks.80 Similarly at Rossignol, the commander of 6 AK achieved a double 
envelopment of 3 DIC, fixing in place both the colonial advance guard and the 
neighbouring 4 DI, before moving supports to the flanks. 50 Brigade at Maissin 
attempted the same despite being seriously outnumbered and eventually forced to 
retreat.  
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The essence of this operational system was, according to Gat, intellectual 
flexibility and an understanding of the chaotic nature of war:  
 
The fundamental conception of the nature of war and military theory clearly set 
the framework within which every military question, past or present, was 
approached and judged. On the one hand, all dogma was rejected, and allowance 
made for great theoretical flexibility. On the other, a whole cluster of ideas was 
regarded as embedded in the very nature of the phenomenon of war, which was 
unaffected by change. ‘Lasting nature’ and ‘changing forms’ cohabited. This 
was not merely the bequest of Clausewitz and Moltke; it expressed the all–
pervasive and fundamental tenets of German culture.81  
 
In action, this unwritten German system expressed itself in an operational doctrine akin 
to the ‘Grandmaison’ model, ironically just as Grandmaison had identified and 
predicted.82 Furthermore it is impossible not to be struck by the similarity between what 
they put into practice in August 1914 and what Goya describes as the Napoleonic 
system taught by General Bonnal at ESG in the 1890s. The large and powerful German 
HKK cavalry screens were, in French terminology, sûreté de première ligne. Goya has 
written of Bonnal’s Napoleonic system, which he asserts was the basis of the French 
1895 Field Regulations: ‘The cavalry, operating several days’ march in front of the 
main body, has the task of scouting and protecting against any surprise by surrounding 
the infantry columns with a protective zone. It must make contact with the enemy and 
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establish his strength.’83 The efficacy of this German application of operational doctrine 
can be shown by the fact that in the one instance where they did not implement it, their 
Fourth Army fell victim to operational surprise.  
Both French and German planners had recognised that the technological 
improvements during the first decade of the twentieth century had undermined the 
ability of traditional cavalry to provide effective security. The German response to this 
problem was to strengthen their HKK with mobile Jaeger infantry, horse artillery and 
mobile machine gun detachments, as well as training them to fight dismounted. The 
French, on the other hand, seem to have developed the concept of strong mixed–arms 
detachments formed around infantry, arguably stronger but less mobile.  
Operational art on the French side seems not to have developed with anything 
like the same level of skill or confidence. Lacking that intellectual flexibility and 
understanding of the chaotic nature of war that Gat identifies as German attributes, the 
‘all–pervasive and fundamental tenets’ of French culture seem to have centred around a 
logical and structured codification of requirement. For example, Article 13 of the 
October 1913 regulation for the conduct of large units required the commander to 
arrange a plan of action,84 to ‘consider with an open mind the various alternatives open 
to his opponent’. It emphasised that ‘any disposition prompted by a definite opinion 
arbitrarily formed concerning the intentions of the enemy would be premature so long 
as the enemy remains free to move’. It is easier to write such instructions than to absorb 
them into one’s mind set and enact them spontaneously when under pressure. And it is 
clear that neither de Langle nor Ruffey took these dicta to heart when seeking to 
implement Joffre’s instructions. 
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Strachan has written that ‘Joffre was wrong to conclude that the Germans would 
not fight in the wooded and broken ground of the Ardennes but would be found on the 
other side’85; true, but his two army commanders must shoulder the responsibility for 
the operational detail. De Langle’s one secret and personal briefing of his corps 
commanders shows him to have had an unclear and essentially erroneous idea of his 
opponent’s position and intentions, despite intelligence details that might have 
enlightened him if interpreted correctly. He left his tactical commanders with a false 
sense of security regarding the enemy’s whereabouts that exacerbated their own tactical 
weaknesses. Ruffey failed to appreciate that his opponent might advance on him, and 
gave operational orders, especially to 5 CA, which ignored the realities of his 
opponent’s position around Longwy. Articles 32–36 of the October 1913 rules 
concerned strategic reconnaissance, in which ‘the commanders of armies have at their 
disposal for this purpose large bodies of cavalry formed into divisions’.86 Ruffey chose 
to deploy his one cavalry division on what he perceived his most vulnerable point, his 
right flank; but his cavalry commander failed him, and he had no sûreté de première 
ligne to his front. De Langle had a provisional cavalry corps of two divisions, and gave 
them appropriate orders which were obeyed on 20 and 21 August and which gave him 
vital intelligence (which he ignored); but on 22 August the cavalry commander failed to 
provide the required screen in front of the army, and contributed to the flawed execution 
of Joffre’s strategic intent.  
 When it came to the exercise of individual judgement in the execution of 
operational matters, French commanders were sadly lacking. This study has shown 
examples of divisional commanders such as Rabier of 4 DI deliberately ignoring 
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operational orders that he thought were unachievable; and Radiguet of 21 DI at Maissin 
whose painfully slow advance turned a supposed envelopment of an enemy flank into a 
frontal attack on a new axis. It has shown how 5 CA’s commander (Brochin) asked his 
infantry to move to assault enemy trenches of unknown strength in a fog without 
artillery when his orders required him to undertake a twenty kilometre route march. It 
has demonstrated that at Maissin and at Neufchâteau, Generals Eydoux and Roques 
failed to use their cavalry regiments in the prescribed manner to threaten their enemy’s 
flank and rear. The full list of French operational failure is longer, leading to the 
conclusion that, whatever happened at the tactical level, senior French generals were 
outclassed and outmanoeuvred in the field.  
Terrain was difficult, making liaison between columns both necessary and 
complicated; but it was difficult for both sides, and the Germans fared better than the 
French. The German 49 brigade of 25 ID at Anloy sought and obtained the help of an 
artillery battery from neighbouring 21 ID at Ochamps,87 whereas the French 34 DI on 
the same battlefield failed to protect 21 DI’s flank. At Rossignol the German 10 ID’s 
column cooperated with that of 11 ID to complete the encirclement and destruction of 3 
DIC, as described above, whereas the French 4 DI was too tired and disorganised to 
protect the Colonials’ flank. At Neufchâteau the German 25 RID successfully marched 
to the rescue of the beleaguered 21 RID, whereas the French 23 DI only succeeded in 
firing on its own side.  
To sum up the comparison of operational doctrine with actual performance, it is 
fair to say that one can identify elements of both the 1895 and 1913 regulations being 
applied in a confused way on the French side; but the overwhelming impression is one 
of poor execution, of a variety of levels of skill and judgement being applied, from the 
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very poor to the mediocre but nowhere achieving the standard set by their opponents. 
The evidence on the German side shows clear signs that Schlieffen’s teachings, and 
those of the Kriegsakademie and General Staff, had been learned, absorbed and put into 
practice. 
 
Tactical Doctrine   
In the French FSR of 1895, section XIV is the all–important section on ‘Combat’. It is 
important to remember the key principles (‘general considerations’) which it sets out 
were those under which virtually all the officers and soldiers who fought in August 
1914 were trained. They stated, inter alia, that combat can be either offensive or 
defensive but always its objective is to break by force the enemy’s will and impose 
yours on him, but only the offensive can obtain decisive results; that the principle of 
engagement is to ‘fix’ all known enemy forces with the minimum necessary force, to 
keep part of your force ready for the violent, concentrated effort at the decisive point 
and to hold a reserve ready to follow up success or limit the effect of failure. Note that, 
even in 1895, the French called this follow up la poursuite à outrance. Finally it was 
envisaged that a decisive effort against a wing or a flank would require shorter but more 
energetic preparation, whereas a longer, fuller preparation would be required when two 
well–prepared adversaries confront each other.88 One can see that at the level of grand 
tactics, the rules of 1895 were not too far removed from the ‘Grandmaison’ model.  
The general principles attached to each arm in the tactical section of the 1895 
FSR (above) were supplemented by detailed tactical instructions. For the French 
infantry, their doctrine was encapsulated in the règlements de manoeuvre d’infanterie 
(RMI) of 1904, which remained current until April 1914 and which ‘guided the training 
                                                 
88  French FSR 1895, Article 128,  pp.196–197 
 
 274 
of French infantry up until the outbreak of war.’89 It was a doctrine of fire and 
movement and, acknowledging the effect of smokeless powder, modern rifles and 
quick–firing artillery, it advocated more open deployment of troops. It was a product of 
General André’s ministry – a time when inspections were abolished and individual 
(republican) responsibility encouraged – so unsurprisingly it advocated dispersed 
formations in which the section of fifty men was the basic tactical unit and the section 
commander’s role was all–important.90 The intention was to ‘develop a spirit of 
initiative at all levels in order to achieve “more flexibility and speed in deployment and 
greater variety in combat formations”’.91 Such a sophisticated system required well–
trained soldiers and even better trained officers. But there was a shortage of NCOs, of 
officers and of trainers throughout the period.92 And there was a shortage of training 
facilities, leading to soldiers spending too much time in barracks and doing route 
marches and drill instead of field exercises.93 When General Menestrel inspected 11 CA 
in 1913 his report concluded: 
 
We must recognise that there are serious failings in the combat training of the 
infantry stemming in great part from our regulations of 3 December 1904. Under 
the pretext of developing initiative at all levels and of allowing subordinate 
commanders the choice of means, we have refrained from issuing rules of even 
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slight precision. Our cadres have been deprived of the directives which they 
need. They must be given them as soon as possible.94 
 
But it was already too late. There was little time for combat training in the spring of 
1914, and 11 CA fought at Maissin on 22 August as described in Chapter Four. Indeed 
it was one of that unit’s subordinate commanders, battalion commander Lafouge of 
II/93 RI, who launched his men across more than a kilometre of open ground without 
waiting for the artillery in his column to deploy in support.95 And one can see in several 
other examples analysed in the battle chapters how much the performance of a unit 
depended upon the quality of an individual officer; and how, as in the case of 24 DI at 
Neufchâteau, a senior officer had to take control, only for the attack to grind to a halt 
when that senior officer was absent. After Colonel Descoings was wounded and once 
the initial élan had worn off, battalions appear to have waited for the artillery to literally 
blast the enemy out of small copses before they would advance. So too with 23 DI; it 
has been shown how panic set in amongst several infantry units and they had to be 
rallied with flags and bugles by a brigade commander before they would advance 
against minimal resistance.  
On the other hand, Colonel Chapès of 19 RI at Maissin executed a text–book 
infantry attack, using fire and movement in small rushes over a few hundred metres of 
open ground supported on the flanks by machine guns for extra fire power, after using 
the terrain to approach in relative safety. And at Neufchâteau, the experienced infantry 
of 5 Colonial Brigade conducted an exemplary engagement using fire and movement in 
both offense and defence against increasingly overwhelming numbers.  
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Goya’s research supports the case outlined above, concluding that the 1904 RMI 
contained many faults and weaknesses: it broke with the more formal structures of the 
1895 RSC, thereby sowing confusion; it placed heavy responsibility on junior officers 
who would need the very best instruction and practice themselves to implement it; and 
its abstract style meant that its content and meaning was beyond most officers’ 
comprehension.96 To compound these weaknesses, there were many technological 
changes during the ten years leading up to 1914, which arguably required the RMI to be 
amended. The Germans, for example, issued a revision to their infantry instructions in 
July 1905 in order to accommodate machine guns into tactical doctrine.97 Further issues 
in 1906 and 1908 incorporated the lessons of the Russo–Japanese war. Perhaps the 
French tactical confusion on the battlefields of August 1914 owed more to their failure 
to update the 1904 RMI than has hitherto been recognised. In the absence of a new 
infantry regulation between 1904 and 1914, Grandmaison’s less famous work, his 
Dressage de l’infanterie en vue du combat offensive,98 was one of many unofficial 
publications which must have contributed to French officers’ confusion, especially 
when the unofficial doctrines allowed for recent innovations and developments where 
the official doctrine did not.  
The role of French field artillery bears detailed examination, especially because 
of its pre–war reputation and that of its 75mm field gun. In so many cases, this study 
has identified instances where the artillery was slow to deploy, got lost on the march, 
failed to find proper firing positions; and there were many cases where the infantry 
either consequently or independently attacked without artillery support, let alone 
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preparation. These are issues of execution, not doctrine. Articles 129 and 135 of the 
1895 RSC laid down clear rules for artillery preparation of the attack. Grandmaison’s 
two lectures, even when applied erroneously to the tactical level, refer to the use of 
artillery batteries alongside infantry in the advance guard;99 his tactical doctrine 
explicitly states that against superior artillery the infantry would not be able to get to 
within rifle range of the enemy, whereas when supported by a more powerful artillery it 
would get much closer before opening fire;100 the 1913 FSR states clearly (Article 125) 
that ‘the primary duty of the artillery is to support the advance of the infantry’ and that 
(Article 99) ‘as a general principle the artillery is close to the head of the main body of 
each column, ready to intervene quickly in the action.’101 Some historians have argued 
that relegating artillery from a preparatory to a support role was a grave error within the 
doctrine of the offensive. But Grandmaison made it clear that the term ‘support’ 
included achieving fire superiority before launching the decisive attack, a subtle but 
important distinction.102  
  In describing the cooperation between infantry and artillery, the new regulations 
specified that: 
The artillery…must in fact profit by the first encounters of the infantry to 
attempt to gain from the very beginning superiority over the hostile 
batteries in action...in the preparatory action the infantry must be 
employed with economy, so that the commander can keep as much of it 
as possible for the attack.103  
                                                 
99 Grandmaison, Deux Conférences, p.15 
 
100 Grandmaison, Dressage, p.6 
 
101 The Operation of Large Formations, 1913, op. cit., Article 99 
 
102 Grandmaison, Dressage, pp.24–25 
 
103 The Operation of Large Formations, 1913, op. cit., Article 117 
 278 
 
The performance of the French artillery in the Ardennes encounters bears no 
resemblance to any of the various doctrines, official or unofficial, current at the time. 
Given time and superior numbers, as at Virton or Neufchâteau, the French artillery did 
eventually manage to achieve fire superiority. But it was the German speed and 
flexibility, born of better combined-arms training, together with a desire to fire first and 
in quantity rather than waiting for designated targets, which gave the German artillery 
arm the edge. 
 As for the cavalry arm, a similar situation can be discerned. The 1895 RSC 
(Article 133) required the cavalry to scout and provide information to the commander; 
in combat it was to act against the enemy’s flank or rear. Two clear opportunities have 
been identified by this study – at Maissin and at Neufchâteau – for corps cavalry 
regiments to work around the enemy flank and operate effectively against his rear; 
neither was taken and the cavalry remained passive. Scouting and provision of 
information by de Langle’s cavalry was patchy, and definitely deficient during the 
crucial twelve hours before contact; Ruffey’s cavalry division was ineffective.  
 Overall, the evidence from this study supports the assertion that French tactical 
doctrine was confused during August 1914. It has been shown that individual 
engagements evidence a range of tactical behaviours, some recognisable as akin to one 
or other of the doctrines debated between 1904 and 1914, others simply demonstrating a 
complete absence of doctrine. Most demonstrate a low level of military competence, 
pointing towards deficiencies in practice and training. 
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German tactical doctrine seems to have been more solidly grounded in a set of clear and 
(compared to the French) unified regulations. The tactical section on fire power 
included in the 1908 FSR clearly aimed to consolidate the twin doctrinal principles of 
(i) establishing fire superiority before assault and (ii) using open order tactics in the 
attack.104  It laid out some key precepts:  
 
The fire effect of infantry…will be materially impaired by the effect of the 
enemy’s fire. Enfilade fire is especially effective.105 Lines of skirmishers on the 
move in the open will suffer severely from the fire of unshaken infantry at 
medium and even long ranges. Their losses will increase with the density of the 
skirmishing lines. Long and uninterrupted advances of dense skirmishing lines 
are therefore impossible under effective hostile fire at short and medium ranges. 
A further advance can consequently only be effected by working forward 
gradually, supported by fire from alternate flanks.106 The result of a bayonet 
charge depends upon the losses already inflicted on the enemy by infantry and 
artillery fire, and upon the vigour of the charge.107  
 
As with the French, the tactical element of the German FSR was supplemented by rules 
for individual arms. The key infantry document was the Exerzier–Reglement für die 
Infanterie (1906), which had been published to include the lessons learned from the 
Russo–Japanese war. There was a consistency and coherence in what was published and 
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when. But it was not completely straightforward. The debate leading to these revised 
regulations, conducted over a long period from 1888 onwards, followed a narrow path 
of compromise between the theories of different military thinkers such as Scherff, 
Schlichting and Caemmerer, as well as staunch traditionalists such as General von 
Plessen, seeking to find a balance between open order tactics and delegated command 
on the one hand and on the other hand the control and cohesion required to make liaison 
between infantry and artillery work effectively.108 Noting Gat’s argument, quoted above 
regarding the great theoretical flexibility with which the Germans addressed doctrinal 
issues, one can better understand what Brose has written about the 1906 Infantry 
regulations: 
 
Genuinely impressed by the heroic efforts of Japan, the German infantry 
rededicated itself to the offensive. Indeed, the aggressive spirit of certain 
passages almost seemed to contradict the commitment in other parts to dispersed 
formations; prudent use of terrain, foxholes, and field fortifications; waiting for 
artillery support; and patiently developing the attack.109 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, given the known German tactical imperative for achieving fire 
superiority, ‘charging with the bayonet was still considered the finishing act of the 
attack.’110 Only a well–trained cadre leading well–trained troops could implement such 
a complex tactical double–act. And it is noticeable that during the time that the 
theoretical debate was working itself out in public, individual divisional and corps 
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commanders could – and did – decide to change tactics from close–order to open–order 
formations and back again, confidently expecting their disciplined regiments to respond 
in an effective and professional manner: 
 
A tactical experiment was held outside Berlin at the Döberitz parade ground in 
February 1902...The purpose was to test the new attacking techniques used in 
the Boer War and ‘to pay more attention than usual to the ravaging effect of 
modern weapons.’ After a second drill and considerable publicity that winter 
and spring, the division exercised before William II at Templehof in May 
1902.111 
 
This example was of the elite Prussian 1 Guard Division; and in the spring exercises of 
May 1903 Guard Corps commander Lieutenant–General von Kessel ‘reverted to 
assaults with massed battalion and company columns.’112 One might expect the Prussian 
Guard to be perfectly disciplined, but the example was not confined to the elite. In 1904 
Karl von Bülow, commander of 3 AK, trained his units: 
 
to stay in dispersed skirmish lines as long as possible. Every method of advance 
was fair in wartime: slithering, crawling, or short sprints to the next available 
cover...repeated drill and “the fullest possible use of leaders in the ranks” would 
teach every man what he had to do. The key was close hand–and–eye contact 
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among squad, platoon and company officers and NCOs during the advance, 
practiced to the point of ‘meticulous order’.113 
 
The debate between traditionalists who favoured close–packed frontal infantry 
assaults and modernists who advocated open–order skirmish and ‘fire and movement’ 
attacks was settled in favour of the latter by the 1906 regulations.114 But that did not 
stop individual corps commanders from ignoring official doctrine and continuing to use 
their own preferred methods despite General Staff pressure and inspection reports. 
There were in 1904 and 1907 manoeuvres lapses back into linear formations.115 And 
there were in August 1914 several examples of close order assault which somewhat 
tarnished the reputation of the ‘institutionalised excellence’ of the German army at war: 
for example 10 AK at Liège,116 9 AK at Mons;117 and in the Ardennes, Prince Oskar’s 
Prussian Grenadiers at Virton.118 However, the overall standard of adherence to doctrine 
was very high, as can be seen in the battles of 22 August. 
 But there was evidence too of practical flexibility and improvisation, when the 
situation warranted it, especially in combined arms cooperation. At Anloy, 116 IR’s 
junior infantry officers hauled a howitzer into the front line to boost their fire power; 
their regimental commander chose to deploy his whole machine–gun company, six guns 
en masse, at the critical point on his left flank; the infantry, far from concealing 
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themselves in trenches, went forward in short rushes, gaining ground by fire and 
movement.119 They held off the best part of a French division all afternoon and evening, 
using their artillery support to best advantage. In their regimental historian’s opinion, 
their French opponent ‘showed no sign of that furious impulse to press forward which 
had become second nature to our infantrymen.’120 Elsewhere, for further example, the 
company commanders of III/125 IR west of Longwy led their men through thick fog 
using compasses to find the direction of their designated objective, whereas their 
opponents, 113 and 191 RIs from the Paris garrison failed to stand under fire and ran.121 
The close cooperation between infantry and artillery was as much doctrine as 
improvisation. In April 1907 the Field Artillery Regulations had been revised to include 
instructions that would ensure that ‘close co–operation with foot soldiers – eschewed in 
1866, achieved in 1870, and glorified thereafter – could not be lost in the next war’.122 
The study of the Ardennes encounter battles in Section Two has shown how well 
rehearsed that combined arms doctrine had been, and how well it had been put into 
practice.  
German artillery doctrine differed from the French in one key respect: the new 
section on ‘fire effect’ in the German 1908 FSR included specific principles for the 
incorporation of heavy artillery into field doctrine. It said: ‘The heavy field howitzer is 
especially adapted for engaging standing targets such as batteries, trenches, villages. Its 
common shell possesses very considerable explosive and splinter effect, and is capable 
of penetrating the stoutest overhead cover likely to be met in the field. Against moving 
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targets, the effect of heavy howitzers is limited.’123 The French had no such doctrine 
and no clear consensus as to how to use the heavy howitzers that they did possess. 
General Brochin’s failure at Longwy to utilise the heavy artillery given to him by 
Ruffey is the most glaring example of this lack of doctrine. 
With regard to regulations on field craft, Zuber has identified the importance of 
the 1911 Feld-Pionierdienst aller Waffen, which gave instruction on ‘integrated 
engineer training, principally digging in’.124 This, together with the Feld–Befestigungs 
Vorschrift of 1893,125 makes it clear that battlefield entrenchment by infantry was an 
essential part of German tactical doctrine during the two decades preceding the war, and 
that there seems to be no comparable French instruction. The difference can be seen on 
the battlefield, and has been noted in the battle chapters as having contributed to 
German success at Rossignol, at Maissin, at Longwy, to name but three encounters. 
 
This brief overview of comparative doctrines has shown that in broad terms there was 
remarkably little difference between the two sides, merely differences in detail, some of 
which admittedly made a difference in battle. But there is considerable evidence of 
differences in the execution of doctrine. Both sides showed a variety of levels of 
individual performance, but the overall German standard of execution was higher. 
At the strategic level, both sides used offensive doctrines, but with the French 
demonstrating greater strategic flexibility by their decision to switch forces from right 
to left to mount a strong counter–attack through the Ardennes.  
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At the operational level, Germany used a doctrine remarkably similar to that 
proposed by Bonnal, incorporated into the 1895 FSR, and developed theoretically by 
Grandmaison. One key difference lay in the ‘grey area’ of operational art, where 
Schlieffen’s teachings in particular seem to have influenced a generation of senior 
German commanders to perfect the implementation of envelopment manoeuvres. 
France’s new operational doctrine of the offensive was issued too late, in October and 
December 1913, causing more confusion than clarity; most commanders had learned 
their art under the auspices of the 1895 FSR; but even that was put into practice with all 
the weaknesses identified by Grandmaison in his two 1911 lectures – multiple columns, 
multiple advance guards, slow and reactive approach and poor combined–arms liaison.  
Tactically, the official French doctrine enshrined in the 1904 RMI seems to have 
been too sophisticated for the level of competence of the French cadre and for the level 
of training of the French soldiers. In several instances French tactical units fell back on 
closer–order deployment, where their few competent officers could exert control; 
alternatively when their officers were killed, they went to ground. At least two examples 
have been cited in which poor training of both officers and men led to French units 
failing to stand under enemy fire. In contrast, German tactical behaviour in the main 
mirrored their tactical doctrine, demonstrating a high level of competence in open–order 
deployment and devolved authority. Junior German officers showed initiative, 
especially in adapting the principles of combined-arms liaison to specific battlefield 
conditions. German infantrymen, and one should cite particularly the reservists of 21 ID 
at Neufchâteau, showed the very qualities of élan as well as resilience under fire, which 
their opponents were supposed to possess. Where French soldiers showed élan, it was 
all–too–often during their naive baptism of fire and was replaced by fear and inertia 
once the reality of war had struck home. 
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Overall, one must conclude that French and German doctrine was remarkably similar in 
its general characteristics and intent. The differences in detail identified in this analysis 
do not adequately explain why the Germans managed to push back the French offensive 
in the Ardennes. Some, such as heavy artillery doctrine (or lack of it), and the German 
regulations on field fortification, did make a difference; but in general the analysis has 
revealed differences in the level of execution of doctrine, rather than in doctrinal 
principles themselves. So the real question is how far each side converted theory into 
practice through training.  
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Chapter 7 : Training 
  
 
 
The most significant issue which differentiated between the quality of the French and 
German soldiers engaged on 22 August in the Ardennes was arguably the one which has 
been least discussed:  the impact of the French Three Year Law passed in 1913. As a 
consequence of that law, nearly two–thirds of the men in the ranks of France’s regular 
divisions had had no more than a few months’ basic training when war broke out.  
The standard term of conscription for young Frenchmen had been reduced to 
two years by a law passed in 1905, having been proposed in 1901–3 under War Minister 
General André’s ‘republicanisation’ programme.1 The political intent behind the change 
was to support the drive towards a citizen army, a ‘nation–in–arms’ made up of 
multitudes of trained reservists, as opposed to a long–service professional standing 
army. As a political statement this policy is unexceptionable, but militarily it made the 
army more dependent upon the quality of refresher training given to those reservists; 
and it made the standing army smaller.  
Debate and action on the issue of the length of conscription was not new: the 
Germans had reduced their national service period to two years in 1833 in order to be 
able to train an extra class and thus increase the size of their mobilized army. They 
reverted to three years in 1860 and, under Colmar von der Goltz’s intellectual influence 
over the Volkskrieg school of thought in the 1870s, contemplated returning to two years 
again, although from the 1890s onwards they maintained three classes in the standing 
army.2 A key difference between France and Germany is thus highlighted: when 
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Germany changed to two years it was for military reasons, when France did so it was 
primarily from political motivation.  
After the first Moroccan crisis in 1905–6, Germany started to expand its armed 
forces, accelerating progress with Army Bills in 1912 and 1913. With its larger 
population it was able to increase the number of men in the standing army simply by 
increasing the percentage conscripted out of each year’s eligible young men. France was 
slower to start its military revival, but in 1913 as part of the response to the Agadir 
crisis and the German Army Bills, both the military (Joffre) and the politicians 
(variously Poincaré, Briand, Clemenceau, Barthou) agreed that it was necessary to 
combat the growth of the German army by the reintroduction of three years’ military 
service. The military intention was to increase the size of the standing army in order to 
match Germany and to ensure the continued viability of France’s new offensive 
strategy. The rationale presented to the public was the need to defend against an attaque 
brusquée by the larger German standing army.3  
It was the way in which the 1913 law was implemented, because of political 
expediency, which led to the damaging reduction in the quality of the standing army in 
August 1914.4 The original proposition, and Joffre’s obviously preferred option, was to 
keep the oldest and best–trained class of conscripts on for an extra year. This meant that 
the Class of 1910, due to go home at the end of September 1913, would remain until 
September 1914.5  But political opposition from the Left and unrest among the troops 
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themselves (revolts by several units across the country were called mutinies – 
mutineries – at the time) led to a political compromise in order to get the law through 
parliament. In the end, it was decided to call up the twenty–year olds of the Class of 
1913 a year early, that is to say October 1913, immediately after the induction of the 
Class of 1912.6 It was a politically effective move and persuaded a majority to vote for 
the law, but the military consequences were in the short term quite the reverse of what 
was originally intended. 
 By August 1914 two of the three classes of conscripts in the regular divisions, 
those which had enlisted in autumn 1913, had barely completed their basic training, and 
their experience of combat exercises would have been limited to company, battalion and 
regimental exercises in the Spring of 1914 with (for the lucky few) the possibility of a 
short spell at a training camp. For example an old soldier of 81 RI recalled after the war 
that, as a member of the Class of 1913, he took part in an exercise on 1 July 1914 at the 
small Larzac camp [in the 16th Military District].7 And Leonard Smith’s study of 5 DI 
confirms this interpretation: 
 
The regulations anticipated that soldiers would spend their first year becoming 
‘soldiers of the rank learning only the “mechanics of movement’ under the 
constant supervision of their immediate commanders’. Only in their second year 
would they become acquainted with the ‘special functions that might fall to a 
soldier on the field of battle’...3 CA’s commander in August 1914, General 
Henry Sauret, complained in October 1914 that he had been given command of 
an army corps that ‘had not during this year undergone either instruction in 
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shooting or in a sojurn in the instruction camp. Their whole preparation in the 
application of the new infantry regulations thus had to be inevitably 
incomplete’.8 
 
Furthermore, because of the increased numbers in the standing army, fewer reservists 
were needed to bring it up to war strength; and ironically the reservists of the recently 
released Class of 1910 were better trained than any other class. These men would, 
presumably, either have joined a reserve division – putting a new slant on the French 
high command’s traditional disdain of those units and on their actual effectiveness when 
after 22 August they entered the front line; or the Class of 1910 would have been used 
as replacements for casualties in the regular divisions. Either way, it suggests that the 
quality of the French army would have actually improved after the casualties of August 
1914 had been replaced.  
Many of the incidents in the Battle of the Ardennes can be put into a fresh 
perspective as a result of this injurious effect of the Three Year Law. One would expect 
twenty–year old raw recruits to exhibit certain behavioural patterns: to be exceptionally 
reliant upon their officers and NCOs for leadership; to show young and naive courage 
(élan) in their first encounter; but to become demoralised very quickly under fire when 
their officers were killed and the reality of gruesome death and mutilation impinged 
upon their young consciousness. One can now better understand the performance of the 
French 113 RI, (9 DI) at Longwy, which broke and ran after less than an hour under fire 
but with only eleven men killed and one hundred and thirty–six wounded.9  Those 
twenty–  and twenty–one year old young men fresh from their Paris barracks were alone 
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and isolated by a fog which reduced visibility to less than twenty metres; they could not 
see their enemy and live fire was coming at them for the first time. Similarly the men of 
130 RI (8 DI) at Virton, who had suffered comparatively heavily in their first action – a 
skirmish at Izel on 21 August – and who advanced into the fog the next day to 
encounter the élite Prussian 7 Grenadiers commanded by Prince Oscar the Kaiser’s 
younger son, failed to stand in a close-quarters fire-fight.10  
On the other hand, when there were defensive positions, or good officers, French 
performance can be observed to have been better. The men of 103 and 104 RI (7 DI) 
fighting at Ethe, were able to take cover among the houses of the village and behind the 
railway embankment, and fought steadfastly until nightfall.11 And 19 RI (22 DI) at 
Maissin, having swiftly and successfully crossed a two–hundred–metre open zone into 
the village, again fought courageously house–to–house without faltering. Their leader, 
Colonel Chapès, was described as ‘a superb soldier’ by his commanding officer’s 
biographer.12 His charismatic leadership was evident and contributed heavily to the 
good performance of his regiment: ‘There was a moment’s hesitation. But Colonel 
Chapès threw himself forward chanting the Marseillaise and to the sound of that 
triumphal hymn the eastern part of the barrier was broken’.13  
The lack of consistency in French infantry performance in the encounter battles 
of the Ardennes can be seen to have been heavily influenced by the lack of training 
given to the young conscripts of the classes of 1912 and 1913 because of the Three Year 
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Law and by the random application of Clauswitzian ‘friction’ through variables such as 
officer casualties, weather and terrain.  
 
Second only in importance was the issue of training camps. French long–term funding 
constraints and bureaucratic obstacles had significantly delayed their 1897 building 
programme. Had that programme been delivered, France would have had, by 1909 at a 
cost of 40 million francs, three new very large camps (6–7000 hectares each) and a 2000 
hectare camp for each corps.14 The programme, proposed by CSG, was approved by the 
War Minister, so only the Finance Ministry and Parliament stood in the way of delivery. 
But between 1897 and 1909, France had twelve changes of War Minister, five of them 
in 1898.15 That year the Dreyfus Affair was in full swing; priorities were changing; each 
new Government would set its own budget (if it had time); the Training Camp 
programme got lost somewhere in the political morass. A second programme was 
announced in 1908, but that too foundered through bureaucratic lethargy. 
The comparative lack of long–term facilities for combat exercises had a huge 
adverse consequence for the French in August 1914. This was particularly true for 
junior officers and NCOs, with the Germans being able to practice doctrine and improve 
their command skills much more frequently, which in turn would improve the quality of 
training given during each two year conscript cycle. Regular high–quality training over 
a sustained period – the nature of mass armies incorporating large numbers of reservists 
requires solid basic training with effective refresher courses over subsequent years – 
was the bedrock of a successful early twentieth century European army.  
                                                 
14 AAT 1N8: Process Verbaux du CSG Dec 1897 
 
15 www.wikipedia.org/Minister_of_Defence (France), accessed 26 March 2008 
 
 293 
By 1911, when Joffre renewed the French programme of building training 
camps, the Germans possessed twenty–eight large camps, twenty–six of at least 5625 
hectares each. There was one camp per corps region and three artillery camps, one being 
an extra–large range at Grafenwöhr.16 At this same moment in time France had only 
two large (corps) camps and two smaller (divisional) camps, one of which was still 
being completed.17 These four camps – Châlons, Coëtquidan, Courtine and Mailly – 
ranged from 2000 to 3000 hectares, but Châlons was badly organised and in need of 
renovation and Mailly was considered virtually unusable. There were in addition three 
small, brigade–sized camps, but their scope for combat exercises was severely limited.18  
Châlons had been in existence since before 1870, and post–Sedan reforms had 
only called for the building of small camps capable of taking regimental exercises and 
firing–ranges of five to six kilometres length for the artillery.19 The Commissions in 
1897 and 1907 which recommended the building of more large camps for mixed–arms 
manoeuvre were never followed through. Thus the initial decision to build only small 
camps shows a lack of vision; the later decisions show a lack of political will. The 
Germans had vision, money and political will, and they gained a twenty–year advantage 
over their enemy. 
As a result of the very significant delays in the French building programme, 
units were subjected to strict allocation schedules for time to practice brigade and 
divisional combat and mixed–arms exercises. Joffre later wrote that barely a third of 
regular troops spent fifteen days each year at a camp, the rest had no large unit or 
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mixed–arms exercises at all.20 By implication many two–year conscripts might have 
missed out altogether if their unit was not allocated a slot during their two summers in 
barracks, something which would contribute to the explanation of French inconsistent 
performance. 
Furthermore, Joffre himself highlighted how there was an uneven treatment 
between French formations. Those furthest away from the few available camps might 
receive no large–unit training at all, the implication being that the extra cost and 
logistical difficulty of transporting those large units from longer distances was 
prohibitive.21 With the bulk of the camps in the north, it has been suggested that units 
from the southern military regions (which included Roques’s 12 CA and Poline’s 17 
CA) would have been less well prepared than, for example, Gérard’s 2 CA. Sarrail’s 6 
CA, as part of the north–eastern frontier defence force was an exception, having a 
generally higher state of preparation. But other than the 1913 schedule, records have not 
been found to corroborate Joffre’s assertion. 
The programme for 1913 proposed a series of events at their seven camps during 
which ‘most corps’ would be able to practice some sort of larger–scale manoeuvre and 
combined–arms operation, depending on the size of the camp allocated.22 It should be 
noted that the culminating annual autumn Grand Manoeuvre was held in open country. 
At the camps a strict central allocation system was in place. For example, the units of 3 
and 6 CAs were to share the facilities at Châlons during the year, while the smaller 
(brigade) camps at Souges and Le Valdahon accommodated the units of one corps each 
– 18 and 7 CAs respectively. Special credits had been voted for these combined–arms 
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exercises, the details of which are missing from the archives. So one is unable to assess 
how long or how effective each event was, although, as will be seen below, there was a 
severe constraint on how much blank ammunition could be used at such events. 
Thirteen metropolitan army corps plus the Colonials were accommodated in this part of 
the 1913 programme; notable by their exclusion were Roques’s 12 CA and Poline’s 17 
CA which were to feature respectively in the lost opportunity at Neufchâteau and the 
disaster at Bertrix.23 However, those two corps both took part in the autumn 1913 Grand 
Manoeuvre, where they performed badly, attracting severe criticism from Joffre 
himself.24 One can only speculate how much an opportunity to practice in the summer 
of 1913 might have improved those two corps’ performance in the autumn of 1913 or 
indeed in August 1914. 
Under Joffre’s regime there were serious attempts to improve the amount of 
field training given. The 1913 Schedule proposed a second set of events: manoeuvres 
progressives, at which three chosen corps – 3, 8 and 20 – were each allocated funds for 
a fifteen–day event, either brigade or divisional, at the end of which the two divisions of 
the corps were given three days to manoeuvre against each other. But none of the major 
units of either Ruffey’s Third or de Langle’s Fourth Army were included in this part of 
the programme. 
The third leg of the programme was a series of brigade manoeuvres – five days 
of activity spread over a ten day period. Eleven of the metropolitan corps were allocated 
funds for this; notably again 12 and 17 CAs were omitted, although 11 and 2 CAs of 
Fourth Army took part, as did 4 and 5 CAs of Third Army. A brief analysis of the split 
of corps between those going to camps in 1913 and those omitted from the programme 
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tends to support the thesis that the ‘cost and distance’ issue was at least one key factor 
in the choice: 12, 17, 14 and 15 CAs (none of which attended a camp at all that year) 
were all from the southern military regions.  
The cavalry were not overlooked in the 1913 programme: General Sordet (then 
commanding 10 CA but earmarked to have the Cavalry Corps as his wartime command) 
was allocated funds for an event at Camp Sissonne in early September involving 3, 4 
and 5 DCs; and a few other cavalry divisional and brigade events were scheduled. There 
were also some special manoeuvres in the Alps, the Vosges and in Tunisia.25 But 
Joffre’s efforts, while they must have improved upon a previously dire situation, were 
too little, too late and could not compare with the continuous long–term commitment of 
the Germans. 
 
The French 1913 Schedule has been described in great detail because it illustrates the 
way French units were rationed in their combat training, even at a time when Joffre’s 
regime was attempting to breathe new life into the French army. There is no 
corresponding schedule on the German side because their activity – being decentralised 
and ‘business–as–usual’ – needed no rationing or allocation. A German regional corps 
commander had exclusive access to his own facility all year, giving each of his two 
divisions a theoretical maximum of thirteen weeks (up to sixty–five days) on large–
scale and mixed–arms exercises assuming a twenty–six week window for outdoor 
exercises between April and the end of September each year. Even before one considers 
the quality of instruction and the professionalism of execution, it is clear that the 
Germans had at least a four–fold advantage in available time to practice in the field. 
And this advantage had applied for most of the decade before the war, so that the 
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German reservists of 1914 in both the active and reserve divisions had enjoyed an equal 
superiority of available training facilities during their initial conscript period as well as 
during refresher–training. The question remains as to what detail there is to substantiate 
the actual as opposed to the theoretical use of these relatively abundant German 
facilities.   
The destruction of the German archives has left little relevant pre–1914 source 
material, but there is some evidence to support Zuber’s conclusion that the German 
army ‘spared no pains to ensure that the troops were trained to perform their simple 
combat tasks in the exceptionally difficult environment of the modern high-intensity 
battlefield’.26 Reflecting the difficulty of reconstituting a dismembered archive, a file on 
5 AK’s 1896 manoeuvres contains only irrelevant material about Fusilier Regiment 37’s 
mobilisation Bestimmung between 1869 and 1870.27 But a few pertinent files exist. A 
typed mimeo book records nineteen tactical exercises performed in 1891 by 33 and 34 
ID for General Graf von Häseler. A report on 16 AK’s August 1902 cavalry–infantry 
combined–arms exercise criticises a ‘Blue’ cavalry brigade for attempting to turn the 
refused right flank of a ‘Red’ infantry brigade.28  Records of cavalry exercises in 13 
AK’s region during August–September 1904 remain: three brigades and six divisions 
attended, each having a full day’s exercise over a twelve–day period.29 An interesting 
exercise took place in August 1912 between 13 AK and 18 AK: the purpose was to 
practice reconnaissance skills, with two opposing cavalry divisions advancing into 
contact in front of the following infantry and artillery columns. The scope included 
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testing the efficacy of both aeroplanes and field telephony.30 A seventy–five page report 
on 16 AK’s September 1910 corps manoeuvre details what happened, what orders were 
given, and so on, and contains their own commanding general’s analysis and 
criticisms.31 The report is an attractive printed and bound A5 book which gives the 
impression of being intended for military libraries, for wider dissemination outside the 
corps and for use in on–going training. It would have formed useful reading for officers 
in the winter months, alongside their map exercises and war games. 
This surviving German material gives the impression of being a small part of a 
large corpus of organised recording, reporting, analysis and feedback, designed to 
cumulatively inform the future as well as improve the present and illuminate the past. It 
takes its place in the heart of the German Army’s quality–management system, and it 
accounts for much of what can be observed on the battlefields of 22 August. The 
German unit which drove the French 113 RI from the field at Longwy was III/125 IR 
whose officers and NCOs led their men through the fog using compasses to find the 
direction of their designated objective.32  A young Lieutenant Erwin Rommel led his 
company through the early morning fog and on through a day of aggressive fighting at 
Bleid (part of the encounter battle at Ethe), and his account bears witness to the quality 
of the German tactical training regime.33 Walther Bloem, novelist and reserve officer, 
who fought at Mons, writes evocatively and in detail of his and his men’s execution of 
tactics learned on the training grounds.34 And above all, there is the example of 88 RIR 
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at Neufchâteau, described in detail in Chapter Three above, an example which 
highlights how the quality of German training extended equally to their reserve 
formations.  
 
When one looks at the human raw material (eligible conscripts) on each side, for whom 
these training exercises were devised, another qualitative differentiator is revealed. The 
average French recruit arguably required more rather than less training than his German 
counterpart. Because of their larger population, the Germans could afford to be much 
more selective in their choice of conscript than the French, needing only a proportion of 
each year’s intake to fill the ranks of their standing army.35 In 1910 only 52% of eligible 
men were selected for active service, the rest being placed on the muster rolls of the 
Ersatz Reserve.36 Over that period France took 80% of her annual intake to fill the 
requirements of the standing army.37 This meant that the Germans had much more 
scope to select on physical fitness, intelligence, motivation, political reliability and 
other appropriate characteristics.  
One important dimension in which the larger population, and selection, favoured 
the Germans was in demographics: they had a larger pool of rural, rather than urban 
conscripts. This was important when choosing both physical and political attributes. 
And the evidence shows that such choices were made; even in 1911 and despite 
increasing urbanisation, 64% of conscripts came from rural areas and only 6% from 
areas of high urban intensity.38 Following the Europe–wide revolution of 1848, both 
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France and Germany experienced an upsurge in left–wing activists who found the 
close–packed intense industrial environment a more fruitful seedbed for dissent than the 
slower, open pace of rural life. In France, ‘anti– militarist demonstrations accompanied 
the annual departure of conscript classes in large cities.’39 Douglas Porch linked this 
urban political unrest to the indiscipline increasingly encountered in many regiments 
after 1900 which in his view ‘was seen as a direct result of growing anti–militaristic 
influence in the ranks,’ although he goes on to claim that specific revolts by French 
regiments were much less political than about bad conditions such as poor food, 
accommodation and lack of leave.40 But there is no doubt that the growth of active 
socialism was an underlying factor adversely affecting morale and discipline and that 
Germany’s ability to select from a pool of conscripts allowed her to minimise the effect 
on the army.  
As well as having a larger and wider pool from which to select its recruits, the 
German army possessed several other advantages over the French. First Prussia then the 
German Reich managed the difficult trick of setting the army as an institution apart 
from civilian life and at the same time retaining a high degree of public support and 
approbation.41 A notable feature was the absorption of middle–class men into the officer 
corps while getting them to fit in and adopt the mores of that elitist body.42 ‘In Imperial 
Germany the possession of a commission was an important sign of social acceptability, 
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and it was eagerly sought after’.43 This unique status helped recruitment and maintained 
the required level of high quality cadres.  
France managed to engender the opposite effect, actively seeking during the 
‘republicanisation’ period to make her officers good citizens at the expense of military 
virtues, whilst at the same time lowering their social status.44 Porch summed it up thus: 
‘Radical calls for civic spirit to replace, rather than reinforce, the military spirit dear to 
post–1870 reformers did not announce that the Left had at last hit upon a coherent 
philosophy of military organisation, but rather betrayed a lack of appreciation of the 
profession of arms of which the Left had long been secretly proud’.45  
 
With an average of only fifteen days of field exercises each in a full year of national 
service, and despite route marches, square drills and small–unit exercises, French 
recruits had plenty of idle time in barracks during which boredom and frustration were 
natural consequences and issues such as food and leave took on great importance.46 
Poor leadership from both NCOs and officers could only exacerbate the situation.47 Add 
to this potent cocktail of ingredients the fact that conscripts were assigned to a regiment 
in their own local region,48 surrounded by a civilian community of which they had only 
recently been part, and an environment was created in which poor morale, indiscipline 
and worse flourished. 
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The record of indiscipline, riot and even mutiny within the French army, 
particularly in the key period from 1900 to 1913, is well documented. By 1906, the 
general lack of discipline was acknowledged by the then War Minister, Étienne, as 
having ‘reached worrying levels’.49 However the situation varied from region to region. 
In Normandy, 3 CA’s region, ‘signs of antimilitarism were almost trivial’,50 whereas in 
1907 the viticole crisis in the Midi erupted in riots and open mutiny. At least nine 
regiments were involved, one of them a supposedly elite unit, 13 chasseurs à pied. 
There were further riots right up to 1913.51 Once again it is noticeable that all the 
regiments cited by Porch in the 1907 crisis were from the southern military districts.  
The same sort of socialist pressures were evident in Germany: in the 1912 elections 
the Socialist Party (SPD) – ‘the Germany of the organised working class, the most 
electorally successful party of the pre–war period’ – won 34.8% of the vote.52 But it 
was balanced by a strong and ‘profoundly conservative’ section of society which was 
exemplified by the Veterans’ Association which, with 2.8 million members, had a larger 
membership than the SPD.53 For complex reasons which lie outside the scope of this 
thesis, the line between political debate and activism was not crossed in Germany, 
though the tension undoubtedly existed. Living with that tension, the army managed to 
avoid the worst consequences through selective recruitment, insulation from everyday 
civilian life and a high level of activity including combat exercises.  
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This necessarily brief overview of the quality of the average conscript called up to 
be trained for war once again leads to the conclusion that Germany enjoyed a 
considerable advantage. And when one looks at the quality of the trainers – the 
company, battalion and regimental officers and NCOs, the pattern of German advantage 
continues. 
 
The higher social status of the German officer corps fed its exclusivity and made it a 
desirable profession.54 Even reserve officer status was something to aspire to and, once 
gained, something to be proudly preserved.55 War games and map exercises in winter, 
staff rides and field exercises in spring and summer were the standard fare of the 
German cadre.56 In France by 1911, a demoralised, under–paid and under–valued cadre 
was undermanned and spent far too much time on office administration and public 
social duty.57 The disparity in the attractiveness of the military as a career led to a 
shortage of French officers. From 1897 to 1907, applications for Saint Cyr dropped by 
49%.58 On 31 December 1911 there was an overall shortfall of 12% of lieutenants and 
sub–lieutenants (5499 compared to an official complement of 6252) and some 300 more 
were on detached duties which took them away from the leadership and training of their 
companies. Ideas for closing the gap included promoting more NCOs (shifting the 
problem downwards) and shortening the officer training course (lowering the quality).59 
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The same situation applied to NCOs: by 1914, Germany had 112,000 well-trained 
NCOs compared to France’s 48,000 although the size of their mobilised armies was 
broadly comparable.60 The overall result of these shortages was that in France ‘training 
personnel were in short supply’,61 which impacted on the quality and quantity of small–
unit combat training (company, battalion and regiment), the only type of preparation 
which could have been done given the lack of large training camps.  
 
The ongoing French political debate as to how much to spend on the military, and in 
what areas, was not confined to long–term capital investment programmes like the 
building of camps. The reluctance to send troops long distances to get to the camps 
points to an annual budgetary issue regarding day–to–day running costs. And there is 
evidence that there were severe budgetary restrictions on ‘consumables’. According to a 
table setting out blank ammunition allocations for 1913 (when Joffre was attempting to 
increase the effectiveness of training), infantry on ‘army’ exercises were allowed 60 
shots, cavalry 25. A further 40 bullets each were allocated to the infantry for ‘brigade’ 
exercises (cavalry were allowed 12). The field artillery were given 565 75mm blank 
shells per battery to expend at ‘army’ exercises and 250 more for brigade exercises 
during the year. Joffre’s Instruction générale for the Autumn 1913 army manoeuvre 
contains an order to both sides to conserve the bulk of their munitions for the second 
half of the event, a pragmatic response to a budgetary constraint which nevertheless 
would have decreased the realism of the training. The participating 17 CA’s general 
instruction for the event includes a note that there were 4000 blank 75mm shells in the 
corps’ artillery park for resupply during the event – roughly 30 shells per gun if the full 
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complement of corps artillery was deployed.62 In an artillery exercise inspected by 
General Ruffey on 24 April 1914, three artillery regiments (25, 46 and 61 RACs) 
practiced the three doctrinal steps taken during combat – engagement of the artillery of 
the advance guard, engagement of the main body including corps artillery, and thirdly 
the task of supporting the decisive attack – each battery of four guns was given forty–
eight shells.63 If final proof were needed of the degree of central control over the 
minutiae of expenditure, it is apparent from a note from the Ministry to the commander 
of 17 CA, issued 3 June 1913 in advance of the September Grand Manoeuvre. It 
authorised General Grellet (commander of the Blue force’s provisional cavalry brigade) 
to perform a reconnaissance ‘between Gers and Blaise, near Lectoure and Condom. He 
has a car allocated to him and his budget allocation is confirmed.’64  
Whereas the limitations imposed on the French by their lack of facilities and of 
money forced them to adopt a centralist approach, the Germans had no such problems. 
Their system of funding a seven–year cycle based on a set amount per man ensured a 
guaranteed sum of money per region free from political interference.65  Their 
decentralised approach devolved authority down to corps regional level. An added 
advantage and cost saving came from their superior facilities; the cost of sending a 
division to its camp for a field exercise was minimal – the camps were local and they 
marched there, gaining additional experience in route march and deployment. By 
comparison with the French, this was a better position to be in when preparing for war; 
nevertheless, Storz argues that there were still deficiencies on the German side, in the 
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size and number of the smaller German Exerzierplätze, leading to unrealistic 
exercises.66  
 
In the German Army, the standard application of doctrine and the maintenance of a 
relatively high level of efficiency was ensured by the system of inspection. There were 
technical inspectorates, for example one for the cavalry arm, one for engineers, 
significantly one for foot (heavy) artillery and even one for communications. In a classic 
matrix organisation, there were simultaneously Inspectors–General with responsibility 
for the corps regions. These senior officers, eight of them, each owning a group of 
corps, were the designated army–commanders, backed by a permanent staff 
organisation.67 In addition to giving feedback to those commanders which they 
inspected, the Inspectors–General sent an annual report to the Chief of General Staff, 
intended to promote best practice across the whole army. Von Moltke personally read 
and acted upon these reports, for example in respect of improving the use of aeroplanes: 
 
The annual reports of the Inspector–General of Foot Artillery (III,62375/12 of 
8/11/1912) and the Inspector of Field Artillery (I.3740/12, Secret, of 
26/10/1912), which I have now received, both show plainly that officers 
controlling artillery fire will be very materially assisted by spotting and 
observation from aircraft... I can only emphatically support the proposals in both 
reports that aircraft sections shall be assigned to artillery practice schools. 
During the training year which has just begun [1913] we must come to some 
definite conclusions in this matter in order that we may start the system of 
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equipping our artillery with the means of air reconnaissance...it is essential that 
obstacles be overcome.68  
 
Von Moltke’s dominant position in the German decision–making process was crucial to 
success of implementing improvements as a result of inspection, as is made clear by a 
similar note on aviation: 
But first of all I will send the Ministry of War the memorandum on the condition 
of French aviation to which I have already referred. On 1 April 1914, the 
assumption of 450 military aeroplanes and somewhere about 350 aviators will 
not be too high. For that time I consider we should require 324 aeroplanes...In 
my view the obstacles to the realisation of my programme are not the objections 
urged above, but simply the question of money and personnel. ... I therefore 
adhere to my former standpoint, that my programme must be carried into effect 
by 1 April 1914. Please see that this is done.69 
 
When one seeks reasons for the way that Germany overtook France’s dominant position 
in the sphere of military aviation between 1911 and 1914, the examples above highlight 
the key role of the inspection system linked to a strong focussed command structure. 
Moltke’s position at the top of the inspection organisation and process ensured a 
powerful application of quality improvement as well as a standardisation of approach 
within the German army. 
In France, as has been previously mentioned, inspections were abolished by War 
Minister General André in 1901 ‘in the conviction that local commanders could best 
                                                 
68 Quoted in: General Ludendorff, The General Staff and its Problems (transl. F.A.Holt, Hutchinson & 
Co, London, 1920), p.47  
 
69 Ibid., p.43 
 
 308 
judge their own troops’.70 They were reinstated by General Joffre after his appointment 
as ‘generalissimo’ in July 191171 and thereafter there was a flurry of activity, evidence 
of the French Army’s belated but genuine attempts to catch up for lost time. Every 
member of CSG launched himself into a full schedule of inspections of his designated 
corps, and records exist for every year from 1911 onwards.72  
Joffre’s plans for 1914 were ambitious; a confidential memo of 5 January 1914 
outlines proposed special exercises for the commanders of large units (the necessary 
follow-on from Grandmaison’s teachings and the October 1913 Regulation), based on 
map exercises and staff rides.73 He also planned a special staff ride for members of the 
Army General Staff, accompanied by students of the Centre des hautes études militaires 
( the third year course at the ESG set up by Foch for the training of the best students as 
prospective army staff officers) directed by General Belin, head of his Operations 
Bureau. This event was scheduled for 20–25 July 1914 and was presumably overtaken 
by events. Members of CSG held their own exercises: de Langle de Cary and his chief 
of staff, Maistre, set up a map exercise for 26–29 May 1914, but it is not clear whether 
it took place.74 The return of members of CSG to inspection duties undoubtedly started 
to improve the French Army’s training regime. But this last–minute ramping up of 
serious activity was no substitute for the long and continuous process which can be 
traced on the German side.  
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Overall, General Ludendorff was in no doubt as to the superior quality of Germany’s 
training regime: 
 
Discipline, to which officer and private alike were subjected, was in my opinion 
the only basis on which an army could be effectively trained for war. Such 
training could only be acquired through long service. It is only what discipline 
makes second nature in a man that is lasting, and survives even the demoralizing 
impressions of the battlefield and psychological changes wrought by a long 
campaign. It was our thorough discipline and training in peacetime which was to 
make up for our inferiority in numbers in the coming war.75  
 
If the inspection reports and consequent improvement projects were the day–to–day 
signs of a sound training process, then the annual autumn Grand Manoeuvre was the 
end–of–term exam. It was the opportunity for two chosen army commanders to show 
off their skills and for four or more corps commanders to demonstrate the proficiency 
which they had drilled into their units. Except that it did not actually happen that way. 
Both sides descended into artificially stage–managed events, with the French as might 
be expected descending further.  
In Germany the Kaisermanöver was, even after von Moltke the Younger had 
persuaded the Emperor to stop ruining it by taking part,76 first and foremost a spectacle 
and showcase rather than a realistic combat simulation.77 But at least the German Army 
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took pride in the opportunity to show off its discipline, ardour and professionalism.78 
And, in 1909, the Germans took a big step towards greater realism by stopping their 
practice of taking breaks during the exercise, and instead conducting a continuous four 
day manoeuvre.79 
In France, the Autumn Manoeuvre merely showed up the ongoing deficiencies 
in the French Army, even in 1913. Joffre himself testifies to the poor quality of the 
1911, 1912 and 1913 manoeuvres.80 German official observers of those of 1908, 1910 
and 1912 corroborate Joffre’s overall opinion.81 And General Bonnal’s comprehensive 
analysis of the 1908 manoeuvre simply reinforces the point that the French problem was 
deeply engrained, while implicitly pointing to the fact that many of the brigade and 
divisional commanders of 1908 would be the corps and army commanders of 1914.82  
 
It is difficult to sum up this brief analysis of the comparative state of the French and 
German training regimes without seeming totally critical of the French. Joffre and his 
staff made significant efforts to improve French training from 1911 onwards, and there 
are signs that improvements were being made. But the legacy of the past and the wasted 
years between 1897 and 1911 could not be overcome in the short few years before the 
war. Germany had put in place a quality system and process which stood the test of 
time, and backed it consistently with funding and facilities. Even under Joffre’s regime, 
political issues and social pressures took precedence over military necessity, as the 
passing of the 1913 Three Year Law tellingly demonstrated.  
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In Germany, despite similar underlying social and political pressures, the army – 
genuinely a state within the state – was to a large extent insulated from outside 
influence. With guaranteed funding and strong autocratic support from their Supreme 
War Leader, the War Minister and the Great General Staff, the decentralised but 
generally efficient regional corps commanders were able to concentrate on preparing the 
army for war.  
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Chapter 8 : Armaments, and Equipment 
 
This chapter will examine the extent to which the comparative quality, numbers or 
usage of key items of equipment affected the outcome of the Battle of the Ardennes, 
testing what has so far been written on each subject against what has been observed in 
the analysis of the encounter battles. In order to set this examination into context, a very 
brief review of the state of pre–war preparation from 1900 to 1914 will first be 
undertaken. In this review, the definition of the term ‘armaments’ put forward by David 
Stevenson  – ‘which in its Edwardian English usage, like that of  its Continental 
synonyms (Rüstungen, armements), might embrace organisation, manpower, and 
deployments’  – will be adopted.1 
 
The period 1904–1914 showed two distinct characteristics in armaments growth. On the 
one hand there was the long– and medium–term growth needed to keep pace with 
technological change and industrial production techniques; and on the other hand there 
were the short–term peaks of armament activity associated with various international 
diplomatic crises. Underlying both was an endemic sense of ‘competition in military 
preparedness’2 between nations, leading at times to an outright arms race – ‘intense 
competition between Powers or groups of Powers, each trying to achieve an advantage 
in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments 
or armed forces’.3 David Herrmann, writing in ‘The arming of Europe’, highlights ‘the 
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relationship between the means available and the way they were to be used’, something 
which this chapter seeks to emphasise, drawing examples from the studies of specific 
encounters.4 Dieter Storz has studied the pre-war preconceptions of modern war as well 
as preparation for it, in order to highlight the transition from preconception to reality, 
but without reference to actual battlefield events, something which this study adds to the 
overall consideration of armament and the coming of war.5  
The underlying long– and medium–term growth experienced between 1904 and 
1914 was driven by the need to adopt new weapons such as the machine gun and the 
quick–firing field gun, new products such as the telephone, wireless and field kitchen, 
and new inventions such as the aeroplane.6 All such preparation was constrained by 
limitations in finance and political will.7  
The short–term ‘arms race’ between Germany and France took place in specific 
periods of political and diplomatic tension, involving ‘a series of diplomatic 
confrontations ... war scares, the threat of war used as a tool of diplomacy, and in some 
cases even the partial mobilization of forces.’8 These short–term arms races were 
chiefly defined by key political events, notably ‘the first and second Moroccan crises, 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina annexation crisis, and the moves for intervention in the 
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913’.9 During these crises, threats of war and increases in 
numbers in the light of other Powers’ real or imagined expansion became a particular 
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concern; then and in the immediate aftermath, questions of finance and budgets took 
second place to military necessity.  
 
* * * 
When it came to funding both long– and short–term armaments improvement, France 
was at a considerable disadvantage throughout the period. Using Stevenson’s figures, 
French annual defence expenditure in 1913 was 145% of its 1901 level at current prices, 
Germany’s was 207%;10 Stevenson also shows that at no time between 1901 and 1913 
did Germany spend less than 50% more than France per annum, the gap being 50% 
more in 1902, rising to a peak of 79% more in 1913.11 In 1906 in response to the 
Moroccan crises, the French Government gave the Ministry of War an increase of 4.4% 
while the German military budget remained flat (at constant prices); but France only 
managed to reduce Germany’s superior defence budget from 162.1% to 161.2%. Of 
course, Germany was spending considerable sums on her naval ambitions, so overall 
defence spending does not necessarily reflect commitment to land armaments. But the 
figures do demonstrate that when, as in the immediate aftermath of the second 
Moroccan crisis, Germany’s naval expenditure took a lower priority, land armament 
expenditure could be considerably increased. 
 Marshal Joffre has also made clear what political and bureaucratic difficulties 
the French military faced in their attempts to close the gap in terms of absolute levels of 
funding.12  Between 1901 and 1909, on average only 57% of the funding requested by 
the armed services was finally voted into law. As a result programmes had to be 
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curtailed, or their delivery delayed (or both); constraints were placed on budgets for 
exercises and annual manoeuvres and on railway costs for transporting troops to 
training grounds.13 And yet Joffre himself concedes that the French Legislative 
Assembly never refused to vote the funds demanded of them; the bulk of the problems 
lay in the bureaucratic and administrative web between the Ministries of War and 
Finance, which linked and yet diluted professional assessment of need with political 
ownership and authority.  
Joffre confirms that French funding was considerably lower than their opponent. 
Between 1901 and 1905, he says, average German military expenditure was about 115 
million francs a year, compared to 47 million by the French. The figures are broadly 
corroborated by Klotz, the president of the French parliamentary budget committee, 
who put the 1904 French defence budget at 38 million francs to Germany’s 99 million 
francs.14  Joffre goes on to say that between 1906 and 1910, these figures increased to 
95 million and 190 million respectively. Joffre ascribes this large disparity to a general 
belief in France during the first decade of the twentieth century in ‘the mirage of 
universal peace’.  
 
Having established that Germany spent appreciably more on land armaments 
consistently over the period 1904–1914, despite having a peace–time army barely larger 
than that of France, one must next examine the patterns of armaments expenditure. 
Long–term development gave long–term advantage, and here Germany’s greater 
capacity and willingness to fund during peacetime paid a dividend. Major programmes 
of capital expenditure take years to prepare and complete, and accumulated investment 
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over a long period gives a far greater return than larger sums committed at the last 
moment. In the end no amount of extra money can compensate for irretrievably lost 
time. German investment in large training grounds for each of her army corps 
(examined in greater detail in the chapter on Training) proves the point. At the turn of 
the century, Germany’s policy was to have one large training ground per Military 
Region (ie per active army corps). When France finally put a similar programme in 
place in 1911, it could not be completed in time to be used to train the troops.  
The step–increments driven by shifts from medium–term to short–term 
development show a different pattern from the underlying trend of expenditure. 
Stevenson has shown how, in the medium–term, expenditure was directed mainly 
towards matériel, with some modest increases in manpower; during short–term crises, 
however, the impetus was towards larger increases to manpower. 
During the period leading up to 1904, all armies had achieved a ‘steady state of 
development’ without resorting to an arms race. And from 1904–1908 ‘land armaments 
remained in approximate equilibrium.’ This was the period when France, relying for too 
long on the superior firepower of their 75mm field gun, allowed numbers of field guns 
to drop. Germany hastened to produce a quick firing version of their 77mm cannon, 
after which numbers became important again, and France found herself with fewer 
pieces. Overall during this period ‘the German army made considerable strides’, 
adopting a new rifle, cartridge, and uniform, the 15cm heavy howitzer 02 and starting to 
distribute the M08 machine gun and the light field howitzer.15  
It was also the period in which France produced the 155mm Rimailho heavy 
howitzer, albeit in small numbers, and decided (in September 1907) to provide every 
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metropolitan infantry regiment with a machine gun company.16 France’s attitude to 
long–term development, described by Joffre as ‘half–asleep’, is further exemplified by 
the October 1906 new long–term programme for matériel, which although approved in 
principle by parliament, was subject to annual votes for actual funding.  
 
The next period, from 1908 to 1912, has been described by Stevenson as a ‘breakdown 
of equilibrium’ in both the East and West, triggered by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and 
resulting in ‘Germany’s reorientation of priorities from the naval to the land race, which 
became manifest in 1911–12 although its origins dated back further.’ But it was also a 
period that saw the restructuring of the French High Command and the emergence of 
Joffre as commander–in–chief designate. He immediately set to work lobbying for, inter 
alia, a new field howitzer and a new long range field gun.17 The French completed the 
delivery of the 1907 long–term programme – distribution of machine guns, work on 
fortresses – and also set out on a new programme of military aviation, after Blériot’s 
successful channel crossing in 1909. But France’s main preoccupation was to restore 
parity in field gun numbers and achieve a marginal superiority from the qualitative edge 
of the 75mm.18  
1911 was the year of the next German Quinquennat, but such was the power of 
the Treasury Secretary that it contained only modest measures. Then came ‘Agadir’, 
resulting in ‘short–term measures all over Europe’.19 By October 1911 there was a 
German perception that they were not militarily strong enough to face up to an alliance 
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of the other Great Powers, and an Army Bill was prepared for 1912 calling for a huge 
one–off increase in expenditure, equivalent to the sum of all the annual increases since 
1893.20 At the same time, France also perceived herself to be ‘not sufficiently prepared 
for war’.21 This was the time of réveil nationale, although ‘there was no one turning-
point as dramatic as in Germany’, more an acceleration in intensity of preparation.22  
But it was 1912 which proved to be the year in which the short–term arms race 
took off. Plans laid then by Germany resulted in the 1913 Army Bill, and in France in 
the new Three Year Service Law. These were primarily measures directed at huge 
increases in manpower, and in direct preparation for war. Since the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine aspects of matériel rather manpower, this important step on the 
road to war must be passed over in favour of the developments in equipment. For the 
French, a great deal of time and energy was put into the new aviation arm, following the 
success of aeroplanes in the 1910 and 1911 manoeuvres. So too, Germany belatedly 
sought to catch up with France with regard to heavier–than–air craft. The 1913 Army 
Bill provided 79m marks for aviation, compared to 71m for artillery. It is interesting, 
too, that alongside the enormous increases in manpower, the bill sought to achieve two 
other vital things: firstly it sought to provide long–term infrastructure (230m marks for 
accommodation for the extra troops) – something which the French struggled and failed 
to resolve in relation to their Three Year Law; and secondly it provided for the early 
completion of previously authorised programmes. As Stevenson has put it: ‘the speed of 
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implementation of Germany’s bill and its opponents’ delays’ pointed to ‘a window of 
opportunity opening after all for Germany in 1914’.23  
This brief resume of the comparative development of armaments in the decade 
before the war has raised some key issues which provide a framework for the following 
examination of individual topics. Germany had the higher level of available funds and 
hence the flexibility to choose between major land and naval programmes. Germany 
had the long–term stability and commitment (compared to the French at least) to invest 
in infrastructure and large capital programmes such as training grounds. Germany had 
the funds and commitment to accelerate programmes for early completion. France, on 
the other hand, placed short–term constraints on long–term investment, in the form of 
annual parliamentary votes and frequent changes of government. France also lacked the 
internal mechanisms  – possibly even the will  – to push to completion even those things 
which were authorised, as will be seen in the discussions below, particularly on the key 
question of artillery.  
 
There is a perception amongst many historians that France entered the war in August 
1914 both completely outclassed and completely outnumbered by the Germans in terms 
of heavy field artillery.24 Douglas Porch says categorically: ‘The French army’s most 
glaring deficiency in 1914 was its almost total lack of heavy artillery’.25 Michel Goya 
has written that such heavy artillery as the French did possess was ancient and 
introduced into the field army only at the last minute.26 And David Stevenson wrote in 
2004 that ‘the heavy artillery service that Joffre knocked together after 1913 comprised 
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only about 300 guns mostly pre–quick–firing weapons pirated from fortresses, and held 
at army group rather than at divisional level.’27 Dieter Storz comes to the conclusion 
that France’s refusal over many years to adopt heavy artillery in greater numbers 
compelled her field artillery to take up much more dangerous firing positions than was 
necessary, whereas German artillerymen had more willingly adopted heavy guns 
because of their aversion to firing from concealed positions.28 Even the French High 
Command at the time subscribed to this perception of weakness. Robert Doughty quotes 
French War Minister Messimy writing immediately after the war: ‘responsibility for the 
French army’s not having heavy artillery at the declaration of war falls principally on 
the artillery’s technical services’.29  
  Joffre too in his memoirs writes of France being half–asleep between 1905 and 
1911, during which time France lost her previous advantage in the sphere of artillery, 
and Germany introduced both the heavy but mobile 150mm and the lighter 105mm field 
howitzers. Joffre’s assertion that France had held but then lost her pre–eminent position 
in this arm in the early years of the twentieth century is corroborated by historian Eric 
Dorn Brose (studying the German army) and by contemporary French General Baquet, 
who was a key figure in French artillery development.30 At the turn of the century, 
France possessed a range of heavy guns such Baquet’s obusier de 155 court modèle 
1890, de Bange’s 1880 220mm, 240mm and 270mm mortars, as well as his 1879 
120mm howitzer, but they were all even then obsolete or obsolescent, they were 
relatively immobile, and they were in the main intended for the reduction of fortresses. 
When in 1900 Germany ‘adopted a wheeled 150mm howitzer for general service and 
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began converting its carriage to a recoil–absorbing version in 1903’31, two factors 
initially prevented the French from following their lead. Firstly, there was a general 
belief that the superior mobility and rate of fire of the 75mm field gun would obviate 
the need for a heavy howitzer in the field. Secondly, France’s then war plans, versions 
XIV and XV, were still essentially defensive in character and did not (as did the 
Schlieffen Plan) envisage the reduction of fortresses while on the march. When in 1904 
it was eventually decided to replace the 120mm–155mm range with a modern, mobile 
field piece, the French chose Captain Emile Rimailho’s newly designed 155mm heavy 
howitzer. After testing and trials it went into full production between 1904 and 1908,32 
but, despite the production line being still available in 1909, barely one hundred guns 
were produced over the whole of its production cycle, based on a standard of six guns 
per corps.33 Actual production was slow and when in July 1909 a new Artillery bill 
became law, there was only provision for an extra three batteries (twelve guns) of heavy 
howitzers, which still only raised the available total to twenty-one batteries (eighty–four 
guns).34 In 1911 General Dubail called for more heavy artillery, a force of 216 guns 
made up of more Rimailhos plus some new 120mm cannon.35 This was the moment, the 
last real opportunity before the war, for France to have committed to the production of 
large enough numbers of heavy mobile guns to at least match the Germans, but they did 
not take it. Whether it was because there were difficult choices to be made between 
different arms competing for limited funds is not entirely clear. But Stevenson, 
highlighting the reluctance of the French High Command to embrace the heavy weapon, 
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writes that the Rimailho ‘was a failure, with insufficient range and mobility to be an 
answer to the German 10.5 cm field howitzer’.36 Stevenson cites a note by General 
Villemajane, dated 2 September 1905, in support of this argument, and it is interesting 
to note that Villemajane went on to command 33 DI at Bertrix in August 1914; there, as 
has been shown, he held responsibility for the debacle which left all his field artillery 
blocked on a forest path to be destroyed by the Germans. He was sent to Limoges on 31 
August 1914. This of itself does not rule him out as a credible source; however by 
comparing the 155mm Rimailho on the one hand with the more mobile 105mm German 
light howitzer (with which it had a comparable range of about 6,000 metres) and on the 
other hand criticising it for lacking the 8,000 metre range of the German 150mm heavy 
howitzer (with which it had a comparable lack of mobility), Villejamine was being very 
selective in his argument.37 This supports other evidence that suggests that a majority of 
French staff and senior officers simply saw no role for either the light field howitzer or 
the heavy mobile howitzer – at least until it was too late.38 It suffices to record that the 
French had the opportunity to produce many more Rimailhos in time to equip their 
corps to a comparable level to the Germans, but chose not to take it.  
Over the same period, Germany produced enough of their 15cm sFH 02 
howitzers to allow every army corps its own integral heavy artillery battery, and 
increase numbers until each corps had sixteen heavy guns. Furthermore, when the 
French ceased even their meagre production of Rimailhos, Germany was preparing for 
production of an upgrade, the 15cm sFH 13, so that a continuous output was sustained 
into the first winter of the war, and beyond.  
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The French lack of production numbers despite considerable production 
capability was matched by a lack of field organisation. Only in the months immediately 
before they war did the French General Staff organise their Rimailhos into regiments. 
All the evidence supports the argument that it was indifference on the part of the French 
command that led to the decline in their heavy artillery capability. 
It is possible that the heavy artillery was another victim of the 
‘republicanisation’ of the army during the post–Dreyfus period. Baquet wrote that if 
France had had a powerful and competent Director of Artillery between 1901 and 1912, 
there would have been enough heavy guns. But the last such Director, General Deloge, 
responsible for the adoption and roll–out programme of the 75mm field gun, was 
dismissed in 1901 and replaced by a series of more politically acceptable officers.39  
 
Turning to the situation at the beginning of the war, there is some confusion as to 
exactly how many heavy guns there were on each side. Joffre wrote that ‘to sum up, at 
the beginning of August 1914, a French army corps had 120 75mm field guns firing a 
7.3kg shell, and that was all; a German army corps had 108 77mm field guns, 36 
105mm howitzers firing a 15kg projectile, and 16 150mm heavy howitzers firing a 42kg 
shell’.40 However, on the issue of heavy guns he was disingenuous; whilst his facts are 
strictly correct, Joffre used the narrow point that his own heavy guns – 105 155mm 
heavy howitzers, 96 120mm howitzers and 20 batteries [108 pieces] of 120mm field 
guns, 308 in all – were held at army level to argue that they should therefore be 
compared not with the German corps artillery but with the 848 heavy guns in the 
German armies’ siege trains, most of which were not mobile enough for use in the 
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field;41 he then compounded his obfuscation by ignoring the 2700 heavy guns in French 
fortresses designed to resist siege.42 There was, for example, a battery of 155mm 
Rimailhos in the small fortress at Longwy, which Joffre does not acknowledge. 
Furthermore both de Langle de Cary and Ruffey delegated command of their heavy 
guns to one or more of their corps commanders, so the supposed organisational 
difference between the two sides cannot be used to confuse the issue of how many 
mobile heavy pieces each side put into the field.43  The true comparison relevant to the 
battles is this: there were only 404 German mobile heavy pieces with their seven field 
armies on the Western front (excluding those in the siege trains), whilst Joffre’s 308 
mobile heavy pieces were supplemented by 16 British 60pdrs.44  
The real issue, that Joffre in his memoires was probably trying to put the best 
gloss on, was that by October 1914, with the onset of trench warfare, heavy field 
artillery came into its own, and the lack of production facilities with which France 
commenced the war came into sharp focus; this argument is supported by a near–
contemporary source: in 1920 Colonel Aublet wrote that from 14 October 1914, GQG 
formalised a programme for the use of obsolete heavy fortress artillery to augment the 
few mobile heavy guns in the field; one hundred batteries of 90mm guns were deployed, 
together with groups of 95mm, 120mm and 155mm short and long guns; all had poor 
mobility, range and rate of fire, but they were all France possessed.45  
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By contrast, from 1902 onwards, German mobile heavy gun production had 
been a continuous process and in 1914 the factories were rolling new 1913–type 150mm 
heavy howitzers off her production lines. The  Rimailho production line was still 
operating in 1909, when twelve extra guns were commissioned; but presumably it was 
then closed and dismantled, otherwise one would expect Joffre to have commissioned a 
fresh production run in addition to stripping the fortresses of obsolete 19th century 
weapons; perhaps the lines were being geared up for the new guns ordered by Joffre in 
1911–13; in any case, it would be many months before any new French guns came off 
new production lines and arrived at the front. But this is a separate issue from that of the 
number or quality of guns in field during the war of movement in August 1914, when 
the situation was very different from what Joffre claimed and from what has so far been 
written into history. 
The number of heavy mobile pieces with the two opposing field armies has been 
shown to have been much closer than has been claimed; and in the Ardennes it was even 
closer, indeed in sheer numbers the French had more heavy pieces. De Langle and 
Ruffey between them had been given 108 of Joffre’s mobile heavy guns;46 whilst Duke 
Albrecht and Crown Prince William had 96 150mm mobile guns, 16 with each of six 
regular army corps.47 Following Joffre’s tenuous argument, it is true that the German 
Fourth and Fifth Armies’ siege trains had between them 48 210mm mortars,48 but these 
needed 18 horses and three travelling carriages each, took many hours to assemble, and 
sat on a platform of heavy planks.49  They were totally unsuitable for the field and were 
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not intended for any role except the reduction of fortresses. In fact 8 of these great guns 
were with Kaempffer’s detachment besieging Longwy and fortuitously were in a 
position to intervene in the fighting on 22 August around that place, although no 
specific evidence for such intervention has yet to be found.50 
Nor were the qualitative differences anywhere near as great as has been 
suggested. In August 1914 at least 40%, possibly more, of the German 150mm 
howitzers were still of the 1902–type, heavier, slower and without shields.51 They were 
not modern quick–firing guns, and had to be repositioned after each shot.52 All of 
Joffre’s 105 Rimailho 155mm howitzers, on the other hand, were of a 1904–type with a 
modern quick–fire capability similar to that of the French 75mm field gun of 1897. It 
was capable of firing an average 5 shots per minute, rising to a maximum of an 
astonishing 15 aimed shots per minute by a well–trained detachment. It has been 
reported that ‘war experience showed it to be fool–proof and robust’.53 Baquet 
considered the Rimailho to have had great mobility.54 In short, Joffre’s Rimailhos were 
as mobile and much faster firing than many of the German guns, if lacking the extra 
2,000 metres range. 
Admittedly, the other two types of French guns were inferior, but were still 
serviceable. There was Baquet’s 120mm short gun (howitzer), 84 guns of 1890–vintage 
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with a range of 5.8km and a 20kg high explosive shell.55 This was the field howitzer 
introduced at the zenith of France’s military recovery but not followed through 
thereafter. The remaining 120 guns were de Bange 120mm long guns, 1878–vintage, 
with a range of 8km. It was a heavy piece (4000kg) but could be pulled by six horses or 
a tractor, and 84 of them had been modified for field use.56 De Langle’s twelve guns 
were all Rimailhos; Ruffey had been given twelve 155mm Rimailhos, twelve 120mm 
Baquets and seventy-two 120mm de Banges.57 The de Banges were intended for the 
defence of the Meuse Heights and, by implication, of Ruffey’s vulnerable right–rear 
flank.58 
The remaining argument in favour of German superiority in heavy artillery rests 
not with numbers, nor with the qualitative difference between the Rimailho and the 
Krupp howitzer, but with the technical superiority of the standard 1902 150mm Krupp 
over the modified 120mm de Bange. But beyond the technical aspects, the true key 
issue was the use made of them during the encounter battles. The question about heavy 
artillery is inextricably bound up with doctrine, training and implementation. 
 
On the planning and organisational front, the Germans had established a clear 
advantage. The Foot (heavy) Artillery battalions allocated to their regular army corps 
had been embedded in their respective units and military districts for over a decade.59 
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They had their own technical inspectorate to ensure technical competence as well as 
coming under the general inspection of the army commander–designate for proficiency 
and combined–arms work.60 The General Staff had ensured over the years that 
resistance to their use, from senior commanders complaining about restrictions to the 
mobility of their columns, was overcome by both persuasion and regulation.61 Their 
staff preparations had even extended to pre–war reconnaissance trips to assess whether 
roads and bridges would hold the weight of the heavy cannon. One such report on a trip 
through the Ardennes, produced in August 1912, was signed off by a certain Oberst 
Ludendorff of the General Staff.62 There was however one organisational problem; on 
the march the Foot Artillery battalion travelled at the back of one of the two divisional 
columns. Under the conditions which pertained in the Ardennes in August 1914 – a 
series of unconnected encounters by divisional columns separated by bands of forest – it 
meant that one divisional column per corps had heavy artillery support, the other did 
not. And (given that German reserve corps played key roles in both Fourth and Fifth 
Army’s fighting) it is most relevant that there were no heavy guns in any reserve corps 
in those armies.63 
The French, as Goya has said, above, had the guns – albeit not as ancient as he 
has inferred – but did not incorporate them into regiments for the field army until early 
1914. This was a doctrinal issue. The French had not revised their doctrine since the 
1890s, when they restricted their role to the reduction of fortresses. German thinking 
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had started at the same point, but Schlieffen foresaw that his envelopment strategy 
required him to reduce fortresses while on the move, requiring more mobility.  
 In 1904 Fayolle’s lectures on artillery at ESG dismissed the role of heavy 
howitzers in the field.64  But in the 21 July 1911 session of CSG, France’s senior 
generals discussed a paper which reviewed the effect of Germany’s new military law 
(‘the biggest increase in effort since 1871’) and concluded that, inter alia, there was a 
need to create special firing ranges for heavy artillery.65 War Minister Messimy 
authorised on 2 October 1911 the formation of a mobile heavy artillery organisation, 
which resulted in forty-two 120L [de Bange] guns being mounted on 155 CTR carriages 
in 1912. The same instruction acknowledged that the Rimailho 155 CTR was classified 
as a ‘modern’ weapon but contained no suggestion that it should be mass–produced.66 
There was on the French side a clear acknowledgement that they faced a potential 
problem with German heavy mobile artillery; there was a lot of debate and, clearly, a 
little action around the periphery of a solution. But in 1911 the big issue, funding, 
confounded the proper solution, which was the urgent construction of new production 
lines and a new generation of modern heavy guns. 
It was on 26 September 1913 that Messimy authorised the War Ministry’s Third 
(Operations) Bureau to set up heavy artillery field regiments, with effect from 1 April 
1914. A secret note in the Operations Bureau’s files shows how, as late as January 
1914, they were rushing to put in place arrangements for the heavy artillery to join the 
ranks of the artillery normally employed on the field of battle. The same report contains 
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a very realistic and sombre assessment of the potential damage to be expected from the 
German heavy howitzers, and examines ways of countering this.67 But there was no 
time left for the formulation of doctrine and the dissemination of regulations for the use 
of heavy artillery in a war of manoeuvre, let alone any chance to practice with the 
newly–formed regiments. General Chomer wrote a note to the War Ministry in February 
1914 which stated that the Germans were much better armed and prepared for the 
artillery battle, which he found infinitely regrettable. In the margin, someone has written 
in pencil: ‘True, but what can we do?’68 
 
So in the absence of doctrine and training, it comes as no surprise to find that the twelve 
155mm Rimailho howitzers delegated to General Brochin’s 5 CA by Third Army 
command were left tantalizingly just ten kilometres behind the front on 22 August, just 
out of range of the improvised German fieldworks which the infantry were to attack.69 
Similarly, the twelve Rimailhos allocated to Fourth Army were delegated to General 
Roques’s 12 CA on 17 August.70 Their orders for 22 August were to gather in the 
Florenville clearing, some twenty–three kilometres behind the actual fighting. 71 
Sarrail’s 6 CA had been given the more mobile 120mm Baquet guns, and the 
remainder – the de Bange 120mm guns – were with Third Group of reserve divisions, in 
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strong defensive positions protecting the Meuse Heights with their longer range.72 At 
least Sarrail attempted to make use of his heavy artillery on 22 August, the only French 
general to do so. But he was frustrated by the length of time which the guns took to get 
to their allocated position. More than six hours after the 10.00 deadline for their 
deployment at Cutry, five kilometres south of Longwy from where they could and 
should have played a vital role in breaking up the attacks of 6 RAK, Sarrail was still 
impatiently waiting for them to open fire.73 On the morning of 23 August Sarrail 
demonstrated the important French ability to learn ‘on their feet’ and ordered his 
120mm heavy cannons to open fire at dawn in order to prepare the way for his attempt 
to continue the offensive.74  
But even though the French use of the heavy guns put at their disposal was so 
poor, the influence of the 48 German heavy howitzers in Fourth Army also seems to 
have been very limited. The sixteen guns of 8 AK remained silent on 22 August as they 
were too far away from the battle zone. The sixteen guns of 6 AK are not mentioned as 
having taken part in the battles at Rossignol and Tintigny, indeed Rocolle asserts that 
they were not engaged,75 and the outcome of that encounter shows they were not 
needed. Only the sixteen guns of 18 AK at Bertrix were in action, supporting 21 ID’s 
action which destroyed the French 33 DI in the forest of Luchy. Analysis of that 
encounter battle suggests that they were arguably less influential that the 77mm field 
guns which destroyed the limbered French artillery at close range. Because of the 
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organisational issue discussed above, 21 ID’s sister division, 25 ID, fighting at Maissin 
and Anloy, had no heavy gun support.  
On Fifth Army front, there was a similar story. On the right, it was the massed 
ranks of 77mm field guns that supported 5 AK’s initial attacks during the fighting at 
Virton and Ethe,76 although Grasset records that General von Below, commanding 9 ID, 
called for and received support from ten or twelve of 5 AK’s 150mm howitzers at 
Virton (the other four or so may have been held in reserve or taken to Ethe, the situation 
is unclear).77 In any case, at Virton the facts show that by the end of the day the French 
had achieved artillery dominance,78 whilst at Ethe, where one might have expected 
high–trajectory heavy howitzers to destroy the French troops trapped in the village and 
the valley, they actually held out until nightfall and marched away under the cover of 
darkness.79 On the left, 16 AK’s Foot Artillery battalion had been allocated to 
Kaempffer’s siege detachment along with 13 AK’s heavy howitzer battalion and 
therefore took no part in the manoeuvre around Ruffey’s right flank.  
When on 22 August 5 CA attacked the German centre around Longwy, 16 AK’s 
heavy artillery – 1st Battalion, 10th Foot Artillery regiment armed with the older SfH ’02 
model howitzer – was temporarily placed under the command of the nearest corps, 6 
RAK, and they marched towards the fighting around Huffigny where they played an 
important role in preventing that reserve corps from breaking under the pressure from 
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Sarrail’s powerful and experienced regular troops.80 Similarly, 13 AK’s guns were 
diverted to support the battle against Brochin’s 5 CA. Reports on the French side of 
their infantry streaming back over the Tellancourt plateau pursued by German artillery 
strongly suggests that the 150mm guns, with their longer range, their high explosive 
shells and their terrifying noise, were instrumental in keeping the French running. It is 
fair to say that in the defence of the centre of Crown Prince William’s line, either side of 
Longwy, two battalions of 150mm howitzers performed a valuable supporting role, 
although the key moments in the fighting took place under cover of thick fog and were 
conducted by infantry alone.  
But despite the contribution of two battalions of foot artillery around Longwy, 
the overall balance of evidence suggests that the heavy field howitzer did not play a 
significant role in the Ardennes on 22 August. Only one–third of the German heavy 
guns came into action, and only at Longwy can they been seen to have made an 
appreciable difference to the result. None of the French heavy guns were used, although 
Sarrail did intend to use his. The Rimailhos attached to 5 CA might have made a 
difference if they had been used to support the attack west of Longwy, but only if it had 
been postponed until the fog lifted. The French could and should have made better use 
of the resources allocated to them, but were lacking in both doctrine and training for 
their use.  
 
The next piece of equipment which features high in the list of reasons given by 
historians for French failure is the light field howitzer. The prevailing opinion is very 
straight–forward: in August 1914 the Germans had them, the French did not, which 
                                                 
80 H. Wendlandt,  Das 1 hannoversche Bataillon des Niedersächsischen Füssartillerie-Regiments nr.10 
(Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg, 1922), pp.20–22 
 
     334 
gave the former a key battlefield advantage, particularly in the Ardennes where the 
higher trajectory was useful for bombarding the dead ground behind hills and in valleys. 
Stevenson for example wrote of the French: ‘Their 75mm field guns were ineffective in 
the hilly terrain…they were no answer to the German machine guns and field howitzers, 
which wreaked havoc.’81  
By 1914 each German regular division had a three–battery battalion (18 guns) of 
1909–vintage 105mm light field howitzers per division.82 But within each division, only 
one group (Abteilung) in one of the two artillery regiments held all the howitzers; in the 
Ardennes campaign with its multiple small columns and individual encounters, it was a 
matter of random chance as to where the German howitzers would be found. So for 
example the German 49 Brigade fighting at Anloy had the support of howitzers but its 
sister 50 Brigade at Maissin did not.83 Furthermore the German reserve divisions had 
only one regiment of field guns, without howitzers, so that there were no German 
howitzers present at the key encounter at Neufchâteau.84  
The French infantry divisions, both regular and reserve, were armed exclusively 
with 75mm field guns. Such was the technical superiority of this weapon that a 
consensus of opinion within the Artillery Directorate of the War Ministry opted for its 
exclusive and universal use at the expense of the 120mm and 155mm pieces which had 
been in use up until 1903. Only in 1911, when the post–Agadir military revival began 
under Joffre, did the search for a new light howitzer really start.85 And even then, the 
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army faced bureaucratic resistance from the Artillery Directorate at the War Ministry, 
which frustrated any chance of a swift decision and implementation. 
Immediately upon his appointment Joffre commissioned a report which 
concluded that there was an urgent need for two new pieces, one being a light howitzer. 
But discussions with the Artillery Directorate took eight months before a test battery of 
Schneider’s existing 105mm howitzer – produced for export to the Bulgarian army – 
was requisitioned for field trials.86 Despite technical opposition, Joffre finally persuaded 
War Minister Millerand to buy 200 customised light howitzers, but it took many more 
months of further discussions and protracted testing (until early 1913) for the order to 
be placed, half from Schneider’s Creusot factory and half from the Ministry’s own 
factory at Bourges.87 Baquet wrote that in France at this time there were political 
difficulties in giving work to private firms instead of state factories. Schneider, despite 
being the best manufacturer and having production lines supplying several other 
nations, got few orders. Then the field howitzer programme became one of the 
casualties of the cuts in the 1912 budget,88 and the order was reduced to 36 pieces, the 
first of which were delivered in the autumn of 1914.  
In place of the cancelled howitzers, ‘the Chamber Budget Commission decided 
March 1913 to save 80 million francs by rejecting the development of a light field 
howitzer and adopting the plaquette Malandrin’,89 a specially designed metal collar, 
sometimes referred to as ‘fins’, which when fitted to a 75mm shell gave it a howitzer–
like high trajectory.90 This option was not only considerably cheaper than building new 
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guns, it also appealed to those who wanted to simplify the supply train by minimising 
the different sizes of munitions. It lacked the range and the weight of shell of the 
German 105mm, and it reduced mobility – it has been argued that the French device 
‘required the gun to be dug in and therefore militated against the mobility and speed 
which had become the artillery’s watchwords’91 – but there were arguments in its 
favour. General Baquet wrote that the plaquette’s trajectory was higher than that of the 
German piece and that factor, combined with a shrapnel shell, meant it could hunt out 
and kill soldiers in dead ground, the implication being that increased range and weight 
of projectile were not key issues for a battlefield weapon.92 On the internal politics 
surrounding this issue, Baquet also wrote that there were too many opinions spread over 
the État major and Artillery Directorate and no one individual sufficiently powerful and 
convincing to impose his opinion within the sceptical milieu of 1912.93 
But the Germans had had their difficulties too. Contrary to what one might 
believe, given the popular view of the Prussian army as a centre of excellence, the 
German development and adoption of the light howitzer was not a straight–forward 
issue. During the 1880s there was considerable resistance from traditionalists: there 
were for example suspicions that test firing trials were rigged to show howitzers in a 
poor light.94 Only in 1896, when Schlieffen became personally convinced that flat–
trajectory cannons were ineffective against field emplacements, did the introduction of 
the L.FH-98 105mm howitzer get forced through, albeit still in the face of strong 
opposition. Schlieffen was opposed in particular by General Ernst Hoffbauer, inspector–
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general of field artillery from 1891 to 1899. At one stage of the debate, Schlieffen even 
believed that he might lose the argument, but decided to press on, and eventually got his 
way. The gun was first introduced in 1900.95  
Having taken the decision to include 105mm howitzers in their line of battle, the 
Germans stuck to it, allocated funding and swiftly executed delivery of the programme. 
Within two years of Schlieffen’s intervention, the 1898 howitzer was rolling off the 
production line. And in 1910 they introduced a more modern version, L.FH 98 09, 
which had genuine modern quick–firing capability, a shield, delayed fuse shells for use 
against field fortifications and an extended range of 6300 metres. In 1911, just as the 
French reopened their debate about such a weapon, the Germans added a three–battery 
battalion of the new 105mms to each of its then twenty–three army corps. 
 
But did the German howitzers give them a battlefield advantage in the Ardennes on 22 
August 1914?  The first point to make is that the terrain over which the encounter 
battles were fought was not universally inimical to the French field guns. The whole 
southern half of the battlefield, from Metz to Longwy, is open with flat plateaux and 
rolling slopes; the Maginot Line fort at Fermont, with its excellent field of fire, is proof 
of that. At Virton and Ethe, the battlefields were natural amphitheatres in which two 
German divisional commanders separately set up old–fashioned gun lines on open 
ground in front of the forests, and field guns operated at relatively close range (up to 
4000 metres).96 Here, on the French Third and German Fifth Army fronts, there was no 
glaring need for a high–trajectory weapon. On the other half of the front there was a 
further variety of terrain. At Rossignol and Tintigny the battle ground was the Semoy 
                                                 
95 Ibid., p.66  
 
96 See note 43, above. 
 
     338 
river valley, narrow, with low water meadows overlooked by ridges; at Neufchâteau it 
was arguably howitzer country, with ridges and hollows, copses and clearings – but the 
German reserve division there had no howitzers. At Bertrix the significant fighting was 
on flat ground covered with either trees or high gorse. At Anloy and at Maissin the 
German artillery held the high ground firing down on their enemy, which gave them 
extra trajectory and less dead ground. The terrain disputed by the German and French 
Fourth Armies was not, overall, such that the absence of a light field howitzer would 
significantly disadvantage one side. 
On the French side, there has not yet been found a single direct reference to the 
use of the French plaquette Malandrin in the Ardennes. But there are perhaps hints: the 
German accounts of the fight for Neufchâteau town refer to French artillery chasing 
their infantry through the folds and hollows of the hills, which suggests a high–
trajectory weapon reaching dead ground;97 and at Bellefontaine, where Cordonnier’s 
brigade held off the attacks of the German 9 ID, Cordonnier wrote: ‘Our shells [obus] 
with their high–angle fire made light of the changes of slope and continued their ravages 
behind the crests where the enemy had previously found shelter’.98  
The light howitzer story really becomes pertinent, as with the heavy artillery, 
with the onset of trench warfare in October 1914. Then the superior German ability to 
lob high–trajectory shells into trenches and to destroy field earthworks (the purpose 
Schlieffen originally chose for this weapon) would give them a clear advantage until 
belatedly the guns ordered by Joffre in 1911 arrived on the battlefield. 
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 From the earliest to the latest writing, historians make much of French infantry 
throwing themselves against entrenched Germans protected by barbed wire and armed 
with machine guns. In 1930 Liddell Hart wrote that ‘the French attacked blindly with 
the bayonet and were mown down by machine guns’.99 In 2004 David Stevenson wrote 
that the French 75mm field guns ‘were no answer to the German machine guns and field 
howitzers, which wreaked havoc.’100 Although this ‘machine gun’ issue is contextual to 
the overall offensive à outrance debate, it nevertheless requires clarification.  
The fact is that each side had exactly the same number of machine guns per 
regiment – six. The Germans organised theirs into one six–gun company per infantry 
regiment.101  The French, on the other hand, allocated a two–gun section to each 
infantry battalion.102 This gave the German regimental commander speed and flexibility 
during battle, to move all six guns to a critical location or to split them up to support 
various different parts of the engagement. With hindsight this is a firepower issue: the 
French regarded two guns per battalion as a way of increasing average weight of fire 
without extra men; the Germans saw merit in using massed fire according to particular 
circumstances.  
But rather than an inspired doctrinal decision, the German organisation may 
have been more chance than judgement. Germany lagged behind the French in the 
distribution of the machine gun to all its infantry regiments. In the early years of the 20th 
century there was considerable resistance from the infantry on grounds of weight, 
reliability and lack of manoeuvrability, and from the artillery, perhaps on grounds of 
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competition.103 Experiments between 1899 and the early 1900s with machine gun 
detachments in sixteen Jaeger battalions were not a success and ‘initial plans for 
integrating the guns into their battalions were jettisoned in favour of independent 
detachments stationed with the Jaeger in peacetime but marching with the cavalry at 
manoeuvres and during wartime.’104 In 1904 not a single German infantry regiment had 
a machine gun detachment, and the persistence with experimentation owed a lot to the 
Kaiser’s personal fixation with things British and with the British cavalry’s use of 
machine guns with their cavalry and mounted infantry during the South African War.105 
Indeed in 1901 draft machine gun regulations, infantry officers had stipulated that the 
weapon should remain at least 800 metres behind the firing line.106 It was only when the 
first Moroccan crisis convinced the Kaiser that the army was not ready to fight and win 
a major European war that the question of machine guns was properly addressed as part 
of the overall German military improvement drive.107 Germany had only ninety-one 
machine guns at that time outside its fortress detachments, grouped in thirteen cavalry 
detachments. As a result of the Russo-Japanese war, four experimental infantry machine 
gun detachments were formed.108 Tests by these units in 1906 and 1907 of the new 
lightweight Maxim MG.08109 were successful, and distribution of the new MG.08 
started towards the end of von Einem’s Ministry.110 But full roll–out was delayed by the 
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1908 German financial situation and by Treasury Minister Adolf Wermuth’s 
‘formidable’ hold on the purse strings.111 So the 1911 Quinquennat provided funding 
for only a small increase in machine guns;112 enough to fund one new detachment (six 
guns) per regular infantry brigade.  
Already by this time France had twice that strength, with six guns per regiment. 
France had been an early adopter of the guns produced by the Hotchkiss company, 
starting with the purchase in 1897 of a small batch of the successful Hotchkiss M1897, 
‘the first gun to combine simplicity with reliability’, and over 200 M1900s soon 
afterwards.113 But the Technical Directorate within the War Ministry was not content to 
buy ‘off the shelf’, and made two unsuccessful attempts to ‘improve’ on Hotchkiss’ 
original design. The Puteaux M1905 was introduced as part of the medium–term 
measures for which 200m francs were voted in the winter of 1905.114 But they were 
‘troublesome’ and were rapidly withdrawn from the field army and relegated to static 
use in fortresses and strong-points, where the drawbacks were not so obvious.115 It was 
replaced by the Saint-Etienne M1907, which was better, if still with shortcomings and 
with weaknesses inherited from the Puteaux.116 In 1907, in an apparent response to the 
successful tests, and planned roll out, of the German MG.08, France decided urgently to 
provide the entire metropolitan infantry with machine–guns, and this was implemented 
between 1908 and 1911.117 But the Saint–Etienne M1907 was not a success and despite 
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being radically modified in 1915 and 1916, it was finally replaced by the original 
Hotchkiss design.118  
But initial German reluctance to fully embrace this new technology was reversed 
when Moltke and the General Staff absorbed the lessons of the Russo–Japanese war.119 
Their original plan to give each brigade a machine gun company starting in 1911 was 
accelerated, and in 1909, two years ahead of schedule, extraordinary funding was found 
to fit out the first four brigades with their six–gun detachment. In the 1910 Kaiser 
Manoeuvre, machine gun detachments were integrated into a ‘mixed brigade’ structure 
within General Alexander von Kluck’s Red Army. In the 1911 Manoeuvre, ‘regular 
infantry brigades on both sides had a machine gun detachment’. Doctrinal issues were 
resolved; Brose argues that ‘with only six maxims to deploy, brigade commanders were 
forced to hold their detachments in reserve’120. On the other hand, Storz’s analysis 
concludes that it was kept organisationally separate from regular infantry units quite 
deliberately on the grounds of its weight, complexity and of the difficulty integrating it 
into existing infantry tactics; however it was increasingly used in combination with the 
rifles in the firing line and therefore became part of the infantry fire fight, so that the 
armies which took the field in 1914 no longer regarded it as an exotic piece of special 
equipment but as a regular infantry support weapon.121 Whatever the reason, German 
machine guns were retained in separate Machine gun companies, to be used ‘in a 
trouble–shooting role that brought the guns to the spot where they were most 
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needed.’122 Finally, as a response to the stimulus of the second Moroccan crisis, 
Germany rushed into a military expansion which gave a machine gun detachment to 
each regiment.123 Only a number of reserve regiments were still lacking in machine 
guns in August 1914 (as has been shown in the analysis of 21 RID’s fight at 
Neufchâteau).  
To summarise the pre–war status of the machine gun, it is fair to say that the two 
sides were more or less at the same stage of development. In implementing their 
machine gun programme, the Germans had started later but caught up fast; they chose a 
robust and reliable product and they fell into an organisational structure that fortuitously 
proved to be the model for the future. The French rolled out their guns to infantry 
battalions earlier, but lost qualitative advantage by trying to adapt the original Hotchkiss 
design. The French chose to use two machine guns per battalion for additional fire 
power, the Germans retained the tactical flexibility of the six–gun machine gun 
company. But how were these weapons used in battle?  
 
Little has been written about French machine guns’ contribution to the battles in the 
Ardennes but they were there nevertheless. At Maissin, I/19 RI advanced across the 
valley separating them from the village accompanied by its two machine guns, which 
augmented firepower from the flanks.124 At nearby Anloy, the author of the regimental 
history of the German 116 IR noted how they were fired upon at a range of barely 400m 
by hidden riflemen and machine gunners.125 At Bertrix the Germans needed artillery to 
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suppress French resistance, using direct fire at 400m at the French, whose machine guns 
were hidden behind bushes and hedges.126 At Neufchâteau, where a German reserve 
division was fighting for its life, it was the French machine guns which did the damage: 
‘It was well into 1:30 pm and the firing–lines lay only 300–400m from the enemy in a 
deliberate fire–fight, which the French strengthened from time to time with their 
machine guns, while the Regiment in those days as a Reserve formation still had no 
machine guns.’127  
The role of the French machine gun in August 1914 has been greatly 
understated, primarily it seems because it was used simply as an augmentation to 
battalion firepower rather than as a regimental tactical differentiator. There is also, of 
course, the powerful influence of the myth of offensive à outrance, under which it 
would be unthinkable that the French also used their machine guns effectively. And it is 
true that the six–gun German company was used very flexibly and to great tactical 
advantage. A classic example was during the fighting at Ochamps, part of the encounter 
battle at Bertrix, where the machine gun company of 87 RI was split into three sections; 
two were placed on the heights around the chapel and the third at the southern exit from 
the village.128  
Given the evidence, it is fair to say that the only times that the German machine 
guns played the stereotypical role attributed to them was when, as with 95 RI at 
Maissin, a tactically inept French attack was launched from too far out with too little 
preparation.  
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Aeroplanes were a very new weapon of war in August 1914. The rate of technological 
innovation and development since the first powered flight in 1903 had been astonishing. 
In 1910 alone, twenty or more significant milestones were broken, some in the United 
States, some in Europe, including the first machine gun in an aircraft, the first bomb 
dropped and the first air–to–ground wireless communication.129  
The catalyst for this explosion of activity was Blériot’s channel crossing on 25 
July 1909. That seminal event was swiftly followed by another, the world’s first 
International Air Show of 22–29 August 1909, at Reims. From a military perspective, 
this event was crucial to the development of French air power. General Pierre Roques 
(Director of Engineers at the War Ministry) attended, and subsequently built a new 
career around the establishment of an independent French Air Force, beating off a 
strong bid by the Artillery Directorate for control of the new instrument of war.130 By 
1914 France was recognised as the pre–eminent nation in civil aviation, with the best 
power units (the proven lightweight Antoinette aero engine in production and the world 
class Gnôme rotary engine in development), the best craft and arguably the best 
pilots.131 However events on the battlefields of the Ardennes in August 1914 seem to 
show a degree of German superiority in the use of this arm, as will be demonstrated 
below. This difference between a perception of French superiority (‘only in aeroplanes 
were the French universally judged superior’, writes David Herrmann of the balance of 
military power in 1914)132 and contrary evidence from this study requires examination.  
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Following the events of 1909 and 1910, the French GQG made military aviation 
the predominant theme of its 1910 autumn manoeuvres, where it proved its worth in 
reconnaissance and artillery spotting.133 Ten aircraft were involved, four for each army 
corps and two for the GQG umpires and observers.134 By comparison, German 
manoeuvres as late as August 1912 between 13 AK and 18 AK and involving a staffel 
of aeroplanes on each side, concluded that the fliers did not prove themselves; the Blue 
side’s aircraft did not put in an appearance, and those on the Red side suffered eight 
defective motors on 1 and 2 August before they got near the enemy.135 
  Germany had started later than France down the heavier–than–air development 
path, concentrating too long on the alternative Zeppelin lighter–than–air technology, 
and was clearly behind her enemy in terms of aerial technology136:  
 
Although Germany had the edge in dirigibles, in heavier–than–air flight the 
French secured a lead in pilot training and in airframe and engine manufacture 
that inspired great national enthusiasm. In 1911 the Germans thought the French 
had over a hundred aircraft and seventy–seven military pilots, although both 
sides were still uncertain about the new invention’s utility.137 
 
But starting after the success of the French 1910 autumn manoeuvres, Germany made a 
significant and ultimately successful effort to catch up with France, in numbers of 
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aircraft and pilots if not necessarily in quality.138 They first used aeroplanes in their 
1911 Kaisermanöver, and immediately afterwards (November 1911) decided to increase 
funds for military aviation.139 Included in the 1912 Army Bill was funding for 
‘specialized troops, including the aviation units’.140 And the drive to catch up was led 
from the top; Moltke himself wrote on 3 December 1912 that: 
 
The annual reports of the Inspector–General of Foot Artillery (III.62375/12 of 
8/11/1912) and the Inspector of Field Artillery (I.3740/12, Secret, of 
26/10/1912), which I have now received, both show plainly that officers 
controlling artillery fire will be very materially assisted by spotting and 
observation from aircraft.141 
 
Moltke had already made plain his determination to match France in this area. In a note 
to the War Ministry dated 6 November 1912, he wrote that he assumed that France 
would have at least 450 military aeroplanes and 350 aviators by 1 April 1914. He called 
for an increase in Germany from the 156 aircraft planned by the Ministry to a total of at 
least 324, concluding: ‘I therefore adhere to my former standpoint, that my programme 
must be carried into effect by 1 April 1914. Please see that this is done.’142 It seems that 
Moltke got his way; the German 1913 Law included provision for an extra 79 million 
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marks for aviation, to be fully implemented by 1916,143 and in the 1913 Prussian army 
estimates a sum of 23 million marks (about 6.8% of the total non-recurrent spending) 
was allocated to ‘aircraft, airships, and ground infrastructure’, compared with 3.5% of 
capital spending on aviation in France.144 It would seem that on the French side the hard 
decisions on where to spend limited funds provoked budget owners in the traditional 
arms to resist cuts in order to fund the aviation arm, unproven as it was in combat.145 
Germany’s financial flexibility, on the other hand, allowed it to create on 1 October 
1913 five new aviation battalions under a new Aviation Inspectorate (part of 
Generalleutnant Ernst von Hoeppner’s Inspectorate of Military Communications).146 
Germany grew, France stagnated; and as a result, the French army failed to field the 
numbers of aeroplanes (450) and pilots (350) predicted by Moltke, although they clearly 
had the capacity and opportunity to do so, whereas the German army substantially met 
Moltke’s targets. In 1914 the French army fielded 23 escadrilles (138 aeroplanes) 
compared to thirty-three for Germany (220 aeroplanes).147  
 
The way in which France and Germany used their respective new air forces was rooted 
in the way their respective organisations had developed. As has been shown above, the 
leadership of Chief of General Staff Moltke was critical in getting the numbers of 
aeroplanes considered necessary, and Moltke was heavily influenced by reports from his 
two artillery Inspectors that the aeroplane should be used for spotting and directing 
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artillery fire. So it is no co-incidence that each corps commander was given his own 
squadron of aeroplanes, leaving but a single squadron under the direct command of each 
army – and none at OHL level.148 In France, there were not enough squadrons to allow 
one per corps, so Joffre placed them at army command level. There is an observable 
tendency in large bureaucracies for ownership to define usage based on personal 
objectives: devolve to army corps level and the aircraft will be used for tactical 
purposes; hold them at army level or above and they will be used for operational and 
even strategic reconnaissance. The evidence from this study, summarised and analysed 
below, shows that such was the way it turned out in August 1914. 
 Pre–war developments contributed to the outcome described above. In October 
1911 a British report on the state of French military air power during the summer of 
1911 said that the French War Ministry ‘had at its disposal, so far as could be 
ascertained, something between two hundred and two hundred and twenty aeroplanes’ – 
many more than were deployed in August 1914. The report concluded that their 
methods of training were elaborate and complete, and that ‘the air corps was continually 
practiced in co-operation with all other arms – infantry, cavalry, and artillery.’149 Had 
Colonel Estienne won for the Artillery Directorate the political battle over ownership of 
the air arm, one can legitimately speculate that greater use of aeroplanes for artillery 
spotting and battlefield observation would have been made, based on the ground–
breaking aeronautical exercises carried out by the French air corps with infantry, 
artillery and cavalry at the Camp de Châlons. But ownership by the Engineering 
Directorate almost inevitably focused development in a different direction: 
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The artillery needed to spot targets hidden behind crests, and direct and control 
fire on those targets. For that they needed fast, short–range aeroplanes capable of 
flying about a hundred metres above the ground for about an hour. The 
Engineers hoped to provide long–range reconnaissance for the infantry and 
cavalry, using an aeroplane capable of seeking out enemy reserve forces at least 
a hundred kilometres behind the front, flying high enough to avoid risk, that is to 
say at about a thousand metres for both legs of the journey. In 1909, the aircraft 
were capable of meeting the demands of the Artillery, but not those of the 
Engineers’.150  
 
But by 1914, as will be shown below, evidence suggests that the Engineers had 
achieved their objectives for the new air arm at the expense of the artillery. 
 
One final organisational feature influenced the comparative use of air power during the 
Ardennes campaign. Having decided to allocate his available squadrons to his army 
commanders, Joffre then gave Fourth Army just two squadrons (twelve aeroplanes) 
compared to four for Third Army and five for Fifth Army.151 There is no explanation to 
be found for this decision; perhaps, again like the heavy artillery of which he gave de 
Langle just twelve guns, he was guided by a preconceived notion of limited usefulness 
in the difficult Ardennes terrain, or perhaps it was because 4 Army was originally in 
reserve and could rely on reports from the front; but there is no evidence to support 
either hypothesis. The result, however, was that de Langle had limited resources 
compared to his opponent, and made limited use of them, especially in the tactical 
                                                 
150 Carlier, sera maître de l’air, p.136 
 
151 AFGG I/1, Appendix III, pp.556, 563, 567 
 
     351 
arena. Ruffey, too, seems to have limited the use of his more plentiful aerial resource to 
operational reconnaissance, which was of course an army commander’s prime 
concern.152 The needs of the French corps commanders do not seem to have been 
considered, despite effective pre–war practice at the tactical level during manoeuvres.153 
 
And so on the battlefields of the Ardennes on 22 August 1914, it seems that Germany 
achieved a decided advantage in the practical use of aircraft in warfare. German 
reconnaissance aircraft, taking off as soon as the fog lifted, had identified the advance of 
de Langle’s army at the earliest opportunity and alerted Duke Albrecht to the impending 
crisis.154 At Bertrix a German aeroplane was scouting ahead of 21 ID as it advanced 
towards 33 DI, and the shooting down of that machine by French infantry – cutting 
short its flow of battlefield intelligence – indirectly caused the final contact to come as 
something of a surprise to the Germans as well as the French.155 The aeroplane almost 
certainly belonged to 18 AK’s integral support squadron.156  
 On the French side, de Langle’s flyers were only asked to perform operational 
missions under his direct control, and then quite late in the day. They seem to have 
delivered their first reports on the situation as late as 17.00, and even then gave little 
useful intelligence.157 
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At an operational level, the quality of intelligence gained by observing marching 
columns from the air has been shown in this study to have been overrated, since flights 
were severely limited by the weather and both sides had rapidly developed the ability to 
hide large bodies of troops in woods and villages, and march at night.158 The failure of 
Ruffy’s airmen to spot and report the movements of the German Fifth Army 
immediately preceding their attack exemplifies this point. But the tactical application 
seems to have been a factor in German superiority, compensating for the cavalry’s 
inability to penetrate security screens with their modern firepower.  
In short, the use to which each side put the new arm, air power, shows once 
again that the key issues were organisation and process driven; that small but important 
doctrinal differences arose and that German pragmatism triumphed over French 
bureaucracy. Here, as elsewhere, France squandered an initial technical advantage and 
suffered as a result on the battlefield. 
 
Although a relatively insignificant item of equipment,  albeit very important to the 
troops, the question of the French lack of field kitchens is important in its own right but 
also perfectly exemplifies one of the worst traits of French military preparation. The 
Germans had introduced field kitchens about the time of the Bosnian crisis, an 
‘expensive innovation’.159 Hot food the night before a battle and even coffee in the 
morning before the fighting started became a normal but important part of the routine of 
the German soldier.160 On the other hand, there are several instances of French soldiers 
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going into action on 22 August cold, tired and hungry, not having had hot food for 
sometimes as long as a whole day.161  
Charles Humbert was senator for the Meuse region, member of the commission 
sénatoriale de l’armée, and renowned for asking awkward questions about French 
military preparation. In a parliamentary session on 31 October 1913, he asked about the 
status of field kitchens.162 The answers provided to him illuminate the French army’s 
way of effecting change. Field kitchens had first been tested in 1905, and annually 
thereafter. In 1908 there were large–scale experiments of kitchens of different types. 
During the winter of 1911–1912 the War Ministry conducted a formal trial between the 
three leading competing systems. Between 1905 and 1913 the Ministry spent 274,800 
francs on these tests and trials, ranging from 5,600 francs in 1905 to a peak of 129,000 
francs in 1910. The status in October 1913 (about the time that the Germans were 
rapidly introducing them) was that there would be further tests pitting the three 2–
wheeled systems against some new 4–wheel types, some with ovens and some without 
ovens, to find the best choice. The intention was to take a decision (in 1913), fit out four 
or five corps with the chosen model during 1914 and then equip the rest of the army 
during 1915 and 1916 with annual programmes within the limits of the budget. It seems 
that no decision was actually taken in 1913, and there is no evidence found yet that any 
French corps went into action in 1914 equipped with field kitchens. 
For nine years the bureaucrats in the War Ministry struggled with the issue of 
finding the perfect field kitchen, unable to choose between the number of wheels needed 
or decide on the relative merit of an oven. Budgetary constraints would ensure that, if 
and when a type was chosen, it would take at least three years to equip just the regular 
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army corps. War overtook the process and French troops went into battle on 22 August 
1914 all too often deprived of their last meal. 
 
Perhaps the least significant but most widely–known French equipment issue was that 
of the red trousers worn by their infantrymen, leading to unfavourable comparisons to 
anachronistic Napoleonic warfare. The British had had khaki for a decade, the Germans 
their field grey since 1909.163 If final proof were needed of the rationale for change, it 
was provided by the Russo–Japanese war.164 Typically, given the pattern emerging from 
evidence above about the nature of French bureaucracy, the French army in their 
autumn manoeuvres of 1911 had experimented with camouflage of a réséda colour 
(which is apparently a shade of green), following a recommendation by a Committee led 
by General Dubail, but no decision had been taken.165 Traditionalists resisted change;166 
and the uniform had taken on a political dimension. The issue had got caught up in 
Millerand’s attempts to boost Army and officer prestige in the post ‘republican’ period 
of military revival. He had banned officers from wearing civilian clothes, and the 
traditional colourful uniform was thus deemed important for morale.167 Although the 
now notorious phrase le pantaloon rouge, c’est la France was uttered by War Minister 
Étienne in 1906, it does exemplify the ‘original patriotic tradition’ of the Radical party 
and of parliamentarian Étienne Clémentel, who was responsible for the Army budget 
when the question of credits for camouflage uniforms was considered, and his advocacy 
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of the red trousers was crucial to the postponement of any change.168 It was only at the 
eleventh hour – on 9 July 1914 – that a law was passed to provide the French infantry 
with new bleu horizon uniforms, too late for the early battles.169   
But was the French uniform the significant drawback that it has sometimes been 
taken to be? It was, perhaps, symbolic of an attitude within military and political French 
circles that mistook show for substance and which failed to comprehend the impending 
realities of modern warfare. But there is little evidence that it significantly worsened 
French chances of success in the Ardennes battles. Indeed if the ‘friendly fire incident’ 
evidenced at Neufchâteau is anything to go by, French artillery did not find the red 
trousers sufficiently noticeable to stop them firing on their own side.170 Contemporary 
pictures show that the dark blue overcoat worn by the poilu covered fully two–thirds of 
their body, although officers with their short blue tunics were more colourfully exposed, 
and the cavalry dragoons’ metal cuirasses frankly ridiculous. But there is a case to be 
answered: a young Lieutenant Rommel, fighting with 53 Brigade at the village of Bleid 
near Ethe on 22 August, wrote of leading his men into contact with an enemy 
distinguishable by their red breeches showing up amongst the yellow corn in the fields, 
but then he also refers to the bright reflection of their cooking gear attached to the top of 
their tall packs, so the question of French attention to camouflage is clearly more wide–
ranging.171 What is important about the French uniform issue is how it informs us of the 
comparative weight of military need as opposed to socio–political bias in French 
preparations for war.  
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Finally, an issue which is made relevant by the doctrinal issue, associated with offensive 
à outrance, of whether to dig temporary battlefield trenches or not: the question of 
entrenching and other field tools. Contrary to what one might expect, the French units 
were just as well endowed with such tools as their German counterparts. 
Each French infantry company of about 250 men was allocated 80 spades, 80 
picks, 16 wire cutters, 8 hand axes and 1 jointed hand saw, all to be carried with their 
packs; further heavier tools travelled with the first and second line transport.172 Despite 
this official allocation, Major Burne (using Grasset as his source) records an incident at 
the battle at Virton where 124 RI, under artillery fire on exposed hillside, ‘proceeded to 
dig in as best they could with the lids of their mess–tins and even with their fingers, for 
they had few entrenching tools’.173 However, Grasset himself said: ‘But everyone was 
driven by the urge to get forward and close with the enemy; nobody thought to dig for 
shelter and their tools remained on their packs and they simply used furrows and stacks 
of straw as they could be found’.174 Burne through his erroneous interpretation 
contributed to the building of a myth, whereas Grasset points to a training issue and an 
unfettered offensive attitude, rather than an equipment issue. The impression gained by 
Edward Spears during his liaison work with Lanrezac’s Fifth Army reinforces this 
conclusion: ‘somewhat to my surprise, I saw no attempt being made anywhere to dig 
entrenchments...The whole pre–war training, or lack of training in this respect, was 
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telling’.175 So the French had the tools but not the inclination (or doctrine or training) to 
use them. 
By comparison, a German infantry company carried 100 spades, 10 pickaxes 
and 5 hatchets with them, with heavier tools in the regimental first line transport and 
more in the second line transport.176 And they had been trained over a long period to use 
them. As Spears said:  
 
I for one was soon to learn that you apply in time of war the lessons you have 
learned in peace; you may do less than you did in peacetime, you will certainly 
not do more. In war it is too late to remember theories and axioms which are all 
very well for officers on Staff rides; the soldier is either too tired or has no time 
to think; he will only do what comes to him naturally and instinctively, through 
long usage.177 
 
 A specific German Instruction Manual on digging and building field emplacements was 
already in use in 1893, and was translated into English by the Corps of Royal Engineers. 
Amongst its guiding principles, it states that: ‘Field defences have acquired additional 
importance from the effect of modern firearms ... they make it possible to offer a stout 
resistance even with comparatively weak forces, or else, by economising men, they 
enable a sufficient force to be reserved for an effective counter–attack at the decisive 
points.’178 One sees at Maissin proof of the application of the defensive doctrine, and at 
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Rossignol that of the counter–attack. And linking the 1893 doctrine with the 1914 
application in the field lay two decades of instruction and practice on Germany’s 
abundant training grounds. The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were taken onboard: 
at the end of 1905 an anonymous article in Militärwochenblatt called for the regulations 
on giving protection to the infantry to be properly implemented after years of theoretical 
observance.179 The call seems to have been heeded, for Zuber observes that ‘in 1911 the 
new regulation Feld-Pionierdienst aller Waffen (Combat Engineer Tasks for all Arms) 
integrated engineer training, principally digging in, river crossing and clearing 
obstacles, into the training of all combat arms’, and that (keeping one step ahead) ‘the 
1st Foot Guard regimental history reported practicing attacks on field fortifications in 
September 1912 and 1913’.180  
The 1893 Instruction stated that ‘one pace per rifle should be reckoned for 
shelter trenches’, although this may well have widened by the time the war started, in 
accordance with development of infantry doctrine on dispersal. ‘Intervals of a few paces 
may be conveniently left between the trenches of different companies’, indicating that 
initial shallow scrapes for individuals were intended to be enlarged into continuous 
‘company’ lines.181 If there was time, the troops were expected to ‘prepare the 
foreground (clear the field of fire) and mark out distances’.182 Wire entanglements and 
abatis (felled trees or thick branches) were to be sited 150 feet in front of the line of the 
defence and the abatis would conceal the wire.183 According to doctrine, a practised 
workman [a pioneer] should in one hour be able to excavate 35–42 cubic feet of light 
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soil, 26 cubic feet of medium and 14 cubic feet of heavy soil; infantry using entrenching 
tools should accomplish the same in no more than twice the time.184 Using these figures, 
and the measurements given for a standard kneeling shelter trench185, the calculation 
shows that a German infantryman was trained to dig his initial shelter trench (with a 
three foot depth) in just over half–an–hour. It is little wonder that the French were 
amazed by evidence of such achievement, nor that they misinterpreted what they saw.  
At Maissin, the French recorded that there were enemy trenches, barbed wire, 
and dummy soldiers whose helmets were cunningly disguised turnips.186 General 
Eydoux and his men could not envisage these works having been constructed during the 
long hours of the fire fight and concluded that they had been prepared in advance. This 
is plainly nonsense; the German infantry had only arrived at Maissin at the same time as 
the French, and if an advance party were to have made such preparation the trenches 
would have faced west, from where the French attack was expected rather than south 
where the French achieved surprise by their unexpected advance. So too at Rossignol, 
an experienced Colonel of the Colonial Army, Lieutentant–colonel Vitart, mistakenly 
reported that the enemy positions facing him had been prepared in advance.187 This 
common mistake stemmed from a total lack of understanding on the French side about 
what could be achieved by training, practice and the effective application of doctrine, 
and contributed in no small part to the myth that the Germans were lying in ambush 
positions in the forests on 22 August.  
One is therefore drawn to the conclusion that the issue of German trenches and 
barbed wire is one of doctrine and training rather than of equipment. It is instructive 
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insofar as so many French soldiers saw what they wanted to see in order to seek 
explanations for their defeat, and it informs us as to how inaccurate pictures of ambush 
and preparation have coloured many previous accounts of the Battle of the Ardennes.   
 
In conclusion on the various armament and equipment issues, one is drawn on the 
French side to underlying themes of insufficient funding, of delay due to excessive 
bureaucracy and of a lack of genuine public and military will to prepare, rather than 
practical issues of technology and production. It is clear, too, that the initial 
technological advantage of the French 75mm field gun left them for too long with an 
ultimately false sense of security, and for a crucial period they traded numbers of guns 
for rate of fire. When their potential adversaries caught up in the qualitative race, France 
had to divert precious funds to make up the numbers again, instead of (say) investing in 
heavy artillery. The French army’s greater reliance on State–owned industry not only 
limited their capacity for production, but introduced delay while customised designs of 
standard private industry models were planned and created and (in the case of the 
Hotchkiss machine gun) ended up with an inferior product.  
On the German side, one sees conversely a swifter response, based in no small 
part on greater funds and political will, and less convoluted bureaucratic rules, processes 
and systems. One sees that the medium–term improvements in equipment taken by 
Germany after the first Moroccan crisis laid better foundations for later expansion than 
in France. In Germany, once a weapon (such as the heavy field howitzer) was 
introduced into the arsenal, it was produced in both sufficient numbers and with 
appropriate upgrades; there is an observable degree of continuity which was absent in 
the more volatile French political –military environment. When the arms race moved 
into the last pre–war short–term cycle, Germany was able not only to expand manpower 
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but also to bring forward and complete vital equipment programmes. Storz’s conclusion 
is that Germany’s initial success stemmed less from superior technology than from the 
methodical, thorough hard work with which they prepared to use that technology; work 
which allowed for fewer significant weaknesses in performance, compared to the 
French, whose last-minute energies were focussed on overcoming all the issues arising 
from the questions of uniform, of field equipment and of heavy artillery.188 Ultimately it 
would seem that slow French progress in all aspects of preparation during the period 
between 1900 and 1911 gave Germany a window of opportunity which she exploited 
when she went to war in August 1914. 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to achieve three things: to present the first operational study of the 
August 1914 Ardennes campaign; to demonstrate that in two particular encounter 
battles the French had the opportunity to inflict a tactical, possibly an operational, defeat 
upon their opponents but in both cases failed to do so; and to explore the reasons for 
that French failure by setting what happened into the context of previous superficial 
explanations and against a brief survey of each side’s pre–war preparations.  
 
The operational study has concluded that Joffre’s strategy for an offensive through the 
Ardennes was not the foolish venture that some historians have claimed; on the 
contrary, despite the flaws in French intelligence and analysis, Joffre delivered superior 
forces at the weakest point in the German deployment. Contamine defined a strategic 
triumph as one in which you put sufficient superior strength at a decisive point, but 
conversely suggests that if neither of the opposing forces has more than a 25% – 30% 
advantage over the other, then strategy gives way to tactics.1 On a thirty–five kilometre 
front between Maissin and Neufchâteau, Joffre managed to commit ninety–six 
battalions of regular infantry against twenty–four regular and twelve reserve German 
battalions – a 60% advantage; he did so under the cover of thick fog and achieved total 
surprise; and he gave his battlefield commanders at least half–a–day to achieve a result 
before the first enemy reinforcements could intervene. Moreover, in specific places the 
odds in France’s favour were simply overwhelming. This, it can be argued, was 
strategic success.  
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German strategy, on the Ardennes front, was essentially defensive but 
deliberately full of risk. OHL preferred to deploy maximum force at their proposed 
decisive point on their right wing; for lack of overall resources, Duke Albrecht was 
given insufficient forces to cover his expanding front and was denied the security of a 
HKK on his southern flank. Those risks nearly brought Fourth Army to disaster and 
only the tactical competence of their divisional, brigade and regimental units bought 
them victory from the jaws of defeat. 
 
At the army operational planning level, both de Langle de Cary and Ruffey 
underestimated the challenges they faced in accomplishing their respective missions and 
failed to anticipate and plan to overcome or avoid key obstacles to success. The failure 
to order strong mixed–arms advance guards to secure the exits of forests through which 
their columns had to march was a significant error by both Third and Fourth Army staff; 
this was a failure to apply doctrine and was contrary to the fundamental principle of 
sûreté embedded in both the 1895 and 1913 regulations. The failure to co–ordinate 5 
CA’s assault on German trenches with the advance of the rest of the army – even if in 
the event extraneous factors made the problem irrelevant – was another operational 
planning error. This too was an error not of doctrine but of execution.  Briefing by both 
armies’ intelligence and operations staff was deficient, Fourth Army’s particularly so, 
and subordinate units marched into contact in an unnecessary state of ignorance.  
Both Duke Albrecht and Crown Prince William discharged their simpler 
operational missions with greater competence than their opponents. Duke Albrecht’s 
daily orders reflect his awareness of and preparation for a turn southwards whilst 
pursuing his westerly march, even if he was taken unawares by the timing and direction 
 364 
of the French attack because of the fog. And there were elements of luck – Clausewitz’s 
principle of ‘friction’ – all of which worked in Germany’s favour at the operational 
level. Fifth Army’s unilateral decision to turn south on the night of 21–22 August meant 
that Ruffey would have to fight through to his objectives rather than undertake a 
peaceful march. And Fifth Army’s advance could have opened up a thirty–kilometre 
gap between them and Fourth Army, a gap which, given the French Plan and actual 
movements, would have been filled by 2 CA occupying the operationally important 
Étalle corridor. Instead, and as a result of ingrained staff training, staff officers of 5 AK, 
6 AK and Fourth Army combined to highlight a potential operational weakness and 
deliver a solution. 6 AK also marched southwards and met the French Colonial Corps at 
Rossignol.  
 
Turning to the respective conduct of combat operations, this study has revealed crucial 
differences between the two sides. The issue of communications in August 1914 was 
always going to be one of explaining varying degrees of imperfection. Radio technology 
was in its infancy and telephone and telegraph apparatus relatively slow and 
cumbersome to set up; neither was suited to large armies engaged in mobile warfare. 
And the size of the modern battlefield meant that physical means of communication had 
decreased dramatically in effectiveness. The motor–car was limited by the state and 
scale of the road network, the horse by its lack of speed. On the battlefield itself, all 
types of courier, even pedestrian, were vulnerable to long–range rifle, machine gun and 
artillery fire in an extended ‘killing zone’.  
The communications within the German Fourth Army have been shown to be of 
high quality, and even with that advantage Duke Albrecht was able to exert only a 
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partial control over events. Crown Prince William’s communications were good enough 
to have been cited by the official historian as a significant factor in his success;2 but 
were not necessarily of the excellence achieved by Duke Albrecht’s staff given the 
longer distances Fourth Army had to cover. But reporting discipline and 
communications within the French Fourth Army were very poor, and as a result left de 
Langle largely ignorant of what was occurring and unable to exercise any degree of 
control over events in the crucial centre and left–wing encounters.  
Command and control also left much to be desired within de Langle’s  Army. 
General Eydoux was unable to accelerate the slow and ponderous approach and 
deployment of his left–hand 21 DI at Maissin; General Radiguet of that division, 
together with his brigadiers and colonels, was unable to prevent an unauthorised and 
costly premature infantry attack led by one of his battalion commanders. At 
Neufchâteau the untimely wounding of Colonel Descoings seems to have been the 
cause of a potentially victorious pursuit grinding to a halt; too much depended on the 
personal ability and charisma of a single officer. 
One sees in the performance of Duke Albrecht’s subordinates a high standard of 
command and some of the best features of German doctrine in action. General von 
Schenk (18 AK) exercised his discretion under the doctrine of Auftragstaktik to alter the 
orders he had been given to suit what he felt were the conditions at the front. At 
Rossignol General de Beaulieu of 12 ID executed an exemplary attack using ‘fix, hold 
and envelop’ tactics; the degree of his success was very much enhanced by the poor 
quality of command demonstrated by his opponent.  
                                                 
2 Weltkrieg 1, p.324 
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Ruffey had placed liaison officers with his corps commanders and this together 
with good communications enabled him to intervene in the actions of his corps at 
several critical moments. But he was unable to control the slow speed with which his 
heavy artillery executed his orders, and the transfer of Third group of reserve divisions 
from his command may have contributed to that unit’s failure to intervene in the battle 
on his right wing. 
Crown Prince William’s release of 16 AK from defensive duties around the 
Moselstellung to attempt a flanking movement of Sarrail’s right wing exemplifies his 
firm control of his army’s battle. So too the release of troops and guns from the siege of 
Longwy to support the battle against Brochin’s 5 CA demonstrates positive command 
characteristics.    
 
In the second part of the thesis, the encounter battles at Neufchâteau and at Maissin–
Anloy were analysed from the perspective of both sides, to demonstrate that the French 
lost two major opportunities to break through the German line. It is only by comparing 
the records of each side that the inevitable human ‘gloss’ or ‘spin’, or understandable 
ignorance of what lay on the other side of the line, can be assessed, and a balanced 
account of the battle presented. Using this methodology, it has been made clear that the 
French records of the two battles were distorted, and that the extent of the opportunity 
given to them was never understood. Subsequent histories reflect this initial distortion. 
Some historians, starting with Henry Contamine in 1970 and echoed by Pierre 
Rocolle and others, have noted that Roques’s corps faced weak opposition and might 
have done better. There is indeed a hint in the immediate aftermath of 22 August that 
senior officers within Fourth Army dimly perceived that an opportunity had been lost, 
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and two divisional commanders became both the necessary victims of Joffre’s drive to 
eradicate sub–standard performers and also sacrifices at the altar of Roques’s ambition. 
But the scale of the lost opportunity could only come to light from a comparative 
analysis of the German side. At Neufchâteau the orientation of the opposing forces was 
as important as the numbers and quality of troops, and the open right (westerly) flank of 
the German 21 RID at Nevraumont was the key to carrying out an operational 
manoeuvre, which Roques and his men missed. 
Similarly at Maissin, there is no record at all that General Eydoux and his men 
appreciated at the time or afterwards what an opportunity they had missed. The vast gap 
in width and depth which extended beyond the final rifleman on 117 IR’s right wing 
offered at the tactical level the opportunity for 21 DI to overlap and overwhelm its 
opponent’s flank with superior numbers; while at the operational level there was the 
prospect of de Langle de Cary pushing his cavalry corps followed by the infantry of 9 
CA north to threaten 8 AK and von Hausen’s Third Army. At Maissin above all the 
other encounter battles, the poor quality of French communications – both technically 
and in terms of disciplined feedback – proved to be one of the decisive factors which 
robbed France of her opportunity. 
The Germans were in no doubt as to the potential consequences of a successful 
French attack. Commenting on the surprise and shock experienced by Duke Albrecht 
when he received news of de Langle’s advance, it has been noted in the German official 
history: ‘Now the priority task for Fourth Army was the protection of the left flank of 
Third Army, and only when this was guaranteed could Third Army cross the Maas 
[Meuse] in order to seek to bring about the decisive action as part of the Right Wing of 
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the Armies’.3  After the battle, when Duke Albrecht’s success in rebuffing de Langle 
became clear, ‘the serious crisis which had threatened not only the [Fourth] Army but 
also the whole front of the German wheeling Right Wing was seen to have been 
favourably overcome...somewhat later news came in from Third Army that it would 
assault across the Meuse on 23 August’.4 It is clear that the decision whether von 
Hausen would cross the Meuse in force depended upon the outcome of the fighting in 
the Ardennes on 22 August. It is ironic that the French not only failed to capitalise upon 
their strategic success and force OHL to keep von Hausen’s Third Army east of the 
Meuse, but they did not even know what they had missed. 
The analysis of the other battles on Fourth Army front is important because it 
shows how in the crucible of war, the relative impact of different events influences the 
overall course of the operation. The overwhelming (and arguably unnecessary) tactical 
defeat of 33 DI in the Forest of Luchy north of Bertrix had knock–on effects which 
swamped any appreciation of the potential for success delivered at Neufchâteau and 
Maissin. The French disaster at Bertrix adversely affected the whole of 17 CA almost 
immediately and news of the defeat spread rapidly to the units either side; the 
precipitate retreat of 17 CA was the key event which wrested the last vestiges of 
operational control from de Langle de Cary and made an overall French withdrawal 
inevitable. Together with the disaster at Rossignol it focussed French command 
attention away from its lost opportunities. 
 Rossignol was significant at the time not only because of the casualties but also 
because of the psychological impact of the decimation of France’s supposedly elite 
corps. Operationally it had a huge impact on de Langle’s plan which was predicated 
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upon CAC getting safely through the forests onto the more open ground north of 
Neufchâteau. With hindsight this is important because of the light it shines on 
weaknesses in French corps and divisional command and control and because of the 
conclusions which can be drawn from the failure of Gerard’s 2 CA to even attempt to 
fulfil its mission. 
This study has shown that French Fourth Army had two clear opportunities to 
achieve both tactical and operational victory in the Ardennes on 22 August; but that 
their commanders were not up to the task of achieving tactical success and were 
incapable of recognising operational manoeuvre opportunities. These events reinforce 
our understanding of why Joffre felt compelled to remove so many of his brigade, 
divisional and corps commanders in the first weeks of the war.    
 
In the third part of the thesis, reasons have been found to explain why the French Third 
and Fourth Armies failed at both operational and tactical levels and why, conversely, 
the German Fourth and Fifth Armies succeeded.  
Before the war the German army was given the resources to pursue a long–term 
programme of continuous improvement of her military machine, and she had the 
political and popular will to devote the resources necessary over the long–term to 
support the military’s needs. She also used her greater resources during periods of 
medium–term armaments growth to improve the matériel of her forces, so that when the 
short–terms crises came and the arms race became a question of numbers of men, fewer 
hard choices had to be made between men and machinery. This was the case 
particularly during the period between the first and second Moroccan crises. Many of 
the improvements which strengthened the German Army in time for action in August 
 370 
1914 – the 150mm heavy howitzers, the 105mm field howitzers, the second artillery 
regiment per regular division, the machine gun companies attached to every regular 
infantry regiment – started to be delivered from 1905 onwards.   
French preparation was virtually the converse of that of the Germans. The 
French compounded their natural disadvantages of low population and weaker industrial 
capacity by placing political issues above military ones. They may have had no option, 
given the volatility of the French political scene and the perceived fragility of the Third 
Republic, but from the narrow perspective of this thesis, the effect was to dilute the 
energy and focus of the nation away from preparation for war. When France did 
eventually wake up to the danger, she had left herself too little time to effect the major 
changes needed. Between 1870 and 1892, France had made significant improvements in 
the armed forces, and her army at the turn of the century, well–trained, endowed with 
heavy and light howitzers and with the world’s best field gun, was impressive. But the 
Dreyfus affair and its aftermath led to a decade of military stagnation from which the 
French army did not fully recover. Most if not all of the individual issues examined in 
the third part of this thesis, in which the French demonstrated their lack of progress, 
were rooted in the malaise stemming from the Dreyfus affair and its aftermath. 
Between 1905 and 1911, France could have mass–produced the Rimhailo 
155mm heavy howitzer, a weapon superior to the German 1902 150mm gun; France 
could have settled the long debate about adopting a light field howitzer, and mass–
produced the Schneider 106.7mm gun built for the Russians in 1907 and subsequently 
modified into the 105mm Schneider field howitzer of 1913 which first appeared in the 
autumn of 1914; or in March 1912, the new Schneider 105mm howitzer produced for 
Bulgaria and admired by Joffre could have been rushed into service; French field 
kitchens could have been provided to all units immediately after the comprehensive 
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trials of 1908; camouflage uniforms could have been issued in 1911 after the trials of 
the réséda coloured kit. In all these instances it was bureaucracy, indecision, 
departmental in–fighting and political interference as much as issues of funding which 
prevented the French from at least narrowing the gap between them and their future 
adversary.  
 
This study has shown that doctrine was not the significant issue that it has generally 
been taken to be. In fact, despite differences in detail, the two sides’ tactical doctrines 
were very similar; the evidence presented shows that, in the Ardennes at least, the key 
difference was that the two German armies performed in a manner reflecting the 
doctrine they had been taught but the French did not.  
At the tactical level there is no evidence of French offensive à outrance: rather 
the predominant impression of French performance in the Ardennes is one of slow and 
ponderous deployment, slack security and caution under fire. There is, however, at least 
one instance where the unofficial ‘cult of the offensive’ might be seen as the cause of a 
rash and costly (and unauthorised) infantry attack. But France’s operational and 
strategic doctrines have been shown to have been in a state of flux, caught when war 
broke out between the 1895 Regulations and those recently issued in October and 
December 1913. The confusion caused by this change of doctrine was compounded by 
confusion within the French officer corps about the difference between operational and 
tactical levels.  
On the German side, tactical doctrine was as offensively–minded as the French; 
everywhere across the Ardennes front units sought to press forward using fire and 
movement. But it is equally clear that German doctrine concerning combined–arms 
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cooperation was put into practice very effectively and enabled them to achieve fire 
superiority on several key battlefields. So too, German doctrine on the use of temporary 
field fortifications lessened the impact of French fire. But the German infantry still 
suffered high casualties as a result of their aggressive fire and movement tactics – at 
Neufchâteau in particular losses were heavier than the French; German casualties were a 
key factor in the failure to aggressively follow up on 23 August the victories won the 
day before. 
 
While doctrine can be shown to have been a less important issue than has hitherto been 
thought, then training – or on the French side, lack of training – appears to be much 
more important. The evidence from the battles combines with the comparative analysis 
of pre–war preparations to show Germany’s advantage at every level. Facilities, funds, 
choice of conscript, quality and number of officers and NCOs, the amount of field 
exercise, inspection, feedback – in all these it has been shown that Germany had the 
advantage and that this worked itself out in Germany’s favour during the fighting.  
 
On the question of whether particular items of equipment gave a decisive advantage in 
battle, the overall conclusion is that these were much less important to the result than 
has previously been thought. German heavy artillery, while contributing to the rout of 5 
CA at Longwy, was otherwise only a minor factor; French heavy artillery was present in 
the field under certain corps’s control, but doctrine and training in its use were deficient. 
Field howitzers do not figure as key weapons, whereas massed German field–guns have 
been shown to have been important at Maissin–Anloy, Neufchâteau, Bertrix, Rossignol, 
Virton and Ethe. It was speed of deployment and firing first which gave Germaan 
 373 
gunners their initial advantage. However, at those same places, massed French field–
guns, while invariably slower to enter action, were also more effective than has been 
recognised, although poor combined–arms cooperation did lessen their contribution.  
The legend of pre–prepared German trenches, machine guns and wire in ambush 
positions has been shown to be just that: testimony from contemporary French 
witnesses such as Lieutenant–Colonel Vitart at Rossignol suggests that this legend has 
its roots on the battlefield where French soldiers made false deductions from the speed 
and efficiency with which German infantry dug temporary field fortifications during the 
fire–fight.5 
Some of the smaller equipment issues illuminate differences between French 
and German efficiency in preparation. The absence of French field kitchens is a case 
study in bureaucratic inefficiency, while the infamous issue of les pantalons rouges 
evidences how political interference limited the ability of the army to determine its 
future even in the smallest detail.  
 
Of all the issues examined above which led to a disparity between French and German 
performance on the battlefield in August 1914, three in particular stand out: the French 
Three Year law passed in 1913, the issue of large training camps, and the importance of 
an inspection regime. The French politicians’ decision not to retain the fully–trained 
conscripts of the class of 1910 for an extra year but to call up the twenty–year–olds of 
the class of 1913 meant that nearly two–thirds of the men in each regular unit were 
young untrained recruits. The French failure to fund and build sufficient large training 
camps meant that the opportunities for general officers to exercise large units of 
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brigade–size and over, and practice their operational and tactical skills including 
combined–arms, were few and far between. General André’s cancellation of the 
inspection regime removed a key component of France’s quality control and 
improvement process, making it impossible to impose standard practice upon trainers 
and trainees or to increase the overall standard. In 1911, with Joffre’s promotion to 
‘generalissimo’, steps were taken to rectify the problems with training facilities and 
with inspection, but there was insufficient time for the changes to take effect before war 
broke out. In Germany, the decisions taken regarding all three of these key issues during 
the period 1894–1914 led to a significant long–term advantage the results of which were 
shown on the battlefield.  
 
The encounter battles of 22 August 1914 which together constitute the Battle of the 
Ardennes have been shown to have been significant events in the opening stages of the 
war. Germany took risks in the way it chose to link Fifth Army and the Moselstellung 
with Third Army and the Meuse; and with Joffre’s achievement of strategic and 
operational surprise in the central Ardennes, those risks looked for a time to have been 
foolhardy. The potential for disruption of the German timetable for the advance of the 
Schwenkungsflügel has been clearly demonstrated, whether the French knew it at the 
time or not. A tactical victory on 22 August at Maissin, Anloy or at Neufchâteau, 
driving the Germans early from the battlefield, might arguably have revealed to de 
Langle the possibility of several fruitful operational manoeuvres during the following 
days, especially if better application of the doctrine of sûreté by 17 CA had mitigated 
the harmful effect of the German attack at Bertrix. And judging by German testimony, a 
further French advance on 23 August would probably have prevented von Hausen’s 
Third Army from crossing the Meuse. Beyond that one enters the realm of speculation; 
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it is enough to prove that the opportunity was there, and to demonstrate why the French, 
through poor operational and tactical capability, were not capable of seizing it. 
 
On 23 August, Joffre’s attention was drawn to events in Belgium west of the river 
Meuse, which was from then on to become the main theatre of operations. He had tried, 
and failed, to get de Langle and Ruffey to continue their offensive; instead he had to 
settle for a stout defence of his own centre while he developed his plans for a counter–
attack on his left. But even in defeat, de Langle and Ruffey achieved one important 
result: their armies withdrew bloodied but unbroken, and lived to fight another day. 
Despite the large numbers of casualties on the French side on 22 August – 27,000 killed 
according to Contamine – the Germans had not achieved a decisive result. Schlieffen 
might have called it an ordinary victory. Brochin’s 5 CA, for example, was routed at 
Longwy and in running suffered far fewer casualties than did CAC which stood firm at 
Rossignol, was enveloped and decimated. Once reformed, under new leadership and 
with replacements from arguably better–trained reservists, 5 CA was able to join the 
defence of the new French line within twenty–four hours. Within CAC, the casualties 
were almost exclusively incurred by 3 DIC, and the defensive line on 23 August was 
built around 2 DIC and the survivors. On 23 August, the French defence was supported 
by the heavy artillery which had lain idle the day before; the six reserve divisions of 
Maunoury’s Army of Lorraine (built around Third group of reserve divisions and 
endowed with substantial heavy artillery considered too immobile to join the Ardennes 
offensive) formed a strong barrier along the Meuse heights south–east of Verdun, 
enabling Ruffey’s Third Army to link with them in the new defensive line. Joffre was 
even able to move Maunoury himself and some of his troops to join the build–up around 
Paris. The losses on 22 August came from regular divisions which contained two 
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classes of raw recruits; their replacements, and the men of the reserve divisions were, 
fortunately for France, probably more experienced. And the French learned their lessons 
fast. 
 On the German side, the failure of Duke Albrecht to organise a swift and 
decisive follow–up to his tactical success was due to the heavy casualties incurred on 22 
August, and the German losses were from the most recently and best trained troops. 18 
AK in particular was unable to march until after midday on 23 August, enabling de 
Langle’s divisions to break contact and giving them time to regroup. Crown Prince 
William had been forbidden to cross the line of the Chiers–Crusnes rivers, and when 
that order was rescinded by OHL, Ruffey too had had time to regroup. 
 All of these factors combined to improve the overall French position, despite the 
setbacks and tactical defeats on 22 August. German success in the Ardennes was limited 
to having avoided defeat; they were not able to capitalise on that success, and, with the 
French defensive line intact, with the French advantage of henceforth being the 
defender in the Ardennes, supported by heavy artillery and with the infantry encouraged 
to dig defensive works, there was less pressure on Joffre on that part of his front. He 
was able to devote his energies to organising his successful counter–attack on the 
Marne.  
 
It is a central conclusion of this thesis that, as Contamine suggested in La Revanche, 
poor French execution arising from inadequate pre–war training was the main cause of 
French failure and German success in the Ardennes. It is therefore particularly 
surprising that only fourteen days later Joffre achieved victory on the Marne. This 
apparent dichotomy requires some brief explanation. 
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 At the strategic level, the campaign of the Marne exhibited several significant 
differences from the Ardennes. Thanks to Joffre’s use of railways and interior lines, 
transferring units from his right to left wing, the Anglo-French forces outnumbered the 
Germans by 41 infantry and 8! cavalry divisions to 23! and 5 divisions across the 
chosen front.6 And the French units had been brought up to strength by reservists from 
the depots, whereas German losses on the long march and in battle meant that, for 
example, in von Kluck’s I Army ‘most corps were down to half of their full strength by 
early September’.7 The long German supply lines, stretching back to Namur and even 
Liège, caused grave difficulties; the troops were exhausted by three weeks of constant 
marching and fighting. Many French troops were relatively fresh, brought up by train, 
and those from the depots were reservists of the older classes, all of whom had received 
their full two year’s training, rather than the twenty– and twenty–one year olds whose 
training had been measured in months. Even those who had taken part in the great 
retreat were now more experienced, and reinvigorated by the prospect of attacking at 
last.8 In the more open terrain east of Paris, and with better communications, Joffre 
exerted close personal control over his army commanders, in contrast to the remote and 
out of touch von Moltke, who to a great extent allowed his individual army commanders 
to act as they saw fit.9 Moltke’s telecommunications network linking him to his two key 
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army commanders was fragile;10 and those two commanders were lax in their 
reporting.11  
In fact, and this leads to a generic point regarding the differences in performance on the 
Marne compared to the Ardennes, many of the faults and weaknesses observed on the 
French side at strategic and operational levels in the Ardennes can be observed on the 
German side on the Marne. 
 For example, allied operational use of their air reconnaissance units improved 
rapidly and dramatically in early September 1914, not least perhaps because their 
reports were now believed and used.12 German movements were observed, and 
operational plans laid as a result. In the Ardennes, the twenty kilometre gap in the centre 
of the German line at Neufchâteau went unobserved, and an opportunity was lost. On 
the Marne, the fifty kilometre gap between von Kluck and von Bulow was found, and 
exploited.13 German air reconnaissance, so much better than the French at the tactical 
level in the Ardennes, was now found wanting. The very strength offered by aeroplanes 
under corps commander’s control now became a weakness, as reconnaissance 
concentrated on what was directly in front of each corps, rather than on the wider 
operational vista. Von Kluck inexplicably ‘neglected what seemed in retrospect 
rudimentary precautions, for he caused no serious aerial reconnaissances to made of the 
region of Paris’;14 and when the aircraft of the one squadron under his direct control 
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reported French troops marching north, the intelligence was dismissed as being only 
French rear guards.15  
From the very beginning of the war, Joffre had been improving the quality of his senior 
commanders by ruthlessly weeding out the old, weak and inefficient.16 On the Marne, 
his key army commanders were the excellent  Maunoury, Franchet d’Esperey and Foch 
rather than the average to poor Lanrezac, de Langle de Cary and Ruffey.17 Similar 
changes had taken place for the better at corps and divisional levels. The opposite is true 
on the German side: where Duke Albrecht had fought an excellent battle in the 
Ardennes on 22 August, co–operating well with Crown Prince William, von Kluck and 
von Bülow were seemingly at odds with each other, and von Hausen, deciding to rest 
his men on 5 September, ‘lost a splendid opportunity to exploit a twenty–five–kilometre 
gap that had developed between Foch’s Ninth Army and Langle de Cary’s Fourth 
Army’.18  
So the French performed comparatively better at the strategic and operational levels on 
the Marne. However it was not necessarily the case that all French tactical weaknesses 
were eliminated overnight. Some gradual improvements can be noted; for example an 
innovative night bombardment on 7–8 September led to the capture – ‘brilliant in 
tactical execution’  – of the key village of Marchais–en–Brie, which unhinged the 
German defence on the Ourcq.19 But there were still a great many poor French tactical 
performances: on 5 September a French reserve cavalry brigade scouting ahead of 
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Maunoury’s advance failed to locate Gronou’s corps whose artillery then disrupted a 
marching column of 14 DI.20 The opposing German cavalry, Otto von Garnier’s 4 KD, 
had only 1200 horsemen left, but still kept up vigilant patrols and detected Maunoury’s 
columns marching on the Ourcq. Also on 5 September Gronau’s 4 RAK fought and won 
an important tactical encounter against superior numbers.21 But fresh French troops 
were brought up to attack again on the following day; in open battle with deep reserves, 
tactical failure on the Marne was not as significant as it had been in the Ardennes. So 
again, on 7 September yet another fresh unit (63 RID) was thrown into this engagement 
and, using massed infantry charges, failed. Only a brilliant and bold intervention by 
Colonel Robert Nivelle’s artillery regiment, galloping into the firing line and shooting 
over open sights, saved another rout.22 On 8 September, Eydoux’s 11 CA (now part of 
Foch’s Detachment) was routed by von Hausen’s Saxons - ‘one French artillery battery 
after another fled’  – but unlike in the Ardennes, reserves were available to come up to 
shore up the line.23 
These examples show that the tactical advantage held by the Germans during the 
Ardennes encounters generally continued into the Marne campaign. But on the one hand 
it was outweighed by French operational advantages and superior forces and on the 
other hand, an accumulation of small random events – ‘this tremendous friction, which 
cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with 
chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured’24  – now seemed to start to 
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work in France’s favour. In the Ardennes, German field guns dragged into the firing 
line by individual initiative brought about favourable results on several occasions; on 
the Marne, Nivelle’s guns performed a similar feat. In the Ardennes, a divisional 
commander at Bellefontaine and a regimental commander at Maissin decided that their 
men were too tired to obey orders, with detrimental results; on the Marne, Army 
commander von Hausen did the same thing and lost an opportunity to beat Foch. In the 
Ardennes, vital intelligence was ignored or misinterpreted by some French 
commanders; on the Marne it was the Germans who ignored or misinterpreted reported 
French movements. In the Ardennes, de Langle de Cary’s corps commanders failed to 
communicate with army HQ and with each other; on the Marne, a similar fault lay at the 
door of von Kluck and von Bülow.  
 
Tactical improvement within French units had been under way since 16 August, when 
Jofrre issued the first of several directives (a second came out on 24 August) to correct 
specific faults.25 But the issue of centralised directives – ‘it is important ... to await the 
support of the artillery and to stop the troops from exposing themselves too early to 
enemy fire’26 – can only achieve so much; equally important was the spontaneous low-
level learning from mistakes, a process identified and described by Goya as ‘a capacity 
within the French army for adapting which, after the bloody reverses since the 
beginning of the war, wrested a decisive success on the Marne.’ This adaptability 
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manifested itself not just in pressure upwards for change based on experience, but also 
on the lateral diffusion of best practice between peers.27  
In short, the beginnings of tactical improvement within French units can be seen to have 
started even in the short span of time between the Ardennes battles and the Marne, but 
not enough either to account for the French success or to challenge the conclusion of 
this thesis that poor French training lay at the heart of their poor tactical performances 
on 22 August 1914. Success on the Marne was due primarily to operational 
improvements and to superior resources and conditions on the French side.  
 
This necessarily brief comparison between French failure in the Ardennes and success 
on the Marne only fourteen days later highlights some of the key conclusions of this 
thesis. Joffre achieved strategic surprise in the Ardennes, only to have two fleeting 
chances for operational manoeuvre denied him by poor performance of certain corps 
and divisional commanders. One can only speculate what might have happened if Foch 
had commanded 12 CA and not 20 CA, or Franchet d’Esperey 11 CA rather than 1 CA. 
Joffre’s recognition of the need to improve the quality of his senior commanders was, 
like his identification of key generic tactical errors, evident from the very first days. He 
took immediate corrective action on both counts, but there was insufficient time for 
improvement before the Ardennes offensive was launched.  
 The operational study and battle analysis in this thesis has shown that the 
hitherto relatively unknown Battle of the Ardennes deserves greater attention from 
historians. The two French missed opportunities will forever testify to the unfortunate 
necessity for the army of August 1914 to learn its lessons in action rather than on the 
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training ground. And the Germans, relying upon the tactical superiority of its troops, 
would continue to the Marne before the operational and strategic weaknesses of their 
plan would be revealed.  
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die die 4 Armee durch ihr kameradschaftliches Entgegenkommen gegenüber der 5 
Armee geraten war, blitzartig beleuchtete: Fünf französische Divisionen hatten um 
11.15 vormittags mit ihren Anfängen von Ste Cécile?les Bulles her die Linie 
Gribomont?Suxy erreicht. Die kurze, aber inhaltschwere Meldung zeigte, dass die 4 
Armee unmittelbar vor einer ernsten Krise stand: Starker Feind hatte sich gegen sie 
nach Norden gewandt, in kürzester Frist musste der Stoss überlegener feindlicher Kräfte 
auch ihre Mitte treffen. Vielleicht wurde dort schon gekämpft. Jetzt war der Schutz der 
linken Flanke der 3 Armee die dringlichste Aufgabe der 4 Armee, nur wenn dieser 
gewährleistet war, konnte die 3 Armee die Maas überschreiten, um hier die 
Entscheidung im Zusammenwirken mit dem rechten Heeresflügel zu erstreben. Sonst 
drohte die Gefahr, dass erhebliche Teile der 3 Armee in südlicher Richtung abgezogen 
wurden. Zur Abwehr des feindlichen Vorstosses waren zunächst nur die beiden Korps 
der Mitte, das XVIII A????????????????????????????????????????????. 
 
 
! p.11:  note 17:  Weltk rieg 1, p.334 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????ht nur die Armee selbst, sondern die gesamte 
Front des deutschen Schwenkungsflügels bedroht hatte, dank der umsichtigen und 
zielbewussten Führung und tapferen Hingabe der Truppe als glücklich überwunden 
angesehen werden ... Etwas später ging von der 3 Armee die Mitteilung ein, dass sie am 
23 August über die M????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.15:  note 30: Weltk rieg 1, p.324 
 
??????????-Oberkommando, das sich von seinem Hauptquartier Diedenhofen nach der 
Befehlstelle Esch vorbegeben hatte, war dank der vorzüglichen Fernsprechverbindung 
mit allen Korps andauernd über die Lage an der Kampffront unterrichtet und konnte 
überall, wo es die Lage erforderte, ausgleichend und fördernd eingreifen; insbesondere 
sorgte es für schnelle Nachrichtenübermittlung der Korps untereinander, so dass die 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.16:  note 31:  A F G G I/1 (1922), p.405 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
avait atteint ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ????devant?Virton et Villers?la?Loue. Ignorant encore à ce moment que 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
! "#%!
étaient arrêtés à leur tour, le géné????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Gérard à établir provisoirement le gros de la 4e division en flanc???????????????????????
la région de Tintigny et à attaquer vigoureusement au sud des bois de Meix en se reliant 
??????????????????????????????????? 
 
  
! p.24:  note 66: Goya, p.178 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
?????????????????????? 
 
 
? Chapter 1: Operational Overview 
 
! p.39:  note 27:  A F G G I/1, Annex 59 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.43:  note 34: A F G G I/1, Annex 266 
 
??????????????????es importantes sont arrivée????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.43:  note 35: A F G G I/1, Annex 267 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.44:  note 37: Weltk rieg 1, p.226 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????Süden bis zur Strasse 
Stenay?Montmédy mit feindlichen Truppen belegt, ebenso die Städte Sedan und 
Mézières. Vortruppen wurden östlich der Chiers von Douzy bis westlich Montmédy 
festgestellt. Die Flieger schätzten die Gesamtstärke des Gegners auf zwei bis drei korps 
... Ein klares bild über die Absichten des Gegners liess sich jedoch aus diesen Erkunden 
???????????????? 
 
 
! p.53:  note 58:  Cordonnier , p.232 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
était maintenu alors que la situation est changée. A la guerre, ordre, contre?ordre, ordre 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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? Chapter 2: A rmy Operations 
 
! p.80:  note 16:  A F G G I/1, Annex 757 
 
???????????????????????????????????Neufchâteau. Zone de mouvement entre la route 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.81:  note 17:  A F G G I/1, Annex 640 
 
????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
ayant pour résultats de déplacer vers le N.N.O la masse centrale de ses forces, sans faire 
de mouvements importants, au sud de la ligne générale Longwy, Neufchâteau, Givet. 
Plus la région Arlon, Audun?le?Roman, Luxembourg sera dégarnie au moment où nous 
????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
de la IVe armée, appuyée à droite par la IIIe. 
 ?????????????????????????????????tale ?????????????????????????????????????
devant nous, vers le N.O., ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
offensive par des détachements dirigés sur notre front. 
 En conséquence, je prescris formellement que les détachements avancés, dont 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????ant de la façon la plus 
complète. 
 Des instructions précises et impératives leur seront données ce soir par les 
commandements de C.A. dont ils relèvent pour que leurs fractions les plus avancées 
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????lisseraient devant elles, 
vers le N.O. 
 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.82:  note 18: Moreau, p.54 
 
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????mouvement est 
arrivé du C.A. La division va cantonner à Neufchâteau. Notre avant?garde doit franchir 
le pont de Mesnil?Breuvannes à 6 heures 30. Aucun renseignement nouveau sur 
?????????? 
 
 
! p.84:   note 22: A F G G I/1, Annex 636 
 
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????Hubert. 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
marche de flanc, se redresserait dans la direction du front de mon armée, il vous 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? 
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! p.84:  note 23:  A F G G I/1, Annex 637 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????-
nord-ouest de plusieurs colonnes ennemies importantes dont les têtes atteignaient vers 
10 heures le front Neufchâteau, Bastogne et plus au nord. 
 Je ne puis savoir si les masses en question vont poursuivre demain leur marche 
de flanc par rapport à moi, ou au contraire se redresser en tout ou partie vers moi. Je 
dois, en tous cas, envisager la possibilité de cette dernière hypothèse. 
 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Médard, Rossignol, Etalle et même sur la direction Arlon, Virton, je demande quelles 
sont les intentions du général en chef en ce qui concerne la conduite à tenir par mon 
armée? Dois????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????
Sedan? Dois?je rechercher la bataille dans les clairières de Florenville et de 
????????????? 
 
 
! p.85:  note 26: Paloque, Bertrix, p.33 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?uvement ordonné 
pour la journée ??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.86:  note 28: A F G G I/1, Annex 593 
 
???????????torise à porter, dès cette nuit, de fortes avant?gardes de toutes armes sur la 
ligne générale Bièvre, Straimont, Tintigny, pour assurer les débouchés de votre armée 
au-delà ????????????? 
 
 
! p.90:  note 40: A F G G I/1, Annex 982 
 
??????????de cavalerie a mission (en outre de sa mission de découverte déjà définie) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
menac?????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.93:  note 46:  A F G G I/1, (1936), p.414 
 
?????? ???????????énéral de Langle ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
armée poursuivent leur marche sans incident: le 12e corps vient d?????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
de Bertrix, sur Acremont et sur Offagne. Le commandant de la IVe armée peut 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
marche vers le nord?ouest, car on lui a signalé le mouvement de deux brigades ayant 
quitté Neufchâteau le matin et se dirigeant, par Re??????????????????? 
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! p.93:  note 48: A F G G I/1, Annex 861 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? 
 
 
! p.103:  note 62:  A F G G I/1, Annex 630 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????agents signalent toujours un 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
frontaliers est que les Allemands se retirent vers le nord pour renforcer leurs troupes en 
?????????? 
 
 
           
? Chapter 3: Neufchateau 
 
! p.118:   note 6:  Contamine, Marne, p.122 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????être de 
Neufchâteau et de Bertrix deux succès c????????????? 
 
 
! p.126:  note 19: Weltk rieg 1, p.337 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Brigade musste ihren letzen Mann 
einsetzen, um die Höhen südwestlich Neufchâteau zu halten. Die Batterien westlich des 
Ortes kamen durch feindliche Schützen, die sich in dem muldenreichen Gelände an sie 
herangepi??????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.126:   note 20: Pugens, p.367?369 
 
?????????????????????????????eint son paroxysme. Deux batteries de la 21e D.R., en 
position aux lisières ouest de Neufchâteau, réclament un soutien immédiat ??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
un fantassin disponible. Von Steuben dépêche en toute hâte un officier de son état?
major chercher le dernier régiment de la 25e D.R.???????????????????????????????????
réserve, avec mission de le ramener immédiatement à Neufchâteau pour étayer le centre 
du disposi?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
de retraite, il maintient son P.C. dans la petite ville, presque sur la ligne de feu, pendant 
que le général Rampacher, son divisionnaire de droite, reste stoïquement  à quelques 
centaines de metres des premiers tirailleurs, sous la mitraille qui fauche 
impitoyablement ses offici????????????????? 
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! p.129:  notes 25 & 26: G rasset, Neufchâteau, p.72 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
informé de la retraite du 12e corps qui, jusque?là, avait couvert la gauche... A 21 
heures, dans le plus profond silence, la colonne se mettait en route. A 22 heures, elle 
????????????????? 
 
 
! p.130:  note 28: G rasset, Neufchâteau, pp.71?72 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????u en respect par nos canons dont 
le tir ne cesse pas, et par les feux ??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
regiments allemands épuisés se rassemblent auprès du pont où ils ont encore à souffrir 
???????????????????????????? 
 
! p.142:  note 53: Jordon, pp.7?8 
 
?Die ersten Verluste traten ein, und dichtere Schützenschwärme verstärkten die 
vorderen dünnen Linien. Rechts arbeitete sich das I/R.81, welches infolge feindlichen 
Flankenfeurs sein Vorgehen teilweise auch südlich der Strasse nach Biourge hatte 
verlegen müssen, meist über freies Feld und durch Getreidefelder ? , links das II/R.81 
durch Waldstücke, des bois du Ban, in der befohlenen Richtung langsam, aber sicher, in 
???????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.147:  note 67:  Jordon, p.9 
 
??????? von Jordan, der die Lage der beiden ersten Bataillone seines Regiments klar 
übersicht und dem die Vorschrift des Ex????????????????????????????????????????????????
Ve????????????????????????????????efehl Folge zu leisten, und schickte noch zweimal, 
einmal den Regiments?Adjutanten, dann den Adjutanten des II/R.81, Oberlt. D. L. Kav. 
Röhrig, zum Brigadekommandeur, Generalleutnant v. Didtmann, zurück, das III/R.81 
wieder zu erhalten. ???????????? 
 
 
! pp.153?154:  notes 85 & 86:  6 Uhlans, p.51 
 
???????nks meldete der auf Rossart entsandte Vizewachtm. Busse das herankommen 
stärkerer feindlicher Kavallerie. Es war sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass bei der 
Gefechtslage feindliche Kavallerie durchgebrochen war. Jedenfalls  konnte sie in dem 
ausserhalb der Strassen für Kavallerie ungangbaren Gelände eine ernste Gefahr kaum 
bedeuten. Sergt. Glenneberg der 1 Esk. wurde mit einer stärkeren Patrouille auf Rossart 
zur Sicherung und etwaigen Abwehr mit der Schutzwaffe entsandt. Auch die Eskadrons 
machen sich mit dem Karabiner bereit, den Feind zu empfangen. Sergt. Glennenberg 
traf aber keine fränkischen Reiter, dagegen überall versprengte feindliche Infanterie, 
denen teilweise die Kugeln recht lose im Laufe sassen. Er machte 17 Gefangene. Sergt. 
Welz brachte es sogar fertig, einen Franzmann zu sich auf das Pferd zu nehmen und zur 
????????? ???????????????????? 
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! p.154:  note 87: 6 Uhlans, p.53 
 
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
Infanterie. Ein Meldereiter zurück. Geschosse pfeifen um uns. Wir reiten weiter. Auf 
den Höhen sehen wir die feindlichen Schützen vorschleichen. Auf einer bewaldeten 
Anhöhe mache ich mir ein Bild von der ganzen Lage. Hier schiesst der Feind sogar mit 
Kanonen auf unsere kleine Patrouille. Wir verschwinden im Walde. Ein Meldereiter 
bringt den Bericht zurück. Die Dämmerung beginnt. Das Geschützfeur lässt nach. Wir 
??????????????? 
 
 
! p.156:  note 91: Jordon, p.7 
 
??????????????eind zu viel Ehre an, ... es ist wohl nur abgesessene K??????????? 
 
 
! p.156:  note 92: Jordan, p.10 
 
??????????????????????????t richtig, Herr Oberst, aber wenn wir aus dem Lazarett 
zurückkommen, dann werden wir es den Franzmänne????????????????????? 
 
 
! P.164:  note 104: Weltk rieg 1, p.331 
 
?Die Batterien westlich des Ortes kamen durch feindliche Schützen, die sich in dem 
muldenreichen Gelände an sie herangepi??????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.170:  note 112: Contamine, Marne, p.122 
 
?????????????????????????????? petite taille, barbiche et tache de vin, était un ami de son 
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.170:  note 113: Rocolle, p.144 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? 
 
 
! p.171:  note 114:  A F G G I/1 (1923), p.395 and (1936) p.404 
 
? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ayant cédé, la colonne de gauche a repris sa 
marche et est ???????????????????????????????????????????
mouvement de la colonne de droite, qui est encore très en retrait... 
Quand, en fin de journée, il apprend que la colonne de gauche du 
corps colonial bat en retraite ainsi que la colonne de droite du 17e 
! "(*!
corps, il ordonne de stationn????????????????????????????????postes 
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? 
 
? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
trois bataillons de la 23e division sont engagés successivement 
sur Neufchâ???????????????????????????????????????????????????e; 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
dirigée également de Saint???????????? ????????? 
 
 
 
? Chapter 4: Maissin-Anloy  
 
! p.178:  note 7: A F G G I/1 Annex 580 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? 
 
 
! p.182:  note 20: Bujac, p.74 
 
???????????????????????????? ??????!+,-!+./012+!304!5+,!-4673+,!088+90.5+,!
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????:8:9+.-,!5+!;+--+!<40;-26.!0--+2=.+.->!07!,75>!7.!=46,!?67@7+-!5+!?62,!+.-4+!
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!
 
 
! p.184:  note 22: 116 IR , p.26 
 
????????????????d 8. Komp. unterstützen die 4. und 6. Komp. des IR 115 beim Sturm auf 
eine feindliche Batterie, die nach hartem Ringen erobert und trotz mehrfacher wilder 
??????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.184:  note 23: Bujac, p.75 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sur la crête voisine. Le lieutenant Granchi court vers une infanterie [sic] qui passe à 
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
gauche, de fournir aide. Le chef de cette troupe (un bataillon du XVIIe Corps, égaré en 
ces parages), répond que les homes son???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
???? ???????????????????????????????????????é????????????????????????????????????????
???????????- Le capitanine Parmentier blessé, le lieutenant tué, la batterie réussit 
péniblement à amener les avant-train????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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! p.189:  note 35: 116 IR , pp.25?26 
 
?????? ????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????
Höhen südwestlich von Anloy erreicht, als ihnen aus einer Entfernung von kaum 400m 
lebhaftes Infanterie- und M.G.- Feuer entgegenschlug. Und doch war vom Gegner 
nichts zu sehen. In Getreidefeldern und am Waldrande weiss er sich vorzüglich gedeckt, 
so dass kein sicherer Schuss auf ihn anzubringen war. Aber dem ungestümen, unserer 
Infanterie zur zweiten Natur gewordenen Drang nach vorwärts zeigte sich der Feind 
nicht gewachsen. Trotz des starken Feuers und trotz der hemmenden 
Drahtumzäunungen der Felder gelang es nach mehrmaligem Ansturm, die 
Getreidefelder allmählich vom Feinde zu säubern und die nächsten Waldstücke zu 
???????????? 
 
 
! p.193:  note 46: Bujac, p.79 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????ère ligne son 2e bataillon 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
avec la ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.193:  note 47: Bujac, p.79?80 
 
????????????????????ît manifeste (écrit le général de Division) que le feu de nos batteries 
avait surpris et dérouté ????????????????????????????irige presque exclusivement son feu 
sur ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? 
 
 
! p.196:  note 57: 116 IR , p.27 & p.28 
 
????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Bataillone auf der Höhe bei Anloy. Bei der Unsicherheit der Gesamtlage ? der rechte 
Flügel der Division hatte wegen drohender Umfassung das um 5 Uhr nachm. gestürmte 
Maissin wieder räumen müssen ? wurde die Höhe und der Dorfrand zur Verteidigung 
eingerichtet. ??????????????????????????????????3 Aug. blieben die Truppen bei 
??????? 
 
 
! p.197:  note 58: Weltk rieg 1, pp.329?330 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-Brigade 
erschienen die vordersten Teile des VIII Reservekorps nach einem in dem schwierigen 
Berglande der Ardennen, unter den sengenden Strahlen der Augustsonne ohne 
Rücksicht auf Ausfälle durchgeführten Gewaltmarsch von durchschnittlich 45 km auf 
dem Schlachtfelde hinter dem XVIII.Armeekorps...[p.330] die 15. Reserve-Division 
angewiesen, ihren Marsch über Libin auf Villance fortzusetzen. Eine Abteilung 
Feldartillerie und ein Halbbataillon schwerer Feldhaubitzen wurden um 6.45 abends 
östlich Villance in Stellung gebracht. Bald trat die gesamte Artillerie in Wirksamkeit. 
Wenn die Hilfe auch zu spät kam, um den Ausgang des Gefechts bei Maissin noch 
! "("!
wenden zu können, so hinderte doch das Geschützfeuer des VIII. Reservekorps den 
????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.199:  note 59: G rasset, Foch, p.79 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????autrefois, par un appel adressé à 
????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.200:  note 60: G randmaison, Dressage, p.8 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? 
 
 
! p.204:  note 70: Bujac, Eydoux, p.72 
 
???????????????????????????????????heures) lentement. ? Au sud-ouest, des tranchées 
arrêtent la ???????????????????????????????es révè??????????éniosité ?????????????????
exécutés depuis plusieurs jours, elles comportent des réseaux de fil de fer, des abatis, de 
fausses tranchées ornées de choux coupé???????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ???????????????????????????? 
 
 
? Chapter 5: The O ther Battles 
 
! p.208:  note 3: A F G G I/1, Annex 1048 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????ois corps 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.208:  note 5: A F G G I/1 (1936), pp.423?424 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contraire, accentuer dans la journée leur mou????????????????? 
 
 
! p.213:  note 15:  Paloque, Bertrix, p.10  
 
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
de mon superbe ré????????????????????????????????????????ficiers, sous?officiers et 
canonniers étaient prêts à me suivre au bout du monde, soit un événement incitant un 
chef de corps à met????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
 
! "($!
! p.214:  note 16: Paloque, Bertrix, p.15, note (1) 
 
???, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
groupe font jalonner leur itinéraire pour que les batteries ????????????? ???????????????????. 
 
 
! p.214:  note 17: Paloque, Bertrix, p.14 
 
?... par un sous?lieutenant de ré????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????colonel Picheral ?????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.214:  note 18: Paloque, Bertrix, p.17 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?u?????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.216:  note 21: Paloque, Artillerie, pp.170?171  
 
??????? Quels ordre????????????????????????????????????????t?il à ses commandants de 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????garde? Les ordres sont 
extrêmement simples ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
qu??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????agent de liaison. Le commandant de 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Ordre aux commandants de 
groupe: Reconnaissance!??et ordre sera souvent complété ??????Batteries à telle allure, 
pour venir, par tel itinéraire, prendre telle formation, en tel point.? 
??????? Reconnaissance du commandant de groupe. ? ... cette reconnaissance ne doit 
pas, non plus, commencer sans que le commandant de groupe ait fait app??????????????
les memes principes, ses commandants de batterie en reconnaissance, et le groupe en 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.216:  note 22:  Paloque, Artillerie, p.171, footnote 1 
 
???????????????????????????????]: Expression commode qui mériterait de devenir 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.217:  note 23: Paloque, Bertrix, p.14 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ême enlevé ni couvre?bouches ni couvre?culasses et que le 
colonel dut admonester en passant le commandant de ce groupe en lui disant????????
attende??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
en effet le canon vers le nord?est.) 
 
! "(%!
! p.225:  note 42: Goya, p.176 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????diatement en défensive, en profitant du 
terrain favo???????????????garde française charge furieusement, en aspirant peu à peu le 
??????????????????????? 
 
! p.227:  note 47: Moreau, Rossignol, p.61 
 
 ??ela ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
traquenard et nous sommes tombés dans le bois sur des positions ennemies établies à 
????????, ??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????éparé?? 
 
 
! p.228:  note 49: Moreau, Rossignol, p.62 
 
???????????? ???????????????????????Vous me baillez belle avec vos fronts!???????????
??????????????????????????????????????????Eh ??????????????????????????????????????????????
ré?????????????????????????????????????????????????????lèle à la route, à 300 mètres à 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
troisième bataillon sur la route.?? 
 
 
! p.229:  note 52: Moreau, Rossignol, p.46 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????é à trotter 
derrière le chef. Quant ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????tion. Lui?mê??????????????????????
grand bataillon; il pense tout au plus, avoir à sa disposition plusieurs adjudants-majors 
dont je suis le plus ancien?????????????être en considération de cette ancienneté, et dans 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ême de 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????t??????????????? 
 
 
! p.230:  note 54: Moreau, pp.70?71 
 
?????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
décomposée. Est?ce une illusion ou bien ma propre tension nerveuse me donne?t?elle la 
malheureux homme a eu la révélation de son incapacité en même temps que du désastre 
irrémédiable. Il me questionne, il attend que je luis propose encore une fois quelque 
chose, mais ???????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.230:  note 55: Moreau, p.74 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????é 
??????????????????????????????????????????é ???????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
 
! "(&!
! p.230:  note 56: Moreau, p.74 
 
???Eh bien! Asseyez?vous là, je vais aller voir un moment de ce côté????????????????
??????????et le vous reprendrai en passant.?? 
  
 
! p.232:  note 62: Moreau, p.65 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.233:  note 63: Moreau, p.71 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.235:  note 66: A F G G I/1, Annex 967 
 
?????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.235:  note 67: A F G G I/1, Annex 969 
 
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
! p.236:  note 68: A F G G I/1, Annex 861 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
deuxièm???????????? 
 
! p.237:  note 73: Rocolle, p.133 
 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????? ?????? 
 
 
 
 
? Chapter 6: Doctrine 
 
 
! p.242:  note 13: Goya, p.70 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
 
! "('!
! p.246:  note 24: A F G G I/1, Annex 757 
 
???????????????????????????????????? mouvement offensif vers le nord, appuyée en 
é?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
! p.250 :  note 39: G randmaison, Deux Conférences, p.34: 
 
 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????se garder de la 
surprise immédiate sur ses flancs, elle attaquera derrière une avant??????????????????????
???????????????? 
 
! p.251  note 40: G randmaison, Deux Conférences, p.45: 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
!  p.251  note 43: G randmaison, Deux Conférences, p.25: 
 
 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????même, 
??????????????????????????????????à?dire dans les ???????????????????????????????????
attaquer vite et fort. Un adversaire assailli brusquement et partout à la fois songe à parer 
les coups; il ne manoeuvre plus et deviant rapidement incapable de toute offensive 
????????????????????????????????????????????qui nous garantira de la surprise et la 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? 
 
! p.252:  note 47: G randmaison, Deux Conférences, p.69:  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
porte ? si peut que ce soit ? ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
ne sera peut?????????????????? 
 
! p.267:  note 83: Goya, p.85 
 
????????????????????? ????????????????????spositif de manoeuvre, la cavalerie est 
chargé????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disposi????? !
! p.271 :  note 89 : Goya, p.92 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????? débat difficile. Remplacé seulement en 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? 
 
 
 
! "(#!
! p.281:  note 120: 116 IR , pp.24?25 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
 
? Chapter 8: A rmaments, and Equipment 
 
 
! p.321:  note 40: Joffre, p.71 
 
?????é?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? avait 108 canons 
de 77, 36 obusiers de 10,5 tirant un projectile de 15 kilos, et 16 obusiers lourds de 15 
?????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.336:  note 98: Cordonnier , p.269 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????riaient du changement de pente; ils 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? 
 
 
 
! p.338:  note 79: Jordon, RIR 81, p.7 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
400 m vom Feinde entfernt in ruhigem Feuergefecht, das die Franzosen zeitweise mit 
ihren Maschinengewehren verstärkten, während das Regiment damals ? als 
Reserveformation ? ??????????? ??????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.342:  note 127: Jordon, RIR 81, p.7 
 
????????wohl 1.30 Uhr nachmittags geworden, und die Schützenlinien lagen nun 300?
400 m vom Feinde entfernt in ruhigem Feuer?gefecht, das die Franzosen zeitweise mit 
ihren Maschinengewehren verstäkten, während das Regiment damals ? als 
Reserveformation ? noch keine ???????????????????????? 
 
 
! p.354:  note 174: G rasset, Virton, p.121 
 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Order of Battle 
 
Note 1:  Sources are: France = AFGG Tome I, Volume 1, Appendice III, pp.535– 
585 and Tome X, vols I & II; Germany = Weltkrieg 1, pp.664–687 and Cron, op. cit., pp.299–329 
 
 
Note 2: On the French side, generals who were relieved of their post (limogés) before 31 
August 1914, that is as an immediate consequence of the battles in the Ardennes and 
their aftermath, are shown with their successors. 
 
 
A: Army Operations 
 
 
French 3 Army 
 
Commander:   General Ruffey  (then General Sarrail from 30 August) 
Chief of Staff:  General Grossetti  (then Colonel Lebouc from 30 August) 
 
4 Corps  General Boelle 
 
? 7 DI  General de Trentinian 
? 8 DI  General de Lartigue 
 
5 Corps  General Brochin  (then General Micheler from 23 August) 
 
? 9 DI  General Martin 
? 10 DI  General Auger  (then General Charles Roques from 26 August) 
 
6 Corps General Sarrail  (promoted to 3 Army on 30 August), succeeded by 
General Verraux (42 DI) 
 
? 12 DI  General Souchier 
? 40 DI  General Hache (then General Leconte from 25 August) 
? 42 DI  General Verraux (then General Grossetti from 30 August)  
 
3 GDR   General Paul-Durand 
 
? 54 DR  General Chailley 
? 55 DR  General Leguay 
? 56 DR  General Micheler  (then General de Dartein from 23 August) 
 
7 DC   General Gillain (then General d’Urbal from 25 August) 
 
 
 
* * * 
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French 4 Army 
 
Commander:  General de Langle de Cary 
Chief of Staff:  General Maistre 
 
11 CA   General Eydoux 
 
? 21 DI  General Radiguet 
? 22 DI  General Pambet 
 
 
12 CA   General Pierre Roques 
 
? 23 DI  General Leblond  (then General Bapst from 22 August) 
? 24 DI  General du Garreau de la Méchenie (then General Deffontaines from             
22 August, then General Descoings from 26 August) 
 
 
17 CA   General Poline  (then General J.B.Dumas from 22 August) 
 
? 33 DI  General de Villemejane (then General Guillaumont from 31  
August) 
? 34 DI  General Alby 
 
CAC   General Lefèvre 
 
? 2 DIC  General Leblois 
? 3 DIC  General Raffenel  (killed 22 August, succeeded by General  
Leblond then permanently by General Goullet on 12 September) 
? 5 Colonial Brigade General Goullet 
 
Provisional Cavalry Corps (General Abonneau) 
 
4 DC   General Abonneau 
 
9 DC   General de l’Éspée 
 
* * * 
 
German 4 Army 
 
Commander:   Generaloberst Archduke Albrecht von Württemberg 
Chief of Staff   Generalleutnant Freiherr von Luttwitz 
 
6 AK    General von Pritzelwitz 
 
? 11 ID   Generalleutnant von Webern 
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? 12 ID   Generalleutnant de Beaulieu [sic] 
 
8 AK    Generalleutnant von Schepe und Weidenbach 
 
? 15 ID   Generalleutnant Riemann 
? 16 ID   Generalleutnant Fuchs 
 
18 AK    General von Schenk 
 
? 21 ID   Generalmajor von Oven 
? 25 ID   Generalmajor Kuhne 
 
8 RAK    General von und zu Egloffstein 
 
? 15 RID  Generalleutnant von Kurowski 
? 16 RID  Generalleutnant Mootz  
 
18 RAK   Generalleutnant von Steuben 
 
? 21 RID  Generalleutnant von Rampacher 
? 25 RID  Generalleutnant Torgany 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
German 5 Army 
 
Commander: Generalmajor Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, Crown 
Prince of Germany 
Chief of Staff: Generalleutnant von Knobelsdorf 
 
5 AK    General von Strantz 
 
? 9 ID   Generalleutnant von Below 
? 10 ID   Generalleutnant Kosch 
 
13 AK    General von Fabeck 
 
? 26 ID   Generalleutnant Wilhelm Herzog von Urach 
? 27 ID   Generalleutnant Graf von pfeil und Klein-Ellguth 
 
16 AK    General von Mudra 
 
? 33 ID   Generalleutnant Reitzenstein 
? 34 ID   Generalleutnant von Heinemann 
 
5 RAK    General von Gundell 
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? 9 RID   Generalleutnant von Suretzky-Sornitz 
? 10 RID  Generalleutnant von Wartenberg 
 
6 RAK    General von Gossler 
 
? 11 RID  Generalmajor Suren 
? 12 RID  Generalleutnant von Lutwitz 
 
 
 
4 HKK   Generalleutnant von Hollen 
 
? 3 KD   Generalmajor von Unger 
? 6 KD   Generalleutnant Graf von Schmettow 
 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
 
B: Lost Opportunities 
Neufchâteau 
 
France 
 
12 CA      General Roques 
 
Corps troops: 300 RI, 326 RI; 21 Chasseurs; 52 RAC 
 
23 DI     General Leblond 
 
 45 Brigade   General Masnou 
   63 RI   
   78 RI   
  46 Brigade   Colonel Chéré 
    107 RI   
    138 RI   
  A.D.23: 21 RAC 
 
  5° escadron, 21 chasseurs  
* 
 
24 DI      General du Garreau de la Méchenie 
 
 47 Brigade   Colonel Descoings 
   50 RI   
   108 RI   
 48 Brigade   General Sorin 
   100 RI   
   126 RI   
 A.D.24: 34 RAC  
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 6° escadron, 21 chasseurs  
 
* 
 
5 Colonial Brigade    General Goullet 
 
    21 RIC Colonel Aubé 
    23 RIC Colonel Nèple 
    3 RACC 
    3 Chasseurs d’Afrique 
 
* * * 
 
Germany 
 
21 RID     Generalleutnant von Rampacher 
 
 41 Reserve Infantry Brigade  Generalleutnant von Mey 
     80 RIR 
     87 RIR* [no mgs] 
 
 42 Reserve Infantry Brigade  Generalleutnant von Quidtman 
     81 RIR* [no mgs] 
     88 RIR 
 
 21 Reserve Artillery Regiment 
 
 7 Reserve Dragoon Regiment 
 
25 RID     Generalleutnant Torgany 
 
 49 Reserve Infantry Brigade  Oberst von Helldorf 
     116 RIR 
     118 RIR*[no mgs] 
 
 50 Reserve Infantry Brigade  Oberst von Bassewitz 
     168 IR (active unit) 
     83 RIR 
 
 25 Reserve Field Artillery Brigade 
 
 4 Reserve Dragoon Regiment 
 
* * * 
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Maissin-Anloy 
 
France 
 
11 CA     General Eydoux 
 
Corps troops: 293 RI, 337 RI, 28 RAC, 2 Chasseurs 
 
 
 21 DI    General Radiguet 
  41 Brigade  Colonel de Teyssière 
    64 RI 
    65 RI 
  42 Brigade  Colonel Laméy 
    93 RI 
    137 RI 
  A.D.21  Colonel Morizot 
    51 RAC 
 
  5 squadron, 2 Chasseurs   
 
* 
 
 22 DI     General Pambert 
43 Brigade   General Duroisel 
    62 RI 
    116 RI 
  44 Brigade    General Chaplain 
    19 RI 
    118 RI 
  A.D.22   Colonel Ely 
    35 RAC 
 
  6 squadron, 2 Chasseurs 
 
 
* 
 
17 CA (elements)    General Poline 
 
 34 DI     General Alby 
  67 Brigade   General Dupuis 
    14 RI 
    83 RI 
  68 Brigade   General Berteaux 
    59 RI 
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    88 RI 
  A.D.34   Colonel Delmotte 
    23 RAC 
 
  6 squadron, 9 Chasseurs 
 
* * * 
 
 
Germany 
 
 25 ID     General Kühne 
  49 Brigade   Generalmajor von Uthmann 
    115 Leib Guard IR 
    116 IR 
      
  50 Brigade   Generalmajor Freiherr von Spesshardt 
    117 Leib IR 
    118 IR 
 
  25 Field Artillery Brigade 
    25 FAR 
    61 FAR 
 
   6 Dragoon Regiment 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
 
C: Other Battles 
Bertrix 
 
France 
 
33 DI     General de Villemejane 
 
 65 Brigade   Colonel Huc 
   7 RI 
   9 RI 
 66 Brigade   General Fraisse 
   11 RI 
   20 RI 
 
 A.D.33   Colonel Paloque 
   18 RAC 
 
 5 squadron, 9 Chasseurs 
 
* * * 
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Germany 
 
21 ID     Generalmajor von Oven 
 
 41 Brigade   Generalmajor von Esch 
   87 IR 
   88 IR 
 42 Brigade   Generalmajor von Elster 
   80 Füs.R 
   81 IR 
 
 21 Feldartillerie Brigade Generalmajor von Scherbening 
   27 FAR 
   63 FAR 
 
(attached corps troops)    
   Fussartillerie I/3 
   Feld–Flieger Abteilung 27 
 
* * * 
 
 
Rossignol 
 
France 
 
CAC     General Lefèvre 
 
Corps troops (excluding  5 Colonial Brigade): 3 RACC, 3 Chasseurs d’Afrique 
 
2 DIC     General Leblois 
 
 4 Colonial Brigade  General Boudonnet 
   4 RIC 
   8 RIC 
 6 Colonial Brigade  General Caudrelier 
   22 RIC 
   24 RIC 
 1 RACC 
 
 5 squadron, 6 Dragoons 
* 
 
3 DIC     General Raffenel 
     Commandant Moreau 
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 1 Colonial Brigade  General Montignault 
   1 RIC 
   2 RIC 
 3 Colonial Brigade  General Rondony 
   3 RIC 
   7 RIC 
 2 RACC 
 
 6 squadron, 6 Dragoons 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
Germany 
 
6 AK     General von Pritzelwitz 
 
Corps troops: Fussartillerie III/6. Feld–Flieger Abtl. 13 
 
11 ID     Generalleutnant von Webern 
 
 21 Brigade   Generalmajor von Drabich–Waechter 
   10 Gren. R. 
   38 IR 
 22 Brigade   Oberst Sendel 
   11 Gren. R. 
   51 IR 
 
 12 Feldartillerie Brigade Generalmajor von Bischoffshausen 
   6 FAR 
   42 FAR 
 
 11 Jaeger zu pferd 
* 
 
12 ID     Generalleutnant de Beaulieu 
 
 24 Brigade   Generalmajor von der Hende 
   23 IR 
   62 IR 
 78 Brigade   Generalmajor Vollbrecht 
   63 IR 
   157 IR 
 
 12 Feldartillerie Brigade Generalmajor Zietlow 
   21 FAR 
   57 FAR 
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 2 Uhlans 
 
* * * * * * *  
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